CourtListener 10680205

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320 Ga. 502
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S24A1353. PETERSON v. VIE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

In this case, as in many others before this Court both recently

and over the decades, a party who wants the results of an election

thrown out has disregarded the clear, longstanding rule requiring

“parties seeking to undo an election to have done everything within

their power to have their claims decided before the election

occurred.” Catoosa County Republican Party v. Henry, 319 Ga. 794,

794 (906 SE2d 750) (2024). We therefore “dismiss the appeal without

reaching the merits (or lack thereof)” of the claim at issue in this

case. Id. at 795.

Christina Peterson, representing herself, appeals from the

dismissal of her challenge to the qualifications of Valerie Vie as a

candidate in this year’s election for the office of probate court judge
in Douglas County.1 Before the primary election, Peterson

challenged Vie’s qualifications in the local Board of Elections and

filed a petition for review of the Board’s adverse decision in superior

court. After the primary election, Peterson filed a second petition in

superior court. Both petitions in superior court were based solely on

the same substantive ground that Vie had not been a resident of

Douglas County for the time required to run for probate court judge.2

The pre-primary petition was denied, and Peterson was

unsuccessful in seeking to appeal from that denial. The direct appeal

now before us is from the dismissal of Peterson’s separate post-

1 Peterson also was a candidate in that election. There were no other

candidates who qualified to run for probate court judge. Peterson had
previously been elected as the Douglas County Probate Court judge in 2020.
However, she was removed from the bench on June 25, 2024, resulting in her
ineligibility to be elected to any judicial office for seven years. See Inquiry
Concerning Judge Peterson, 319 Ga. 316, 347 (3) (903 SE2d 645) (2024).
Nevertheless, a candidate’s qualifications can be challenged, not only by
another candidate, but also “by any aggrieved elector who was entitled to vote
for such person[.]” OCGA § 21-2-521. After Peterson’s removal from office, Vie
was appointed and sworn in to serve the remainder of Peterson’s term.
2 Subject to an exception that is not applicable here, “no individual shall

be eligible to offer for election to or hold the office of judge of the probate court
unless,” among other things, she “[i]s a resident of the county in which the
individual seeks the office of judge of the probate court for at least two years
prior to qualifying for election to the office and remains a resident of such
county during the term of office[.]” OCGA § 15-9-2 (a) (1) (B).
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primary petition.

Vie qualified as a candidate for probate court judge on March

8, 2024, and Peterson submitted her pre-primary challenge to the

local Board of Elections on March 14. After a March 26 hearing, the

Board unanimously denied the challenge on March 28, with one

abstention. Peterson filed her petition for review in superior court

on April 8, and Vie responded on May 7. After a May 8 hearing, the

superior court denied her petition for review and affirmed the

Board’s decision on May 9. Twelve days later, on May 21, the

Democratic primary election was held, and Vie was the winner.

Peterson did not move to stay that primary election. On Monday,

June 10, almost three weeks after the primary, Peterson filed an

application for discretionary appeal in this Court from the denial of

her pre-primary petition for review. On June 25, we denied that

application in Case No. S24D1153.

In the meantime, Peterson filed her verified post-primary

petition in superior court on May 30, nine days after the primary.

See OCGA § 21-2-520 et seq. That post-primary petition did not seek

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review of any administrative decision but was a direct challenge to

the result of the primary election on the ground that Vie was

ineligible for the office of probate court judge. See OCGA § 21-2-522

(2). Peterson twice filed a motion for recusal of the trial judge and

requested that consideration of each motion be expedited, and both

motions to recuse were promptly denied, but Peterson did not ask

the superior court to expedite the case. On June 12, Vie filed a

motion to dismiss Peterson’s post-primary petition, asserting that

the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata barred the

petition and, in reliance on Jordan v. Cook, 277 Ga. 155, 157 (587

SE2d 52) (2003), that the petition was moot due to Peterson’s failure

to move for a stay of the May 21 primary election. On June 21, the

superior court granted Vie’s motion to dismiss “for all the reasons

set forth in [Vie’s] motion and brief.” Peterson filed a notice of appeal

on the same day her post-primary petition was dismissed. However,

Peterson did not request expedited treatment of the appeal or an

expedited briefing schedule and instead filed her appellate brief on

August 12, 20 days after the case was docketed in this Court. Later

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on August 12, she moved to expedite the appeal and stay the general

election. We denied that motion on August 26.

When a party who brings an election contest fails to act with

dispatch to have the dispute resolved before the election in question,

this Court has long declined to grant the “drastic remedy” of

invalidating the election after it has happened. Miller v. Hodge, 319

Ga. 543, 549 (1) (905 SE2d 562) (2024). In Miller, we reaffirmed that,

although “the occurrence of a subsequent election does not affect this

Court’s authority to direct a trial court to declare an election result

invalid and to call for a new election,” we generally will not review

challenges to a candidate’s qualifications “once the succeeding

election at issue has occurred.” Id. at 545-546, 548 (1). Due to

prudential considerations grounded in the statutory framework for

elections,3 “litigants in election contests have a duty to expedite

3 We have explained that those prudential considerations include
“preventing the unnecessary expense of holding more than one election,
assuring the finality of results, and respecting the sanctity of elections wherein
the will of the people is the supreme law.” Henry, 319 Ga. at 798 (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also Miller, 319 Ga. at 548-549 (1). Moreover, in
Georgia’s election statutes, “the General Assembly has demonstrated that

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resolution of the dispute before an election is held[,] and . . . the

failure to make every effort to dispose of election disputes with

dispatch before a subsequent election may result in the dismissal of

the case.” Id. at 549 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). Peterson

argues that under Jordan (on which we relied in Miller), these

principles apply only when the general election has already taken

place. However, “the sort of policy considerations behind our

prudential rule . . . apply even more strongly in the context of an

impending primary election.” Henry, 319 Ga. at 799.

Peterson consistently failed to “utilize every available means

to protect [her] rights and to resolve” her challenges to Vie’s

qualifications prior to the primary election. Miller, 319 Ga. at 547

(1). The record shows that (until she filed her appellate brief in this

post-primary proceeding) Peterson never requested an expedited

final ruling, an expedited appeal, or a stay of the primary election.

See id. Instead, she effectively delayed the proceedings by using the

election contests are to be heard with the greatest of expedition.” Miller, 319
Ga. at 546 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Henry, 319 Ga. at
798.
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full time allotted instead of expediting her own filings. By waiting

until June 10 to file an application for a discretionary appeal from

the final order of the superior court in the pre-primary proceeding,

Peterson took the full 30 days allowed by statute. See OCGA §§ 5-6-

35 (d); 21-2-6 (e). Accordingly, the delay in consideration and final

disposition of Peterson’s challenge to Vie’s qualifications “is

attributable to [Peterson’s] failure to avail [herself] of the applicable

procedures of the Election Code,” by not promptly seeking to

expedite the pre-primary proceeding or to stay the primary election.

Miller, 319 Ga. at 549 (1).4

4 We note that, even if Peterson had done everything in her power to

resolve her challenge to Vie’s qualifications before the primary election,
Peterson failed to utilize every available means to resolve that challenge after
the primary election and before the general election. In this post-primary
proceeding, until she filed her appellate brief, Peterson never requested an
expedited final ruling, an expedited appeal, or a stay of the general election.
Instead, she once again delayed resolution of her claim by using the full time
allotted instead of expediting her own filings, when she took the full 20 days
allowed from the date of docketing to file her brief in this appeal. See Supreme
Court Rule 10 (1) (a). Peterson’s requests to expedite her motions for recusal
were her only efforts to expedite any proceedings until she had filed her brief
in this appeal. Thus, she failed to avail herself of the applicable procedures of
the Election Code when she instituted new litigation without promptly seeking
to expedite the proceeding or to stay the general election. See Miller, 319 Ga.
at 549 (1).
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For these reasons, the superior court correctly dismissed

Peterson’s post-primary petition, and we dismiss the appeal without

addressing the merits of Peterson’s enumerations of error regarding

the superior court’s other rulings. See Henry, 319 Ga. at 795; Miller,

319 Ga. at 544, 549 (1), 550 (2). Cf. Williams v. Heard, 302 Ga. 114,

116-118 (2) (805 SE2d 1) (2017) (where the case had to be remanded

for the superior court to dismiss an elections case as moot and this

Court addressed a recusal issue only in part, so as to require that a

new judge be selected to preside over the case on remand).

Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J.,
disqualified.

Decided December 10, 2024.

Election. Douglas Superior Court. Before Judge Brantley,

Senior Judge.

Christina J. Peterson, pro se.

O’Dell O’Neal Hungerford & Blanchard, Justin B. O’Dell,

Nicholas M. Booth, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 10, 2024