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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 15, 2024

S24A0588. TEDDER v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

In October 2015, a jury found Dolonte Tedder guilty of malice

murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Quleon Glass. 1 This is the second appearance of Tedder’s case in this

1 The crimes occurred on September 8, 2014. On December 12, 2014, a

Fulton County grand jury indicted Tedder and co-indictees Jacquavious
Eggleston and Teandria Tabb for various offenses. Tedder was indicted for
participation in criminal street gang activity (Count 1), malice murder (Count
2), felony murder (Counts 3-5), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon
Glass (Count 6), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon Cedrick
Gifford (Count 7), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 9). Eggleston was indicted on each count, as well as an additional count
of making false statements (Count 8). Tabb was indicted on Counts 2-4, 6-7,
and 9. Eggleston and Tabb pleaded guilty and testified against Tedder at trial.
Tedder was tried alone before a jury from October 26 to October 28, 2015,
and was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Tedder to serve
life in prison on Count 2; a concurrent term of 15 years on Count 1; a concurrent
term of 20 years on Count 7; and a consecutive term of 5 years on Count 9. The
remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Tedder filed a
timely motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. The trial
court granted in part the amended motion for new trial, finding that trial
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. We reversed the trial
Court. See State v. Tedder, 305 Ga. 577 (826 SE2d 30) (2019)

(“Tedder I”). Following the trial court’s denial of his motion for new

trial, Tedder appeals, arguing that the evidence at trial was

insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court committed

reversible error in two respects, and that trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. We set forth the facts of this case in Tedder I:

[O]n the afternoon of September 8, 2014, [co-indictee
Teandria Tabb] was hanging out with her boyfriend Glass
and his friend Tedder. During that time, Glass received a
call from [co-indictee] Eggleston, who wanted a ride to a
College Park apartment complex. Tabb, Glass, and
Tedder then got into Tabb’s vehicle and drove to pick up
Eggleston. When the four arrived at the College Park
apartment complex, Eggleston exited the vehicle to speak
to a group congregated around several parked cars.
Shortly thereafter, Glass exited the vehicle, as did
Tedder, who did not appear to know the people outside
the vehicle. Ten minutes later, Eggleston, Glass, and

court’s ruling in State v. Tedder, 305 Ga. 577 (826 SE2d 30) (2019), and
remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the remaining grounds
of Tedder’s motion for new trial. Tedder thereafter amended his motion for new
trial on two occasions. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
as amended, on November 29, 2023. Tedder filed a timely notice of appeal, and
the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
2
Tedder reentered the car, and Glass instructed Tabb to
follow two other cars. Glass was sitting in the front
passenger seat, Eggleston was sitting behind Tabb, and
Tedder was sitting behind Glass.
Tabb testified that she followed the cars to a house
near Godby Road, where all three cars parked, and
Eggleston again exited the car to speak with people
outside the house. When he returned, Eggleston
instructed Tabb to continue following the other two cars.
The other cars drove erratically, and, when Tabb would
lose track of them, Eggleston used his phone to
communicate with persons in the other cars to find out
where to meet up. No one in the car questioned what was
happening or asked to be let out of the car. According to
Tabb, she continued driving, directed by Eggleston, for
about twenty minutes, during which time she came to the
conclusion that the purpose of the drive was to locate a
certain group of people.2 At some point during the drive,
Tabb stopped at a light on Godby Road. While at the light,
she heard Glass say “you just want to shoot at them.”3
Tabb recalled that no one in the car seemed surprised by,
objected to, or questioned Glass’s statement.
When the light turned green, Tabb drove the car
through the intersection, and, shortly thereafter, Tabb
heard gunshots ring from Glass’s weapon.4 When Tabb
heard Glass fire his gun, she also saw, in her peripheral
vision, Eggleston stand up through her open sunroof.

2 Tabb testified that she came to this conclusion because she heard
someone in the back of the car make statements such as, “we can’t find them,”
“they’re not here no more,” “they just not out here,” and “let’s just go … they
ran, they’re not out here no more.” Tabb believed it was Eggleston who made
these statements, and she, once again, testified that no one else in the car
questioned these statements or asked to be let out of the car
3 Neither Tabb’s nor Eggleston’s trial testimony indicated whom Glass

was referencing with this statement.
4 Tabb testified that Glass “carried a weapon everywhere.”

3
Tabb could not see what Tedder was doing or whether he
had a gun due to a large laundry basket obstructing her
vision. During the commotion, she also recalled hearing
someone yell, “They were shooting back, they were
shooting back.” Tabb did not see that Glass was wounded
until after she drove away from the shooting.
Eggleston testified that he and Glass were friends
and fellow members of “Yung Fame,” which Eggleston
characterized as a rap group but which a detective with
the College Park Police Department characterized as
having been known to be involved in “gang activity.”
Eggleston stated that Tedder was not a member of Yung
Fame, that he did not know Tedder, and that he first met
Tedder on the day of Glass’s death. Eggleston explained
that, while at the College Park apartment complex, he
was speaking with other Yung Fame members regarding
an attempt earlier in the day by a member of the Sex
Money Murder (“S.M.M.”) gang to shoot Davon Lewis,
another Yung Fame member. He also explained that [the
occupants of] the two cars he instructed Tabb to follow
were looking for members of the S.M.M. gang to exact
revenge for the earlier attempted shooting. Eggleston
testified that Tedder did not know any of the people at the
apartment complex and did not “participate in [the Yung
Fame members’] talking about . . . what was going on.”
Eggleston admitted to having a .40-caliber handgun,
which he fired while he was standing through the sunroof,
and he confirmed that Glass had a gun, although he did
not recall the type of gun. Eggleston was the only witness
who testified that Tedder was armed,5 but he also
testified that he could not see whether Tedder shot his
weapon because the laundry basket obstructed his view.

5 While Eggleston claimed that he could recall specifically that Tedder

was riding in the vehicle with a gun on his leg, Eggleston was unable to recall
whether the gun was a rifle, a shotgun, or a handgun.
4
When Eggleston sat back down in the vehicle, he saw that
Glass had suffered a gunshot wound to the head, and he
directed Tabb to a hospital.
Cedrick Gifford, who was present at the crime scene
during the shooting, testified that . . . [a]s he was
walking along Godby Road, he saw a car drive past him,
and he saw someone shooting from the car; Gifford
sustained a gunshot wound to his arm. . . .
Dr. Michael Heninger, the forensic pathologist from
the Fulton County Medical Examiner’s Office, concluded
that Glass’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the
back of his head. Though Dr. Heninger was unable to
locate a bullet during the autopsy, he testified that the
entry wound was circular and “smaller than average”
when compared to the typical wound inflicted by a
handgun and that the angle of the shot was “straight-
on.” . . .
Finally, the State offered as a witness Omar Stuart,
an ex-boyfriend of Tedder’s sister. Stuart claimed that he
made contact with Tedder after learning of the shooting,
and Tedder asked Stuart for a ride. Stuart, accompanied
by his father, picked up Tedder and took Tedder back to
Stuart’s home. Stuart testified that, upon arriving at his
home, Tedder gave him two pistols. Stuart told Tedder
that he did not want the pistols and did not ask Tedder
for any details regarding the guns, but proceeded to put
the pistols in a shoebox and to hide them in his closet.
Stuart testified that, a few days later, Tedder returned to
Stuart’s home and took the guns. . . .
Based on the totality of the evidence presented at
trial, the State argued that Tedder, sitting behind Glass,
was the only person who could have fired the shot that
killed Glass. Defense counsel argued that Tedder was
merely present in the vehicle, that he did not participate
in planning or executing the shootout, and that he was

5
not armed. Tedder’s counsel also attacked Eggleston’s
credibility, calling him a “liar” and pointing out the
inconsistencies in Eggleston’s testimony about Tedder’s
having a gun. Tedder’s counsel further argued, consistent
with Dr. Heninger’s testimony on cross-examination, that
Eggleston fired the fatal shot. Ultimately, however, the
jury found Tedder guilty on all charges.

Tedder I, 305 Ga. at 577-581 (footnotes in original).

2. Tedder contends that the trial court erred by denying his

motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was

insufficient to prove he was a party to the crimes. Tedder also

contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction

for violation of the Georgia Gang Act. We are not persuaded.

(a) We turn first to Tedder’s claim that the trial court erred by

denying his motion for a directed verdict. In support of this claim,

Tedder points to testimony that he did not participate in planning

the drive-by shooting, arguing that the State failed to prove that he

had prior knowledge that the shooting would occur and, thus, failed

to prove that he was a party to the crimes. In Tedder’s estimation,

the evidence showed, at best, that he concealed the weapons after

the crimes and, as such, that he was an accessory after the fact, not

6
a party to the crimes. The evidence presented at trial belies this

claim.

The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal is the same as for
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction. Under this review, we must put aside any
questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of
witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the
resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of
fact. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a
matter of constitutional due process, we must determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Monroe v. State, 315 Ga. 767, 768 (1) (884 SE2d 906) (2023)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

Tedder was charged individually and as a party to the crimes

of malice murder,6 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by

shooting bystander Gifford,7 and possession of a firearm during the

6 See OCGA § 16-5-1 (a) (“A person commits the offense of murder when

he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes
the death of another human being.”).
7 See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (“A person commits the offense of

aggravated assaults when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon”).
7
commission of a crime. 8 To prove Tedder guilty of these charges, 9 the

State was required to show either that Tedder was the direct

perpetrator of the crimes — that is, that he personally possessed a

firearm and that he fired the shots that injured Gifford and killed

Glass — or that “he intentionally aided or abetted in the commission

of the crimes or intentionally advised, encouraged, counseled, or

procured someone else to commit the crimes.” Milton v. State, 318

Ga. 737, 742 (2) (900 SE2d 590) (2024) (citation and punctuation

omitted). And “[w]hile mere presence at the scene of the crime is not

sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime, criminal

intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct

8 See OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1) (prohibiting any person from “hav[ing] on

or within arm’s reach of his or her person a firearm . . . during the commission
of, or the attempt to commit . . . [a]ny crime against or involving the person of
another”).
9 Tedder was also charged with and found guilty of three counts of felony

murder (Counts 3-5) and an additional count of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (Count 6). However, because those counts merged for
sentencing or were vacated by operation of law, Tedder was not sentenced on
those counts. Thus, to the extent Tedder challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying those counts, any such argument is moot. See Eggleston
v. State, 309 Ga. 888, 890-891 (848 SE2d 853) (2020). We address the
sufficiency of the evidence to support Tedder’s conviction for participation in
criminal gang activity in Division 2 (b) below.
8
before, during, and after the offense.” Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450,

453 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“Whether the evidence supports such an inference is a question for

the jury.” Mohamed v. State, 307 Ga. 89, 90 (1) (834 SE2d 762)

(2019). Applying these principles, we conclude that the evidence

presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdicts, was constitutionally sufficient to support Tedder’s

convictions.

As to the convictions for malice murder and aggravated

assault, the evidence did not conclusively show, as Tedder argues,

that Tedder participated in planning the shooting. But that makes

no difference here because there was sufficient evidence from which

the jury could find, based on his conduct immediately before, during,

and after the crimes, that Tedder shared a common criminal intent

with the actual perpetrator. Specifically, Tabb testified that, before

the shooting, it became apparent to her from statements made by

one of the men — Eggleston, she assumed but was not certain —

that the purpose of her driving the three men around was to locate

9
a certain group of people. She further testified that no one in the car,

including Tedder, questioned what was happening or asked to be let

out of the car, nor did anyone question Glass’s instruction that “you

just want to shoot at them.” She also testified that Glass, a close

friend of Tedder’s, “carried a gun everywhere.” The jury could infer

from this evidence that Tedder knew, or at least became aware

before the crimes, that a shooting would occur. See McGruder v.

State, 303 Ga. 588, 590-591 (II) (814 SE2d 293) (2018). In addition,

Eggleston testified that, immediately after the shooting, he saw

Tedder waving a gun outside the car window, and Glass, who was

sitting directly in front of Tedder, was shot in the back of the head.

Evidence also showed that Eggleston was armed with a firearm and

that he fired his weapon during the shooting. And there was

evidence that, after the shooting, Tedder fled the crime scene and

that he concealed two firearms at the home of his sister’s ex-

boyfriend. From this evidence, a rational jury was authorized to find

Tedder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and

aggravated assault, at least as a party to the crimes. See Leanos v.

10
State, 303 Ga. 666, 668-669 (2) (814 SE2d 332) (2018) (evidence

sufficient to support appellant’s convictions as party to the crimes

despite testimony that appellant did not participate in planning

crimes because evidence showed, among other things, that appellant

“became aware of the plan” before the shooting, agreed to be the get-

away driver, and helped to conceal firearm used in the crimes).

Compare Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. 277, 285 (3) (a) (830 SE2d 90)

(2019) (purported accomplice’s “conduct before, during, and after

[shooting] did not indicate an intent to aid or abet appellant in any

of the crimes charged” where purported accomplice drove victim to

crime scene for drug deal during which victim was killed but did not

flee scene with assailants and instead reported shooting to police

and disclosed that he and victim were present for drug deal).

As to the conviction for possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony, Eggleston testified that Tedder was armed

with a gun during the crimes, which is sufficient to sustain the

11
conviction as a matter of federal constitutional due process. 10 See

State v. Thomas, 311 Ga. 407, 420 (4) (858 SE2d 52) (2021)

(concluding that accomplice’s “testimony alone was sufficient to

support [appellant’s] convictions as a matter of due process under

the federal Constitution”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by

denying Tedder’s motion for a directed verdict.

(b) Tedder also argues that the State failed to present sufficient

evidence to support his conviction for participation in criminal gang

activity. More specifically, Tedder contends that the State failed to

prove either that Yung Fame was a “criminal street gang,” as that

term is defined in Georgia’s Gang Act, OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq., or

that Tedder was associated with Yung Fame. We conclude that the

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that Yung

Fame was a gang for purposes of the Gang Act and that Tedder was

associated with the gang.

Tedder was convicted of violating the Gang Act by

10 Tedder does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter

of Georgia statutory law.
12
participating in criminal gang activity through the commission of

murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon as an associate of Yung Fame. See OCGA §§ 16-15-4 (a) (“It

shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a

criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang

activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in

paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3.”); 16-15-3 (1) (J) (enumerated

offenses include “[a]ny criminal offense . . . that involves violence,

possession of a weapon, or use of a weapon”). And to convict Tedder

of violating the Gang Act, the State was required to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt (1) that Yung Fame was a “criminal street gang”

within the meaning of the Gang Act; (2) that Tedder was associated

with Yung Fame; (3) that Tedder committed at least one of the

predicate acts of malice murder, felony murder, or aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon; and (4) that the commission of those

offenses was intended to further the interests of Yung Fame. See

Monroe, 315 Ga. at 768 (1); Overstreet v. State, 312 Ga. 565, 572-573

(1) (b) (864 SE2d 14) (2021). Tedder’s arguments on appeal concern

13
the first and second elements, namely, whether the State proved

that Yung Fame was a “criminal street gang” and whether Tedder

was associated with Yung Fame.

OCGA § 16-15-3 (2) defines “criminal street gang” as “any

organization, association, or group of three or more persons

associated in fact, whether formal or informal, which engages in

criminal gang activity.” Tedder argues that the State failed to prove

that Yung Fame engaged in “criminal gang activity” because, he

says, the State did not present any evidence about the group’s

involvement in such activity beyond the crimes of which he was

found guilty in this case. It is true that “the commission of an

enumerated offense by the defendant is not itself sufficient to prove

the existence of a ‘criminal street gang’ because ‘an isolated offense

by a single member does not fulfil’ the statutory requirement of a

‘group of three or more persons which engages in criminal gang

activity.’” Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 209 (1) (b) (830 SE2d 160)

(2019) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 807 (2) (671 SE2d

497) (2009)) (cleaned up). “But we have also clarified that evidence

14
that multiple gang members conspired to engage in underlying

crimes constituting ‘criminal gang activity,’ as defined in OCGA §

16-15-3 (1) and (2), can be proof of a gang’s existing, ongoing criminal

activity.” Boyd, 306 Ga. at 209 (1) (b) (emphasis in original; citation

and punctuation omitted).

Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that

Yung Fame was a group of three or more persons that conspired to

engage in “criminal gang activity” as defined by OCGA § 16-15-3 (1)

and that Tedder was associated with Yung Fame. The evidence

showed that members of Yung Fame were in each of the three cars

that left the apartment complex before the shooting, with two

members — Glass and Eggleston — riding in a single vehicle, which

supports the reasonable inference that Yung Fame had more than

three members. In addition, Eggleston testified that Glass was a

member of Yung Fame, an investigating officer testified that Yung

Fame was “known to be involved in gang activity,” and Tabb

confirmed that Glass was involved in “gang activity.” And the

15
meeting of the Yung Fame members at the apartment complex to

plan the retaliatory shooting established that the group conspired to

engage in crimes that constitute “criminal gang activity.” See Boyd,

306 Ga. at 209-210 (1) (b); McGruder, 303 Ga. at 592 (II) (before

drive-by shooting was carried out, gang members “‘engaged in

criminal gang activity’ when they gathered to plan the attack”);

Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 341-342 (1) (a) (781 SE2d 777) (2016)

(“[E]vidence of [appellant’s and his co-defendants’] conspiracy to

commit armed robbery was proof of their existing, ongoing criminal

activity.”). Though Eggleston testified that Tedder was not a

member of Yung Fame, evidence that Tedder participated in the

retaliatory drive-by shooting with other Yung Fame members was

sufficient to prove that he was at least associated with Yung Fame,

which is all the statute requires. See OCGA § 16-15-4 (“It shall be

unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal

street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity . . . .”

(emphasis supplied)). Accordingly, Tedder’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violation of

16
the Georgia Gang Act fails.

3. Tedder next argues that, when responding to a jury question,

the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in violation of

OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1) (“It is error for any judge, during any phase

of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s

opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or

as to the guilt of the accused.”). Relatedly, Tedder asserts that the

trial court erred by excluding juror affidavits submitted in support

of his claim that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). We

address these arguments in turn.

(a) During deliberations, the jury requested to see transcripts

that were used to refresh the recollection of two investigating

officers who testified at trial. The transcripts were not admitted into

evidence, however, and both the prosecutor and Tedder’s counsel

agreed that the transcripts could not be provided to the jury. The

jurors were brought to the courtroom, where the foreperson

explained that they wanted to review the transcripts because they

disagreed about the substance of the officers’ testimony and wanted

17
to understand why shell casings recovered at the crime scene were

not admitted into evidence at trial. In response, the trial judge

explained:

[I]f you recall from the start, what I’ve been telling you is,
you’ve got to make your mind up based upon what you
hear and see in the courtroom. You’ve heard it, and you’ve
seen it. . . . The interviews that you refer to were not
introduced into evidence. The witnesses talked about
them. You have to use your recollection of what they said
about those things. And again, as I told you, don’t try to
be detectives. Just try to find out. You have the evidence.
That’s all the evidence that was put up. That’s all you are
to consider. That, together with applying your common
sense and drawing whatever inferences you think are
reasonable in light of the evidence you heard. But that’s
it. That’s it.

Tedder contends that this response amounted to an improper

comment on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) because,

he says, the trial judge effectively instructed the jurors to disregard

any concerns they had about a lack of evidence or conflicts in the

evidence. Tedder did not object to the response at trial, and, “as he

now concedes, his failure to make a timely objection precludes

appellate review, unless the alleged violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 (a)

constitutes plain error which affects substantive rights of the

18
parties.” Sturkey v. State, 319 Ga. 156, 158 (2) (902 SE2d 607) (2024)

(citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 17-8-57 (b). To

establish plain error, Tedder “must point to a legal error that was

not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious beyond reasonable

dispute, affected his substantial rights, and seriously affected the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Sturkey, 319 Ga. at 158 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

We see no error, let alone plain error, in the trial judge’s

response to the jury’s question because the response neither

pertained to a disputed issue of fact, see Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263,

272 (4) (882 SE2d 227) (2022) (“To violate [OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)],

the trial court’s comments must pertain to a disputed issue of fact.”

(citation and punctuation omitted)), nor conveyed “the judge’s

opinion as to whether a fact at issue ha[d] or ha[d] not been proved

or as to the guilt of” Tedder, OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). Instead, the

trial judge’s explanation that the transcripts were not introduced

into evidence and, thus, were not available for viewing was the “type

of explanation” that amounts to “a permissible clarification of

19
procedure that does not address the credibility of witnesses or any

fact at issue in trial.” Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 262-263 (4) (824

SE2d 326) (2019) (trial judge did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)

by instructing jury to “pay special attention” to video footage

because, viewed in context, comment was simply “a straightforward

explanation that [the jury] would not have additional opportunities

to review the video during deliberations”); Linson v. State, 287 Ga.

881, 884 (700 SE2d 394) (2010) (no violation of OCGA § 17-8-57

where trial judge informed jury that video had been redacted to

include only relevant portions). As to the remainder of the response,

the trial judge did not, as Tedder argues, instruct the jury to

disregard a lack of evidence or conflicts in the evidence presented at

trial. Rather, the trial judge merely reiterated a point on which the

jury had already been charged — that the jury was duty-bound to

decide the case based solely on the evidence presented at trial and

any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom — which was a correct

statement of law. There was no error here, plain or otherwise, and

this claim fails.

20
(b) In a related enumeration, Tedder asserts that the trial court

erred by excluding under OCGA § 24-6-606 (b) (“Rule 606 (b)”)11

affidavits executed by two jurors that Tedder submitted at the

motion for new trial hearing in support of his claim that the trial

court’s response to the jury’s question violated OCGA § 17-8-57.

Tedder argues that the trial court’s response to the jury constituted

“extraneous prejudicial information” and that these affidavits were

admissible to demonstrate “the effect” the response “had on the

verdicts entered” in this case or, in other words, to show that he was

harmed by the purportedly improper response. But because we have

already concluded that there was no error in the trial court’s

11 Rule 606 (b) states:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
shall not testify by affidavit or otherwise nor shall a juror’s
statements be received in evidence as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon the jury deliberations or any other juror’s
mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental
processes in connection therewith; provided, however, that a juror
may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the juror’s attention,
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror, or whether there was a mistake in entering the
verdict onto the verdict form.
21
response to the jury’s question, any error in excluding evidence of

harm arising from that response is itself harmless. See Palmer v.

State, 310 Ga. 668, 677 (3) (853 SE2d 650) (2021) (“It is fundamental

that harm as well as error must be shown for reversal.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). And in any event, the jurors’ affidavits were

not admissible under Rule 606 (b) to show the “effect” of anything

upon the jury’s deliberations.

As we have explained, Rule 606 (b) “creat[es] a nearly

categorical bar on juror testimony, with only three specific

exceptions.” Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 51, 55 (2) (875 SE2d 649) (2022)

(Rule 606 (b)’s exceptions permit jurors to testify about whether “(A)

extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the

jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to

bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict

on the verdict form” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Here, while

“Rule 606 (b) permitted the jurors to testify on the question of

whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought

to their attention,” the Rule “prohibited them from testifying as to

22
how such information affected their deliberations or the verdict,” the

precise purpose for which Tedder sought to admit the affidavits. Id.

(emphasis supplied). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by

excluding the affidavits under Rule 606 (b).

4. Finally, Tedder asserts that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects. To succeed

on this claim, Tedder bears the burden of showing “that his counsel’s

performance both was deficient (objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances) and caused him prejudice (shown by establishing a

reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been

different absent counsel’s deficient performance).” Harmon v. State

319 Ga. 259, 265 (3) (903 SE2d 28) (2024). See also Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984). Critically, a defendant must show both “deficient

performance and prejudice through competent evidence, for a silent

or ambiguous record is not sufficient to overcome the strong

presumption of reasonable performance.” Thorpe v. State, 304 Ga.

266, 268 (2) (a) (818 SE2d 547) (2018) (citation and punctuation

23
omitted).

(a) Tedder’s first claim of ineffective assistance concerns trial

counsel’s failure to present the testimony at trial of Devon Lewis,

the target of the attempted shooting that preceded the retaliatory

drive-by shooting during which Glass was killed. Tedder did not

present Lewis’s testimony at the hearing on his motion for new trial

and instead relied on a transcript of Lewis’s unsworn statement to

police. The trial court rejected this claim, concluding that Lewis’s

unsworn statement to police was insufficient to establish prejudice.

On appeal, Tedder primarily argues that the trial court erred by

refusing to consider Lewis’s unsworn statement to police in

resolving this claim because, he insists, unsworn statements are

“legally acceptable substitutes” for witness testimony. As our

precedent plainly demonstrates, Tedder is incorrect.

When a defendant asserts that trial counsel was deficient for

failing to present the testimony of a witness at trial, he “may not

rely on hearsay and speculation, including prior unsworn

statements, to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness

24
claim.” Neely v. State, 302 Ga. 121, 124 (2) (805 SE2d 18) (2017)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Rather, he must present “either

testimony from the uncalled witness or a legally recognized

substitute” for the witness’s testimony. Harris v. State, 304 Ga. 652,

655 (2) (a) (821 SE2d 346) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

And our precedent is clear that “unsworn statements to police are

not a legally acceptable substitute for witness testimony needed to

prove prejudice.” Id. at 656 (2) (b). See also Palmer v. State, 310 Ga.

668, 678-679 (4) (853 SE2d 650) (2021); Manriquez v. State, 285 Ga.

880, 881 (2) (684 SE2d 650) (2009) (noting that “an affidavit” is “a

legally recognized substitute” for an uncalled witness’s testimony

and that “copies of [witness’s] unsworn statements to police” are

insufficient to carry burden of proving prejudice). As Tedder relies

only on a transcript of Lewis’s unsworn statement to police, the trial

court correctly concluded that Tedder cannot carry his burden of

proving prejudice with respect to this claim. Accordingly, this

enumeration presents no basis for reversal.

(b) Tedder next asserts that trial counsel was deficient for

25
failing to introduce into evidence surveillance video footage from the

hospital to which Glass was taken after the shooting. According to

Tedder, this footage was crucial to his defense because it showed

that Eggleston, not Tedder, disposed of the guns and would have

raised reasonable doubt about Tedder’s participation in the crimes.

The footage was offered as an exhibit to Tedder’s amended motion

for new trial and is part of the appellate record. Nevertheless, our

review of this claim is frustrated by Tedder’s failure to direct this

Court to the pertinent portion of the video footage.

As this Court has emphasized time and again, we are “not

required to scour the record for support for an appellant’s

arguments.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 144 (3) (a) (829 SE2d 321)

(2019). Rather, the burden is on Tedder, the party alleging error, to

show it by the record. See Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 426 (5) (d) (ii)

(897 SE2d 856) (2024). Though at least a portion of the video footage

is part of the appellate record, Tedder cites only generally to the

footage, which has a running time of more than an hour, and fails to

direct the Court to the specific portion that purportedly supports

26
this claim. And despite reviewing the video footage in its entirety,

we are unable to identify the relevant portion of the footage, which,

from our review, does not appear to depict the events that Tedder

says it does. 12 In light of these circumstances, Tedder has not

established how introducing the surveillance video footage into

evidence at trial could have helped his defense and therefore has not

established that counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard.

See id.; Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 874 (3) (a) n.5 (742 SE2d 707)

(2013) (“An ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to disprove

the strong and continuing presumption of competent

performance. Therefore, where the record is incomplete or unclear

about counsel’s actions, we will presume that he did what he should

have done.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

12 We note that some portion of the video footage appears to be missing

from the record before us. The video footage comprises two electronic files; the
footage shown on the first file concludes at approximately 7:00 p.m. on the day
of the crimes, and the footage on the second file resumes at approximately 8:00
p.m. As a general matter, the appellant bears the burden of ensuring that the
appellate record is complete. See Ware v. State, 279 Ga. 17, 18 (2) (608 SE2d
643) (2005) (“When a portion of the evidence bearing upon the issues raised by
the enumerations of error is not brought up in the appellate record so that this
court can make its determination from a consideration of it all, an affirmance
as to that issue must result.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
27
(c) In his final claim of ineffective assistance, Tedder contends

that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to sufficiently

cross-examine Eggleston regarding his initial untruthful statements

to police, why he altered his account of the crimes, and his

subsequent plea agreement with the State. More specifically, Tedder

complains that his trial counsel did not elicit testimony from

Eggleston that investigating officers pressured him to change his

account of the crimes.

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel detailed his

strategic approach for Eggleston’s cross-examination. Trial counsel

pursued a two-pronged defense in an effort to rebut the State’s

theories that Tedder either was the direct perpetrator of the crimes

or was a party to the crimes. To that end, counsel sought to

demonstrate that Tedder both was unarmed and was merely present

during the crimes. As to his strategy for cross-examining Eggleston,

trial counsel explained that he did not want to question Eggleston

too extensively about his changing statements because he did not

know what the exact substance of Eggleston’s responses might be

28
and he was concerned about eliciting testimony unfavorable to

Tedder. Trial counsel instead decided “to focus on the fact that

[Eggleston] had a gun,” that “[h]e admitted to firing it, and that he

admitted to firing it outside the vehicle,” essentially seeking to paint

Eggleston as the person directly responsible for Glass’s death. And

on cross-examination, Eggleston testified that Tedder was not a

member of Yung Fame and did not know any of the Yung Fame

members prior to the crimes, that Eggleston made conflicting

statements about who disposed of the firearms after the shooting,

and that Eggleston initially lied to police before changing his story

and accepting a plea deal. Trial counsel also elicited testimony that

Eggleston was charged with the same crimes as Tedder but that,

pursuant to his plea agreement with the State, he was sentenced to

serve 20 years in prison while Tedder faced life in prison if convicted.

“Decisions about what particular questions to ask on cross-

examination are quintessential trial strategy and will rarely

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. In particular, whether to

impeach prosecution witnesses and how to do so are tactical

29
decisions.” Davis, 306 Ga. at 146 (2) (e) (citation and punctuation

omitted). In light of the cross-examination trial counsel conducted

and counsel’s testimony at the motion for new trial hearing, Tedder

has not shown that trial counsel’s strategic approach to cross-

examining Eggleston was patently unreasonable. See id.; Smith v.

State, 303 Ga. 643, 648 (III) (B) (814 SE2d 411) (2018).

Moreover, Tedder has failed to present evidence that Eggleston

changed his account of the crimes as a result of pressure from police.

In support of this claim, Tedder generally points to a transcript and

video-recording of Eggleston’s unsworn interview with police during

which Eggleston changed his account of the crimes, which Tedder

submitted in support of his motion for new trial. But Tedder does

not explain — and it is not apparent to us — how this evidence

demonstrates that Eggleston’s altered statement was coerced by the

police, and the mere fact that Eggleston changed his account of the

crimes while being questioned by police does not establish that he

did so as a result of police coercion. See Redding v. State, 307 Ga.

722, 727 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 282) (2020) (appellant failed to

30
demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to

cross-examine witness about possible prison sentence the witness

faced in connection with criminal charges brought before the witness

testified because appellant failed to present evidence that the

witness “had any sort of plea deal with the State . . . in exchange for

his statement to police or his testimony at trial”). For these reasons,

this claim, like the others, fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

320 Ga. 29
FINAL COPY

S24A0588. TEDDER v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

In October 2015, a jury found Dolonte Tedder guilty of malice

murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Quleon Glass.1 This is the second appearance of Tedder’s case in this

1 The crimes occurred on September 8, 2014. On December 12, 2014, a

Fulton County grand jury indicted Tedder and co-indictees Jacquavious
Eggleston and Teandria Tabb for various offenses. Tedder was indicted for
participation in criminal street gang activity (Count 1), malice murder (Count
2), felony murder (Counts 3-5), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon
Glass (Count 6), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon Cedrick
Gifford (Count 7), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 9). Eggleston was indicted on each count, as well as an additional count
of making false statements (Count 8). Tabb was indicted on Counts 2-4, 6-7,
and 9. Eggleston and Tabb pleaded guilty and testified against Tedder at trial.
Tedder was tried alone before a jury from October 26 to October 28, 2015,
and was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Tedder to serve
life in prison on Count 2; a concurrent term of 15 years on Count 1; a concurrent
term of 20 years on Count 7; and a consecutive term of five years on Count 9.
The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Tedder filed
a timely motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. The
trial court granted in part the amended motion for new trial, finding that trial
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. We reversed the trial
court’s ruling in State v. Tedder, 305 Ga. 577 (826 SE2d 30) (2019), and
remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the remaining grounds
of Tedder’s motion for new trial. Tedder thereafter amended his motion for new
trial on two occasions. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
as amended, on October 30, 2023. Tedder filed a timely notice of appeal, and
Court. See State v. Tedder, 305 Ga. 577 (826 SE2d 30) (2019)

(“Tedder I”). Following the trial court’s denial of his motion for new

trial, Tedder appeals, arguing that the evidence at trial was

insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court committed

reversible error in two respects, and that trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. We set forth the facts of this case in Tedder I:

the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
2
near Godby Road, where all three cars parked, and
Eggleston again exited the car to speak with people
outside the house. When he returned, Eggleston
instructed Tabb to continue following the other two cars.
The other cars drove erratically, and, when Tabb would
lose track of them, Eggleston used his phone to
communicate with persons in the other cars to find out
where to meet up. No one in the car questioned what was
happening or asked to be let out of the car. According to
Tabb, she continued driving, directed by Eggleston, for
about twenty minutes, during which time she came to the
conclusion that the purpose of the drive was to locate a
certain group of people.2 At some point during the drive,
Tabb stopped at a light on Godby Road. While at the light,
she heard Glass say “you just want to shoot at them.”3
Tabb recalled that no one in the car seemed surprised by,
objected to, or questioned Glass’s statement.
When the light turned green, Tabb drove the car
through the intersection, and, shortly thereafter, Tabb
heard gunshots ring from Glass’s weapon.4 When Tabb
heard Glass fire his gun, she also saw, in her peripheral
vision, Eggleston stand up through her open sunroof.
Tabb could not see what Tedder was doing or whether he
had a gun due to a large laundry basket obstructing her
vision. During the commotion, she also recalled hearing
someone yell, “They were shooting back, they were
shooting back.” Tabb did not see that Glass was wounded

2 Tabb testified that she came to this conclusion because she heard
someone in the back of the car make statements such as, “we can’t find them,”
“they’re not here no more,” “they just not out here,” and “let’s just go … they
ran, they’re not out here no more.” Tabb believed it was Eggleston who made
these statements, and she, once again, testified that no one else in the car
questioned these statements or asked to be let out of the car.
3 Neither Tabb’s nor Eggleston’s trial testimony indicated whom Glass

was referencing with this statement.
4 Tabb testified that Glass “carried a weapon everywhere.”

3
until after she drove away from the shooting.
Eggleston testified that he and Glass were friends
and fellow members of “Yung Fame,” which Eggleston
characterized as a rap group but which a detective with
the College Park Police Department characterized as
having been known to be involved in “gang activity.”
Eggleston stated that Tedder was not a member of Yung
Fame, that he did not know Tedder, and that he first met
Tedder on the day of Glass’s death. Eggleston explained
that, while at the College Park apartment complex, he
was speaking with other Yung Fame members regarding
an attempt earlier in the day by a member of the Sex
Money Murder (“S.M.M.”) gang to shoot Davon Lewis,
another Yung Fame member. He also explained that [the
occupants of] the two cars he instructed Tabb to follow
were looking for members of the S.M.M. gang to exact
revenge for the earlier attempted shooting. Eggleston
testified that Tedder did not know any of the people at the
apartment complex and did not “participate in [the Yung
Fame members’] talking about . . . what was going on.”
Eggleston admitted to having a .40-caliber handgun,
which he fired while he was standing through the sunroof,
and he confirmed that Glass had a gun, although he did
not recall the type of gun. Eggleston was the only witness
who testified that Tedder was armed,5 but he also testified
that he could not see whether Tedder shot his weapon
because the laundry basket obstructed his view. When
Eggleston sat back down in the vehicle, he saw that Glass
had suffered a gunshot wound to the head, and he
directed Tabb to a hospital.
Cedrick Gifford, who was present at the crime scene
during the shooting, testified that . . . [a]s he was

5 While Eggleston claimed that he could recall specifically that Tedder

was riding in the vehicle with a gun on his leg, Eggleston was unable to recall
whether the gun was a rifle, a shotgun, or a handgun.
4
walking along Godby Road, he saw a car drive past him,
and he saw someone shooting from the car; Gifford
sustained a gunshot wound to his arm.
...
Dr. Michael Heninger, the forensic pathologist from
the Fulton County Medical Examiner’s Office, concluded
that Glass’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the
back of his head. Though Dr. Heninger was unable to
locate a bullet during the autopsy, he testified that the
entry wound was circular and “smaller than average”
when compared to the typical wound inflicted by a
handgun and that the angle of the shot was “straight-on.”
...
Finally, the State offered as a witness Omar Stuart,
an ex-boyfriend of Tedder’s sister. Stuart claimed that he
made contact with Tedder after learning of the shooting,
and Tedder asked Stuart for a ride. Stuart, accompanied
by his father, picked up Tedder and took Tedder back to
Stuart’s home. Stuart testified that, upon arriving at his
home, Tedder gave him two pistols. Stuart told Tedder
that he did not want the pistols and did not ask Tedder
for any details regarding the guns, but proceeded to put
the pistols in a shoebox and to hide them in his closet.
Stuart testified that, a few days later, Tedder returned to
Stuart’s home and took the guns. . . .
Based on the totality of the evidence presented at
trial, the State argued that Tedder, sitting behind Glass,
was the only person who could have fired the shot that
killed Glass. Defense counsel argued that Tedder was
merely present in the vehicle, that he did not participate
in planning or executing the shootout, and that he was
not armed. Tedder’s counsel also attacked Eggleston’s
credibility, calling him a “liar” and pointing out the
inconsistencies in Eggleston’s testimony about Tedder’s
having a gun. Tedder’s counsel further argued, consistent

5
with Dr. Heninger’s testimony on cross-examination, that
Eggleston fired the fatal shot. Ultimately, however, the
jury found Tedder guilty on all charges.