CourtListener 10680322

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 29, 2024

S24A0521. TARVER v. STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Ricquavious Tarver was convicted of murder and other crimes

in connection with the shooting death of Roosevelt Demmons.1

Tarver argues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in excluding

evidence of Tarver’s knowledge of Demmons’s previous acts of

1 Demmons was killed on August 27, 2016, and Tarver was charged by

special presentment in McDuffie County in June 2017 for malice murder
(Count 1), felony murder predicated upon aggravated assault (Count 2),
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3), and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). He was tried before a jury
in September 2018 and found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced
Tarver to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole on Count 1, and five
years in prison to be served consecutively on Count 4. Count 2 was vacated by
operation of law and Count 3 was merged into Count 1. Tarver filed a timely
motion for new trial on October 2, 2018, which was amended by new counsel
on July 31, 2019, and amended a second time by current counsel on March 24,
2021. Following a hearing on June 28, 2021, the trial court denied the motion
as amended on November 27, 2023. Tarver filed a timely notice of appeal, and
the case was docketed to the April 2024 term of this Court. The Court heard
oral argument on the case on April 18, 2024.
violence to support his claim of self-defense and (2) the trial court

erred in excluding, on the grounds of hearsay, the video-recorded

interview of Tarver by police because the interview was not being

admitted for the truth of the matter asserted and should have been

admitted to show how cooperative Tarver was after the shooting. For

the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed 2 that Alton Tucker

owned a car wash business in Thomson in a former garage, and on

August 27, 2016, Tarver went there to wash his car. Tucker had

known Tarver and Tarver’s father, a police officer, for a long time

and considered them to be like family. Tucker’s 13-year-old son,

Shamar, was also at the car wash that day. Shamar and Tarver left

the car wash together to go to a store and then to Tarver’s parents’

house. After they left, Demmons came to the car wash to collect

money from Tucker for a set of tire rims Demmons was selling.

2 Because this case involves an analysis of whether errors in excluding

evidence were harmless, “we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence
as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done instead of viewing it in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863 (2)
(896 SE2d 516) (2023).
2
Tucker asked Demmons to wait because he was in the process of

washing a car for a customer, Cedric Williams. Williams knew

Demmons and asked if he wanted to walk to a nearby gas station to

get something to drink while they were waiting, and Demmons

agreed.

At some point, Tarver drove back by the car wash and saw

Demmons’s truck parked there. He then called Tucker and told him

that Demmons was the man he “got into it with a few months back”

and asked if he could come to the car wash to talk to Demmons “to

get this over with.” At trial, Tarver, who testified in his own defense,

explained that a few months earlier, in May or early June 2016,

Tarver and Demmons had a confrontation at an apartment complex

as they both sat in their vehicles with their windows open. Demmons

yelled, so that everyone around could hear, that Tarver was “a

police[, a n****r] and you just like your daddy.” Demmons accused

Tarver of calling the police and getting Demmons “locked up” in

connection with a prior incident. When Tarver told Demmons that

he had no idea what Demmons was talking about, Demmons replied,

3
“I tell you what, just don’t speak my name no more, just don’t talk

my name no more, the next time you speak my name I’m coming to

see about you.” Tarver testified that he had never had trouble with

Demmons before, and he had no further contact with Demmons

between that incident and August 27. However, based on

Demmons’s statement, Tarver thought that Demmons wanted “to

try to beat [him] up,” “to hurt [him],” or to “cause [him] harm.”

Tarver further testified that he applied for a permit to carry a

weapon on July 7, 2016, which he received on July 25, and that he

purchased a “.45 1911A Rock Island firearm” at some point between

his receipt of the permit and August 27. However, Tarver said that

there was nothing about the words Demmons used in the prior

incident that made him feel threatened enough to get his gun

permit; rather, he obtained the gun for his own protection and not

because of Demmons.

When Tarver arrived back at the car wash with Shamar on

August 27, Demmons and Williams had not yet returned from the

gas station. Tucker asked Tarver if everything was going to be all

4
right with Demmons, and Tarver responded, “yeah, I’m good.”

Tucker asked this question because Tarver had shown Tucker his

gun permit earlier in the day, and Tucker sought assurance from

Tarver that he was not carrying a weapon and was just intending to

talk to Demmons. Tarver testified at trial that he only wanted “to

make peace” with Demmons. However, he admitted that every time

he went anywhere, he “always tote[d]” his gun on his side, and, even

though Tarver usually carried his gun and ammunition separately,

that day, he put the ammunition clip in his gun when he got to the

car wash because he “knew [Demmons] was already there.”

Williams testified that as soon as he and Demmons got back to

the car wash from the gas station, Tarver came up to Demmons, and

when Tarver got close enough, “they went to arguing.” Tucker

testified that he was washing Williams’s car when Williams and

Demmons returned, and he did not pay much attention to what

Tarver and Demmons were saying. Both men were standing in one

of the two open garage bay doors within ten feet from where Tucker

was working, and Tucker overheard Demmons tell Tarver “to find

5
somebody to play with or I’ll give you something you don’t want.”

Tucker told police at the time of the incident that he also heard

Demmons tell Tarver, “Oh, I think I’m going to lay you out” and

something to the effect of “get out of my face.” Williams testified that

he was sitting in the other garage bay, about 15 feet away from

Tarver and Demmons. He heard Demmons say, “I know what you

did” and “don’t make me whoop your a** out here with these shower

shoes on,” after which Demmons turned and walked away.

Both Williams and Tucker testified that Demmons was

walking toward the back of the garage, and away from Tarver, when

they heard the first gunshot. They then observed Tarver walk

toward Demmons, who fell to the ground. After Demmons fell,

Tarver, as he later admitted, pointed the gun down at him and kept

shooting until he had emptied his clip of eight .45 caliber bullets.

Demmons was unarmed, and the only gun Williams or Tucker saw

that day was Tarver’s. No evidence was presented that any physical

interaction occurred between Tarver and Demmons before the

shooting began, and Tarver admitted that Demmons never punched,

6
pushed, or even touched him.

After the shooting, Tucker and Tarver walked out of the

garage, and Tarver put his arm around Tucker, saying that it was

not Tucker’s fault, that it was “something [Tarver] wanted to do.”

«V3-80» Tucker testified that he called the police and that Tarver

called his mother and told her, “Mama, I just killed me a MF.”

Tarver stayed at the scene and put his gun in the glove box of his

car.

When police and EMS arrived, Demmons, who was lying face

down on the garage floor, was not breathing and had no pulse.

Tarver had his hands in the air and kept them there until officers

ordered him to the ground and handcuffed him. Tarver was

cooperative with police, following their instructions and telling them

that the gun he used to shoot Demmons could be found in his car.

Police patted Tarver down and the officer who escorted Tarver to a

waiting police car testified that Tarver repeatedly volunteered that

he knew he was wrong for what he had done, and he should have

7
walked away. 3 The officer said that Tarver also voluntarily spoke to

police at the police station, saying that Demmons had tried to fight

him before and that Demmons was again trying to fight him that

day, so Tarver “did what he had to do,” but he knew it was a mistake.

During the autopsy, the medical examiner identified ten

gunshot wounds on Tucker’s body, some of which were caused by the

same bullet. Only one of the wounds was found on the front of

Demmons’s body. The medical examiner described this wound as a

“complex wound,” which she testified consisted of “an entrance, an

exit, a reentrance, and a re-exit,” meaning that “the bullet went in,

out, in, out.” The cause of death was attributed to multiple gunshot

wounds.

A GBI crime scene specialist testified that he found flattened

bullets at the scene and in Demmons’s clothing, suggesting that they

had passed through Demmons’s body and struck the concrete floor,

3 Tarver testified that he told the officer. “I know I was wrong, but I have

the right to defend myself. And I said: it wasn’t supposed to happen like that,
I was just trying to talk to him.” He also testified that, at the jail, he just kept
repeating, “I wish it would’ve never happened like that, I wish it would’ve
never happened like that.”
8
which supported that Demmons had been lying down when those

shots were fired. He also found two bullets in the parking lot and the

rest inside the garage.

In addition, Tarver testified that although Demmons never

physically touched him, Demmons “got very aggressive” when they

talked that day at the car wash. Demmons called Tarver “a rat” and

asked why Tarver was there after he had “already snitched on

[Demmons] one time.” When Tarver denied these accusations,

Demmons asked Tarver, “what you coming up here for, to try me or

something, you know I’m chain gang bound.” Tarver said he took

that statement to mean that Demmons had intentions of hurting

Tarver and that because Demmons had already been to prison, he

did not care what the consequences would be if he were to hurt

Tarver. Demmons also told Tarver that he did not need a pistol to

fight him; Demmons said he “could beat [Tarver] with these slippers

on.” Tarver testified that he believed that Demmons knew Tarver

was “at a disadvantage” because Tarver was disabled from a work

accident, which had severely injured his left knee so that he could

9
not bend it and reduced the strength in both of his legs.

According to Tarver, after making these statements,

Demmons balled up his fists and turned sideways into a “fight

stance,” asking Tarver if he was “ready.” Tarver said that Demmons

was walking toward him, so Tarver pulled out his gun to stop

Demmons. Tarver testified that when he did that, Demmons said,

“you got to use it,” which Tarver interpreted to mean that if he did

not use the gun, Demmons would get the gun from Tarver and use

it on him. Demmons outweighed Tarver by almost 100 pounds

although they were about the same height, and Tarver testified that

when Demmons turned sideways and “came at [him],” Tarver felt

threatened and was “fighting for [his] life.” He then took two steps

back and shot Demmons. Tarver said he shot Demmons eight times

because he was taught in a firearm defense course not to quit

shooting until he knew the person he was shooting was down. Tarver

further testified that after the shooting, he called his mother to tell

10
her he had shot someone and also called 911.4

However, Tarver admitted on cross-examination that after he

confronted Demmons at the car wash, Demmons said he did not

want to talk about the prior incident, and it was Tarver who insisted

on carrying the conversation further. And when Tarver persisted,

Demmons told Tarver to “get out of [his] face.”

2. Tarver first asserts that because self-defense was an issue in

the case and the jury was instructed on self-defense, the trial court

erred in excluding evidence that Tarver knew Demmons had shot a

man over a woman, had shot at a motel, and was known to carry a

gun. Tarver sought to introduce this evidence to show Tarver’s state

of mind at the time of the shooting and why he was in fear for his

life.

“A trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence

is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Brinkley,

316 Ga. 689, 690 (889 SE2d 787) (2023) (citation and punctuation

4 One of Tarver’s friends testified that Tarver called him right after the

shooting, and the friend then called 911 to report the shooting. Seven character
witnesses also testified on Tarver’s behalf, including his mother.
11
omitted). But if the trial court abuses its discretion in excluding

evidence, we will reverse a conviction for a trial court’s evidentiary

error only if it was harmful. See Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 261

(2) (c) (869 SE2d 447) (2022) (“It is fundamental that harm as well

as error must be shown for reversal.”); OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error

shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes

evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.”). It is

well-settled that the test “for determining nonconstitutional

harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not

contribute to the verdict.” Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863 (2) (896

SE2d 516) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Truett

v. State, 311 Ga. 313, 318 (2) (857 SE2d 690) (2021).

Before trial, the State filed a motion to prohibit the defense

from referring to Demmons’s “reputation . . . for violence and/or

specific acts of violence by [him],” and the trial court held a hearing

on the motion on the first day of trial. At the hearing, the State

argued that any character evidence regarding Demmons in the form

of specific bad acts equated to propensity evidence under OCGA §§

12
24-4-404 and 24-4-4055 and that to admit the evidence Tarver

would be required to make a prima facie showing that he acted in

self-defense by shooting Demmons, citing Oliver v. State, 329 Ga.

App. 377, 381 (765 SE2d 706) (2014) (holding as “well established

under Georgia law,” and still in effect under the current Evidence

Code, that before evidence of a victim’s general reputation for

violence or his specific acts of violence can be admitted, “the

defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens,

make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that

the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant

5 OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
OCGA § 24-4-405 provides in relevant part:
(a) In all proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof shall be made by
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion.
(b) In proceedings in which character or a trait of character of a person
is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense or when an accused
testifies to his or her own character, proof may also be made of specific
instances of that person’s conduct . . . .
13
responded with force only to defend himself or herself”) (citation and

punctuation omitted). 6 In response, Tarver’s counsel indicated that

he did not intend to present any evidence of specific offenses. Rather,

he planned to present evidence as “to what my client knew, what my

client knew of this person, and prior difficulties they had had

together.” After some further discussion, the trial court noted the

parties’ agreement to the admission of prior difficulties between

Tarver and Demmons and granted the State’s motion in limine as to

evidence of Demmons’s prior acts of violence involving third parties.

However, during trial, Tarver’s counsel argued that the State had

opened the door to testimony about Demmons’s bad acts by eliciting

from Tarver on cross-examination that Demmons had called Tarver

a “snitch,” which counsel argued should permit Tarver to testify

about the conduct about which Demmons thought Tarver had

6 Some members of the Court are doubtful that this prima facie
requirement was carried over to the current Evidence Code. However, we need
not address this issue given that we assume error on this ground and conclude
that any error was harmless.
14
snitched.7 After reviewing the record, the trial court found that the

State had not “opened the door” to more specific evidence and denied

the objection.

In his motion for new trial, Tarver contested the trial court’s

decision to exclude evidence of his knowledge of Demmons’s prior

violent acts toward third parties. At the motion for new trial

hearing, Tarver testified that on the day of the shooting, he was

aware that Demmons “had just shot a motel up” and he “just shot a

guy over a lady,” without further detail. Tarver said that those were

recent events at the time of the shooting, and his awareness of these

events influenced his actions. Tarver said it made him “feel like, you

know, that he would have shot me, too, because he was known for

toting a gun.” The trial court denied Tarver’s motion on this ground,

finding that the minimal probative value of the evidence was

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, and misleading the jury under OCGA § 24-4-403.

7 The record is unclear as to the particular acts as to which Tarver
contended the State opened the door.
15
Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in

excluding this evidence at trial and that Tarver preserved this error

for ordinary appellate review, any such error was harmless. Tarver’s

counsel was allowed to elicit extensive evidence as to why Tarver

felt threatened by Demmons on the day of the shooting. Tarver

testified that in the incident several months prior to the shooting,

Demmons accused Tarver of telling the police something that got

Demmons “locked up” for a “prior situation.” Tarver said that from

the language Demmons used in making those accusations, he

believed that Demmons wanted to hurt him. Tarver further testified

that on the day of the shooting, Demmons asked Tarver why he

wanted to challenge him when Tarver knew that Demmons was

“chain gang bound.” Tarver testified that he believed this statement

meant that Demmons wanted to hurt him and that Demmons did

not care about the consequences because he had already been to

prison. Additionally, Demmons had a 100-pound weight advantage

over Tarver, and Tarver said he believed that Demmons knew that

Tarver’s injuries put him at a disadvantage after Demmons said

16
that he did not need a gun to beat Tarver. Also, Tucker and Williams

each testified to hearing Demmons threatening Tarver just before

the shooting. Therefore, evidence that Tarver was aware that

Demmons had shot another man over a woman, “shot a motel up,”

and was known to carry a gun added little to Tarver’s testimony

about his prior difficulties with Demmons and evidence of

Demmons’s threats on the day of the shooting. See Cook v. State, 312

Ga. 299, 302 (2) (862 SE2d 510) (2021) (any error in exclusion of

three instances of violence by victim against third parties to show

that defendant had reason to fear victim was harmless in light of

other evidence at trial, including evidence showing victim’s prior

threats and violence toward defendant); Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259,

263 (1) (857 SE2d 447) (2021) (concluding that exclusion of

testimony was harmless where it was essentially cumulative of

other evidence); Nix v. State, 280 Ga. 141, 144-45 (5) (625 SE2d 746)

(2006) (the trial court’s error, if any, in excluding hearsay testimony

of defendant’s mother, was harmless where the excluded testimony

was largely cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial).

17
Moreover, Tarver’s claim of self-defense was weak since it

depended solely on Tarver’s self-serving testimony that Demmons

came at him. In contrast, there was strong evidence undercutting

his defense. After Tarver and Demmons had their initial verbal

altercation earlier in the summer, Demmons did not further

confront Tarver or take any threatening action against him. In fact,

the two had no further contact until Tarver confronted Demmons on

August 27, armed with a loaded weapon. Tarver testified that he

loaded his gun at the car wash, though he usually kept his gun

unloaded, because he knew Demmons was there. Moreover, Tarver

acknowledged that when he confronted Demmons about the earlier

incident, Demmons did not want to discuss the matter, but Tarver

persisted, leading Demmons to tell him to “get out of [his] face.”

Tarver also admitted that Demmons never punched, pushed, or even

touched him that day. And two eyewitnesses testified that Demmons

was walking away from Tarver at the time Tarver shot him. This

testimony was supported by evidence that Demmons was found face

down after the shooting with ten gunshot wounds and had only one

18
wound to the front of his body, which expert testimony explained

was a “complex wound” where the bullet could have gone in and out

of the body. Additionally, Tarver continued shooting after Demmons

was on the ground and no longer posed a threat.

Because the excluded evidence was largely cumulative and the

evidence supporting a claim of self-defense was weak, we conclude

that it is highly probable that the exclusion of the proffered evidence

did not contribute to the verdict, and any error was harmless. See

Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 714 (3) (854 SE2d 523) (2021) (trial

court’s exclusion of defendant’s testimony about a victim's threat

was harmless, in part because that testimony “added little if

anything” to defendant’s other testimony about “more explicit

threats” from the victim and because “evidence of [defendant’]s guilt

was very strong”); Beck v. State, 310 Ga. 491, 497-99 (3) (852 SE2d

535) (2020) (concluding that it was highly probable that any error

by the trial court in ruling that the defense could not introduce

victim’s prior acts of violence (except any involving the defendant)

did not contribute to the verdict and was therefore harmless in light

19
of other evidence at trial); Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59, 67 (4) (829

SE2d 81) (2019) (given strong evidence of defendant’s guilt and the

marginal and cumulative value of the excluded evidence, it was

highly probable that any error in its exclusion did not contribute to

the verdict).

3. Tarver also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion

in not allowing him to play his video-recorded interview with police

because it was not hearsay as it was not being admitted for the truth

of the matter asserted.8 Tarver asserts that he sought to admit the

video “to show the jury his tone of voice, the degree of emotion

shown, his forthrightness rather than deflections and evasions when

talking about the shooting.” As with the prior enumeration, we

review the trial court’s denial of Tarver’s request to play the video

of his interview with police for an abuse of discretion, see Brinkley,

8 To the extent that Tarver’s reply brief addresses the trial court’s ruling

that the video-recorded interview was not admissible as a prior consistent
statement, we do not consider such an argument because it was raised for the
first time on appeal in a reply brief. See Supreme Court Rule 19 (3) (“Reply
briefs may not be used to expand the enumeration of errors.”).

20
316 Ga. at 690, and if we conclude that there is error, we then

consider whether any error was harmful under the standard for non-

constitutional errors. See Morrell, 313 Ga. at 261 (2) (c).

When Tarver announced his intention to testify, defense

counsel indicated that he planned to play Tarver’s recorded

interview with police. The State moved in limine to exclude the

recording on the grounds that it contained hearsay since it was being

offered for the truth of the matters asserted, was not being offered

by a party opponent, and would constitute improper bolstering. In

response, Tarver’s counsel argued that it was not improper hearsay

because he wanted the jury to see that Tarver was being cooperative

in the wake of the shooting and had nothing to hide then or at trial.

After the trial court took a recess to give the defense an opportunity

to research the issue, Tarver’s counsel also asked that the recording

be admitted as a past recorded recollection, which is not excluded by

the hearsay rule even when the declarant is available as a witness.

The trial court denied Tarver’s request to admit the recording,

finding it clear “that it would be self-serving and hearsay even under

21
the new rules.” In its order denying the motion for new trial on this

ground, the trial court reaffirmed its conclusion that the statements

were self-serving hearsay.

Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused

its discretion in excluding the video-recorded interview for the

purpose for which it was offered, any such error was harmless in

light of the other evidence presented at trial that showed that

Tarver was cooperative with police after the shooting. One police

officer described Tarver as “cooperative as can be” and said that he

told the officers where to locate his gun; another officer described

Tarver as “very cooperative”; and a third police officer testified that

Tarver told police where to find the gun, spoke with police willingly,

volunteered to give up his clothes for a search without a warrant,

and was “cooperative.” Tucker also testified that Tarver did not try

to run, but instead directed Tucker to call 911, called 911 himself,

put the gun in his car, and waited for police. And Tarver also

testified to the actions he took to cooperate with police. We conclude

that evidence of Tarver’s cooperation from the video-recorded police

22
interview would be largely cumulative of the other evidence

presented at trial describing Tarver’s interactions and cooperation

with police, and therefore it is highly probable that the exclusion of

the video did not contribute to the verdict. Accordingly, any error by

the trial court was harmless.9 See Byers, 311 Ga. at 263 (1); Nix,

280 Ga. at 144-45 (5).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

9 Tarver also enumerates as error that, to the extent that either of his

first two enumerations of error was not properly preserved for appeal, he
received ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to properly preserve the
claim. Defense counsel acknowledged at oral argument that this was a
“backup” claim in the event either of the other two issues were not preserved
and that it appeared from the briefing that the parties agreed the issues were
preserved. Because we have assumed that the first claim was preserved for
ordinary appellate review and because the second claim was clearly preserved,
we conclude that no claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground
can stand. Therefore, we need not address Tarver’s third enumeration.
In addition, Tarver does not argue that the errors we have assumed and
determined to be individually harmless nevertheless cumulatively resulted in
harm. However, from our review of the record we discern no cumulative
prejudice warranting reversal. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d
808) (2020) (“[E]ven in the evidentiary context, a defendant who wishes to take
advantage of the [cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court
just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”).
23

319 Ga. 165
FINAL COPY

S24A0521. TARVER v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Ricquavious Tarver was convicted of murder and other crimes

in connection with the shooting death of Roosevelt Demmons.1

Tarver argues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in excluding

evidence of Tarver’s knowledge of Demmons’s previous acts of

violence to support his claim of self-defense and (2) the trial court

erred in excluding, on the grounds of hearsay, the video-recorded

1 Demmons was killed on August 27, 2016, and Tarver was charged by

special presentment in McDuffie County in June 2017 for malice murder
(Count 1), felony murder predicated upon aggravated assault (Count 2),
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3), and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). He was tried before a jury
in September 2018 and found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced
Tarver to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole on Count 1, and five
years in prison to be served consecutively on Count 4. Count 2 was vacated by
operation of law and Count 3 was merged into Count 1. Tarver filed a timely
motion for new trial on October 2, 2018, which was amended by new counsel
on July 31, 2019, and amended a second time by current counsel on March 24,
2021. Following a hearing on June 28, 2021, the trial court denied the motion
as amended on November 27, 2023. Tarver filed a timely notice of appeal, and
the case was docketed to the April 2024 term of this Court. The Court heard
oral argument on the case on April 18, 2024.
interview of Tarver by police because the interview was not being

admitted for the truth of the matter asserted and should have been

admitted to show how cooperative Tarver was after the shooting. For

the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed2 that Alton Tucker