CourtListener 10680437

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321 Ga. 627
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S25A0058. SIMS v. THE STATE.
S25A0150. GLOVER v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

Colton Jerrod Sims and Monte Glover were convicted of malice

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

DeCoby Barlow and the contemporaneous aggravated assault of

Landon Brown.1 Both Sims and Glover challenge the sufficiency of

1 The crimes occurred on December 8 to 9, 2018. In February 2019, a

Henry County grand jury indicted Sims, Glover, and co-defendant Jalon
Edwards for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 5 and 6), and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 9
and 10). Sims was separately indicted for felony murder predicated on
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3) and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7); Glover was separately indicted for the
same crimes (Counts 4 and 8). Sims, Glover, and Edwards were tried together
before a jury in January and February 2020 and were found guilty on all
counts. Edwards’ case is not part of this appeal. The trial court sentenced Sims
and Glover to serve life in prison on Count 1, twenty years concurrent on Count
6, five years consecutive on their respective felon-in-possession counts, and five
years consecutive on Count 9. The remaining counts merged or were vacated
by operation of law.
Sims and Glover separately filed timely motions for new trial, which
were amended. Following evidentiary hearings, the trial court entered orders
denying Sims’ and Glover’s motions, as amended, on November 22, 2023, and
July 28, 2023, respectively. Sims and Glover then filed timely notices of appeal,
the evidence supporting their convictions. Additionally, Sims raises

four claims of trial court error, and both Sims and Glover assert that

their trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in various

respects. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence at trial showed the following. On the evening of December

8, 2018, Sims and his friend Colby Toles got into a dispute with

Glover and co-defendant Jalon Edwards at a nightclub. During the

ensuing scuffle between Toles and Edwards, Edwards brandished a

firearm, and the dispute moved outside. The group and several

patrons, including Barlow, likewise exited the building.

A witness, Chris Jackson, testified that he saw Sims, whom he

knew, fire several shots in the air near the club at the corner of the

building and that he thought Sims was “taking up” for Toles.

Jackson then heard shots being fired by another person.

Security guards outside the club observed Glover retrieve a

and their cases were docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2
firearm from his vehicle and then heard shots ring out from different

directions outside the club. Brown, one of the security guards, saw

several people with firearms, heard shots fired toward him and the

other security guards at the front of the club, and heard shots

returned between the front of the club and the adjacent building.

While fleeing the barrage of shots, Barlow was struck in the

crossfire, sustaining a fatal gunshot wound to his back.

During the investigation into the crimes, ballistics evidence

confirmed that shots were fired between the two locations. Police

ultimately recovered a Glock handgun belonging to Edwards, which

was determined to have fired the bullet that killed Barlow. A

detective obtained surveillance video showing the crimes, which was

played for the jury at trial, and which the detective testified showed

Edwards and Glover firing weapons. The jury also heard testimony

that one of the security guards, who was present during the crimes

and who knew Glover, reviewed the security footage of the incident

and observed Glover fire his weapon.

2. Sims and Glover first challenge the sufficiency of the

3
evidence supporting their convictions as a matter of constitutional

due process. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a

matter of constitutional due process, the proper standard of review

is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was

convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt

2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence in the

“light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s

assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Hayes v.

State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “The jury’s verdicts will be upheld as long as

some competent evidence, even if contradicted, supports each fact

necessary to make out the State’s case.” Garcia-Solis v. State, 320

Ga. 754, 760 (1) (911 SE2d 673) (2025) (citation and punctuation

omitted). With these principles in mind, we address the appellants’

contentions in turn.

(a) Sims argues that the evidence against him was insufficient

to support his convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault,

4
and felon-in-possession because, he says, the evidence did not

support a finding that he was a party to the crimes.2 To that end, he

points to the “undisputed” fact that he did not fire the fatal shot and

evidence that he was unacquainted with his co-defendants. Sims

further complains that only one witness testified that he fired a

weapon, that the State failed to produce physical or video evidence

connecting him to the crime, and that the evidence against him was

circumstantial and inconsistent. We are not persuaded.

Sims was charged individually and as a party to the crimes.

OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) provides that “[e]very person concerned in the

commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with

and convicted of commission of the crime.” “Conviction as a party to

a crime requires proof of a common criminal intent, which the jury

may infer from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and

2 Though Sims purports to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on

all the charges of which he was found guilty, we confine our analysis to those
crimes for which Sims was actually sentenced. See Milton v. State, 318 Ga. 737,
742 (2) n.5 (900 SE2d 590) (2024) (because appellant was not sentenced for
charges that were vacated or merged, sufficiency claims related to those crimes
were moot).

5
conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the

crimes.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 427 (2) (883 SE2d 317) (2023).

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury

could find that Sims was guilty of the crimes of which he was

convicted, at least as a party to the crimes.

As an initial matter, Sims’ complaints about the circumstantial

nature of the evidence3 and inconsistencies in the evidence do not

mean that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional

due process. See Anglin v. State, 312 Ga. 503, 506-507 (1) (863 SE2d

148) (2021) (“The fact that the evidence of guilt was circumstantial

3 In his appellate brief, Sims makes no specific argument that the
evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of Georgia statutory law. To the
extent Sims’ reference to the circumstantial nature of the evidence against him
is intended to raise a sufficiency challenge under Georgia statutory law, see
OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the
proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall
exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
accused.”) OCGA § 24-14-6 is inapplicable here because the State also
presented direct evidence of Sims’ guilt in the form of eyewitness testimony.
See Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142, 144 (1) (897 SE2d 428) (2024) (“[I]f there is
any direct evidence presented by the State, the circumstantial evidence statute
does not apply in a sufficiency analysis.” (citation and punctuation omitted));
Gittens v. State, 307 Ga. 841, 843 (1) n.2 (838 SE2d 888) (2020) (“Eyewitness
testimony based on the witness’s firsthand observations of the crime is direct,
not circumstantial, evidence.”).

6
does not render it insufficient.” (citation and punctuation omitted));

Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 199, 200 (695 SE2d 246) (2010) (“It was

for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to

resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation

and punctuation omitted)).

Here, eyewitness testimony established that the crimes arose

from Toles and Sims’ dispute with Glover and Edwards and that,

during the resulting exchange of gunfire between the men, Barlow

sustained a fatal gunshot wound and shots were fired toward Brown.

An eyewitness who knew Sims testified that he saw Sims fire several

shots in the air near the club and that he thought Sims was “taking

up” for Toles. We have held that participating in a gunfight in a

crowded area is enough to support a conviction for malice murder as

a party to the crime. See Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 821 (1) (809

SE2d 727) (2018); Coe v. State, 293 Ga. 233, 235 (1) (748 SE2d 824)

(2013) (evidence that defendant and intended victim engaged in

gunfight that ultimately resulted in death of bystander was

sufficient to support conviction for malice murder). And regardless

7
of who inflicted the fatal shot, evidence that Sims armed himself

with and subsequently discharged his weapon during his dispute

with Glover and Edwards authorized a rational jury to infer that

Sims “shared a common criminal intent with [his co-defendants] to

engage in a gunfight in the presence of innocent bystanders.”

Blackwell, 302 Ga. at 821 (1) (where appellant participated in a

gunfight in a crowded parking lot, a rational trier of fact could find

he was a party to malice murder even though he did not fire the fatal

shot). See also Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 658 (1) (a) (740 SE2d 590)

(2013) (evidence sufficient for aggravated assault conviction where

rational jury could have inferred that defendant and co-conspirator,

who discharged a firearm, striking an innocent bystander, shared a

common intent to engage in a gunfight in the presence of innocent

bystanders).

That only one eyewitness testified to seeing Sims possess and

fire a weapon is of no moment. See OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The testimony

of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.”). Nor

was the State required to produce evidence besides the eyewitness

8
testimony showing that Sims possessed and fired a weapon —

whether physical, video, or otherwise — “because the testimony of a

single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the lack

of corroboration with physical evidence only goes to the weight of the

evidence and the credibility of the testifying witness, which is solely

within the purview of the jury.” Denson v. State, 307 Ga. 545, 547

(1) (837 SE2d 261) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). See

also Grant v. State, 319 Ga. 490, 494 (2) (a) (904 SE2d 338) (2024)

(“[T]he fact that the State did not produce certain types of evidence

does not mean that the evidence was insufficient.”). As such, the

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Sims’

convictions as a party to the crime as a matter of constitutional due

process, and Sims’ sufficiency claim fails.

(b) Glover, for his part, challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his conviction for malice murder4 by arguing

4 Because Glover’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence

focuses exclusively on his murder conviction, we have limited our analysis
accordingly. See Morrell v. State, 318 Ga. 244, 246 (1) n.3 (897 SE2d 841)
(2024).

9
that the “only” evidence connecting him to the shooting was the

testimony of an investigating detective who identified Glover as one

of the shooters shown on the surveillance video, and he complains

that the detective’s testimony should have been excluded.5 This

argument is unavailing.

Whether the detective’s testimony was properly admitted is

irrelevant to a sufficiency analysis. As we have explained, “[w]hen

we consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 . . . , we consider all of the evidence presented

at trial, without regard to whether some of that evidence might have

been improperly admitted.” Welbon v. State, 301 Ga. 106, 107 (1) n.2

(799 SE2d 793) (2017). See also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U. S. 120,

131 (III) (130 SCt 665, 175 LE2d 582) (2010) (When assessing

whether evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support a

conviction, “a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence

admitted by the trial court, regardless of whether that evidence was

5 Glover does not separately enumerate as error the admission of this

testimony or provide authority in support of his conclusory assertion that it
should have been excluded.

10
admitted erroneously.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Moreover, contrary to Glover’s assertion, the detective’s testimony

was not the only evidence of his guilt. As noted above, two security

guards who knew Glover testified that they saw him run to a car in

front of the club and retrieve a gun, and one of the guards testified

that Glover was one of the shooters visible in security footage of the

incident. Though Glover attempts to discount this evidence by

casting doubt on the credibility of the guards and the weight owed

their testimony, those were issues for the jury to resolve, and “[t]he

jury’s resolution of these issues adversely to the defendant does not

render the evidence insufficient.” Tyler v. State, 311 Ga. 727, 730 (2)

(859 SE2d 73) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Instead,

viewed in the appropriate light, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process for a rational

trier of fact to find Glover guilty of malice murder. See Coe, 293 Ga.

at 235 (1).

3. Sims raises four claims of trial court error. As explained

below, we conclude that Sims waived appellate review of one claim

11
by acquiescence and abandoned two other claims for failure to cite

any authority or engage in legal analysis. Sims’ third claim of error

fails on the merits.

(a) Sims first argues that the trial court erred by refusing a

juror’s request to be excused from jury service based on concern for

her and her family’s safety or, alternatively, by denying the State’s

request to instruct the juror not to discuss her concerns with other

jurors. But in the trial court, Sims did not object to the trial court’s

refusal either to excuse the juror or to instruct her not to speak to

other jurors about her concerns, as requested by the State. In fact,

Sims expressly indicated that he did not believe it was necessary to

excuse the juror. It is axiomatic that “[n]o matter how erroneous a

ruling of a trial court might be, a litigant cannot submit to a ruling

or acquiesce in the holding, and then complain of the same on

appeal.” Compton v. State, 281 Ga. 45, 46 (2) (635 SE2d 766) (2006).

As such, Sims has waived appellate review of this claim.6

6 Further, plain error review does not apply to this claim of error. See

Williams v. State, 291 Ga. 501, 505 (2) (732 SE2d 47) (2012).

12
(b) In two separate additional enumerations of error, Sims

argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objections to

testimony by an investigating detective. However, Sims has failed

to cite any authority or engage in legal analysis in support of those

claims. Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) states that in all briefs filed in

cases other than death-penalty matters, “[a]ny enumerated error or

subpart of an enumerated error not supported by argument,

citations to authority, and citations to the record shall be deemed

abandoned.” And as we recently explained, to avoid having an

enumeration of error deemed abandoned, litigants must “ensure

that argument, citation to authority, and citation to the record are

all present” with respect to each and every error enumerated in their

briefs. Byrd v. State, 321 Ga. 222, 225 (2) (913 SE2d 667) (2025)

(emphasis supplied). By omitting citation of authority and legal

analysis, Sims has failed to comply with Rule 22, and we conclude

that he has abandoned these claims of error. See id.

appellate review, Sims argues that the trial court erred by

13
sustaining the State’s hearsay objection during his cross-

examination of a detective, specifically, when Sims asked the

detective if he had learned that another person, whom Sims

identified by name, was investigated as a possible shooter. But even

assuming that the trial court erred by sustaining the objection, we

conclude that any error was harmless, particularly in light of Sims’

failure to show, or even argue, how the exclusion of this testimony

harmed him. See Kitchens v. State, 310 Ga. 698, 702 (2) (854 SE2d

518) (2021) (“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless

error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not

contribute to the verdict.”).

Here, the primary import of the excluded testimony was to

show that the investigation into the crimes was flawed and that

police failed to consider other viable suspects. But the jury heard

ample testimony supporting that aspect of Sims’ defense theory.

Indeed, the record shows that Sims was not foreclosed from pursuing

a line of inquiry about other potential perpetrators and, in fact,

elicited additional testimony from the detective about another

14
possible shooter who was “not seated at the defense table.” Sims also

elicited testimony without objection regarding the investigation into

a different potential shooter, whom he also identified by name. In

light of the specific evidence presented in support of Sims’ theory,

testimony identifying a specific person as an alternative suspect

“was essentially cumulative, and it is highly unlikely that such

additional evidence would have had any effect on the verdict.” Cook

v. State, 312 Ga. 299, 302 (2) (862 SE2d 510) (2021) (any error in

excluding testimony about acts of violence committed by victim

against third parties that was intended to show appellant had

reason to fear victim was harmless because other evidence

established that victim had reputation for violence, was known to

carry a gun, and previously assaulted appellant and, thus, excluded

testimony was “essentially cumulative”); Walker v. State, 306 Ga.

44, 47 (2) (829 SE2d 121) (2019) (any error in excluding testimony

of appellant’s sister that appellant said victim tried to kill him was

cumulative and harmless because appellant testified that he acted

in self-defense and responding officer testified that appellant

15
claimed victim had shot him). As such, this claim fails.

4. Finally, Sims and Glover argue that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance in numerous ways. To establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s

performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered

prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668,

687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove deficiency, he

must show that his lawyer “performed his duties in an objectively

unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light

of prevailing professional norms,” which is “no easy showing, as the

law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed

reasonably.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (2) (787 SE2d 221)

(2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). To show prejudice, a

defendant must show “that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been

different.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132)

(2022). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694

16
(III) (B). If a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on one part

of the Strickland test, we need not address the other part. See

Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3).

(a) Sims first contends that his counsel performed deficiently

by failing to object when Jackson testified that he thought Sims “was

“taking up” for Toles, asserting that Jackson’s testimony was based

on speculation. We disagree.

Under OCGA § 24-6-602, a witness generally cannot testify

about a matter “unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support

a finding that the witness has personal knowledge” of the matter.

That evidence “may, but need not, consist of the witness’s own

testimony.” Under that rule, “witnesses may testify about events

they personally observed.” Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 385 (4)

(858 SE2d 8) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). And a lay

witness may testify in the form of opinions which are “[r]ationally

based on the perception of the witness[.]” OCGA § 24-7-701 (a) (1).

Here, Jackson’s testimony that he saw Sims shooting and

believed that Sims was “taking up” for Toles was based on his

17
personal observation of the two at the club prior to the shooting, and

his opinion that Sims was “taking up” for Toles was rationally based

on his observations of the group and the altercation inside the club.

His testimony in this regard was thus properly admitted, and any

objection would have been meritless. See Favors v. State, 296 Ga.

842, 845-846 (3) (770 SE2d 855) (2015). And because trial counsel

does not perform deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection,

this enumeration fails. See Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3) (a)

(689 SE2d 280) (2010) (failure to make a meritless objection cannot

be evidence of ineffective assistance).

(b) Sims next complains that trial counsel was deficient for

failing to question a detective further about the lack of investigation

into the third shooter and more thoroughly present that theory of

defense to the jury. But “decisions about what questions to ask on

cross-examination are quintessential trial strategy and will rarely

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Pritchett v. State, 314

Ga. 767, 786 (3) (b) (879 SE2d 436) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). The record shows that counsel questioned the detective

18
about a possible third shooter and argued to the jury during closing

that investigators failed to adequately pursue and investigate this

theory of the crime. Sims’ vague assertions that counsel should have

asked more or different questions about a third shooter is

insufficient to carry his burden of showing that counsel’s cross-

examination of the detective fell outside the “wide range of

reasonable professional conduct.” Id.; Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634,

642 (2) (d) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (“Decisions about cross-

examination do not amount to deficient performance unless they are

so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made them

under similar circumstances.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

For this reason, this claim fails.

excuse the juror who expressed concern for her and her family’s

safety, or, at a minimum, requested further inquiry into that juror’s

letter to the court. “[J]uror selection is a matter of trial tactics and

strategy,” and “a decision implicating trial tactics and strategy can

serve as the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if it is so patently

19
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made such a

decision.” Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6, 12-13 (2) (e) (792 SE2d 665)

(2016). At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified that he

did not think the alternate jurors would be favorable to the defense

and that he was “more afraid of the alternate” than he was of the

juror at issue here. Counsel also noted that, despite her safety

concerns, the juror indicated that she could remain impartial and,

for that reason, he did not think a motion to excuse her from service

would succeed. Though counsel expressed some regret at the motion

for new trial hearing for his decision not to pursue the matter

further, “trial counsel’s decisions relating to strategy and tactics are

not judged by hindsight.” Byrd, 321 Ga. at 230 (4) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Sims has not established that, under the facts

of this case, counsel’s assessment was so patently unreasonable that

no competent attorney would have done the same, and his claim of

ineffective assistance fails. See Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 1, 4-5 (2) (a)

(880 SE2d 201) (2022) (trial counsel did not perform deficiently by

failing to further address alleged juror misconduct where reasonable

20
efforts were made to address the issue).

(d) Sims argues that trial counsel should not have withdrawn

his request for jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and

involuntary manslaughter. This claim, like the others, fails.

“A request to charge must be legal, apt, and precisely adjusted

to some principle involved in the case and be authorized by the

evidence.” Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 445 (2) (841 SE2d 696)

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). And “[t]o justify an

instruction for voluntary manslaughter, Appellant must show that

the killing occurred ‘solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and

irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to

excite such passion in a reasonable person.’” Hayes v. State, 320 Ga.

505, 520 (6) (910 SE2d 198) (2024) (quoting OCGA § 16-5-2 (a)). At

the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel explained that he

withdrew his request for the instruction based on his determination

that the voluntary manslaughter charge was not adjusted to the

facts of the case, and the facts of this case appear to support that

conclusion. See Annunziata v. State, 317 Ga. 175, 179 (891 SE2d

21
814) (2023) (“Even a physical confrontation between two individuals

does not necessarily provide the slight evidence necessary to require

a voluntary manslaughter charge.”). Indeed, Sims points to no

evidence in the record supporting his assertion that such a charge

was warranted under the facts of this case. Sims therefore has not

shown that trial counsel’s assessment that the evidence did not

support a voluntary manslaughter instruction was unreasonable

and, as such, has not shown that counsel performed deficiently by

withdrawing his request for the instruction. See Vann v. State, 311

Ga. 301, 304-305 (2) (857 SE2d 677) (2021) (no deficient performance

where “[a] competent attorney could have assessed that a voluntary

manslaughter defense was either unavailable or weak”).

Trial counsel likewise did not perform deficiently by

withdrawing the instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Under

OCGA § 16-5-3 (a), “[a] person commits the offense of involuntary

manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes

the death of another human being without any intention to do so by

the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.” (Emphasis

22
supplied.) To warrant a charge on involuntary manslaughter, “the

unlawful act underlying the unintentional death of the victim must

be an act other than a felony.” Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 428 (3)

(811 SE2d 392) (2018). Under the facts of this case, Sims’ acts of

possessing and discharging a firearm in the presence of innocent

bystanders constituted felonies, including aggravated assault and

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (b)

and 16-11-131 (b), and Sims makes no effort to argue otherwise.

Accordingly, an involuntary manslaughter instruction was not

adjusted to the evidence in this case, and counsel did not perform

deficiently by withdrawing his request for such an instruction. See

Johnson v. State, 295 Ga. 615, 619-620 (3) (b) (759 SE2d 837) (2014);

Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 364 (3) (882 SE2d 289) (2022).

(e) Lastly, Glover argues that trial counsel performed

deficiently by failing to meet or speak with him before trial.7 The

23
record belies this contention.

At the hearing on Glover’s motion for new trial, trial counsel

testified that he spoke with Glover about possible defenses and

witnesses before trial and met with him at the jail at least once.

Though Glover offered his own testimony to the contrary, the trial

court, in rejecting this claim below, explicitly credited counsel’s

testimony over Glover’s. “The trial court was authorized to credit the

testimony of [appellant’s] counsel, and its factual findings and

credibility determinations will be accepted unless clearly

erroneous.” Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 270, 272 (695 SE2d 271) (2010)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Because neither Glover nor our

own review of the record reveals any such error, Glover has failed to

meet his burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance was

deficient, and this claim fails.8 See id.

on it. As such, this claim is waived. See King v. State, 304 Ga. 349, 351 (2) (818
SE2d 612) (2018) (“Where the issue of trial counsel’s effectiveness has been
raised on motion for new trial, any claims of ineffective assistance by trial
counsel not raised at that time are waived.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
8 Because Glover has failed to show any deficiency, we need not address

24
Judgments affirmed. Peterson, C. J., Warren, P. J., and
Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ., concur.

Decided May 28, 2025.

Murder. Henry Superior Court. Before Judge Amero.

J. Scott Key, Kayci N. Timmons, for appellant (case no.

S25A0058).

Manning Peace, Holly Y. Peace, for appellant (case no.

S25A0150).

Darius Pattillo, District Attorney, Sharon L. Hopkins, Assistant

District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,

Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Eric C. Peters, M. Catherine

Norman, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

his argument that new witness testimony presented at the hearing on the
motion for new trial established prejudice. See Jones, 287 Ga. at 272. And
Glover has not argued that the failure to call this witness at trial was otherwise
deficient performance.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 28, 2025

S25A0058. SIMS v. THE STATE.
S25A0150. GLOVER v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

Colton Jerrod Sims and Monte Glover were convicted of malice

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

DeCoby Barlow and the contemporaneous aggravated assault of

Landon Brown.1 Both Sims and Glover challenge the sufficiency of

1 The crimes occurred on December 8 to 9, 2018. In February 2019, a

Henry County grand jury indicted Sims, Glover, and co-defendant Jalon
Edwards for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 5 and 6), and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 9
and 10). Sims was separately indicted for felony murder predicated on
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3) and felon-in-possession
(Count 7); Glover was separately indicted for the same crimes (Counts 4 and
8). Sims, Glover, and Edwards were tried together before a jury in January and
February 2020 and were found guilty on all counts. Edwards’ case is not part
of this appeal. The trial court sentenced Sims and Glover to serve life in prison
on Count 1, twenty years concurrent on Count 6, five years consecutive on their
respective felon-in-possession counts, and five years consecutive on Count 9.
The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
the evidence supporting their convictions. Additionally, Sims raises

four claims of trial court error, and both Sims and Glover assert that

their trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in various

respects. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence at trial showed the following. On the evening of December

8, 2018, Sims and his friend Colby Toles got into a dispute with

Glover and co-defendant Jalon Edwards at a nightclub. During the

ensuing scuffle between Toles and Edwards, Edwards brandished a

firearm, and the dispute moved outside. The group and several

patrons, including Barlow, likewise exited the building.

A witness, Chris Jackson, testified that he saw Sims, whom he

knew, fire several shots in the air near the club at the corner of the

building and that he thought Sims was “taking up” for Toles.

Sims and Glover separately filed timely motions for new trial, which
were amended. Following evidentiary hearings, the trial court entered orders
denying Sims’ and Glover’s motions, as amended, on November 22, 2023, and
July 28, 2023, respectively. Sims and Glover then filed timely notices of appeal,
and their cases were docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2
Jackson then heard shots being fired by another person.

Security guards outside the club observed Glover retrieve a

firearm from his vehicle and then heard shots ring out from different