CourtListener 10680339

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 14, 2024

S24A0405. ANDERSON v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Clark Chandler Anderson shot and killed Kevin Murr. At trial,

Anderson argued the killing was voluntary manslaughter, not

murder, because he shot Murr after being seriously provoked, but

the jury found Anderson guilty of malice murder. On appeal,

Anderson contends that insufficient evidence supported his

convictions, that the trial court should have given Anderson’s

requested jury instruction about voluntary manslaughter, and that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to three pieces of

testimony from his coworkers that, in Anderson’s view, were

inadmissible character evidence.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support

Anderson’s conviction for malice murder because it showed that he
intentionally shot Murr 16 times. We further conclude that no jury

instruction about voluntary manslaughter was required because the

provocation that Anderson claims—Murr yelling and cursing at him

and threatening to get a gun—was not enough to excite the “sudden,

violent, and irresistible passion” that could warrant a jury

instruction on voluntary manslaughter. And counsel was not

ineffective for failing to object to the coworkers’ testimony: counsel

wanted the jury to hear some of the testimony because it would serve

counsel’s strategy of trying to evoke the jury’s sympathy, and

Anderson suffered no prejudice from the remaining testimony. So

we affirm Anderson’s convictions.

1. Anderson was convicted of malice murder and other crimes

in connection with the shooting death of Murr. 1 The evidence at trial

1 The shooting occurred on June 7, 2020. On October 28, 2020, a Paulding

2
showed the following.

Anderson lived with his mother, Carol, and Carol’s fiancé,

Murr. Carol and Murr had been together for nine and a half years,

and Carol and Anderson had moved in with Murr about a year before

the shooting. Carol described Anderson and Murr’s relationship as

“generally good,” although she acknowledged that Anderson “was a

little distrustful” and that the two “were both a little back and forth

sometimes.”

Anderson and Murr’s relationship grew more fraught a few

months before the shooting. Starting around that time, Anderson

described Murr to coworkers as an “evil piece of s**t” and said he

hated Murr and wanted to kill him. In Anderson’s text messages to

a coworker from about three months before the shooting, which were

read to the jury, Anderson said he would probably kill Murr “and

remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Anderson filed
a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel.
After a hearing and supplemental briefing, the trial court denied the motion
for new trial, as amended, on October 23, 2023. Anderson filed a timely notice
of appeal. His case was docketed to the term of Court beginning in December
2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
3
shoot it out with the cops,” and that killing Murr would be “easier

than killing [an] ISIS or Taliban solider.”

On the morning of the shooting, Anderson left the house early

to go to work. Murr and Carol stayed home all day. When Anderson

returned home in the evening, he said he was tired and went to his

room.

A little later, Murr angrily went to Anderson’s closed bedroom

door. He began “banging on the door,” “screaming,” and “yelling” at

Anderson to come out and take a shower. Anderson—who had not

showered for “upwards to about a month”—responded repeatedly

that he would do it in the morning. During this commotion, Carol

came out from the main bedroom into the hallway to see what the

trouble was. Murr told her to “get the F back in there,” but Carol

remained in the hall.

Suddenly things grew “eerily quiet.” Carol and Murr heard a

clicking from inside Anderson’s room, which they recognized as the

sound of his gun. Ordinarily Carol and Murr would “roll [their] eyes”

when they heard that clicking sound, because they knew Anderson

4
was just playing with the gun. But this time it “felt different . . .

because of the yelling” that had just happened.

Shots rang out. Murr was hit through the closed door. Other

bullets hit the wall near where Carol was standing. Murr screamed

out, “GD you hit me,” and ran towards the kitchen. Carol followed.

Anderson emerged from his room and, in his own words, “kept

shooting” at Murr until his gun was empty—16 rounds in all. Murr

reached the kitchen and fell to the floor. He died soon after.

Murr had been hit five times in the chest and back. The bullets,

bullet holes, and spent shell casings found around his body

suggested that Anderson had fired some of those shots after Murr

was on the ground. Nevertheless, Carol testified that Anderson

performed CPR on Murr, to no avail, and that Anderson said, “Oh,

God, what have I done, what have I done, oh, F, what have I done .

. . mom, I’m sorry, mom, I’m sorry, God, I’m sorry.” Carol,

meanwhile, called 9-1-1.

Sheriff’s deputies arrived at the scene. The first responding

officer found Anderson and Carol on the front steps of the house.

5
Anderson’s hands were covered in blood. He told the officer he had

shot Murr multiple times with a handgun.

Police took Anderson to the sheriff’s office. There, Anderson

waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt

1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and gave a recorded statement, portions

of which were played for the jury. In the statement, Anderson

admitted that he shot Murr. He said repeatedly that he was not

angry at Murr and did not lose his temper, but rather feared for

himself and his mother because Murr had threatened to get his own

gun. According to Anderson, when Murr was pounding on the

bedroom door, Anderson “racked the slide [of his gun] as a

deterrent.” Despite that deterrent, Murr eventually broke through

the locked door. Anderson then pushed the door closed and shot

Murr through the closed door.

At least one part of Anderson’s statement was undercut by

other trial evidence. Although Anderson claimed that Murr had

broken through the locked bedroom door, an officer testified that the

door was undamaged—except for the bullet holes.

6
2. Anderson contends that the evidence at trial was not

sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his

conviction for malice murder. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “We evaluate a due

process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the

evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the

verdicts, and asking whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes

of which he was convicted.” Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 72 (2)

(891 SE2d 884) (2023). “We leave to the jury the resolution of

conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses,

and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.” Perkins v.

State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 185) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

Under that standard, the evidence at Anderson’s trial was

sufficient to sustain his malice murder conviction. A person is guilty

of malice murder if “he unlawfully and with malice aforethought,

either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.”

7
OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). At Anderson’s trial, it was undisputed that

Anderson shot Murr. Not only that, but he shot him multiple times,

pursued him to the kitchen, and continued firing until the gun was

empty. Although Anderson had told police that he shot Murr out of

fear, he never asserted an affirmative defense of justification, asked

for a jury instruction on self-defense, or otherwise claimed at trial

that he shot Murr in self-defense. To the contrary, the evidence

showed that in the months leading up to the shooting, Anderson had

told his colleagues that he hated Murr and fantasized about killing

him. Presented with that evidence and the evidence at trial and

recounted in part above, a reasonable jury could find beyond a

reasonable doubt Anderson killed Murr with malice aforethought.

See Neason v. State, 317 Ga. 695, 698-699 (895 SE2d 278) (2023)

(evidence sufficient to support malice murder conviction when

multiple witnesses saw defendant shoot victim and defendant had

motive to kill victim); Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 131 (2) (891

SE2d 849) (2023) (evidence sufficient to support malice murder

conviction when defendant stabbed victim 50 times and strangled

8
him, because defendant’s “brutal and excessive actions . . .

support[ed] the jury’s finding of the requisite malice and intent”).

Anderson contends on appeal that he “raised an affirmative

defense” that the killing was voluntary manslaughter, rather than

murder, because he “committed this crime out of a sudden, violent,

and irresistible passion,” and that the State failed to disprove that

defense beyond a reasonable doubt. But voluntary manslaughter is

a separate offense, not an affirmative defense to murder, so the

State was not required to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. See

OCGA §§ 16-3-20 to 16-3-28 (listing affirmative defenses); Wyman v.

State, 278 Ga. 339, 340-341 (3) (602 SE2d 619) (2004) (voluntary

manslaughter is not a defense to murder); cf. Clark v. State, 307 Ga.

537, 539-540 (1) (837 SE2d 265) (2019) (“When a defendant raises

an affirmative defense that is supported by some evidence, the State

has the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable

doubt.”). And as explained in Division 4, no evidence supported a

voluntary manslaughter conviction in any event.

3. Anderson also argues that this Court should reverse his

9
conviction under the “general grounds” in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-

21. Those Code sections allow a trial court, on a motion for new trial,

to reverse a conviction if the conviction is “contrary to evidence and

the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-20, or “decidedly

and strongly against the weight of the evidence,” OCGA § 5-5-21.

But when we determine that the trial court has exercised its

discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, we do not review the

merits of the general grounds on appeal. The decision whether to

reverse a conviction on the general grounds is left to the sole

discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 318 Ga. 105,

114 (2) (897 SE2d 396) (2024); King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2)

(889 SE2d 851) (2023); Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 456 (3) (883

SE2d 357) (2023); Bundel v. State, 308 Ga. 317, 318 (1) (840 SE2d

349) (2020); Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 843 (3) (828 SE2d 327)

(2019). Here, the trial court noted that it “ha[d] considered but

decline[d] to grant a new trial under the general grounds.” Absent

affirmative evidence to the contrary—and there is none here—we

presume that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in

10
denying a motion for new trial on the general grounds. 2 See, e.g.,

Ward v. State, 316 Ga. 295, 299 (3) (888 SE2d 75) (2023).

Separately, Anderson contends that his conviction should be

reversed under OCGA § 5-5-25, which allows a court to grant a new

trial “on other grounds not provided for in this Code” if the court

finds that relief is required “according to the provisions of the

common law and practice of the courts.” But Anderson does not point

to any “other grounds” or support his contention with argument or

explanation. “[T]his Court is not required to scour the record for

support for an appellant’s arguments,” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140,

144 (3) (829 SE2d 321) (2019), and we decline to do so here. So

Anderson’s claim on this ground also fails.

4. Anderson contends that the trial court erred by refusing to

2 In the past, when evaluating a trial court’s denial of a motion for new

trial on the general grounds, we have sometimes reviewed the sufficiency of
the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process under Jackson, 443 U.S.
307. See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 315 Ga. 467, 474 (3) (883 SE2d 351) (2023).
Many of us “question whether it is proper for this Court to import Jackson into
an appellate review of the general grounds.” King, 316 Ga. at 616 (2) n.8. But
we need not resolve that question here, because Anderson’s general-grounds
claim fails in any event: the trial court exercised its discretion to deny the
claim, and, as we explained above, the evidence was constitutionally sufficient
to affirm Anderson’s convictions. See id.
11
give his requested jury instruction about voluntary manslaughter.

Voluntary manslaughter is the killing of another person, “under

circumstances which would otherwise be murder,” where the

perpetrator “acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and

irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to

excite such passion in a reasonable person.” OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).

When a defendant requests a jury instruction on voluntary

manslaughter, as Anderson did here, the trial court must give the

instruction if there is “slight evidence” to support it—that is, if there

is slight evidence that the defendant, in killing the victim, acted

under a “serious provocation” that could excite a “sudden, violent,

and irresistible passion” in a reasonable person. See Mobley v. State,

314 Ga. 38, 42 (875 SE2d 655) (2022) (citations and punctuation

omitted). The existence, or not, of that “slight evidence” is a question

of law. See id. at 42-43. And when, as here, a defendant properly

preserves a claim that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct

the jury on an applicable principle of law, that claim is reviewed de

novo. See Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 581 (3) (b) (894 SE2d 27)

12
(2023).

The trial court here did not err in refusing to give a voluntary

manslaughter instruction because no evidence supported giving one.

Anderson contends that he was seriously provoked by Murr

pounding on the door, yelling and cursing at him, and threatening

to get a gun. But threats and insults on their own are not enough to

support a voluntary manslaughter instruction. See, e.g., Smith v.

State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (“[N]either fear

that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of

provocation which demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.”);

Rountree v. State, 316 Ga. 691, 694-695 (2) (889 SE2d 803) (2023)

(“threatening words and racial epithets” did not amount to serious

provocation, “no matter how menacing or offensive they were” to the

defendant); Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 446 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 696)

(2020) (voluntary manslaughter instruction not required where

victim used crude and insulting language toward defendant,

because “[t]here was no evidence whatsoever of provocation

sufficient to excite the passions of a reasonable person”). Here, the

13
evidence was that Murr yelled and cursed at Anderson, told him to

take a shower, and threatened to get his gun. Those threats and

insults, no matter how offensive to Anderson, did not subject him to

a provocation that would reduce his crime from murder to voluntary

manslaughter. See Smith, 296 Ga. at 737 (3). The trial court thus

did not err in declining to give the instruction. See Hudson, 308 Ga.

at 446 (2) (a).

Anderson also contends the trial court was required to give a

voluntary manslaughter instruction because it was his “sole

defense” at trial. See Price v. State, 289 Ga. 459, 459-460 (2) (712

SE2d 828) (2011) (“The trial court must charge the jury on the

defendant’s sole defense, even without a written request, if there is

some evidence to support the charge.”) (citation and punctuation

omitted). But voluntary manslaughter is a distinct offense, not a

defense to murder. See Wyman, 278 Ga. at 340-341 (3). And in any

event, as discussed above, no evidence supported the charge. See

Price, 289 Ga. at 459 (2).

5. Anderson contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective

14
assistance by failing to object to certain testimony from Anderson’s

coworkers. In Anderson’s view, that testimony was character

evidence that would have been excluded under OCGA §§ 24-4-404

(a) and 24-4-405 (a) had his counsel objected. See OCGA § 24-4-404

(a) (“[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character shall

not be admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity

therewith on a particular occasion,” subject to certain exceptions

that the State did not rely on here); OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) (requiring

that, whenever evidence of character is admissible, “proof shall be

made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of

an opinion”).

(a) Anderson identifies three pieces of testimony that he says

counsel should have tried to exclude. First, two of his coworkers

testified that he sometimes brought guns to work. Second, the same

two coworkers testified that Anderson falsely claimed to have served

in the military, with one recalling that Anderson said he suffered

15
from post-traumatic stress disorder.3 Finally, one coworker testified

that while she was giving Anderson a ride home from work a few

weeks before the murder, she asked if Anderson wanted to move

from the back seat of her car to the front seat, and he replied,

“[W]hat do you think I’m going to rape you or something?”

At the hearing on Anderson’s motion for a new trial, trial

counsel was asked why he did not try to exclude the coworkers’

testimony about Anderson bringing guns to work or lying about

military service. (He was not asked why he did not try to exclude the

testimony about Anderson’s comment about rape.) In response,

counsel explained how the coworkers’ testimony served his trial

strategy of trying to gain the jury’s sympathy. Counsel recalled that

Anderson, in a part of his recorded interview that the jury would

see, had talked about being too small in stature to join the police or

the military. Counsel said he played up that idea in his opening

3 The witnesses did not explicitly characterize Anderson’s claims about

military service as untrue, but it was (and is) undisputed that Anderson never
served. The State argued in closing that it was obviously untrue that Anderson
had ever served in the military, and pointed out that his mother testified that
he had never had another job.
16
statement to argue that Anderson’s small stature had prevented

him from achieving his goals and left him frustrated. In counsel’s

view, the challenged testimony from Anderson’s coworkers—that

Anderson lied about military service and displayed guns at work—

fit the same narrative. Counsel testified that he made a “strategic

decision to just let it all in and give the jury the full picture of what

was going on,” because Anderson’s “only real shot at anything” was

to generate sympathy from the jury.

(b) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052,

80 LE2d 674) (1984); Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873

SE2d 132) (2022). “If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of

proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does

not have to examine the other prong.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630,

647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d 346) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

To prove deficiency, a defendant “must show that his lawyer

17
performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 221 (2) (892 SE2d

744) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). This is “no easy

showing,” id. (citation and punctuation omitted), because the law

recognizes a “strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls

within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct,” Harper

v. State, 318 Ga. 185, 192 (1) (897 SE2d 818) (2024) (citation and

punctuation omitted). To overcome that presumption, the appellant

must show that “no reasonable lawyer would have done what his

lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.”

Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“In particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may

form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so

patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have

followed such a course.” Waters v. State, 317 Ga. 822, 829 (3) (b) (896

SE2d 507) (2023) (citation and punctuation).

To show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

18
performance, a defendant must show that, but for the deficiency,

there was a “reasonable probability” that the result of the trial

would have been different. See Waters, 317 Ga. at 829 (3) (b). “A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

With these standards in mind, we review in turn each piece of

testimony that Anderson contends his counsel should have tried to

exclude.

(i) Counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the

coworkers’ testimony about Anderson bringing guns to work and

lying about military service. Counsel testified that his strategy at

trial—indeed, his “only real shot at anything”—was to play on the

jury’s sympathy in the hope that the jury would find that Anderson

acted without malice. That strategy was reasonable under the

circumstances. See Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 496-497 (5) (422

SE2d 188) (1992) (strategy of trying to invoke the jury’s sympathy

is “within the range of professionally reasonable decisions”). Counsel

pursued his strategy by trying to give the jury “the full picture of

19
what was going on” with Anderson. For counsel, that meant

portraying Anderson as a man whose small stature prevented him

from joining the police or the military, and who may have

compensated for those frustrations by enacting fantasies of military

service around his coworkers. The coworkers’ testimony, especially

layered with Anderson’s own statements to police, helped complete

that “full picture.” So it was reasonable for counsel not to object to

it. See Jones v. State, 300 Ga. 543, 546 (2) (a) (796 SE2d 659) (2017)

(reasonable strategy not to object to evidence that “might be useful

to create sympathy for the [defendants] and convince a jury that

they did not act with malice”).

Because counsel’s decision not to object was part of a

reasonable trial strategy, it fell within the “broad range of

reasonable professional conduct.” See Harper, 318 Ga. at 192 (1);

Waters, 317 Ga. at 829 (3) (b); Jones, 300 Ga. at 546 (2) (a). The fact

that the strategy did not carry the day does not mean it was unsound

or that counsel’s performance was deficient. See Grissom v. State,

296 Ga. 406, 412 (4) (768 SE2d 494) (2015) (counsel’s strategic

20
decisions “must not be judged by hindsight or the ultimate result of

the trial”) (citation and punctuation omitted). So Anderson’s claim

of ineffectiveness on this ground fails.

(ii) We turn next to the coworker’s testimony about Anderson’s

comment about rape. Counsel was not asked why he did not object

to that testimony, so he never had a chance to explain (as he did

with the other challenged evidence) how it might fit into a trial

strategy. But even if no reasonable lawyer would have failed to

object to this testimony, its admission did not prejudice Anderson.

At trial, it was uncontested that Anderson shot Murr to death, that

he pursued him through the house while continuing to fire until the

gun was empty, and that he had talked about killing Murr for

months beforehand. Against that evidence, Anderson’s only defense

was that he was responding to Murr’s threats and insults. Given all

the jury heard about the brutality of the killing and about

Anderson’s animus toward Murr, there is not a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the trial was affected by testimony

that Anderson once made a comment about rape to a coworker,

21
however unseemly or offensive it may have been. See Talley v. State,

314 Ga. 153, 162-163 (3) (a) (875 SE2d 789) (2022) (defendant not

prejudiced when counsel did not object to testimony about a threat

defendant had made, because while the threat “might have reflected

negatively on” the defendant, it was “not particularly disparaging of

[his] character” when viewed in context and “given the strength of

the other admissible evidence against him”) (citation and

punctuation omitted); Gibbs v. State, 303 Ga. 681, 682-683 (1) (813

SE2d 393) (2018) (defendant not prejudiced when counsel did not

object to testimony that arguably placed defendant’s character in

issue, given strong evidence of defendant’s guilt). Because Anderson

cannot show he suffered prejudice from this testimony, his claim of

ineffectiveness on this ground fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

319 Ga. 56
FINAL COPY

S24A0405. ANDERSON v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Clark Chandler Anderson shot and killed Kevin Murr. At trial,

Anderson argued the killing was voluntary manslaughter, not

murder, because he shot Murr after being seriously provoked, but

the jury found Anderson guilty of malice murder. On appeal,

Anderson contends that insufficient evidence supported his

convictions, that the trial court should have given Anderson’s

requested jury instruction about voluntary manslaughter, and that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to three pieces of

testimony from his co-workers that, in Anderson’s view, were

inadmissible character evidence.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support

Anderson’s conviction for malice murder because it showed that he

intentionally shot Murr 16 times. We further conclude that no jury

instruction about voluntary manslaughter was required because the
provocation that Anderson claims—Murr yelling and cursing at him

and threatening to get a gun—was not enough to excite the “sudden,

violent, and irresistible passion” that could warrant a jury

instruction on voluntary manslaughter. And counsel was not

ineffective for failing to object to the co-workers’ testimony: counsel

wanted the jury to hear some of the testimony because it would serve

counsel’s strategy of trying to evoke the jury’s sympathy, and

Anderson suffered no prejudice from the remaining testimony. So

we affirm Anderson’s convictions.

1. Anderson was convicted of malice murder and other crimes

in connection with the shooting death of Murr.1 The evidence at trial

1 The shooting occurred on June 7, 2020. On October 28, 2020, a Paulding

County grand jury indicted Anderson for malice murder, felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault of Murr, aggravated
assault of Carol Anderson, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony. He was tried by a jury from June 6 to 8, 2022. The jury found
Anderson not guilty of the aggravated assault of Carol Anderson but guilty of
the remaining charges. He was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for malice murder, with a consecutive term of five years in
prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The
remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Anderson filed
a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel.
After a hearing and supplemental briefing, the trial court denied the motion
for new trial, as amended, on October 23, 2023. Anderson filed a timely notice

2
showed the following.

Anderson lived with his mother, Carol, and Carol’s fiancé,

Murr. Carol and Murr had been together for nine and a half years,

and Carol and Anderson had moved in with Murr about a year before

the shooting. Carol described Anderson and Murr’s relationship as

“generally good,” although she acknowledged that Anderson “was a

little distrustful” and that the two “were both a little back and forth

sometimes.”

Anderson and Murr’s relationship grew more fraught a few

months before the shooting. Starting around that time, Anderson

described Murr to co-workers as an “evil piece of s**t” and said he

hated Murr and wanted to kill him. In Anderson’s text messages to

a co-worker from about three months before the shooting, which

were read to the jury, Anderson said he would probably kill Murr

“and shoot it out with the cops,” and that killing Murr would be

“easier than killing [an] ISIS or Taliban soldier.”

of appeal. His case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in
December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
3
On the morning of the shooting, Anderson left the house early

to go to work. Murr and Carol stayed home all day. When Anderson

returned home in the evening, he said he was tired and went to his

room.

A little later, Murr angrily went to Anderson’s closed bedroom

door. He began “banging on the door,” “screaming,” and “yelling” at

Anderson to come out and take a shower. Anderson—who had not

showered for “upwards to about a month”—responded repeatedly

that he would do it in the morning. During this commotion, Carol

came out from the main bedroom into the hallway to see what the

trouble was. Murr told her to “get the F back in there,” but Carol

remained in the hall.

Suddenly things grew “eerily quiet.” Carol and Murr heard a

clicking from inside Anderson’s room, which they recognized as the

sound of his gun. Ordinarily Carol and Murr would “roll [their] eyes”

when they heard that clicking sound, because they knew Anderson

was just playing with the gun. But this time it “felt different . . .

because of the yelling” that had just happened.

4
Shots rang out. Murr was hit through the closed door. Other

bullets hit the wall near where Carol was standing. Murr screamed

out, “GD you hit me,” and ran toward the kitchen. Carol followed.

Anderson emerged from his room and, in his own words, “kept

shooting” at Murr until his gun was empty—16 rounds in all. Murr

reached the kitchen and fell to the floor. He died soon after.

Murr had been hit five times in the chest and back. The bullets,

bullet holes, and spent shell casings found around his body

suggested that Anderson had fired some of those shots after Murr

was on the ground. Nevertheless, Carol testified that Anderson

performed CPR on Murr, to no avail, and that Anderson said, “Oh,

God, what have I done, what have I done, oh, F, what have I done .

. . mom, I’m sorry, mom, I’m sorry, God, I’m sorry.” Carol,

meanwhile, called 9-1-1.

Sheriff’s deputies arrived at the scene. The first responding

officer found Anderson and Carol on the front steps of the house.

Anderson’s hands were covered in blood. He told the officer he had

shot Murr multiple times with a handgun.

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Police took Anderson to the sheriff’s office. There, Anderson

waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt

1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and gave a recorded statement, portions

of which were played for the jury. In the statement, Anderson

admitted that he shot Murr. He said repeatedly that he was not

angry at Murr and did not lose his temper, but rather feared for

himself and his mother because Murr had threatened to get his own

gun. According to Anderson, when Murr was pounding on the

bedroom door, Anderson “racked the slide [of his gun] as a

deterrent.” Despite that deterrent, Murr eventually broke through

the locked door. Anderson then pushed the door closed and shot

Murr through the closed door.

At least one part of Anderson’s statement was undercut by

other trial evidence. Although Anderson claimed that Murr had

broken through the locked bedroom door, an officer testified that the

door was undamaged—except for the bullet holes.

2. Anderson contends that the evidence at trial was not

sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his

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conviction for malice murder. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,