Nunnally v. State

CourtListener 10680282GaAug 13, 2024

Full text

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 13, 2024

S24A0574. NUNNALLY v. THE STATE.

COLVIN, Justice.

Appellant Malik Nunnally appeals his convictions for malice

murder and other crimes related to the death of Maya Mitchell. 1 On

1 Mitchell died on December 31, 2018. On July 30, 2019, a DeKalb County

grand jury charged Appellant with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
(Count 2), armed robbery (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), possession
of a firearm by a first offender probationer (Count 5), and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6).
A jury trial was held from August 26, 2021, through September 2, 2021.
At trial, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for directed verdict as to
Count 3. The jury found Appellant guilty of the remaining counts (Counts 1-2,
4-5). On September 2, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison
for malice murder, five years in prison concurrent for possession of a firearm
by a first offender probationer, and five years in prison consecutive for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The felony-murder
count was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated-assault count
merged into the malice-murder count for sentencing purposes. See Favors v.
State, 296 Ga. 842, 847-848 (5) (770 SE2d 855) (2015).
Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial and amended it through
new counsel on October 6, 2023. Following a hearing on October 30, 2023, the
trial court denied Appellant’s amended motion for new trial on December 8,
2023.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court on December 20,
appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was constitutionally

and statutorily insufficient to support his convictions. Appellant also

argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on party to

a crime. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. The trial evidence showed the following. On December 30,

2018, Mitchell spent the day at the home of her boyfriend, Xavier

Lamar, in Decatur and left at some point in the evening to meet

Appellant. At approximately 9:15 a.m. the following morning, a

person walking in Glen Emerald Park discovered a body lying in a

wooded area a few feet off the path and called 911. The body, which

had a gunshot wound to the head, was later identified as Mitchell.

At trial, Lamar testified that he and Mitchell started dating in

August 2018 and that she moved in with him in November 2018. He

stated that they smoked marijuana together at his home and that

Mitchell would often leave to buy marijuana even though Lamar

already had marijuana for them to smoke. At first, Mitchell did not

2023. This appeal was docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.

2
tell Lamar who her supplier was, just that she bought it from an

area “off Bouldercrest [Road].” Eventually, however, she showed

Lamar a television show on which her supplier was featured and

identified a man on the show as her supplier. At trial, Lamar

identified Appellant as the man he had previously seen on the show.

Lamar testified that on the evening of December 30, 2018,

“[Mitchell and I were] just chilling in the bed, just watching TV,

watching movies and stuff.” According to Lamar, Mitchell was on

her phone texting and calling throughout the evening and left his

home at some point between 10:00 p.m. and midnight to meet

Appellant. 2 Lamar stated that “she said she’d be right back,” and

that when she left his house, she was wearing a sweatshirt, gray

sweatpants, and slippers. On redirect examination, Lamar admitted

that he suspected Mitchell was cheating on him.

Appellant’s girlfriend, Jazmin McClendon, testified that she

2 On direct and cross-examination, Lamar conceded that he previously

told investigators that Mitchell left his home around 2:00 a.m. on December
31, 2018. Notwithstanding his prior statement, Lamar confirmed at trial that
Mitchell left between 10:00 p.m. and midnight.
3
and Appellant started dating in August 2018 and that Appellant did

not have a car or a job. McClendon also testified that she had two

cell phones, one with a phone number ending in –2170 that she gave

Appellant in November 2018 for him to use, and the other ending in

–2761, which she used. McClendon further confirmed that Appellant

had possession of the phone corresponding to the –2170 phone

number on the night of December 30, 2018. McClendon testified that

on that night, Appellant told her that he was leaving to sell a gun

and that he would return soon, which she believed would be no more

than 30 minutes later. After 30 minutes passed, she called him

multiple times, but he did not answer her calls. At some point, he

called her back and said that he would be home soon. However, at

trial, McClendon testified that she could not recall when she next

saw Appellant; instead, she could only recall that she met Appellant

to retrieve her phone on or before January 7, 2019, when she was

questioned by police.

Mitchell’s parents testified that they tried to contact Mitchell

on December 31, 2018, but could not reach her. Becoming concerned,

4
Mitchell’s mother used her tablet, which was synced with Mitchell’s

cell phone, to locate Mitchell. Her tablet placed Mitchell’s cell phone

near a dumpster at a gas station on Gresham Road. A picture of the

tablet displaying the location of Mitchell’s cell phone was entered

into evidence. Mitchell’s mother testified that she and her husband

drove to the gas station but did not find Mitchell’s phone there.

Mitchell’s mother testified that because her tablet was synced

with Mitchell’s phone, she could read the text messages on Mitchell’s

phone. Using this information, she began calling the numbers

Mitchell’s phone had recently texted. These numbers included the

number corresponding to the phone McClendon had provided to

Appellant. When Mitchell’s mother called this number, a man

answered and introduced himself as “Lee.” Mitchell’s mother

testified that, over the course of several conversations on December

31, the man stated that he and Mitchell were “supposed to meet” the

previous night. “Lee” suggested they look for Mitchell at various

locations, including two apartment complexes on Gresham Road

near the gas station where her parents had previously searched for

5
Mitchell’s phone, a gas station where Mitchell’s car was allegedly

seen, a grocery store, and, ultimately, Glen Emerald Park. The

mother testified that the man also told her that a body had been

found in Glen Emerald Park but that it was not on the news yet.

Mitchell’s father also called the number ending in –2170 and spoke

to the man purporting to be “Lee.” The father testified that the man

told them that he was supposed to meet Mitchell on the night of

December 30 but that he “stood her up” and stayed at home with his

baby’s mother. The man also told him that he sent his brother to

meet Mitchell that night.

Photos of Mitchell’s mother’s tablet displaying text messages

from Mitchell’s phone with the phone number ending in –2170 from

December 2018 were entered into evidence and showed the

following. On the evening of December 19, the –2170 number texted,

“I’m with my brother” and then the two discussed meeting. Early in

the morning of December 22, the –2170 number texted Mitchell’s

phone, “[yo]u trying to come thr[ough][?]” and sent his current

location, to which Mitchell’s phone responded, “I’m on my period

6
tho[ugh].” On December 23, Mitchell’s phone texted the –2170

number, asking him if he had any “gas,” to which he responded that

he did but that he only had “seven . . . left.”

On the evening of December 30, Mitchell’s phone and the –2170

number texted numerous times, beginning at 10:23 p.m. and ending

at 1:05 a.m. the following morning. The text messages from

December 30 to December 31 primarily concerned the two meeting

for the user of Mitchell’s phone to purchase “gas” from Appellant.

The –2170 number also asked Mitchell’s phone if they wanted to “get

one off in the car.” After going back and forth about where to meet,

the –2170 number told Mitchell’s phone at 10:36 p.m. to meet him

at an address on Bouldercrest Road, which he said was near his old

neighborhood, Paradise East Apartments. At 11:40 p.m., the –2170

number told Mitchell’s phone to “go to the park . . . across from the

neighborhood.” At 11:44 p.m., the –2170 number texted, “[m]y

brother is at the park[.] He has my weed[.]”At 1:05 a.m. on December

31, 2018, Mitchell’s phone sent the –2170 number the last known

text from her phone, which read, “I[’]m blocking [yo]ur number[,]

7
[yo]u bitch.”

Law enforcement personnel used data from phone records for

Mitchell’s phone and the phone ending in –2170 to generate a

“TRAS” report, which consolidated information regarding the

contacts between the two phones into a “readable form.” This report

was entered into evidence and shown to the jury. The detective who

generated the report testified that “these two devices [were]

commonly in contact with each other at the end of the night or the

very beginning of the morning.” The report showed there were eight

calls between Mitchell’s phone and the phone ending in –2170 on

December 30, 2018, and that the last text message between the two

phones was sent at 1:10 a.m. on December 31, 2018.

The detective who ran the “TRAS” report also testified that he

located Mitchell’s abandoned car and obtained a search warrant of

the vehicle. He testified that the vehicle was found at the dead end

of Whitehall Way. He testified that the rear bumper and rear

passenger window of the car were damaged.

Cell-site location data of the phone ending in –2170 was also

8
entered into evidence.3 The cellular record analyst who prepared the

data noted that cell-site location data is not available for calls that

are not completed. The report showed that Mitchell’s phone called

the –2170 number twice around 10:30 p.m. on December 30 but that

the calls were not completed. At 10:38 p.m. and 10:41 p.m., the

–2170 number made calls to or received calls from Mitchell’s phone

from the vicinity of McClendon’s mother’s apartment on Casanova

Street. From 11:33 p.m. on December 30 to 12:10 a.m. on December

31, Mitchell’s phone and the –2170 number attempted to call one

another six times, with only two of those calls being completed. The

completed calls, made at 11:37 and 11:48 p.m. on December 30,

placed the –2170 number in the vicinity of Glen Emerald Park and

3 “A cell site typically consists of a set of either three or six directional

radio antennas mounted on a tower, light post, flagpole, church steeple, or side
of a building. Unless powered off, a cell phone continuously scans its
environment looking for the strongest signal, which generally comes from the
nearest cell site. Each time a phone connects to a cell site, the connection
generates a time-stamped digital record in the service provider’s account
records that includes the particular cell site and the specific antenna activated
(‘sector’ information); such records are known as cell-site location [data].”
Lofton v. State, 310 Ga. 770, 775 (2) n.3 (854 SE2d 690) (2021) (citing Carpenter
v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 300-301 (I) (A) (138 SCt 2206, 201 LE2d 507)
(2018)).
9
Appellant’s previous residence at Paradise East Apartments on

Bouldercrest Road. Starting at 1:22 a.m., the –2170 number called

various numbers, including McClendon, at 1:38 a.m. The first four

calls, beginning at 1:22 a.m. and ending at 1:54 a.m., placed the

caller near Glen Emerald Park and Paradise East Apartments. The

last two calls, beginning at 2:47 a.m. and ending at 2:48 a.m., placed

the –2170 number near McClendon’s mother’s apartment on

Cassanova Street. The cellular record analyst testified that the

–2170 number utilized a cell phone tower near Whitehall Way,

where Mitchell’s car was recovered, at approximately 10:45 a.m. on

January 1, 2019.

Photographs of the crime scene, which were admitted into

evidence, showed that Mitchell was found bare from the waist down,

and that her sweatpants, underwear, and slippers were nearby. An

investigator testified that they found a .40-caliber cartridge casing

near the body. Photographic evidence showed that the casing was

found only a few feet away from Mitchell’s feet. Investigators were

unable to lift any prints from the items found at the scene.

10
An investigator with the DeKalb County Police Department’s

homicide unit testified that Glen Emerald Park is a small park

located on Bouldercrest Road “directly across” from Paradise East

Apartments. He also stated that he received search warrants to

perform extractions on Mitchell’s phone and the phone ending in

–2170 but that the extraction was unsuccessful on Mitchell’s phone.

He said that Mitchell’s phone was never located and that the photos

of her text messages displayed on her mother’s tablet were the only

evidence obtained on Mitchell’s phone. The extraction on the phone

ending in –2170 revealed that Mitchell’s phone number was saved

in the –2170 number’s contacts as “Maya wants ounce” and that the

user of the –2170 number attempted to delete the call logs with the

contact “Maya wants ounce.”

The extraction also revealed the –2170 number’s internet

search history, which showed that its user searched “breaking news

Atlanta” and “channel 2 news breaking news murder” on the

evening of December 31, 2018, and searched “Glen Emerald Park”

on the evening of January 6, 2019.

11
The homicide investigator testified that he interviewed Lamar,

McClendon, and Appellant at various times after the murder. He

described Lamar as “very straightforward in his demeanor and his

information that he provided.” He testified that McClendon initially

said that she and Appellant were together on the night of December

30, 2018, but after being presented evidence of their phone calls,

“changed her story” and admitted that he left at some point in the

evening. After interviewing McClendon, the investigator

determined that Appellant was in sole possession of the phone

number ending in –2170 “during this homicide.” And as to his

interview with Appellant, the investigator stated that Appellant did

not provide an alibi for December 30, 2018, and December 31, 2018.

The investigator also said that Mitchell’s car was recovered on

Whitehall Way on January 5, 2019.

The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy on Mitchell

testified that the bullet entered through the back right side of her

head near her ear, passed through the brain, and exited through her

left ear. Due to the lack of soot and stippling, he determined that the

12
gun was “more than two to three feet away from [Mitchell]” when it

was fired. Her only other injury was an abrasion on her right

buttock, possibly indicating that she was dragged across a rough

surface. The autopsy report listed her cause of death as a gunshot

wound to the head. On cross-examination, the medical examiner

testified that he was unable to establish Mitchell’s time of death.

A firearms expert who worked for the Georgia Bureau of

Investigation testified that after examining the bullet fragments, he

concluded that the bullet fragments were from a .40[-]caliber

weapon, consistent with being fired from a “hi[gh]-point .40[-]caliber

pistol.”

The parties stipulated that Appellant was serving probation as

a felony first offender at the time of the shooting.

2. On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of constitutional

due process and as a matter of Georgia statutory law, see OCGA §

24-14-6. We disagree.

(a) When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the

13
evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, “we view the

evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts

and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crimes for which

he was convicted.” Ellington v. State, 314 Ga. 335, 339 (2) (877 SE2d

221) (2022) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99

SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560 (1979)). We leave to the trier of fact “the

resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility

of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts,”

and we do not “reweigh the evidence.” Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225,

229 (2) (869 SE2d 461) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of

Mitchell’s murder and the other crimes of which he was convicted as

a matter of constitutional due process. Viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdicts, the evidence showed that Mitchell left

Lamar’s house on the evening of December 30, 2018, to buy

marijuana from Appellant; that a phone number ending in –2170,

which was in Appellant’s sole possession at the time, messaged

14
Mitchell’s phone and said to meet him at Glen Emerald Park; that

Appellant left McClendon’s mother’s apartment that same night

carrying a gun; that Mitchell was found dead with a gunshot wound

to the head in Glen Emerald Park the following morning; that cell-

site location data placed Appellant’s phone at Glen Emerald Park

late in the evening of December 30 and early in the morning of

December 31; and that, during this time, Appellant was serving

probation as a felony first offender. See Carter v. State, 305 Ga. 863,

867 (2) (828 SE2d 317) (2019) (circumstantial evidence supporting

murder conviction included text messages between defendant and

the victim which showed that defendant was the last person to be

with the victim).

The evidence also showed that after Mitchell’s death, the –2170

number, which was in Appellant’s sole possession at the time, tried

to delete call logs with Mitchell’s phone on the –2170 phone and

searched “breaking news Atlanta” and “channel 2 news breaking

news murder” on the internet on December 31, 2018, and “Glen

Emerald Park” on January 6, 2019. Further, Appellant lied to

15
Mitchell’s parents and introduced himself as “Lee,” told them that

he was supposed to meet Mitchell on December 30 but that he “stood

her up,” admitted to investigators that he did not have an alibi for

that night, and told her parents to look for Mitchell in various places,

including Glen Emerald Park where he also said that a body had

recently been found but that it was not on the news yet. Also,

Mitchell’s car was found abandoned on Whitehall Way, where cell-

site location data placed Appellant on January 1, 2019. See Gray v.

State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (__ SE2d __) (2024) (noting that “the fact of

an accused’s . . . concealment, assumption of a false name, and

related conduct [is] admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt,

and thus of guilt itself”).

While Appellant argues the lack of eyewitnesses make the

evidence insufficient, this argument is without merit because

“[a]lthough the State is required to prove its case with competent

evidence, there is no requirement that it prove its case with any

particular sort of evidence.” Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 506 (1) (796

SE2d 704) (2017). And as to Appellant’s argument that he did not

16
have a motive to shoot Mitchell, “the State need not introduce

evidence of motive in order to support a guilty verdict on the charge

of malice murder.” Adams v. State, 317 Ga. 342, 349 (1) (893 SE2d

85) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Taken as a whole, the evidence presented at trial authorized a

reasonable jury to infer that Appellant and Mitchell had a sexual

relationship and would meet late at night or early in the morning to

engage in sexual activity; that Appellant directed Mitchell to Glen

Emerald Park to meet; that Appellant left McClendon’s mother’s

apartment on the evening of December 30 carrying a gun; that

Appellant shot and killed Mitchell using that gun; and that, after

killing Mitchell, Appellant left her car at the dead-end of Whitehall

Way on January 1, 2019, where it was later discovered by

investigators, conducted internet searches to see if her body had

been discovered, attempted to delete call logs with Mitchell from his

phone to conceal his guilt, lied about his name to Mitchell’s parents

to conceal his identity, suggested various locations to her parents to

find Mitchell before suggesting they check Glen Emerald Park

17
where her body was ultimately discovered, demonstrating his

knowledge of her death, and told investigators he did not have an

alibi for the dates in question.

Because a reasonable jury could infer each element of each of

the crimes for which Appellant was convicted, the evidence is

sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process. See Young v.

State, 305 Ga. 92, 94 (1) (823 SE2d 774) (2019) (holding that the

evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s

murder conviction where there were no eyewitnesses or DNA

evidence linking defendant to the murder, but there was evidence

that the two were in a contentious divorce and had recently

participated in an unsuccessful mediation and that defendant fled

the area and remained in hiding until he was arrested).

(b) As a matter of Georgia statutory law, “[t]o warrant a

conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only

be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every

other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”

OCGA § 24-14-6. “However, not every hypothesis is reasonable, and

18
the evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference or

hypothesis – only those that are reasonable.” Adams, 317 Ga. at 348

(1) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). “Whether

alternative hypotheses are reasonable is principally a question for

the jury, and this Court will not disturb the jury’s finding unless it

is insupportable as a matter of law.” Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Here, based on the evidence summarized above, we conclude

that the jury was free to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that

Appellant did not shoot Mitchell, or, at the least, knowingly

participate in Mitchell’s murder, and that she was killed by someone

else such as Appellant’s “brother.” Accordingly, the evidence was

also sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions under OCGA § 24-

14-6. See Taylor v. State, 313 Ga. 5, 9-10 (867 SE2d 88) (2021)

(affirming murder conviction under circumstantial-evidence statute

where the evidence showed that defendant went to the area where

the victim was shot only minutes before shooting; that after the

shooting, he emerged looking distraught and was pacing the room,

19
that defendant made inconsistent statements to police officers; that

defendant and victim had a lengthy, unusual conversation the day

before the shooting; and that ballistics evidence showed that

defendant’s gun fired the fatal shot; and based on this evidence, the

jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable defendant’s

alternative theories that a stranger or a family member killed the

victim or that the victim committed suicide and accept the State’s

theory that defendant shot and killed the victim).

3. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the

jury on party to a crime. We identify no error.

The trial court charged the jury as follows:

Every party to a crime may be charged with and convicted
of commission of the crime. A person is a party to a crime
only if that person directly commits the crime or
intentionally helps in the commission of the crime. Any
party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime
may be prosecuted for commission of the crime upon proof
that the crime was committed, and that the person was a
party to it, even though the person alleged to have directly
committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted
or is not amenable to justice.

“To authorize a requested jury instruction, there need be only

20
slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” McClure v.

State, 306 Ga. 856, 863 (1) (834 SE2d 96) (2019). “Conviction as a

party to a crime requires proof that the defendant shared a common

criminal intent with the principal perpetrator of the crime, which

may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before,

during, and after the offense.” Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 732 (2)

(a) (864 SE2d 85) (2021). While Appellant argues the State did not

advance the party-to-a-crime theory, “even if the party requesting a

charge on a particular theory did not advance that theory, that

instruction is authorized as long as slight evidence supports the

theory of the charge.” Bowman v. State, 317 Ga. 457, 461 (2) (a) (893

SE2d 735) (2023).

Here, there was at least slight evidence that Appellant was a

party to the crimes. The evidence showed that Appellant texted

Mitchell late at night on December 30, 2018, to coordinate a place

for them to meet; that, by means of those text messages, he directed

her to Glen Emerald Park, where she was found dead the following

day; and that, during the course of their correspondence, Appellant

21
told Mitchell that both he and his “brother” would be present and

that his “brother” would provide her with the marijuana. This

constituted at least slight evidence from which a jury could conclude

that, at a minimum, Appellant was involved in the events leading

up to and including Mitchell’s murder, and thus, was a party to the

crimes.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on

such a theory. See Leeks v. State, 303 Ga. 104, 106-107 (2) (810 SE2d

536) (2018) (holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the

jury on party to a crime where the State did not indict defendant as

such nor rely upon such theory in presenting its case to the jury, but

there was testimony that defendant discussed robbing the store with

his two co-indictees and that he fled the scene of the crime with one

of his co-indictees, which was “at least slight evidence” supporting

the party-to-a-crime theory). See also Meadows v. State, 316 Ga. 22,

24-25 (2) (885 SE2d 780) (2023) (holding that the evidence was

constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of

malice murder and related crimes as at least a party to the crimes

22
where the evidence showed that defendant and an unidentified

driver arranged to meet the victim, that they met the victim at a gas

station, and that either defendant or the driver shot and killed the

victim from inside the driver’s vehicle).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

23

319 Ga. 701
FINAL COPY

S24A0574. NUNNALLY v. THE STATE.

COLVIN, Justice.

Appellant Malik Nunnally appeals his convictions for malice

murder and other crimes related to the death of Maya Mitchell.1 On

appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was constitutionally

1 Mitchell died on December 31, 2018. On July 30, 2019, a DeKalb County

grand jury charged Appellant with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
(Count 2), armed robbery (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), possession
of a firearm by a first offender probationer (Count 5), and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6).
A jury trial was held from August 26, 2021, through September 2, 2021.
At trial, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for directed verdict as to
Count 3. The jury found Appellant guilty of the remaining counts (Counts 1-2,
4-6). On September 2, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison
for malice murder, five years in prison concurrent for possession of a firearm
by a first offender probationer, and five years in prison consecutive for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The felony-murder
count was vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated-assault count
merged into the malice-murder count for sentencing purposes. See Favors v.
State, 296 Ga. 842, 847-848 (5) (770 SE2d 855) (2015).
Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial and amended it through
new counsel on October 6, 2023. Following a hearing on October 30, 2023, the
trial court denied Appellant’s amended motion for new trial on December 8,
2023.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court on December 20,
2023. This appeal was docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
and statutorily insufficient to support his convictions. Appellant also

argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on party to

a crime. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. The trial evidence showed the following. On December 30,

2018, Mitchell spent the day at the home of her boyfriend, Xavier

Lamar, in Decatur and left at some point in the evening to meet

Appellant. At approximately 9:15 a.m. the following day, a person

walking in Glen Emerald Park discovered a body lying in a wooded

area a few feet off the path and called 911. The body, which had a

gunshot wound to the head, was later identified as Mitchell.

At trial, Lamar testified that he and Mitchell started dating in

August 2018 and that she moved in with him in November 2018. He

stated that they smoked marijuana together at his home and that

Mitchell would often leave to buy marijuana even though Lamar

already had marijuana for them to smoke. At first, Mitchell did not

tell Lamar who her supplier was, just that she bought it from an

area “off Bouldercrest [Road].” Eventually, however, she showed

Lamar a television show on which her supplier was featured and

2
identified a man on the show as her supplier. At trial, Lamar

identified Appellant as the man he had previously seen on the show.

Lamar testified that on the evening of December 30, 2018,

“[Mitchell and I were] just chilling in the bed, just watching TV,

watching movies and stuff.” According to Lamar, Mitchell was on

her phone texting and calling throughout the evening and left his

home at some point between 10:00 p.m. and midnight to meet

Appellant.2 Lamar stated that “she said she’d be right back,” and

that when she left his house, she was wearing a sweatshirt, gray

sweatpants, and slippers. On redirect examination, Lamar admitted

that he suspected Mitchell was cheating on him.

Appellant’s girlfriend, Jazmin McClendon, testified that she

and Appellant started dating in August 2018 and that Appellant did

not have a car or a job. McClendon also testified that she had two

cell phones, one with a phone number ending in -2170 that she gave

2 On direct and cross-examination, Lamar conceded that he previously

told investigators that Mitchell left his home around 2:00 a.m. on December
31, 2018. Notwithstanding his prior statement, Lamar confirmed at trial that
Mitchell left between 10:00 p.m. and midnight.
3
Appellant in November 2018 for him to use, and the other ending in

-2761, which she used. McClendon further confirmed that Appellant

had possession of the phone corresponding to the -2170 phone

number on the night of December 30, 2018. McClendon testified that

on that night, Appellant told her that he was leaving to sell a gun

and that he would return soon, which she believed would be no more

than 30 minutes later. After 30 minutes passed, she called him

multiple times, but he did not answer her calls. At some point, he

called her back and said that he would be home soon. However, at

trial, McClendon testified that she could not recall when she next

saw Appellant; instead, she could only recall that she met Appellant

to retrieve her phone on or before January 7, 2019, when she was

questioned by police.

Mitchell’s parents testified that they tried to contact Mitchell

on December 31, 2018, but could not reach her. Becoming concerned,

Mitchell’s mother used her tablet, which was synced with Mitchell’s

cell phone, to locate Mitchell. Her tablet placed Mitchell’s cell phone

near a dumpster at a gas station on Gresham Road. A picture of the

4
tablet displaying the location of Mitchell’s cell phone was entered

into evidence. Mitchell’s mother testified that she and her husband

drove to the gas station but did not find Mitchell’s phone there.

Mitchell’s mother testified that because her tablet was synced

with Mitchell’s phone, she could read the text messages on Mitchell’s

phone. Using this information, she began calling the numbers

Mitchell’s phone had recently texted. These numbers included the

number corresponding to the phone McClendon had provided to

Appellant. When Mitchell’s mother called this number, a man

answered and introduced himself as “Lee.” Mitchell’s mother

testified that, over the course of several conversations on December

31, the man stated that he and Mitchell were “supposed to meet” the

previous night. “Lee” suggested they look for Mitchell at various

locations, including two apartment complexes on Gresham Road

near the gas station where her parents had previously searched for

Mitchell’s phone, a gas station where Mitchell’s car was allegedly

seen, a grocery store, and, ultimately, Glen Emerald Park. The

mother testified that the man also told her that a body had been

5
found in Glen Emerald Park but that it was not on the news yet.

Mitchell’s father also called the number ending in -2170 and spoke

to the man purporting to be “Lee.” The father testified that the man

told them that he was supposed to meet Mitchell on the night of

December 30 but that he “stood her up” and stayed at home with his

baby’s mother. The man also told him that he sent his brother to

meet Mitchell that night.

Photos of Mitchell’s mother’s tablet displaying text messages

from Mitchell’s phone with the phone number ending in -2170 from

December 2018 were entered into evidence and showed the

following. On the evening of December 19, the -2170 number texted,

“I’m with my brother” and then the two discussed meeting. Early in

the morning of December 22, the -2170 number texted Mitchell’s

phone, “[you] trying to come thr[ough][?]” and sent his current

location, to which Mitchell’s phone responded, “I’m on my period

tho[ugh].” On December 23, Mitchell’s phone texted the -2170

number, asking him if he had any “gas,” to which he responded that

he did but that he only had “seven . . . [l]eft.”

6
On December 30, Mitchell’s phone and the -2170 number

texted numerous times, beginning at 10:23 p.m. and ending at 1:05

a.m. the following day. The text messages from December 30 to

December 31 primarily concerned the two meeting for the user of

Mitchell’s phone to purchase “gas” from Appellant. The -2170

number also asked Mitchell’s phone if they wanted to “get one off in

the car.” After going back and forth about where to meet, the -2170

number told Mitchell’s phone at 10:36 p.m. to meet him at an

address on Bouldercrest Road, which he said was near his old

neighborhood, Paradise East Apartments. At 11:40 p.m., the -2170

number told Mitchell’s phone to “go to the park . . . across from the

neighborhood.” At 11:44 p.m., the -2170 number texted, “[m]y

brother is at the park[.] He has my weed[.]”At 1:05 a.m. on December

31, 2018, Mitchell’s phone sent the -2170 number the last known

text from her phone, which read, “I[’]m blocking [yo]ur number[,]

[yo]u a bitch.”

Law enforcement personnel used data from phone records for

Mitchell’s phone and the phone ending in -2170 to generate a

7
“TRAS” report, which consolidated information regarding the

contacts between the two phones into a “readable form.” This report

was entered into evidence and shown to the jury. The detective who

generated the report testified that “the two devices were most

commonly in contact with each other at the end of the night or the

very beginning of the morning.” The report showed there were eight

calls between Mitchell’s phone and the phone ending in -2170 on

December 30, 2018, and that the last text message between the two

phones was sent at 1:10 a.m. on December 31, 2018.

The detective who ran the “TRAS” report also testified that he

located Mitchell’s abandoned car and obtained a search warrant of

the vehicle. He testified that the vehicle was found at the dead end

of Whitehall Way. He testified that the rear bumper and rear

passenger window of the car were damaged.

Cell-site location data of the phone ending in -2170 was also

entered into evidence.3 The cellular record analyst who prepared the

3

A cell site typically consists of a set of either three or six

8
data noted that cell-site location data is not available for calls that

are not completed. The report showed that Mitchell’s phone called

the -2170 number twice around 10:30 p.m. on December 30 but that

the calls were not completed. At 10:38 p.m. and 10:41 p.m., the -2170

number made calls to or received calls from Mitchell’s phone from

the vicinity of McClendon’s mother’s apartment on Casanova Street.

From 11:33 p.m. on December 30 to 12:10 a.m. on December 31,

Mitchell’s phone and the -2170 number attempted to call one

another six times, with only two of those calls being completed. The

completed calls, made at 11:37 and 11:48 p.m. on December 30,

placed the -2170 number in the vicinity of Glen Emerald Park and

Appellant’s previous residence at Paradise East Apartments on

directional radio antennas mounted on a tower, light post, flagpole,
church steeple, or side of a building. Unless powered off, a cell
phone continuously scans its environment looking for the strongest
signal, which generally comes from the nearest cell site. Each time
a phone connects to a cell site, the connection generates a time-
stamped digital record in the service provider’s account records
that includes the particular cell site and the specific antenna
activated (“sector” information); such records are known as cell-
site location [data].
Lofton v. State, 310 Ga. 770, 775 (2) n.3 (854 SE2d 690) (2021) (citing Carpenter
v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 300-301 (I) (A) (138 SCt 2206, 201 LE2d 507)
(2018)).
9
Bouldercrest Road. Starting at 1:22 a.m., the -2170 number called

various numbers, including McClendon, at 1:38 a.m. The first four

calls, beginning at 1:22 a.m. and ending at 1:54 a.m., placed the

caller near Glen Emerald Park and Paradise East Apartments. The

last two calls, beginning at 2:47 a.m. and ending at 2:48 a.m., placed

the -2170 number near McClendon’s mother’s apartment on

Casanova Street. The cellular record analyst testified that the -2170

number utilized a cell phone tower near Whitehall Way, where

Mitchell’s car was recovered, at approximately 10:45 a.m. on

January 1, 2019.

Photos of the crime scene, which were admitted into evidence,

showed that Mitchell was found bare from the waist down, and that

her sweatpants, underwear, and slippers were nearby. An

investigator testified that they found a .40-caliber cartridge casing

near the body. Photographic evidence showed that the casing was

found only a few feet away from Mitchell’s feet. Investigators were

unable to lift any prints from the items found at the scene.

An investigator with the DeKalb County Police Department’s

10
homicide unit testified that Glen Emerald Park is a small park

located on Bouldercrest Road “directly across” from Paradise East

Apartments. He also stated that he received search warrants to

perform extractions on Mitchell’s phone and the phone ending in -

2170 but that the extraction was unsuccessful on Mitchell’s phone.

He said that Mitchell’s phone was never located and that the photos

of her text messages displayed on her mother’s tablet were the only

evidence obtained on Mitchell’s phone. The extraction on the phone

ending in -2170 revealed that Mitchell’s phone number was saved in

the -2170 number’s contacts as “Maya wants ounce” and that the

user of the -2170 number attempted to delete the call logs with the

contact “Maya wants ounce.”

The extraction also revealed the -2170 number’s internet

search history, which showed that its user searched “breaking news

Atlanta” and “channel 2 news breaking news murder” on the

evening of December 31, 2018, and searched “Glen Emerald Park”

on the evening of January 6, 2019.

The homicide investigator testified that he interviewed Lamar,

11
McClendon, and Appellant at various times after the murder. He

described Lamar as “very straightforward in his demeanor and his

information that he provided.” He testified that McClendon initially

said that she and Appellant were together on the night of December

30, 2018, but after being presented evidence of their phone calls,

“changed her story” and admitted that he left at some point in the

evening. After interviewing McClendon, the investigator

determined that Appellant was in sole possession of the phone

number ending in -2170 “during this homicide.” And as to his

interview with Appellant, the investigator stated that Appellant did

not provide an alibi for December 30, 2018, and December 31, 2018.

The investigator also said that Mitchell’s car was recovered on

Whitehall Way on January 5, 2019.

The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy on Mitchell

testified that the bullet entered through the back right side of her

head near her ear, passed through the brain, and exited through her

left ear. Due to the lack of soot and stippling, he determined that the

gun was “more than two to three feet away from [Mitchell]” when it

12
was fired. Her only other injury was an abrasion on her right

buttock, possibly indicating that she was dragged across a rough

surface. The autopsy report listed her cause of death as a gunshot

wound to the head. On cross-examination, the medical examiner

testified that he was unable to establish Mitchell’s time of death.

A firearms expert who worked for the Georgia Bureau of

Investigation testified that after examining the bullet fragments, he

concluded that the bullet fragments were from a .40[-]caliber

weapon, consistent with being fired from a “hi[gh]-point .40[-]caliber

pistol.”

The parties stipulated that Appellant was serving probation as

a felony first offender at the time of the shooting.

2. On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of constitutional

due process and as a matter of Georgia statutory law, see OCGA §

24-14-6. We disagree.

(a) When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, “we view all of

13
the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the

verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crimes for

which he was convicted.” Ellington v. State, 314 Ga. 335, 339 (2) (877

SE2d 221) (2022) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-319

(III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). We leave to the trier of

fact “the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence,

credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from

the facts,” and we do not “reweigh the evidence.” Harris v. State, 313

Ga. 225, 229 (2) (869 SE2d 461) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Here, the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of

Mitchell’s murder and the other crimes of which he was convicted as

a matter of constitutional due process. Viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdicts, the evidence showed that Mitchell left

Lamar’s house on the evening of December 30, 2018, to buy

marijuana from Appellant; that a phone number ending in -2170,

which was in Appellant’s sole possession at the time, messaged

14
Mitchell’s phone and said to meet him at Glen Emerald Park; that

Appellant left McClendon’s mother’s apartment that same night

carrying a gun; that Mitchell was found dead with a gunshot wound

to the head in Glen Emerald Park the following morning; that cell-

site location data placed Appellant’s phone at Glen Emerald Park

late in the evening of December 30 and early in the morning of

December 31; and that, during this time, Appellant was serving

probation as a felony first offender. See Carter v. State, 305 Ga. 863,

867 (2) (828 SE2d 317) (2019) (circumstantial evidence supporting

murder conviction included text messages between defendant and

the victim which showed that defendant was the last person to be

with the victim).

The evidence also showed that after Mitchell’s death, the -2170

number, which was in Appellant’s sole possession at the time, tried

to delete call logs with Mitchell’s phone on the -2170 phone and

searched “breaking news Atlanta” and “channel 2 news breaking

news murder” on the Internet on December 31, 2018, and “Glen

Emerald Park” on January 6, 2019. Further, Appellant lied to

15
Mitchell’s parents and introduced himself as “Lee,” told them that

he was supposed to meet Mitchell on December 30 but that he “stood

her up,” admitted to investigators that he did not have an alibi for

that night, and told her parents to look for Mitchell in various places,

including Glen Emerald Park where he also said that a body had

recently been found but that it was not on the news yet. Also,

Mitchell’s car was found abandoned on Whitehall Way, where cell-

site location data placed Appellant on January 1, 2019. See Gray v.

State, 319 Ga. 72, 78 (2) (901 SE2d 556) (2024) (noting that “the fact

of an accused’s . . . concealment, assumption of a false name, and

related conduct [is] admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt,

and thus of guilt itself”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

While Appellant argues the lack of eyewitnesses makes the

evidence insufficient, this argument is without merit because

“[a]lthough the State is required to prove its case with competent

evidence, there is no requirement that it prove its case with any

particular sort of evidence.” Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 506 (1) (796

SE2d 704) (2017). And as to Appellant’s argument that he did not

16
have a motive to shoot Mitchell, “the State need not introduce

evidence of motive in order to support a guilty verdict on the charge

of malice murder.” Adams v. State, 317 Ga. 342, 349 (1) (893 SE2d

85) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Taken as a whole, the evidence presented at trial authorized a

reasonable jury to infer that Appellant and Mitchell had a sexual

relationship and would meet late at night or early in the morning to

engage in sexual activity; that Appellant directed Mitchell to Glen

Emerald Park to meet; that Appellant left McClendon’s mother’s

apartment on the evening of December 30 carrying a gun; that

Appellant shot and killed Mitchell using that gun; and that, after

killing Mitchell, Appellant left her car at the dead-end of Whitehall

Way on January 1, 2019, where it was later discovered by

investigators, conducted Internet searches to see if her body had

been discovered, attempted to delete call logs with Mitchell from his

phone to conceal his guilt, lied about his name to Mitchell’s parents

to conceal his identity, suggested various locations to her parents to

find Mitchell before suggesting they check Glen Emerald Park

17
where her body was ultimately discovered, demonstrating his

knowledge of her death, and told investigators he did not have an

alibi for the dates in question.

Because a reasonable jury could infer each element of each of

the crimes for which Appellant was convicted, the evidence is

sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process. See Young v.

State, 305 Ga. 92, 94 (1) (823 SE2d 774) (2019) (holding that the

evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s

murder conviction where there were no eyewitnesses or DNA

evidence linking defendant to the murder, but there was evidence

that the two were in a contentious divorce and had recently

participated in an unsuccessful mediation and that defendant fled

the area and remained in hiding until he was arrested).

(b) As a matter of Georgia statutory law, “[t]o warrant a

conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only

be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every

other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”

OCGA § 24-14-6. “However, not every hypothesis is a reasonable

18
one, and the evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference

or hypothesis — only those that are reasonable.” Adams, 317 Ga. at

348 (1) (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted). “Whether

alternative hypotheses are reasonable is principally a question for

the jury, and this Court will not disturb the jury’s finding unless it

is insupportable as a matter of law.” Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted).

Here, based on the evidence summarized above, we conclude

that the jury was free to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that

Appellant did not shoot Mitchell, or, at the least, knowingly

participate in Mitchell’s murder, and that she was killed by someone

else such as Appellant’s “brother.” Accordingly, the evidence was

also sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions under OCGA § 24-

14-6. See Taylor v. State, 313 Ga. 5, 9-10 (867 SE2d 88) (2021)

(affirming murder conviction under circumstantial-evidence statute

where the evidence showed that defendant went to the area where

the victim was shot only minutes before shooting; that after the

shooting, he emerged looking distraught and was pacing the room;

19
that defendant made inconsistent statements to police officers; that

defendant and victim had a lengthy, unusual conversation the day

before the shooting; and that ballistics evidence showed that

defendant’s gun fired the fatal shot; and based on this evidence, the

jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable defendant’s

alternative theories that a stranger or a family member killed the

victim or that the victim committed suicide and accept the State’s

theory that defendant shot and killed the victim).

3. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the

jury on party to a crime. We identify no error.

The trial court charged the jury as follows:

Every party to a crime may be charged with and
convicted of commission of the crime. A person is a party
to a crime only if that person directly commits the crime
or intentionally helps in the commission of the crime. Any
party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime
may be prosecuted for commission of the crime upon proof
that the crime was committed, and that the person was a
party to it, even though the person alleged to have directly
committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted
or is not amenable to justice.

“[T]o authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be

20
slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” McClure v.

State, 306 Ga. 856, 863 (1) (834 SE2d 96) (2019). “Conviction as a

party to a crime requires proof that the defendant shared a common

criminal intent with the principal perpetrator of the crime, which

may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before,

during, and after the offense.” Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 732 (2)

(a) (864 SE2d 85) (2021). While Appellant argues the State did not

advance the party-to-a-crime theory, “even if the party requesting a

charge on a particular theory did not advance that theory, that

instruction is authorized as long as slight evidence supports the

theory of the charge.” Bowman v. State, 317 Ga. 457, 461 (2) (a) (893

SE2d 735) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, there was at least slight evidence that Appellant was a

party to the crimes. The evidence showed that Appellant texted

Mitchell late at night on December 30, 2018, to coordinate a place

for them to meet; that, by means of those text messages, he directed

her to Glen Emerald Park, where she was found dead the following

day; and that, during the course of their correspondence, Appellant

21
told Mitchell that both he and his “brother” would be present and

that his “brother” would provide her with the marijuana. This

constituted at least slight evidence from which a jury could conclude

that, at a minimum, Appellant was involved in the events leading

up to and including Mitchell’s murder, and thus, was a party to the

crimes.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on

such a theory. See Leeks v. State, 303 Ga. 104, 106-107 (2) (810 SE2d

536) (2018) (holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the

jury on party to a crime where the State did not indict defendant as

such nor rely upon such theory in presenting its case to the jury, but

there was testimony that defendant discussed robbing the store with

his two co-indictees and that he fled the scene of the crime with one

of his co-indictees, which was “at least slight evidence” supporting

the party-to-a-crime theory). See also Meadows v. State, 316 Ga. 22,

24-25 (2) (885 SE2d 780) (2023) (holding that the evidence was

constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of

malice murder and related crimes as at least a party to the crimes

22
where the evidence showed that defendant and an unidentified

driver arranged to meet the victim, that they met the victim at a gas

station, and that either defendant or the driver shot and killed the

victim from inside the driver’s vehicle).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided August 13, 2024 — Reconsideration denied September 17,

2024.

Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Johnson.

Pearce, LLC, Forrest G. Pearce, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Thomas L. Williams, Deborah

D. Wellborn, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan

H. Hill, Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General,

Elizabeth H. Brock, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

23

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