CourtListener 10680136

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316 Ga. 30
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S23Y0445. IN THE MATTER OF WILLIE GEORGE DAVIS, JR.

PER CURIAM.

This is the third appearance of this disciplinary matter before

the Court, following the rejection of the petition for voluntary

discipline filed by Willie George Davis, Jr. (State Bar No. 213371),

after a formal complaint was filed against him. See In the Matter of

Willie George Davis, Jr., 311 Ga. 67 (855 SE2d 643) (2021) (“Davis

II”).1 This matter is now before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (the

“Review Board”) which recommends that Davis, a member of the

State Bar since 1996, be disbarred based on his violations of Rules

1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d),

8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct

1 Prior to Davis II, we granted the State Bar’s petition for appointment

of a special master. See In the Matter of Willie George Davis, Jr., Case No.
S19B0187 (Oct. 10, 2018) (“Davis I”).
(“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), which stem from Davis’s

mishandling of his sister’s estate and his nephew’s conservatorship

as well as his repeated failure to comply with orders of the Cobb

County Probate Court. After considering the record and Davis’s

exceptions to the Review Board’s report and recommendation, this

Court finds that given the circumstances of this case, disbarment is

appropriate.

1. The Facts and Procedural History.

Regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding Davis’s

misconduct, we have previously recounted as follows:

In 2012, Davis drafted a will for his sister, naming
himself as the executor of her estate, the guardian of his
nephew, and the conservator of his nephew’s funds. The
will specifically excepted Davis from the requirements to
post a fiduciary bond and to file inventories or annual
returns with the probate court, and Davis did not obtain
informed and written consent that his sister was aware of
the potential conflict of interest in having him serve
without bond as executor, conservator, and guardian
pursuant to the will he drafted. Davis was not aware that
his sister was suffering from breast cancer at the time he
drafted her will, and she died shortly thereafter. The
nephew was only 13 years old at the time of his mother’s
death and was the sole beneficiary of his mother’s estate.

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Davis filed a petition to admit the will to probate,
and the probate court appointed him to serve without
bond as executor, conservator, and guardian per the
terms of the will. The nephew was named a beneficiary of
his mother’s life insurance policy, the proceeds of which
were $157,277.48. Davis admitted that he received the
funds and placed them in his IOLTA account instead of a
conservator account. Moreover, although the Special
Master found that Davis did eventually establish a
conservator account and “transferred the funds to that
account,” Davis failed to maintain, and could not produce,
records of the funds held in the IOLTA account. He also
received the nephew’s Social Security benefit checks in
trust as the nephew’s custodian and conservator, but he
did not keep records of those funds, either.
In October 2016, the nephew reached the age of
majority (18), which terminated the testamentary
conservatorship by law. Thereafter, the nephew and
Davis had disagreements that led to Davis cutting off the
nephew’s cell phone service and making no further
mortgage payments on his deceased sister’s home, where
the nephew had been residing.
In May 2017, the nephew, through counsel, filed a
petition to suspend the conservatorship and to obtain a
final settlement of accounts of the estate and the
conservatorship. According to the probate court, “[a]n
extensive procedural odyssey ensued . . . including
multiple hearings, dozens of attempts to serve [Davis],
findings of contempt against [Davis], and multiple
orders of [Davis’s] incarceration.” First, the probate court
entered an order suspending Davis’s letters of
testamentary and issued a citation for him to appear and
make an accounting of estate and conservatorship assets
within 15 days. A deputy from the Fulton County Sheriff’s
Office then personally served Davis with the probate

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court’s order and citation. Davis, however, did not make
any accounting or appear at the hearing because he
“simply could not handle the emotion which welled up.
[He] was in denial and could not address the court
proceeding properly.” He explained that, beginning in
2016, he experienced a series of family deaths and life
changes that impacted him severely and that he failed to
address right away. In 2017, during the time of these
proceedings, his primary care physician prescribed him
medication for depression and anxiety, but he failed to
seek counseling as his physician directed him to do. He
also did not notify his nephew’s counsel or the probate
court about his mental illness or seek any relief from the
probate court’s requirements on that basis.
In June 2017, the probate court issued another order
directing Davis to file the accountings, and the court set
the matter for another hearing. But Davis did not file the
accountings or appear in court, and the probate court
issued another order for Davis to appear, to present the
accountings, and to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt. The probate court then entered an interim
judgment against Davis in the amount of $157,227.58, the
amount of the life insurance proceeds for which he had
not accounted, and attorney fees in the amount of
$11,891. Approximately one month before that order was
issued, Davis delivered a check to his nephew’s attorney
in the amount of $34,025.80, which was the amount that
remained in the conservatorship account. But Davis still
did not respond to the probate court’s “requests for
personal service of the court’s notices and demands,”
which resulted in the probate court directing service by
publication. Davis admitted that he was not opening
correspondence from the probate court during this time
due to his declining mental state, and after he failed to
appear at yet another hearing, the probate court issued a

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bench warrant for his arrest and issued an order finding
him in contempt. Davis eventually turned himself in to
jail in January 2018.
Following a hearing, the probate court entered a
criminal contempt finding, sentencing Davis to 20 days in
jail with credit for time served, and to pay a fine of $500;
the probate court also entered a civil contempt finding,
sentencing Davis to remain incarcerated and pay a fine of
$100 per day until such time as he purged his contempt
by filing accountings of the estate and conservatorship.
Because Davis “had been unable to put together anything
remotely [responsive] to the court’s demand” while
incarcerated, and because he had not been given his
medication while in custody, the judge released Davis to
allow him to get back on his medication, to gather the
records of the conservatorship and estate, and to file the
accountings in advance of a hearing in March 2018. The
judge also awarded the nephew additional attorney fees.
At two hearings, Davis presented some documentation of
his activities and expenditures on behalf of the estate and
conservatorship, as well as an inventory of the estate and
its annual returns, but failed to include complete bank
statements for the custodial account or any statements for
an account for the estate. After considering that evidence,
the probate court issued a judgment against Davis in
favor of his nephew in an amount of $9,971 for breaches
related to the estate and in the amount of $190,043.48 for
breaches related to the conservatorship.
Following the judgment, Davis failed adequately to
respond to his nephew’s post-judgment requests, which
caused the probate court to grant the nephew’s motion to
compel and request for attorney fees for having to file the
motion. Davis then failed to respond to the requests
within the time set forth in the order granting the motion
to compel, which caused him to be held in contempt and

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subject to additional attorney fees. Davis admitted that,
including amounts due for the attorney fees judgments,
but not including any statutory interest, the amount of
money he still owed to his nephew was $193,174.91.

Davis II, 311 Ga. at 68-70 (1). The Special Master recommended that

Davis be suspended from the practice of law for at least 18 months,

with reinstatement conditioned upon Davis providing proof that he

has satisfied the probate court judgment and that he was no longer

suffering from any mental disability that would make him unfit to

practice law. See id. at 75 (3) (b). But if Davis failed to meet the

above conditions within 60 days after the 18-month suspension

expired, the time-limited suspension would be converted

automatically to an indefinite suspension under the same

conditions, so that Davis’s nephew could seek relief for his loss under

the Client’s Security Fund. See id.

The Court rejected the Special Master’s recommendation,

reasoning that “to impose an indefinite suspension until the

reinstatement conditions are met would effectively result in Davis

being suspended for approximately 50 years if he continued paying

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restitution at the rate the record shows he is currently paying,” and

this Court does not allow suspensions of that length. Davis II, 311

Ga. at 75 (4). The Court also concluded that the reinstatement

conditions recommended by the Special Master for Davis were

“considerably less stringent than for disbarred attorneys, insofar as

Davis could remain suspended for far longer than five years but —

upon satisfying the conditions of his suspension — not be required

to re-certify his fitness before he resumes the practice of law.” Id. at

76 (4). The Court also noted that the recommended conditions

seemed “more punitive to Davis” because “the large discrepancy

between the amount he would be required to repay and his current

rate of repayment” meant that “the recommended conditions could

place Davis in a disciplinary purgatory: if he cannot finish paying

restitution, his discipline will be endless.” Id.

After Davis II, the State Bar took Davis’s deposition and filed

its motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the record,

including Davis’s deposition and unconditional admissions in his

petition for voluntary discipline, established as a matter of law that

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he violated GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II)

(a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5). The State Bar

elected not to proceed on the claims that Davis had violated GRPC

Rules 1.15 (I) (d), 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4).

After Davis failed to file a response to the motion for partial

summary judgment, the Special Master granted the motion, finding

that Davis had violated the above Rules by clear and convincing

evidence. The nephew then filed an amicus brief in which he harshly

criticized his uncle, providing details about Davis’s behavior toward

him while he was a minor.

After granting partial summary judgment, the Special Master

issued her second report and recommendation that Davis be

disbarred with reinstatement conditioned upon (1) his payment in

full of the probate judgment and (2) his obtaining a certification of

fitness to practice law from a licensed mental health professional.

Davis filed exceptions and requested review by the Review Board.

Subsequently, the State Bar filed a response.

In its report and recommendation, the Review Board adopted

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the Special Master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and

incorporated them by reference, concluding that the Special

Master’s recommendation of disbarment with conditions for

reinstatement was the appropriate level of discipline.

2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation.

(a) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In her second report and recommendation, the Special Master

summarized the procedural history of the disciplinary proceeding,

including that she had granted partial summary judgment as to

Davis’s violations of GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c),

1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5). The Special

Master also adopted the facts as stated by the Court in Davis II.

Regarding GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b),2 the Special Master

2 GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b) provide:

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concluded that Davis violated these rules by drafting his sister’s will

without first obtaining informed consent confirmed in writing that

his sister was aware of a potential conflict of interest in Davis

naming himself the executor of her will.

Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (a)3 (concerning segregation of

funds and recordkeeping), the Special Master concluded Davis

violated this rule by depositing his sister’s life insurance proceeds

into his IOLTA account, transferring the proceeds to his personal

informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation
after:
(1) consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0
(c);
(2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate
information about the material risks of and reasonable
available alternatives to the representation[;] and
(3) having been given the opportunity to consult with
independent counsel.
3 GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides:

A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third
persons that are in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer’s own funds or other
property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts
maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III)
(c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately
safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a
period of six years after termination of the representation.

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investment account, and failing to maintain accurate records.

Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (c),4 the Special Master

concluded Davis violated this rule by: (1) failing to deliver the full

amount of the life insurance proceeds to his nephew and “treat[ing]

[him] abysmally and failed in his basic duties to him as a child”; and

(2) failing to provide his nephew with an accounting of the life

insurance proceeds and by admitting that an accounting was not

possible because he did not maintain records of how he used the

funds.

Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (a),5 the Special Master

4 GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides:

Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or
third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted
by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property
that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.
5 GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (a) provides:

Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer
practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm,
association, or professional corporation, and who receives money
or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity,
shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as
required by these rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and

11
concluded Davis violated this rule because, as a fiduciary, he was

required to deposit his sister’s life insurance proceeds into an

interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of his nephew, but

instead, he deposited the funds into a personal investment account

and “administered” the funds from there. The Special Master

further found that Davis admitted to these acts at his deposition.

Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (b),6 the Special Master

concluded Davis violated this rule by failing to keep and maintain

accurate records of expenditures made from the life insurance

proceeds.

all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be
deposited in and administered from a trust account.
6 GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (b) provides:

No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer’s trust
account, except that unearned attorney’s fees may be so held until
the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may
be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as
service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts
shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact
balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be
withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the
lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer’s fees
debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as
such.

12
Regarding GRPC Rule 3.4 (a),7 the Special Master concluded

Davis violated this rule when he unlawfully obstructed his nephew’s

access to evidence for nearly a year during the probate court

proceedings and failed to provide an accounting of expenditures of

the funds after the nephew’s attorney repeatedly requested it. The

Special Master also concluded that Davis violated this rule when he

failed to produce an accounting of expenditures after ordered to do

so by the probate court, finding that some documentation of

expenditures existed when the accounting was first requested by the

nephew’s attorney.

Regarding GRPC Rule 3.5 (d),8 the Special Master concluded

Davis violated this rule by failing to attend the probate proceedings.

7 GRPC Rule 3.4 (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not: unlawfully obstruct

another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall
not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.”
8 GRPC Rule 3.5 (d) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not, without regard

to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: engage in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal.”

13
Regarding GRPC Rule 8.1 (b),9 the Special Master concluded

Davis violated this rule by failing to provide the accounting

requested by the State Bar during its investigation in the

disciplinary proceeding and by failing to respond to the notice of

investigation, which led to his interim suspension pursuant to Bar

Rule 4-204.3 (d) in 2018.

Finally, regarding GRPC Rule 8.4 (a) (5),10 the Special Master

concluded Davis violated this rule by “violat[ing] his fiduciary duties

to account for funds held in trust (i.e., the money collected by him

and held in his IOLTA account), which formed the basis of the

judgment against him [by] his nephew” and by failing to pay the

probate court judgment.

(b) Application of ABA Standards.

9 GRPC Rule 8.1 (b) provides in relevant part that “a lawyer . . . in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: fail to disclose a fact necessary
to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter,
or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from a[ ] . . .
disciplinary authority . . . .”
10 GRPC Rule 8.4 (a) (5) provides that it is a violation of the Rules for a

lawyer to “fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such
lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the
time appointed in the order or judgment.”

14
The Special Master looked to the ABA Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) to determine the appropriate

punishment for Davis’s misconduct, see In the Matter of Morse, 266

Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (ABA Standards are instructive

in determining the appropriate level of discipline), and noted that in

imposing a sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, a court should

consider: (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental state; (3) the

potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4)

the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See ABA

Standard 3.0.

The Special Master found that Davis violated his duties by: (1)

failing to preserve his nephew’s property, see ABA Standard 4.1; (2)

failing to obtain informed consent regarding the conflict of interest

inherent in drafting a will that allowed him to serve, without bond,

as executor, conservator, and guardian, see ABA Standard 4.3; (3)

failing to diligently handle his nephew’s affairs entrusted to him

both before and after the nephew turned 18, see ABA Standard 4.4;

(4) failing to recognize his lack of competency in acting as a fiduciary

15
for his nephew, see ABA Standard 4.5; (5) misleading the nephew’s

attorney and the probate court in order to protect his actions from

scrutiny, see ABA Standard 4.6; (6) deliberately withholding

material information regarding the status of his sister’s estate and

the nephew’s conservatorship from the probate court, see ABA

Standard 6.1; and (7) violating duties owed to the probate court by

unnecessarily delaying the progress of the nephew’s reasonable

efforts to obtain an accounting of the funds that had been entrusted

to him, see ABA Standard 6.2.

Regarding Davis’s mental state, the Special Master made

lengthy and detailed findings. The Special Master found that Davis

was affected by grief, depression, and anxiety, but that Davis never

suggested he was incompetent. The Special Master accepted that

Davis’s clinical depression and anxiety played a role in his general

avoidance of his duties. But, the Special Master concluded that

Davis’s mental state when he drafted his sister’s will and when his

sister died shortly thereafter was different than the mental state he

had five years later when his nephew reached the age of majority

16
and the probate court became involved. Ultimately, the Special

Master concluded that Davis’s depression did not explain his

behavior when the probate court and his nephew’s attorney

requested that he provide an accounting and appear in court.

The Special Master found that while Davis did not admit to

stealing the money, he could not establish that he used all the money

to pay the nephew’s expenses. Nonetheless, Davis acknowledged he

owed his nephew the amount of the probate court judgment, but

stated he could not pay the judgment because the funds had been

depleted.

Ultimately, the Special Master found that some of Davis’s

conduct was negligent, i.e., he grossly disregarded his duties as

executor and conservator, but that a significant amount of Davis’s

conduct appeared to be knowing and intentional, with the purpose

of avoiding the consequences of having misused or squandered his

nephew’s funds without any excuse, oversight, or recordkeeping.

The Special Master noted that Davis’s nephew lived alone most of

the time after his mother’s death and should have been protected by

17
the arrangements she made for him, but instead, Davis shunned his

nephew, drained and depleted his funds, and attacked him when he

inquired about the funds. The Special Master concluded that this

more culpable mental state distinguished Davis’s actions from cases

where trust accounting problems were based on oversight failure

alone, see In the Matter of Mathis, 312 Ga. 626 (864 SE2d 40) (2021),

or oversight failure alongside serious personal and emotional

problems, see In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206 (857 SE2d 212)

(2021).

Regarding any presumptive penalty, the Special Master

recited that the maximum penalty for Davis’s violations of GRPC

Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a),

8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5) was disbarment, and the maximum penalty

for his violation of GRPC Rule 3.5 (d) was a public reprimand. Based

on the application of the ABA Standards, Davis’s mental state, and

the ongoing injury to his nephew, the Special Master concluded that

“the presumptive penalty is clearly disbarment.”

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Regarding the potential or actual injury caused by Davis’s

misconduct, the Special Master found that the nephew suffered

serious, actual injury from Davis’s misconduct, exemplified by the

probate court judgment and Davis’s failure to pay. The Special

Master also found that the nephew suffered serious, actual injury as

a result of Davis’s withholding information and not appearing in

court.

Regarding the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors,

the Special Master found five aggravating factors supported by clear

and convincing evidence: (1) Davis violated multiple GRPC Rules

over several years, see ABA Standard 9.22 (d); (2) Davis obstructed

the disciplinary proceeding by failing to respond to the State Bar’s

demands for information, see ABA Standard 9.22 (e); (3) Davis’s

nephew was a vulnerable victim because he was orphaned at age 13,

see ABA Standard 9.22 (h); (4) Davis had practiced law for 26 years,

see ABA Standard 9.22 (i); and (5) Davis was involved in two prior

disciplinary matters in the form of an Investigative Panel

19
Reprimand in 2014 and a Formal Letter of Admonition in 2016, see

ABA Standard 9.22 (a).

The Special Master found three mitigating factors supported

by the evidence: (1) Davis had difficulty dealing with the deaths of

family members, which affected his law practice and his judgment,

see ABA Standard 9.32 (c); (2) Davis’s partially untreated

depression and anxiety played a role in his misconduct, see ABA

Standard 9.32 (i); and (3) Davis’s leadership positions in his

children’s school organizations justified a finding of his positive

character and reputation insofar as Davis reported that he tutored

students, volunteered as a career day speaker, served in various

offices of his children’s elementary school’s PTA/PTSA, was

chairman of the local school advisory council, vice chairman of the

school governance council, president of Westlake High School PTSA,

and school board chairman of Berean Christian Junior Academy, see

ABA Standard 9.32 (g).

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The Special Master concluded that disbarment remained the

presumptive penalty because, sympathy aside, the mitigating

factors were not sufficient to offset the aggravating factors. After a

review of Davis II and other cases “involving violations of trust

accounting rules and [GRPC] Rule 8.4,” the Special Master

recommended that Davis be disbarred, with two reinstatement

conditions. First, Davis must make full repayment of his debt to his

nephew. See In the Matter of Woodall, 273 Ga. 412, 418 (541 SE2d

649) (2001) (disbarring attorney and requiring that “prior to

submitting any petition for reinstatement, [attorney] shall make full

restitution to the estate of all moneys he received in regard to his

representation of the estate . . . .”); In the Matter of Henderson, 289

Ga. 135, 136 (710 SE2d 124) (2011) (rejecting petition for voluntary

suspension because petitioner had not made full restitution to

victim). Second, Davis must provide certification from a licensed

mental health professional that he was fit to practice law prior to

seeking reinstatement. See In the Matter of Moore, 305 Ga. 419, 420-

421 (825 SE2d 225) (2019) (describing what is necessary to include

21
in mental health evaluation). Davis filed exceptions to the Special

Master’s report and recommendation and sought review by the

Review Board.

3. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation.

The Review Board concluded that the Special Master’s factual

findings were supported by the record and were not clearly

erroneous or manifestly in error and adopted them. The Review

Board further concluded that the Special Master’s conclusions of law

were correct and adopted them. The Review Board also affirmed the

Special Master’s grant of partial summary judgment to the State

Bar. Next, the Review Board adopted the Special Master’s findings

with regard to the ABA Standards and the applicable aggravating

and mitigating factors. The Review Board recommended that this

Court adopt the Special Master’s findings and disbar Davis with

conditions for reinstatement.

4. Davis’s Exceptions.

Davis has made four exceptions to the Review Board: (1) Bar

22
Rule 4-22211 prohibits the State Bar from prosecuting conduct that

occurred outside the four-year time limitation provided for in the

rule; (2) the Special Master’s recommendation of disbarment is too

harsh and not suited to the facts of this case; (3) the Bar Rules do

not assign “presumptive” discipline for a lawyer’s conduct; and (4)

the probate court judgment is the proper vehicle for making Davis’s

nephew whole. We conclude that these exceptions are without merit.

First, Davis drafted his sister’s will in August 2012, and the

State Bar filed its grievance within six years on March 12, 2018. Bar

Rule 4-222 (a) contains a four-year limitation, but permits a two-

year tolling period where “the offense is unknown.” Here, Davis’s

nephew did not discover Davis’s misconduct until he reached the age

11 Bar Rule 4-222 (a) provides:

No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a
Memorandum of Grievance, a written description pursuant to Rule
4-202 (a), or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been
received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted
pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of
the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during
any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the
offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or
the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to
practice law in this State.

23
of majority and instituted probate court proceedings. Accordingly,

this exception has no merit. We further note that Davis

unconditionally admitted in his petition for voluntary discipline that

he violated GRPC Rule 1.7 (b) by failing to obtain his sister’s

informed consent as to the potential conflict of interest in naming

Davis as the executor in her will and to violating GRPC Rule 1.15 (I)

(a) by depositing the insurance proceeds into his IOLTA account and

failing to maintain accurate records.

Second, we conclude that disbarment is consistent with the

ABA Standards and this Court’s rulings in similar cases. Davis

attempts to rely on several cases involving trust account violations

for his argument that disbarment is too harsh a sanction,12 but these

12 See Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a) (public reprimand appropriate for

repeated violations of GRPC Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (a) and (b)); In the
Matter of Brock, 306 Ga. 388, 389 (830 SE2d 736) (2019) (Review Board
reprimand appropriate for violations of GRPC Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15
(II) (a) and (b), and 5.3 (a) and (b)); In the Matter of Ralston, 300 Ga. 416, 416
(794 SE2d 646) (2016) (Review Board reprimand appropriate for violation of
GRPC Rules 1.8 (e) and 1.15 (II) (b)); In the Matter of Brown, 297 Ga. 865, 866
(778 SE2d 790) (2015) (public reprimand appropriate for violation of GRPC
Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (II) (a), and 1.15 (III) (b)); In the Matter of
Francis, 297 Ga. 282, 283 (773 SE2d 280) (2015) (public reprimand appropriate
for one violation of GRPC Rule 1.15 (II)).

24
cases are distinguishable. In several of these cases, there was no

harm done to a client or third party. See Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a)

(concluding that no client or third party suffered any actual harm as

a result of the violations); In the Matter of Ralston, 300 Ga. 416, 418

(794 SE2d 646) (2016) (concluding there was an absence of any

apparent harm to a client or benefit to the lawyer); In the Matter of

Francis, 297 Ga. 282, 283 (773 SE2d 280) (2015) (concluding that no

clients were harmed). Additionally, in the cases where clients were

harmed, there were timely, good-faith efforts to make restitution

and to rectify the consequences of the misconduct. See In the Matter

of Brock, 306 Ga. 388, 390 (830 SE2d 736) (2019); In the Matter of

Brown, 297 Ga. 865, 867 (778 SE2d 790) (2015). Here, Davis’s

misconduct not only harmed his nephew, but there was no timely,

good-faith effort to make restitution. Rather, Davis appeared to have

stonewalled both his nephew and the probate court. Further, in all

of these cases, there was either no intentional conduct by the lawyer

or no dispute that the lawyer’s conduct was not the result of a selfish

or dishonest motive. See Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a) (no evidence

25
that the lawyer acted dishonestly, intentionally, or maliciously);

Brock, 306 Ga. at 389 (evidence showed that the lawyer failed to

supervise his paralegal’s use of the trust account); Ralston, 300 Ga.

at 417 (no dispute that the lawyer did not intentionally violate

GRPC Rule 1.8 (e)); Brown, 297 Ga. at 866 (no dispute that the

lawyer’s actions were not the result of a dishonest or sinister

motive); Francis, 297 Ga. at 283 (no dispute that the lawyer’s

conduct was not for a selfish or dishonest motive). Here, the Special

Master found that at least some of Davis’s misconduct was

intentional, e.g., Davis “deliberately and improperly withheld

material information . . . regarding the status of [his nephew’s]

estate and the conservatorship from the [p]robate [c]ourt” and “[i]t

took [Davis] being jailed for contempt to get [Davis] to take ‘remedial

action.’” “[B]ecause this Court recognizes that the special master is

in the best position to determine the witnesses’ credibility, it

generally defers to the factual findings and credibility

determinations made by the special master unless those findings or

determinations are clearly erroneous.” In the Matter of Eddings, 314

26
Ga. 409, 416 (877 SE2d 248) (2022). And the Special Master’s

findings that some of Davis’s misconduct was intentional were not

clearly erroneous.

Third, although Davis contends that the Special Master’s

“application of a presumptive penalty for violation of each of the Bar

Rules [was] a clear error of law,” Davis’s complaint regarding the

Special Master’s recommendation is immaterial since, ultimately,

“the level of punishment imposed rests in the sound discretion of

this Court.” Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a).

Fourth, we conclude that, contrary to Davis’s contentions, the

State Bar did not “inappropriately expand[ ] its prosecution” when

it alleged that Davis violated GRPC Rule 8.4 (a) (5) and the Special

Master did not “erroneously appl[y]” the rule when she

recommended repayment of the probate court judgment as a

condition of reinstatement. See In the Matter of Smith Fitch, 298 Ga.

379, 380 (782 SE2d 40) (2016) (imposing a six-month suspension

with conditions for reinstatement where the lawyer violated GRPC

Rules 1.5 and 8.4 (a) (5) by failing to timely pay a probate court

27
judgment resulting from her representation in a conservatorship

case); In the Matter of Roberson, 273 Ga. 651, 651 (544 SE2d 715)

(2001) (adopting Review Panel’s recommendation of disbarment

with special condition of making full restitution prior to seeking

reinstatement). Further, as stated above, “the level of punishment

imposed rests in the sound discretion of this Court.” Cook, 311 Ga.

at 213 (3) (a). And we note that Davis unconditionally admitted in

his petition for voluntary discipline that he violated GRPC Rule 8.4

(a) (5).

5. Analysis and Conclusion.

Based on a careful review of the evidence in the record, we

agree with the Special Master that disbarment is appropriate for

Davis’s violation of GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c),

1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5), with

reinstatement conditioned upon full payment of the probate

judgment and certification from a licensed mental health

professional of Davis’s fitness to practice law. See In the Matter of

Harris, 301 Ga. 378, 379 (801 SE2d 39) (2017) (disbarring attorney

28
for violating GRPC Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II) by

“misappropriat[ing] trust funds and commingl[ing] those funds with

his own,” even though attorney deposited $12,500 of his personal

funds to cure deficiencies in his trust account); In the Matter of

Anderson, 286 Ga. 137, 141 (685 SE2d 711) (2009) (disbarring

attorney for violating GRPC Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II) with

reinstatement conditioned upon repayment of a judgment, making

restitution, and completing the State Bar’s Law Practice

Management Program); In the Matter of Byars, 282 Ga. 630, 631

(652 SE2d 567) (2007) (disbarring attorney for violations of the trust

accounting rules and GRPC Rule 8.4 (a) by depositing clients’

settlement checks into trust account and converting them to his own

use); In the Matter of Oellerich, 278 Ga. 22, 25 (596 SE2d 156) (2004)

(disbarring attorney for using his client’s estate as a source of funds

for his close corporation, with reinstatement conditioned upon his

making full restitution to the estate). Accordingly, it is hereby

ordered that the name of Willie George Davis, Jr., be removed from

the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of

29
Georgia. Davis is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219

(b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

Decided March 21, 2023.

Disbarment.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.

NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K.

Mittelman, James S. Lewis, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for

State Bar of Georgia.

Gene Chapman, for Davis.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 21, 2023

S23Y0445. IN THE MATTER OF WILLIE GEORGE DAVIS, JR.

PER CURIAM.

This is the third appearance of this disciplinary matter before

the Court, following the rejection of the petition for voluntary

discipline filed by Willie George Davis, Jr. (State Bar No. 213371)

after a formal complaint was filed against him. See In the Matter of

Willie George Davis, Jr., 311 Ga. 67 (855 SE2d 643) (2021) (“Davis

II”).1 This matter is now before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (the

“Review Board”) which recommends that Davis, a member of the

State Bar since 1996, be disbarred based on his violations of Rules

1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d),

Prior to Davis II, we granted the State Bar’s petition for appointment
1

of a special master. See In the Matter of Willie George Davis, Jr., Case No.
S19B0187 (Oct. 10, 2018) (“Davis I”).
8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct

(“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), which stem from Davis’s

mishandling of his sister’s estate and his nephew’s conservatorship

as well as his repeated failure to comply with orders of the Cobb

County Probate Court. After considering the record and Davis’s

exceptions to the Review Board’s report and recommendation, this

Court finds that given the circumstances of this case, disbarment is

appropriate.

1. The Facts and Procedural History.

Regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding Davis’s

misconduct, we have previously recounted as follows:

2
nephew was only 13 years old at the time of his mother’s
death and was the sole beneficiary of his mother’s estate.

Davis filed a petition to admit the will to probate,
and the probate court appointed him to serve without
bond as executor, conservator, and guardian per the
terms of the will. The nephew was named a beneficiary of
his mother’s life insurance policy, the proceeds of which
were $157,277.48. Davis admitted that he received the
funds and placed them in his IOLTA account instead of a
conservator account. Moreover, although the Special
Master found that Davis did eventually establish a
conservator account and ‘transferred the funds to that
account,’ Davis failed to maintain, and could not produce,
records of the funds held in the IOLTA account. He also
received the nephew’s Social Security benefit checks in
trust as the nephew’s custodian and conservator, but he
did not keep records of those funds, either.

In October 2016, the nephew reached the age of
majority (18), which terminated the testamentary
conservatorship by law. Thereafter, the nephew and
Davis had disagreements that led to Davis cutting off the
nephew’s cell phone service and making no further
mortgage payments on his deceased sister’s home, where
the nephew had been residing.

In May 2017, the nephew, through counsel, filed a
petition to suspend the conservatorship and to obtain a
final settlement of accounts of the estate and the
conservatorship. According to the probate court, ‘[a]n
extensive procedural odyssey ensued … including
multiple hearings, dozens of attempts to serve [Davis],
findings of contempt against [Davis], and multiple
orders of [Davis’s] incarceration.’ First, the probate court

3
entered an order suspending Davis’s letters of
testamentary and issued a citation for him to appear and
make an accounting of estate and conservatorship assets
within 15 days. A deputy from the Fulton County Sheriff’s
Office then personally served Davis with the probate
court’s order and citation. Davis, however, did not make
any accounting or appear at the hearing because he
‘simply could not handle the emotion which welled up.
[He] was in denial and could not address the court
proceeding properly.’ He explained that, beginning in
2016, he experienced a series of family deaths and life
changes that impacted him severely and that he failed to
address right away. In 2017, during the time of these
proceedings, his primary care physician prescribed him
medication for depression and anxiety, but he failed to
seek counseling as his physician directed him to do. He
also did not notify his nephew’s counsel or the probate
court about his mental illness or seek any relief from the
probate court’s requirements on that basis.

In June 2017, the probate court issued another order
directing Davis to file the accountings, and the court set
the matter for another hearing. But Davis did not file the
accountings or appear in court, and the probate court
issued another order for Davis to appear, to present the
accountings, and to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt. The probate court then entered an interim
judgment against Davis in the amount of $157,227.58, the
amount of the life insurance proceeds for which he had
not accounted, and attorney fees in the amount of
$11,891. Approximately one month before that order was
issued, Davis delivered a check to his nephew’s attorney
in the amount of $34,025.80, which was the amount that
remained in the conservatorship account. But Davis still
did not respond to the probate court’s ‘requests for

4
personal service of the court’s notices and demands,’
which resulted in the probate court directing service by
publication. Davis admitted that he was not opening
correspondence from the probate court during this time
due to his declining mental state, and after he failed to
appear at yet another hearing, the probate court issued a
bench warrant for his arrest and issued an order finding
him in contempt. Davis eventually turned himself in to
jail in January 2018.

Following a hearing, the probate court entered a
criminal contempt finding, sentencing Davis to 20 days in
jail with credit for time served, and to pay a fine of $500;
the probate court also entered a civil contempt finding,
sentencing Davis to remain incarcerated and pay a fine of
$100 per day until such time as he purged his contempt
by filing accountings of the estate and conservatorship.
Because Davis ‘had been unable to put together anything
remotely [responsive] to the court’s demand’ while
incarcerated, and because he had not been given his
medication while in custody, the judge released Davis to
allow him to get back on his medication, to gather the
records of the conservatorship and estate, and to file the
accountings in advance of a hearing in March 2018. The
judge also awarded the nephew additional attorney fees.
At two hearings, Davis presented some documentation of
his activities and expenditures on behalf of the estate and
conservatorship, as well as an inventory of the estate and
its annual returns, but failed to include complete bank
statements for the custodial account or any statements for
an account for the estate. After considering that evidence,
the probate court issued a judgment against Davis in
favor of his nephew in an amount of $9,971 for breaches
related to the estate and in the amount of $190,043.48 for
breaches related to the conservatorship.

5
Following the judgment, Davis failed adequately to
respond to his nephew’s post-judgment requests, which
caused the probate court to grant the nephew’s motion to
compel and request for attorney fees for having to file the
motion. Davis then failed to respond to the requests
within the time set forth in the order granting the motion
to compel, which caused him to be held in contempt and
subject to additional attorney fees. Davis admitted that,
including amounts due for the attorney fees judgments,
but not including any statutory interest, the amount of
money he still owed to his nephew was $193,174.91.

Davis II, 311 Ga. at 68-70 (1). The Special Master recommended that

Davis be suspended from the practice of law for at least 18 months,

with reinstatement conditioned upon Davis providing proof that he

has satisfied the probate court judgment and that he was no longer

suffering from any mental disability that would make him unfit to

practice law. See id. at 75 (3) (b). But if Davis failed to meet the

above conditions within 60 days after the 18-month suspension

expired, the time-limited suspension would be converted

automatically to an indefinite suspension under the same

conditions, so that Davis’s nephew could seek relief for his loss under

the Client’s Security Fund. See id.

The Court rejected the Special Master’s recommendation,

6
reasoning that “to impose an indefinite suspension until the

reinstatement conditions are met would effectively result in Davis

being suspended for approximately 50 years if he continued paying

restitution at the rate the record shows he is currently paying,” and

this Court does not allow suspensions of that length. Id. at 75 (4).

The Court also concluded that the reinstatement conditions

recommended by the Special Master for Davis were “considerably

less stringent than for disbarred attorneys, insofar as Davis could

remain suspended for far longer than five years but—upon

satisfying the conditions of his suspension—not be required to re-

certify his fitness before he resumes the practice of law.” Id. at 76

(4). The Court also noted that the recommended conditions seemed

“more punitive to Davis” because “the large discrepancy between the

amount he would be required to repay and his current rate of

repayment” meant that “the recommended conditions could place

Davis in a disciplinary purgatory: if he cannot finish paying

restitution, his discipline will be endless.” Id.

After Davis II, the State Bar took Davis’s deposition and filed

7
its motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the record,

including Davis’s deposition and unconditional admissions in his

petition for voluntary discipline, established as a matter of law that

he violated GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II)

(a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5). The State Bar

elected not to proceed on the claims that Davis had violated GRPC

Rules 1.15 (I) (d), 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4).

After Davis failed to file a response to the motion for partial

summary judgment, the Special Master granted the motion, finding

that Davis had violated the above GRPC Rules by clear and

convincing evidence. The nephew then filed an amicus brief in which

he harshly criticized his uncle, providing details about Davis’s

behavior toward him while he was a minor.

After granting partial summary judgment, the Special Master

issued her second report and recommendation that Davis be

disbarred with reinstatement conditioned upon (1) his payment in

full of the probate judgment and (2) his obtaining a certification of

fitness to practice law from a licensed mental health professional.

8
Davis filed exceptions and requested review by the Review Board.

Subsequently, the State Bar filed a response.

In its report and recommendation, the Review Board adopted

the Special Master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and

incorporated them by reference, concluding that the Special

Master’s recommendation of disbarment with conditions for

reinstatement was the appropriate level of discipline.

2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation.

(a) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In her second report and recommendation, the Special Master

summarized the procedural history of the disciplinary proceeding,

including that she had granted partial summary judgment as to

Davis’s violations of GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (II) (a) and (c),

1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a), 3.5 (d), 8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5). The Special

Master also adopted the facts as stated by the Court in Davis II.

Regarding GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b),2 the Special Master

2 GRPC Rules 1.7 (a) and (b) provide:

9
concluded that Davis violated these rules by drafting his sister’s will

without first obtaining informed consent confirmed in writing that

his sister was aware of a potential conflict of interest in Davis

naming himself the executor of her will.

Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (a),3 (concerning segregation of

(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if
there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s own interests or the
lawyer’s duties to another client, a former client, or a third person
will materially and adversely affect the representation of the
client, except as permitted in (b).
(b) If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may
represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material
and adverse effect if each affected client or former gives informed
consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:
(1) consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0
(c);
(2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate
information about the material risks of and reasonable
available alternatives to the representation; and
(3) having been given the opportunity to consult with
independent counsel.
3 GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides:

10
funds and recordkeeping), the Special Master concluded Davis

violated this rule by depositing his sister’s life insurance proceeds

into his IOLTA account, transferring the proceeds to his personal

investment account, and failing to maintain accurate records.

Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (c),4 the Special Master

concluded Davis violated this rule by: (1) failing to deliver the full

amount of the life insurance proceeds to his nephew and “treat[ing]

[him] abysmally and failed in his basic duties to him as a child”; and

(2) failing to provide his nephew with an accounting of the life

insurance proceeds and by admitting that an accounting was not

possible because he did not maintain records of how he used the

funds.

4GRPC Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides:
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or
third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted
by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property
that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.

11
Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (a),5 the Special Master

concluded Davis violated this rule because, as a fiduciary, he was

required to deposit his sister’s life insurance proceeds into an

interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of his nephew, but

instead, he deposited the funds into a personal investment account

and “administered” the funds from there. The Special Master

further found that Davis admitted to these acts at his deposition.

Regarding GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (b),6 the Special Master

5 GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (a) provides:
Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer
practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm,
association, or professional corporation, and who receives money
or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity,
shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as
required by these rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and
all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be
deposited in and administered from a trust account.
6 GRPC Rule 1.15 (II) (b) provides:

12
concluded Davis violated this rule by failing to keep and maintain

accurate records of expenditures made from the life insurance

proceeds.

Regarding GRPC Rule 3.4 (a),7 the Special Master concluded

Davis violated this rule when he unlawfully obstructed his nephew’s

access to evidence for nearly a year during the probate court

proceedings and failed to provide an accounting of expenditures of

the funds after the nephew’s attorney repeatedly requested it. The

Special Master also concluded that Davis violated this rule when he

failed to produce an accounting of expenditures after ordered to do

so by the probate court, finding that some documentation of

expenditures existed when the accounting was first requested by the

nephew’s attorney.

debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as
such.
7 GRPC Rule 3.4 (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not: unlawfully obstruct

13
Regarding GRPC Rule 3.5 (d),8 the Special Master concluded

Davis violated this rule by failing to attend the probate proceedings.

Regarding GRPC Rule 8.1 (b),9 the Special Master concluded

Davis violated this rule by failing to provide the accounting

requested by the State Bar during its investigation in the

disciplinary proceeding and by failing to respond to the notice of

investigation, which led to his interim suspension pursuant to Bar

Rule 4-204.3 (d) in 2018.

Finally, regarding GRPC Rule 8.4 (a) (5),10 the Special Master

concluded Davis violated this rule by “violat[ing] his fiduciary duties

to account for funds held in trust (i.e., the money collected by him

and held in his IOLTA account), which formed the basis of the

8 GRPC Rule 3.5 (d) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not, without regard
to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: engage in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal.”
9 GRPC Rule 8.1 (b) provides in relevant part that “a lawyer . . . in

connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: fail to disclose a fact necessary
to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in this
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from
a[] . . . disciplinary authority . . . .”
10 GRPC Rule 8.4 (a) (5) provides that it is a violation of the Rules for a

14
judgment against him [by] his nephew” and by failing to pay the

probate court judgment.

(b) Application of ABA Standards.

The Special Master looked to the ABA Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) to determine the appropriate

punishment for Davis’s misconduct, see In the Matter of Morse, 266

Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (ABA Standards are instructive

in determining the appropriate level of discipline), and noted that in

imposing a sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, a court should

consider: (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental state; (3) the

potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4)

the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See ABA

Standard 3.0.

The Special Master found that Davis violated his duties by: (1)

failing to preserve his nephew’s property, see ABA Standard 4.1; (2)

failing to obtain informed consent regarding the conflict of interest

inherent in drafting a will that allowed him to serve, without bond,

as executor, conservator, and guardian, see ABA Standard 4.3; (3)

15
failing to diligently handle his nephew’s affairs entrusted to him

both before and after the nephew turned 18, see ABA Standard 4.4;

(4) failing to recognize his lack of competency in acting as a fiduciary

for his nephew, see ABA Standard 4.5; (5) misleading the nephew’s

attorney and the probate court in order to protect his actions from

scrutiny, see ABA Standard 4.6; (6) deliberately withholding

material information regarding the status of his sister’s estate and

the nephew’s conservatorship from the probate court, see ABA

Standard 6.1; and (7) violating duties owed to the probate court by

unnecessarily delaying the progress of the nephew’s reasonable

efforts to obtain an accounting of the funds that had been entrusted

to him, see ABA Standard 6.2.

Regarding Davis’s mental state, the Special Master made

lengthy and detailed findings. The Special Master found that Davis

was affected by grief, depression, and anxiety, but that Davis never

suggested he was incompetent. The Special Master accepted that

Davis’s clinical depression and anxiety played a role in his general

avoidance of his duties. But, the Special Master concluded that

16
Davis’s mental state when he drafted his sister’s will and when his

sister died shortly thereafter was different than the mental state he

had five years later when his nephew reached the age of majority

and the probate court became involved. Ultimately, the Special

Master concluded that Davis’s depression did not explain his

behavior when the probate court and his nephew’s attorney

requested that he provide an accounting and appear in court.

The Special Master found that while Davis did not admit to

stealing the money, he could not establish that he used all the money

to pay the nephew’s expenses. Nonetheless, Davis acknowledged he

owed his nephew the amount of the probate court judgment, but

stated he could not pay the judgment because the funds had been

depleted.

Ultimately, the Special Master found that some of Davis’s

conduct was negligent, i.e., he grossly disregarded his duties as

executor and conservator, but that a significant amount of Davis’s

conduct appeared to be knowing and intentional, with the purpose

of avoiding the consequences of having misused or squandered his

17
nephew’s funds without any excuse, oversight, or recordkeeping.

The Special Master noted that Davis’s nephew lived alone most of

the time after his mother’s death and should have been protected by

the arrangements she made for him, but instead, Davis shunned his

nephew, drained and depleted his funds, and attacked him when he

inquired about the funds. The Special Master concluded that this

more culpable mental state distinguished Davis’s actions from cases

where trust accounting problems were based on oversight failure

alone, see In the Matter of Mathis, 312 Ga. 626 (864 SE2d 40) (2021),

or oversight failure alongside serious personal and emotional

problems, see In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206 (857 SE2d 212)

(2021).

Regarding any presumptive penalty, the Special Master

recited that the maximum penalty for Davis’s violations of GRPC

Rules 1.7 (a) and (b), 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 3.4 (a),

8.1 (b), and 8.4 (a) (5) was disbarment, and the maximum penalty

for his violation of GRPC Rule 3.5 (d) was a public reprimand. Based

on the application of the ABA Standards, Davis’s mental state, and

18
the ongoing injury to his nephew, the Special Master concluded that

“the presumptive penalty is clearly disbarment.”

Regarding the potential or actual injury caused by Davis’s