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320 Ga. 466
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S24A1063. WOOD v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Tabitha Wood killed her fiancé, Leroy Kramer; his body was

found two months later in the home he and Wood had shared. At

trial, Wood claimed self-defense, testified about the long history of

Kramer’s violence toward her, and presented testimony from an ex-

pert who concluded that Wood suffered from battered person syn-

drome. A jury convicted her of malice murder and other crimes.1

1 Kramer died on or about April 1, 2022. On February 15, 2023, a Hall

County grand jury returned an indictment charging Wood with malice murder
(Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), aggravated assault
(Count 4), exploitation of an elder person (Count 5), concealing the death of
another (Count 6), and financial transaction card theft (Count 7). After a jury
trial from March 13 to 24, 2023, the jury found Wood guilty of all counts. On
March 24, 2023, the trial court sentenced Wood to life in prison for malice mur-
der (Count 1), a consecutive prison sentence of ten years for concealing the
death of another (Count 6), and a concurrent sentence of three years for finan-
cial transaction card theft (Count 7). The trial court purported to merge the
remaining counts. Although the felony murder counts were actually vacated
by operation of law, and the trial court may have committed a merger error
with respect to the other counts, we decline to address that issue here because
any error benefited the defendant and the State has not challenged the merger
of these counts. See Ware v. State, 302 Ga. 792, 794-795 (3) (809 SE2d 762)
(2018); Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697-698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017). Wood
On appeal, Wood contends that the trial court erred by not al-

lowing her to introduce witness testimony about Kramer’s acts of

violence toward other women under OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) (Rule 405),

and that not admitting this evidence violated her constitutional

right to a complete defense. But the trial court did not abuse its dis-

cretion by not admitting this evidence of Kramer’s prior acts of vio-

lence under Rule 405 (b): that rule allows proof of specific instances

of a victim’s conduct to establish the victim’s character or a trait of

character when it is an essential element of a defense, but Wood

sought to support a claim of self-defense with this evidence, and a

victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense.

As for her constitutional claim, which we review only for plain error,

Wood has not shown that the trial court’s application of the standard

evidentiary rules at issue here was a clear and obvious violation of

her constitutional rights. So Wood’s convictions are affirmed.

timely filed a motion for new trial, which was later amended. After a hearing,
the trial court denied the motion for new trial on October 30, 2023. Wood timely
filed a notice of appeal on November 29, 2023. The appeal was docketed to the
August 2024 term of this Court and was orally argued on September 17, 2024.
2
1. The evidence at trial showed the following. Wood met and

moved in with Kramer sometime in 2020, and they were engaged in

February 2021. They lived in a home that had been owned by Kra-

mer’s late wife, and the homes on either side were occupied by his

late wife’s family members. In early June 2022, the family members

realized that no one had seen or heard from Kramer in months. On

June 4, 2022, Kramer’s stepdaughter, who lived out of state, called

the Hall County police and adult protective services to request a wel-

fare check. When a local sheriff’s deputy went to Kramer’s home on

June 6 for a wellness check, the home appeared “abandoned” and no

one came to the door.

Kramer’s stepdaughter filed a missing-person report with the

Hall County police. When deputies returned to the home on June 7

in response to the report, Wood came outside after “several

minutes.” She told the deputies that she last saw Kramer in April

and that he had died by suicide.

In the home, investigators found Kramer’s decaying body in the

bedroom. Based on the level of decomposition, the medical examiner

3
who performed Kramer’s autopsy estimated he had been deceased

for anywhere from “weeks to months,” and the exact amount of time

would depend on environmental factors not known to the medical

examiner. The medical examiner concluded that Kramer died from

traumatic injuries to his neck and that traumatic injuries to his

chest were also a “significant factor” that contributed to his death.

Investigators opined that a three-pound dumbbell found near Kra-

mer’s body was likely used to cause these injuries.

Wood testified that she and Kramer got into an argument that

escalated to his using physical violence against her on April 1, 2022.

At some point during the fight, Wood “blacked out.” Eventually she

kicked Kramer, got away from him, and ran into the woods near

their home where she stayed until morning. She testified that Kra-

mer was alive when she left their home because he was yelling

“B**ch, I’m going to kill you.” But sometime after she returned to

their home the next day, she “realized he was dead.” Wood said she

did not want to accept his death and did not report it to the police.

Wood also testified extensively about Kramer’s violence toward

4
her during their relationship. And she presented expert testimony

from a psychologist who had evaluated her and concluded she suf-

fered from battered person syndrome throughout her relationship

with Kramer, including on the night he was killed.

2. Wood contends that the trial court erred in not admitting

evidence about Kramer’s prior acts of violence against two other

women through the testimony of other witnesses. She claims that

this evidence should have been admitted under Rule 405 (b), a claim

we review for abuse of discretion, see White v. State, 319 Ga. 367,

376 (3) (903 SE2d 891) (2024), and that the failure to admit that

evidence violated her constitutional right to a complete defense.

Wood raised this constitutional claim for the first time in her motion

for new trial, so we review it for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103

(d); State v. Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259, 263 (2) (b) (818 SE2d

552) (2018).

(a) Before trial, Wood filed a “Notice of Defendant’s Intent to

Present Evidence of Acts of Violence by the Victim” under OCGA §

24-4-404 (Rule 404) (a) and (b) and Rule 405. The notice specified

5
acts of violence Kramer had committed against three women: A. S.,

J. P., and S. W. After a pre-trial hearing, the court ruled that if Wood

made a prima facie showing of self-defense, she could then testify to

her personal knowledge of Kramer’s prior violent acts against other

women to show “her reasonableness of fear or justification for self-

defense.” And it ruled that she could introduce testimony from other

witnesses about Kramer’s character for violence in the form of rep-

utation and opinion testimony. See OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) (“In all pro-

ceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a

person is admissible, proof shall be made by testimony as to reputa-

tion or by testimony in the form of an opinion.”).

At trial, the court ruled that Wood made a prima facie showing

of self-defense, so it allowed her to testify to her personal knowledge

of Kramer’s violent acts against other women to show her own state

of mind.2 The trial court maintained its earlier ruling that Wood

could call witnesses to testify about Kramer’s reputation but ruled

2 The trial court did not cite a specific rule of evidence to support its rul-

ing, and we express no opinion on the admissibility of this evidence, which has
not been challenged on appeal.
6
that the witnesses could not testify about Kramer’s specific bad acts

toward other women. See OCGA § 24-4-405 (a)-(b).

Wood testified that Kramer “told [her] about the things he had

done to women and he would laugh about it.” He spoke to her about

his relationships with three women — A. S., S. W., and J. P. Accord-

ing to Wood, Kramer told her that he and A. S. had lived together,

and Kramer had stalked, raped, and threatened A. S. He would go

to A. S.’s job, follow her, and threaten her. Wood and Kramer once

ran into A. S., and A. S. looked “kind of scared” and “very shocked.”

Kramer also told Wood that he had dated S. W. and “pulled a gun

on” her. And he told her that he lived with J. P. at one point and

“pulled a gun on” her too. Wood said that when Kramer spoke to her

about what he had done to these other women, it was “very shock-

ing” and felt threatening. She testified that hearing from Kramer

about what he had done to these other women made her even more

fearful of him because he was doing the same types of things to her.

After Wood testified, she proffered testimony from A.S. and

7
from S. W.’s children (S. W. was deceased).3 The proffer from S. W.’s

children did not include testimony about Kramer “pulling a gun” on

S. W. or any other specific act by Kramer. During her proffer, A. S.

testified that she had lived with Kramer and he was abusive. She

left Kramer’s home after he raped her and became physically vio-

lent.

After this proffer, Wood withdrew the request to introduce rep-

utation or opinion testimony through these witnesses but main-

tained that the trial court should allow her to call them to testify

about Kramer’s prior acts of violence against S. W. and A. S. She

also moved to introduce this testimony as prior consistent state-

ments under OCGA § 24-6-613 (c) (Rule 613). The trial court main-

tained its prior ruling that Wood could not introduce extrinsic evi-

dence of specific acts through these witnesses. And the trial court

also rejected Wood’s new argument that the testimony was admissi-

3 Wood did not proffer extrinsic evidence of Kramer’s violence toward J.

P.
8
ble under Rule 613, because it concluded that the witnesses’ testi-

mony would be “improper bolstering” and neither witnesses’ testi-

mony was a “prior consistent statement.”4

(b) Under our Evidence Code, the accused may offer evidence

of a “pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim” to prove “ac-

tion in conformity therewith” in limited circumstances. OCGA § 24-

4-404 (a) (2). When such evidence is admissible, it generally may be

introduced only “by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in

the form of an opinion.” OCGA § 24-4-405 (a). See also Copeland v.

State, 316 Ga. 452, 458 (3) (b) (888 SE2d 517) (2023) (explaining that

Rules 404 (a) and 405 are read together). That said, the accused may

offer proof of “specific instances” of the victim’s conduct if the trait

is “an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense.” See OCGA §

4 On appeal, Wood argues that the trial court erred in concluding that

the other witnesses’ testimony would be “improper bolstering.” But, as noted
above, that ruling was in response to Wood’s motion to admit those statements
as “prior consistent statements” under OCGA § 24-6-613 (c), and Wood no
longer contends on appeal that those statements should have been admitted as
prior consistent statements under Rule 613 (and in fact conceded at oral argu-
ment before this Court that the statements would not have been properly ad-
mitted under that Rule). Thus, the trial court’s “improper bolstering” ruling is
not properly before us on appeal.
9
24-4-405 (b).

The testimony from S. W.’s children and from A. S. about spe-

cific instances of Kramer’s conduct was not admissible under Rule

405 (b). We have held before that “[a] victim’s violent character is

pertinent to” a defendant’s claim of self-defense, but it is “not an es-

sential element of” that defense. Beck v. State, 310 Ga. 491, 498 (3)

(852 SE2d 535) (2020) (emphasis in original). Thus, evidence of a

victim’s character for violence generally may be admitted only in the

form of reputation or opinion testimony under Rule 405 (a), and not

by proof of “specific instances” of the victim’s conduct under Rule 405

(b). See OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (a); 24-4-405 (a)-(b). So the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by not admitting testimony from S. W.’s chil-

dren and from A. S. about specific instances of Kramer’s conduct.

See Beck, 310 Ga. at 498 (3).5

5 This Court has reserved the question whether prior acts of violence by

a victim could be admitted if they are relevant to a purpose other than to prove
the victim’s “character . . . in order to show action in conformity therewith.”
See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). See, e.g., Ward v. State, 318 Ga. 884, 902 (3) (c) (901
SE2d 189) (2024) (assuming without deciding that Rule 404 (b) applies to evi-
dence regarding the other acts of a victim, a victim’s prior violence may be

10
(c) Wood also contends that not allowing her to introduce the

other witnesses’ testimony about Kramer’s prior acts violated her

constitutional rights, “such as her right to a complete defense and to

call witnesses in her own defense,” citing the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution. She points out that the trial court

allowed her to testify about what Kramer told her about his prior

acts of violence against other women, and so she should have been

allowed to call other witnesses to testify about Kramer’s prior acts

of violence to show that she was credible.

Wood raised this constitutional claim for the first time in a mo-

tion for new trial, so we review it only for plain error. See OCGA §

24-1-103 (d); Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. at 263 (2) (b). To estab-

lish plain error, the trial court must have committed an error that

was not “affirmatively waived”; was “clear or obvious, rather than

admissible to “establish the defendant’s state of mind and the reasonableness
of the defendant’s use of force”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Copeland,
316 Ga. at 459 (3) (b) & n.7 (noting, in the context of an ineffective assistance
claim, that the admissibility of this evidence was “an open question” in Geor-
gia). That question is not properly before us here, however, because Wood
makes no such argument on appeal.
11
subject to reasonable dispute”; and affected the defendant’s “sub-

stantial rights.” See White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 119-120 (3) (823

SE2d 794) (2019) (punctuation omitted) (quoting State v. Kelly, 290

Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011)). If the defendant establishes

each of those things, then the appellate court has the discretion to

remedy the error if it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 120 (3).

Wood has failed to establish that the trial court committed a

clear or obvious error by not allowing her to call other witnesses to

testify about Kramer’s prior acts. The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution “guaran-

tees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a com-

plete defense,” but a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence

is “subject to reasonable restrictions.” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117,

121-122 (2) (829 SE2d 367) (2019) (citations and punctuation omit-

ted). As the United States Supreme Court has explained, state-law

rules excluding evidence from criminal trials “do not abridge an ac-

cused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’

12
or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” Id.

at 122 (2) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (118

SCt 1261, 140 LE2d 413) (1998)). Wood makes no argument that

Rule 405 or the trial court’s application of it is arbitrary or dispro-

portionate to its purposes. Nor does she offer any authority in sup-

port of her specific assertion that not allowing her to call the other

witnesses to support her credibility violated her right to a complete

defense. She has therefore failed to establish that the trial court

committed a clear or obvious error. See Sconyers v. State, 318 Ga.

855, 859 (1) (901 SE2d 170) (2024) (“For an error to be obvious for

purposes of plain error review, it must be plain under controlling

precedent or in view of the unequivocally clear words of a statute or

rule.” (punctuation omitted) (quoting Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 242

(3) (b) (869 SE2d 423) (2022))).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

13
Decided December 10, 2024.

Murder. Hall Superior Court. Before Judge Burton.

Jake A. Shapiro, for appellant.

Lee Darragh, District Attorney, Rachel M. Bennett, Harold A.

Buckler, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm,

Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Elizabeth

Rosenwasser, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: December 10, 2024

S24A1063. WOOD v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Tabitha Wood killed her fiancé, Leroy Kramer; his body was

found two months later in the home he and Wood had shared. At

trial, Wood claimed self-defense, testified about the long history of

Kramer’s violence toward her, and presented testimony from an ex-

pert who concluded that Wood suffered from battered person syn-

drome. A jury convicted her of malice murder and other crimes.1

1 Kramer died on or about April 1, 2022. On February 15, 2023, a Hall

County grand jury returned an indictment charging Wood with malice murder
(Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2, 3), aggravated assault (Count
4), exploitation of an elder person (Count 5), concealing the death of another
(Count 6), and financial transaction card theft (Count 7). After a jury trial from
March 13 to 24, 2023, the jury found Wood guilty of all counts. On March 24,
2023, the trial court sentenced Wood to life in prison for malice murder (Count
1), a consecutive prison sentence of ten years for concealing the death of an-
other (Count 6), and a concurrent sentence of three years for transaction card
theft (Count 7). The trial court purported to merge the remaining counts. Alt-
hough the felony murder counts were actually vacated by operation of law, and
On appeal, Wood contends that the trial court erred by not al-