CourtListener 10680086

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316 Ga. 551
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S22G0838. EFFICIENCY LODGE, INC. v. NEASON et al.

PINSON, Justice.

The three plaintiffs in this case had each rented rooms at an

extended-stay motel for some time. They fell behind on their rent

and were threatened with immediate eviction. They sued to stop

that from happening, claiming that they were in a landlord-tenant

relationship with the motel and so could not be evicted without dis-

possessory proceedings in court. The motel, however, argued that it

had signed agreements with the plaintiffs that foreclosed their

claims because, among other things, the agreement stated that their

relationship was one of “Innkeeper and Guest,” and “not . . . Land-

lord and Tenant.” The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs, and the

Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review.

We now vacate the Court of Appeals’ opinion and remand with

direction so that the trial court may determine the parties’ relation-

ship under the proper legal framework, which we set out briefly here
and fully below. The key question for the trial court is whether the

parties created a landlord-tenant relationship. That relationship is

created when a property owner “grants” to another the right “simply

to possess and enjoy the use of” the owner’s property, either for a

fixed time or at the will of the grantor. OCGA § 44-7-1 (a). This grant

can be made expressly in a written agreement, but it may also be

implied from the tenant’s possession of the property with the land-

lord’s consent. As to possession, for reasons we explain below, a per-

son who uses the property as a dwelling place—as their home—can

ordinarily establish actual possession for purposes of showing a

landlord-tenant relationship. As to consent, whether the owner con-

sented to another’s possession is determined by first looking to a

written agreement between the parties if one exists. Evidence of the

parties’ conduct may also be probative if a written agreement is am-

biguous, or to show that the parties changed or mutually departed

from the agreement.

We leave it for the trial court to apply this framework in the

first instance, consistent with this opinion.

2
1. Background

(a) Legal Framework

Two legal relationships are at issue in this case. Both are be-

tween a property owner and a person who occupies that property,

and both are defined by statute. Under either relationship, if the

occupant fails to pay rent, the owner may take steps to remove him.

But the rights of the non-paying occupant depend a great deal on

which relationship he has with the property owner.

The first relationship is that of landlord and tenant. A land-

lord-tenant relationship is created when “the owner of real estate

grants to another person, who accepts such grant, the right simply

to possess and enjoy the use of such real estate either for a fixed time

or at the will of the grantor.” OCGA § 44-7-1 (a). If a tenant “holds

possession of lands or tenements over and beyond the term for which

they were rented or leased to such tenant or fails to pay the rent

when it becomes due,” the landlord may make a demand for posses-

sion, OCGA § 44-7-50 (a), and if the tenant does not deliver posses-

sion, the landlord may seek a writ of possession in superior court.

3
OCGA § 44-7-49 et seq. In that proceeding, the tenant has rights,

too, including the rights to assert defenses, to be heard at trial, and

to appeal an unfavorable decision. OCGA §§ 44-7-51; 44-7-53; 44-7-

56. These rights cannot be waived by contract. OCGA § 44-7-2 (b).

The second relationship is that of innkeeper and guest. An inn

is a “tavern[ ], hotel[ ], [or] house[ ] of public general entertainment

for guests,” and a guest is “a person who pays a fee to the keeper of

an inn for the purpose of entertainment at that inn.” OCGA § 43-21-

1. Unlike a landlord, an innkeeper does not need to file a writ of

possession to remove a non-paying guest. Instead, the innkeeper

may use a statutory “lockout” remedy when certain conditions are

met: the guest must have signed a written statement “prominently

setting forth in bold type the time period during which [the] guest

may occupy an assigned room,” and the agreed-upon time period

must have expired. OCGA § 43-21-3.2. Under this lockout remedy,

“the guest may be restrained from entering such room and any prop-

erty of the guest may be removed by the innkeeper to a secure place

where the guest may recover his or her property without liability to

4
the innkeeper.” Id.

(b) Facts

Efficiency Lodge advertises as an extended-stay motel: its web-

site invites guests to “Stay a nite or stay forever.” The three plain-

tiffs—Armetrius Neason, Lynetrice Preston, and Altonese Weaver—

each occupied their rooms at the Lodge for months or years. Neason

still stays there, but Preston and Weaver have left.

When the plaintiffs first moved into Efficiency Lodge, they each

signed a rental agreement. Neason and Preston also each signed a

second agreement sometime after moving in. According to Neason,

his second agreement was signed when he moved to a new room

within the Lodge.1

Preston’s and Neason’s rental agreements each stated that

“The relationship of Innkeeper and Guest shall apply and not the

relationship of Landlord and Tenant.” Each referred multiple times

1 Preston’s initial agreement and Neason’s second agreement were in-

cluded in the record on appeal.
5
to the occupant and the Lodge as, respectively, “Guest” and “Inn-

keeper.” Both agreements also provided that rent was due every

week and that management reserved the right to enter any room

“for the purpose of inspections, housekeeping, maintenance and pest

control.” Both agreements had a space for listing additional occu-

pants of the room, and both provided that “Guest and other occu-

pants listed on rental agreement shall be the only persons who will

reside in rental unit.” Neither agreement listed any additional occu-

pants, although Preston’s daughters and grandson lived in the room

with her. Preston testified that the Lodge told her she did not need

to name her daughters or her grandson on her agreement.

The two agreements addressed the term of occupancy in

slightly different ways. Both agreements included a blank space for

the ending date of occupancy, and on both, the space was left blank.

Neason’s agreement stated that occupants could “rerent on a week

to week basis.” Preston’s agreement specified that she was “only al-

lowed to stay for 180 days straight,” after which she would have to

6
vacate for two days before she could re-rent, although Preston testi-

fied that she lived at the Lodge consistently for two years without

leaving and coming back. Finally, both agreements provided that if

Efficiency Lodge terminated the agreement early for any violation

of the agreement, “Guest shall be responsible for any and all ex-

penses including attorney’s fees and court cost incurred in affecting

the eviction.”

All three plaintiffs say, and the Lodge does not contest, that

they used Efficiency Lodge as their home. Neason received his mail

there, and he listed the Lodge as his address on his driver’s licenses.

Preston—who lived in her room with her teenage daughters and her

grandson—used the Lodge’s address to register her daughters for

school, and the school bus picked them up there. In addition, both

Neason and Preston decorated their rooms and moved in their per-

sonal belongings, including furniture and appliances. Preston also

provided her own linens. The plaintiffs were responsible for cleaning

their rooms; the Lodge did not provide them with cleaning or repair

services.

7
In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, all three plaintiffs

fell behind on their rent. In April 2020, Efficiency Lodge sent a letter

to Preston and Weaver asking that they make arrangements to pay

rent. The letter informed the plaintiffs that “Those guest[s] who

have been with us for over 90 days may no[ ]longer be ‘guest[s],’ you

may be ‘tenants at will.’ This means we may have to go through the

courts to evict you for non-payment. Efficiency Lodge is trying to

avoid this because per your rental agreement YOU will be the one

responsible for all COURT COST[S].” Neason, although he did not

receive a letter, was also led to believe that he could be evicted if he

did not bring his rent current. Weaver ultimately was locked out of

her room, although the other two plaintiffs were not.

The three plaintiffs sued. They asked for a permanent injunc-

tion to stop Efficiency Lodge from evicting Neason and Preston with-

out filing dispossessory actions against them, and for damages to

compensate Weaver for her past eviction. All three plaintiffs also

asserted a general claim for damages. And they sought a temporary

8
restraining order and interlocutory injunction to preserve the status

quo while the case proceeded. Efficiency Lodge answered and then

moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court held a hearing

on the injunction motion and granted an interlocutory injunction.

The plaintiffs then asked the court to convert it into a permanent

injunction.

In separate orders, the trial court denied the Lodge’s motion

for judgment on the pleadings and granted the permanent injunc-

tion. The trial court noted that the plaintiffs used the Lodge as their

long-term home with the Lodge’s “permission and consent”; that the

Lodge explicitly acknowledged in the April 2020 letter that the

plaintiffs “may be ‘tenants at will’”; and that Georgia law required

the Lodge to pay an “innkeeper tax” only for the first 90 days of the

plaintiffs’ occupancy.2 Given those circumstances, the trial court

2 Under the part of the tax code dealing with taxes on hotel rooms, an

innkeeper is
[a]ny person that furnishes for value to the public any room or
rooms, lodgings, or accommodations in a county or municipality
and that is licensed by, or required to pay business or occupation
taxes to, such municipality or county for operating a hotel, motel,
inn, lodge, tourist camp, tourist cabin, campground, or any other

9
concluded that Efficiency Lodge did not meet the statutory or com-

mon-law definition of an “inn.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed. To determine the parties’ legal

relationship the court looked first to the rental agreements, but it

determined that they were “ambiguous” about the nature of the legal

relationship: the agreements described the relationship as one of

“Innkeeper and Guest,” but they also expressly contemplated evic-

tion actions in court, which is a thing landlords must do to evict ten-

ants. See Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Neason, 363 Ga. App. 19, 23 (1) (a)

(870 SE2d 549) (2022); OCGA § 44-7-49 et seq. To resolve this per-

ceived ambiguity, the court focused on Georgia’s innkeeper statutes

and two appellate decisions that addressed whether certain resi-

dents of the inns in those cases were guests or tenants. Id. at 25-26

place in which room or rooms, lodgings, or accommodations are
regularly furnished for value.
OCGA § 48-13-50.2 (2) (A). And under OCGA § 48-8-2 (31) (B), the taxes appli-
cable to charges “for any room, lodging or accommodation furnished to transi-
ents by any hotel, inn . . . or any other place in which rooms, lodgings or ac-
commodations are regularly furnished to transients for a consideration”—that
is, taxes on the charges collected by innkeepers—“shall not apply to rooms,
lodgings, or accommodations supplied for a period of 90 continuous days or
more.”
10
(1) (a) (quoting Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296 (1849) and Garner v.

La Marr, 88 Ga. App. 364 (76 SE2d 721) (1953)). Applying that law,

the Court of Appeals noted, among other things, that the plaintiffs

had lived at Efficiency Lodge for a long time with the Lodge’s “per-

mission and consent,” that they brought many personal items with

them, and that both Neason and Preston used the Lodge as their

home address for official purposes. See id. at 26 (1) (a). In the Court

of Appeals’ view, “[n]one of these facts are consistent with the idea

that Efficiency Lodge treated the Plaintiffs as the transient guests

of a hotel as such is understood by a reasonably common person.” Id.

at 27 (1) (a). As a result, the court concluded that the Lodge was

required to go through dispossessory proceedings to evict the plain-

tiffs, and further, that this requirement could not be waived by con-

tract because the plaintiffs had used their rooms as their “perma-

nent dwelling places.” Id. at 27-28 (1) (b).

We granted certiorari to consider, generally speaking, whether

and when an extended-stay motel like Efficiency Lodge must go

through dispossessory proceedings to evict occupants who have

11
stayed there for a long time.

2. Analysis

(a) We begin with a basic but important point: the question we

asked in this case—whether dispossessory proceedings are required

to evict an occupant under these circumstances—turns on whether

the parties’ legal relationship is one of landlord and tenant. If the

parties are in a landlord-tenant relationship, our landlord-tenant

code sets out the landlord’s remedy—and the tenant’s rights—when

a tenant fails to pay rent or stays past a specified rental term. That

remedy is to go to court and get a writ of possession, which author-

izes the landlord to have the tenant evicted by lawful means. See

OCGA §§ 44-7-49; 44-7-50; 44-7-55. And neither that remedy nor the

tenants’ rights in such dispossessory proceedings may be waived.

See OCGA § 44-7-2 (b).

It is true that in a given case, as here, the owner or operator of

a motel might seek to rely on the statutory remedy granted to an

“innkeeper” to “restrain” a holdover “guest” from entering his room

under the separate statutory framework that governs inns and their

12
guests. OCGA § 43-21-3.2. But the question whether this particular

statutory “lockout” remedy is available is separate from the question

whether dispossessory proceedings are required. The lockout rem-

edy is available if the requirements of the lockout statute are met—

i.e., when an “innkeeper” has a “written statement prominently set-

ting forth in bold type the time period during which a guest may

occupy an assigned room, . . . separately signed or initialed by the

guest,” and that time period expires. Id. By contrast, dispossessory

proceedings are required if the operator and occupant are in a land-

lord-tenant relationship.

These inquiries are not necessarily an either/or proposition,

and answering one of these questions does not necessarily answer

the other. To be sure, the landlord-tenant relationship and inn-

keeper-guest relationship are mutually exclusive. See Bonner, 7 Ga.

at 307-308 (treating innkeeper-guest and landlord-tenant relation-

ships as mutually exclusive). That is, if the parties are in one of those

relationships, they cannot be in the other. As we will explain below,

a landlord-tenant relationship is created when an owner or operator

13
grants the occupant the right of possession. See OCGA § 44-7-1. This

transfer of possession is inconsistent with the transient, non-posses-

sory relationship of innkeeper and guest. See id.; OCGA § 43-21-1

(1) (“‘Guest’ means a person who pays a fee to the keeper of an inn

for the purpose of entertainment at that inn.”). But the reverse is

not necessarily true: the absence of a landlord-tenant relationship

does not necessarily mean that parties are in an innkeeper-guest

relationship (nor does it mean that the specific statutory conditions

for taking advantage of the lockout remedy are met). By the same

token, the absence of an innkeeper-guest relationship does not prove

the landlord-tenant relationship that is the basis for requiring dis-

possessory proceedings to evict an occupant.

Here, the question we asked in granting review was whether

an extended-stay motel must go through dispossessory proceedings

to evict occupants who had stayed there for a long period of time. We

asked that particular question because it is the question this case

squarely presents: the plaintiffs here sought a declaration that they

are in a landlord-tenant relationship with Efficiency Lodge and an

14
injunction that would prevent Efficiency Lodge from evicting them

without initiating dispossessory proceedings. Because the question

whether the plaintiffs are entitled to that relief turns on whether

they are in a landlord-tenant relationship with the Lodge, we turn

to the landlord-tenant relationship now.

(b) The relationship of landlord and tenant is a legal relation-

ship defined by statute. That statute says this relationship is cre-

ated when “the owner of real estate grants to another person, who

accepts such grant, the right simply to possess and enjoy the use of

such real estate either for a fixed time or at the will of the grantor.”

OCGA § 44-7-1 (a). This has been the way to create a landlord-ten-

ant relationship in Georgia for quite a long time. See Code Ann. 1860

§ 2261 (“When the owner of lands grants to another simply the right

to possess and enjoy the use of such lands, either for a fixed time or

at the will of the grantor, and the tenant accepts the grants, the re-

lation of landlord and tenant exists between them.”); Irwin’s Code

Rev. 1867 § 2253; Irwin’s Code Rev. 1873 § 2279; Code Ann. 1895 §

3115; Code Ann. 1910 § 3691.

15
The focus here is on the transfer of the right of possession—the

grant by the owner and acceptance by another—that is the hallmark

of a landlord-tenant relationship. See, e.g., Camp v. Delta Air Lines,

Inc., 232 Ga. 37, 39 (205 SE2d 194) (1974) (explaining that the “car-

dinal rule” in determining whether an agreement creates a lease-

hold or an estate for years is to scrutinize the agreement “to ascer-

tain what interest the parties intended to be conveyed or demised by

it”). See also Restatement (Second) of Property, Land. & Ten. § 1.2

& Reporter’s Note (1977) (reciting as blackletter law that “[a] land-

lord-tenant relationship exists only if the landlord transfers the

right to possession of the leased property” and noting that this is

“undoubtedly accepted dogma in this field of the law”). In particular,

the question here is how to determine whether that transfer hap-

pened.

The short answer is that the intent of the parties controls. Be-

cause transferring the right to possession requires a grant by the

owner and acceptance by another, OCGA § 44-7-1, we look to “the

intention of the parties” to see whether the right was transferred,

16
such that the relationship of landlord and tenant was created. Potts-

Thompson Liquor Co. v. Potts, 135 Ga. 451, 456, 459 (69 SE 734)

(1910). See also Plank v. Bourdon, 173 Ga. App. 391, 394 (2) (326

SE2d 571) (1985) (“In distinguishing between a purported lease and

an executory agreement to make a lease, the intention of the parties,

as manifested by a writing, is a controlling element.”); Orr v. Neilly,

67 F2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1933) (“[W]hether the relationship of land-

lord and tenant is created depends almost entirely upon the inten-

tion of the parties.”) (citing Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 135 Ga.

451).

Discerning the parties’ intent to create a landlord-tenant rela-

tionship is easiest when the parties transfer the right of possession

expressly. In other words, the required transfer of the right of pos-

session may be clearly established by express agreement. See, e.g.,

Clayton Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Joint Venture,

304 Ga. 15, 16-17 (1) (815 SE2d 870) (2018) (agreement that

“granted a five-year term of possession” of property created land-

lord-tenant relationship); Ouseley v. Foss, 188 Ga. App. 766, 767

17
(374 SE2d 534) (1988) (describing a “written lease transferring right

of possession in a certain portion of property”); see also Langley v.

MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321, 325-326 (834 SE2d 800) (2019)

(concluding that an agreement entitled “Apartment Lease Con-

tract,” which granted to one party the right to rent an apartment

“‘for use as a private residence,’” “demonstrate[d] the parties’ clear

intent to create a landlord-tenant relationship”).

But even without an express agreement, the parties’ intent to

transfer the right of possession may be discerned through evidence

from the parties’ arrangement and the circumstances as a whole.

See Littleton v. Wynn, 31 Ga. 583, 585 (1860) (recognizing that a

landlord-tenant contract may be “either express or implied”);

McCullough v. Reyes, 287 Ga. App. 483, 486 (1) (651 SE2d 810)

(2007) (“neither a written lease agreement nor the payment of rent

is required for a landlord-tenant relationship to exist”). See also

OCGA § 44-7-5 (“When . . . title is shown in the plaintiff and occupa-

tion by the defendant is proved, an obligation to pay rent is generally

implied.”); Restatement (Second) of Property, Land. & Ten. § 1.2,

18
cmt. a (“Whether an arrangement between two parties with respect

to leased property transfers to one of them the right to possession of

the property depends on the intention of the parties, as revealed by

the terms of their arrangement and the circumstances.”). The requi-

site intent may be shown in this way with evidence that establishes

that (i) a person is in actual possession of the property in question,

(ii) with the owner’s consent. See Hawkins v. Tanner, 129 Ga. 497

(59 SE 225) (1907) (“the relation of landlord and tenant exists where

one person occupies the land or premises of another in subordination

of the other’s title, and with his consent, express or implied”) (quot-

ing 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.) 164-165); Sharpe v. Mathews,

123 Ga. 794, 797-798 (51 SE 706) (1905) (“as a general rule, it is

sufficient to create the relation [of landlord and tenant] if it appears

to have been the intention of one to enter or occupy the premises in

subordination to the title of the other”) (punctuation omitted); Lit-

tleton, 31 Ga. at 585 (landlord-tenant contract “presumed from the

title of the [landlord] and the possession of the other,” and the pre-

sumption is “rebutted when it appears that the tenant does not hold

19
under, but adversely to him who holds the title”); S.S. Air. Inc. v.

City of Vidalia, 278 Ga. App. 149, 150 (1) (628 SE2d 117) (2006) (air-

line was tenant of city, despite lack of formal lease agreement, when

airline occupied city land and built hangar on it with city’s permis-

sion); Daniel F. Hinkel, 2 Pindar’s Ga. Real Estate Law & Procedure

§ 11.3 (7th ed., Apr. 2023 update) (“Mere possession of the land of

another will raise a presumption of tenancy. Such a presumption,

however, is rebutted by proof that the occupant did not enter with

the owner’s consent or is holding adversely to him.”) (footnote omit-

ted).3 Put simply, actual possession establishes the would-be ten-

ant’s acceptance of possession, while the owner’s consent establishes

that the right to that possession was in fact granted. See OCGA §

44-7-1. We take each concept in turn.

3 A handful of early cases spoke in terms of a tenant’s “occupation” rather

than “possession” of the premises. See, e.g., Hawkins, 129 Ga. 497. It is not
apparent from these decisions that those terms were used to mean different
things, and given the clear and unchanging statutory language requiring a
transfer of the “right to possess and enjoy the use” of the property, we do not
read these decisions as deviating from the well-established understanding that
a transfer of the right of possession is required.
20
(i) Possession is an important legal concept throughout prop-

erty law. See Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 529 (173 SE

817) (1934) (“Possession is the basis of all ownership.”); Restatement

(First) of Property § 7, cmt. b (1936) (“There are many aspects of the

law of real property that involve a consideration of these doctrines

of constructive and actual possession.”). Speaking generally, posses-

sion involves a physical relationship with and the exercise of suffi-

cient acts of ownership and control with respect to the subject prop-

erty. See, e.g., Page v. Jones, 186 Ga. 485, 491-492 (3) (198 SE 63)

(1938) (actual possession of property could be established by person

who “resided” on the property and “exercised acts of ownership over

the property”); Hadaway v. Smedley, 119 Ga. 264, 269 (2) (46 SE 96)

(1903) (noting that “evidences of [a person’s] possession” of land in-

cluded that he “resided upon the place and exercised acts of owner-

ship and control”); Restatement (First) of Property § 7 (“A possessory

interest in land exists in a person who has (a) a physical relation to

the land of a kind which gives a certain degree of physical control

over the land, and an intent so to exercise such control as to exclude

21
other members of society in general from any present occupation of

the land; or (b) interests in the land which are substantially identi-

cal with those arising when the elements stated in Clause (a) ex-

ist.”). But we need not (and do not) try here to define the contours of

possession for all purposes. It is enough to say that when looking for

a landlord-tenant relationship in a residential context, possession is

ordinarily established when a person does a collection of things we

normally associate with using the subject property as her dwelling

place—as her home.

Using property as a home ordinarily establishes possession be-

cause the kinds of acts associated with using property as a home

match up with traditional hallmarks of possession. As a general

matter, possession may be shown through “acts of ownership and

control,” including a physical relationship to the property. Hadaway,

119 Ga. at 269 (2) (explaining that a person is evidently in posses-

sion of land when she “exercise[s] acts of ownership and control” over

the land). See also Wood v. McGuire, 15 Ga. 202, 204 (1) (1854) (“pos-

22
session must be constituted, either by residence on the land in per-

son…accompanied with the exercise of ownership; or by cultivation

of a portion of the land, accompanied by acts of ownership over the

balance; or it must consist of acts of ownership, ‘positive, definite,

and notorious’”). See also Restatement (First) of Property § 7.4 When

someone uses property as a home—not just a place to sleep or stay

for a short time—such use is marked by various acts of ownership

and control. Making a place home means maintaining a relatively

continuous physical presence—both in person and with personal ef-

fects. It also typically means performing routine cleaning and

4 Many of our cases addressing possession as a legal concept come from

the law of adverse possession. Adverse possession is different from tenancy in
one important way: by definition, it happens without the consent of the land-
owner. See OCGA § 44-5-161 (b) (clarifying that “[p]ermissive possession can-
not be the foundation of” adverse possession); Coates v. Jones, 142 Ga. 237, 240
(82 SE 649) (1914) (explaining that a tenant cannot assert an adverse-posses-
sion claim on the property he occupies as a tenant). But because both adverse
possession and tenancy involve the actual possession of property by someone
who does not hold title to it, see MEA Family Investments, LP v. Adams, 284
Ga. 407, 408 (667 SE2d 609) (2008) (adverse possession of property extends
only to the area of “actual possession”); Hall v. Gay, 68 Ga. 442, 443 (1882)
(“[a]ctual adverse possession of land by itself for twenty years gives a good title
by prescription . . . [; n]o paper title is necessary, nothing but actual bona fide
possession, this is all which the law requires”) (citation and punctuation omit-
ted), the law of adverse possession is a useful comparator for guidance on what
it means for a tenant to be in possession of property.
23
maintenance; adding, removing, or altering fixtures, furnishings,

and decor; and keeping belongings there. And importantly for pur-

poses of showing possession, it means controlling access to the prop-

erty by others: deciding whom to invite in as guests, see Cham v.

ECI Mgmt. Corp., 311 Ga. 170, 185 (856 SE2d 267) (2021) (Peterson,

J., dissenting) (“The authority to host guests in your home is for

many people a key element of what it means for a home to be

yours.”), and whom to keep out, using locks and any number of other

security measures to protect one’s privacy and safety, see Geor-

giaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 306 Ga. 829,

844 (834 SE2d 27) (2019) (Peterson, J., concurring) (describing the

right to exclude others from one’s property as “‘one of the most es-

sential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-

ized as property’”) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,

393 (III) (B) (114 SCt 2309, 129 LE2d 304) (1994)). Put simply, the

physical relationship with and conduct toward property that is typ-

ical of making a place home are just the kinds of “acts of ownership

and control” that establish possession. See, e.g., Ammons v. Central

24
of Ga. Ry. Co., 215 Ga. 758, 761 (1) (113 SE2d 438) (1960) (noting

that “[a] tenant of premises . . . is the owner of its use for the term

of his rent contract”); Bentley v. City of Atlanta, 92 Ga. 623, 627 (1)

(18 SE 1013) (1893) (“A tenant, although he has no estate in the

land, is the owner of its use for the term of his rent contract[.]”) (cit-

ing 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 719); Wood, 15 Ga. at 204 (1) (explain-

ing that possession may be “constituted . . . by residence on the land

in person”); Kahn v. Britt, 330 Ga. App. 377, 391-392 (7) (765 SE2d

446) (2014) (landlord-tenant relationship could exist when would-be

tenant was “allowed to stay” at property and “kept personal property

there” but did not pay rent or sign a lease); McCullough, 287 Ga.

App. at 486 (1) (landlord-tenant relationship established where, in

return for caring for property owner’s father, tenant was given “a

place for her family to live” in a separate house on the property).

The idea that using property as a home ordinarily establishes

possession finds clear support in our landlord-tenant statutes and

decisional law, too. The statutes contemplate that someone using

property as a dwelling place is in possession of it: they carve out for

25
special treatment a subset of landlord-tenant relationships where

the tenant uses, occupies, or rents the property as a “dwelling place.”

See, e.g., OCGA § 44-7-2 (b) (“[i]n any contract, lease, license agree-

ment, or similar agreement, oral or written, for the use or rental of

real property as a dwelling place, a landlord or a tenant may not

waive, assign, transfer, or otherwise avoid any of the rights, duties,

or remedies” enumerated in other parts of the Code) (emphasis sup-

plied); OCGA § 44-7-4 (a) (allowing municipalities to establish secu-

rity standards “to prevent the unauthorized entry of premises occu-

pied by a tenant as a dwelling place”) (emphasis supplied). Implicit

in that carve-out is the understanding that when someone uses the

property as a dwelling place with the owner’s permission, the right

to possess and enjoy the property has been transferred. And con-

sistent with this understanding, our decisions have equated the use

of a property as a dwelling place with possession. See Ammons, 215

Ga. at 761 (1), 763 (7) (approving an injunction preventing a railway

from “interfering with the occupancy and possession by the tenant .

. . of the dwelling house which she occupies”); Mackenzie v. Minis,

26
132 Ga. 323, 330-331 (63 SE 900) (1909) (explaining that if a servant

is a “tenant of his master,” in that he has both a contract of employ-

ment and a separate “contract to rent a dwelling” belonging to the

master, the servant may keep his contractual “right to retain pos-

session of the premises” even if the employment contract ends);

Wood, 15 Ga. at 204 (1).

Two caveats. First, possession is not established by a person’s

mere subjective belief that a property is or was her home. When we

talk about using property as a dwelling place, it is shorthand for a

collection of acts of ownership and control that is generally sufficient

to establish possession in the residential context—but one still needs

to provide evidence of those acts, which remain the touchstone of

possession as a general matter. See, e.g., Hadaway, 119 Ga. at 269

(2); Wood, 15 Ga. at 204 (1). Second, none of this is to say that using

property as a dwelling place is the only way to establish possession.

Not all tenants are residential tenants, and a commercial tenant, by

contrast, ordinarily would possess property without living there.

See, e.g., S.S. Air, 278 Ga. App. at 150 (1) (airline possessed land by

27
building hangar on it). But sufficient evidence of conduct showing

that the property is being used as a dwelling place ordinarily suffices

to establish possession in the residential context.

(ii) As for consent, the question is simply whether the would-be

tenant is in possession of the property with the owner’s permission.

As with the broader question whether the right of possession was

transferred, consent to possession may be express or implied. See

Hawkins, 129 Ga. at 497 (“‘the relation of landlord and tenant exists

where one person occupies the land or premises of another in subor-

dination of the other’s title, and with his consent, express or im-

plied’”) (quoting 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.) 164-165); Daniel

F. Hinkel, 2 Pindar’s Ga. Real Estate Law & Procedure § 11:1 (7th

ed., Apr. 2023 update) (specifying that landlord’s consent may be

“express or implied”).

Where to look for this consent? If the parties have a written

agreement respecting the property (as here), the search starts there.

Even an agreement between the parties that does not expressly

transfer the right to possess and use the property may shed light on

28
whether the owner intended to allow the other party to possess the

property. Indeed, the agreement may well allow, or prohibit, just the

kinds of acts of ownership and control that can establish possession.

For instance, an agreement could require a renter to take responsi-

bility for the security of people and personal items inside, provide

his own furniture, take out the trash, and keep the premises clean,

or it might give him authority to invite in or exclude others from the

property—acts consistent with possession. On the other hand, the

agreement could prohibit the occupant from making any alterations,

performing maintenance, or having visitors, or it might restrict the

hours at which the occupant can come and go, thus suggesting the

opposite. In this inquiry, substance generally prevails over form;

mere labels or talismanic language in an agreement are not dispos-

itive, at least not by themselves. See Atlanta Bread Co. Intl. v.

Lupton-Smith, 285 Ga. 587, 589 (2) (679 SE2d 722) (2009) (looking

to substance of contractual clause, “no matter the nomenclature as-

signed” to it, to determine whether it was a restrictive covenant);

Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Brock Constr. Co., Inc., 241 Ga. 460, 465

29
(246 SE2d 316) (1978) (Undercofler, P. J., concurring) (“You can call

a camel an elephant but that won’t make its hump disappear. Labels

do not change substance.”); Wolkin v. Nat. Acceptance Co., 222 Ga.

487, 489 (150 SE2d 831) (1966) (“mere nomenclature” of contract

stating it was a guaranty was not determinative when in substance

contract was clearly one of suretyship). If an agreement between the

parties plainly establishes consent (or lack thereof), that may be the

end of the matter. See Langley, 307 Ga. at 324 (“When the terms of

a contract are clear and unambiguous, the reviewing court looks

only to the contract itself to determine the parties’ intent.”) (punctu-

ation omitted); Terry v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 777,

778-779 (2) (504 SE2d 194) (1998) (“If the language of a contract is

clear and unambiguous, the terms of the agreement are controlling

and an appellate court should look no further to determine the in-

tention of the parties.”); see also OCGA § 13-2-3 (providing that if a

contract makes clear the parties’ intention and the intention “con-

travenes no rule of law,” the intention “shall be enforced”).

But there are a few reasons a court may need to look beyond a

30
written agreement. First, if the agreement leaves the parties’ inten-

tions ambiguous, extrinsic or parol evidence is “admissible to ex-

plain all ambiguities, both latent and patent.” OCGA § 24-3-3 (b).

See Coppedge v. Coppedge, 298 Ga. 494, 498 (1) n.3 (783 SE2d 94)

(2016) (citing rule that “‘if the contract contains an ambiguity that

cannot be resolved through the rules of construction, the court may

. . . consider parol evidence’”); Armistead v. McGuire, 46 Ga. 232, 235

(1872) (citing earlier, materially identical version of OCGA § 24-3-3

for the proposition that “the surroundings and understandings of the

parties [to a contract] may be used to explain and discover the true

meaning in doubtful cases”). In this context, that outside evidence

could include the parties’ course of conduct, see Scruggs v. Purvis,

218 Ga. 40, 42 (126 SE2d 208) (1962) (“The construction placed upon

a contract by the parties thereto, as shown by their acts and conduct,

is entitled to much weight and may be conclusive upon them.”),

which could show, for instance, that a property owner knew about

and allowed a renter to do things consistent with possession—deco-

rating and furnishing the premises, taking on responsibility for

31
cleaning and maintenance, entertaining houseguests, changing the

locks—or that the owner discouraged or was unaware of these or

other acts of ownership or control. Or, under certain circumstances,

outside evidence could include oral agreements, see Preferred Risk

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 233 Ga. 423, 425 (1) (211 SE2d 720) (1975)

(oral agreements admissible to resolve ambiguity if oral agreement

is not inconsistent with written contract and parties did not intend

contract to encompass “the whole of the transactions between them”)

(punctuation omitted), which could include the parties’ representa-

tions about the meaning of contractual terms.

And even if a written agreement is clear on its face, outside

evidence may also be relevant to show the parties’ changed inten-

tions after the agreement is signed. Such evidence could show that

the parties intended to modify their written agreement, see Hanham

v. Access Management Group L.P., 305 Ga. 414, 417 (2) (825 SE2d

217) (2019) (“parties may modify a contract through course of con-

duct” that is supported by consideration and not prohibited by the

32
contract or by law); Am. Century Mtg. Investors v. Bankamerica Re-

alty Investors, 246 Ga. 39, 41 (2) (268 SE2d 609) (1980) (later oral

agreement can modify the terms of a contract if it is supported by

consideration), or that they intended to mutually depart from some

of its terms, see Hughes v. Great Southern Midway, Inc., 265 Ga. 94,

95 (1) (454 SE2d 130) (1995) (parties mutually departed from closing

date in real estate contract by extending it until zoning issue was

resolved).5 In the case of a property rental, such evidence might show

the parties modified or mutually departed from a term of the rental

agreement by continuing to possess (and allowing the continued pos-

session of) the premises, and continuing to pay (and accepting the

payment of) rent, after the written term of occupancy expired. See

OCGA § 44-7-5 (“[w]hen…title is shown in the plaintiff and occupa-

tion by the defendant is proved, an obligation to pay rent is generally

implied”).

Finally, evidence of the parties’ conduct comes to the forefront

5 The parties’ later course of conduct can even “operate to waive an oth-

erwise validly enforceable written requirement that all modifications be in
writing.” See Hanham, 305 Ga. at 417 (3) n.2.
33
in the absence of an express agreement between them. See, e.g.,

McCullough, 287 Ga. App. at 486 (1) (noting that a landlord-tenant

relationship may exist even without a lease agreement). In that cir-

cumstance, the inquiry would reduce to the ultimate question

whether the owner’s conduct toward the party in possession of the

property—including the kinds of evidence just discussed above—es-

tablishes that the possession was with the owner’s permission ra-

ther than adverse.6

6 A final note. The Court of Appeals below, relying on its own precedent,

indicated that “‘[w]hether a landlord-tenant relationship exists is a question of
fact.’” Efficiency Lodge, 363 Ga. App. at 23 (1) (citing Williams v. State, 261 Ga.
App. 511, 513 (1) (583 SE2d 172) (2003)). We overrule this precedent, because
properly understood, the question whether a landlord-tenant relationship has
been created is a mixed question of fact and law. The transfer of the right of
possession is established by reference to historical facts—for example, evidence
that a renter installed locks or put up a fence, or that the property owner told
her he would allow her to live there. But the ultimate question is not merely
what happened in the real world, but whether what happened is properly char-
acterized as a “grant[ ]” and “accept[ance]” of “the right simply to possess and
enjoy the use of” the property. OCGA § 44-7-1. Such questions, which require
a nuanced judgment whether given historical facts meet or add up to an ab-
stract legal concept or standard—a “landlord-tenant relationship,” or “adverse
possession,” or “domicile,” for instance—are mixed questions of law and fact.
See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zeh, 312 Ga. 647, 665-666 (3) (864
SE2d 422) (2021) (in defamation actions, whether someone is a public official
is a mixed question of law and fact because it is determined on a case-by-case
basis whether the facts of the person’s position make it “one which would invite
public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it”) (punctuation omitted);

34
3. Application and Disposition

Harvey v. Merchan, 311 Ga. 811, 820 (2) (b) (ii) & n.9 (860 SE2d 561) (2021)
(question whether statute of limitation barred action, which turned in part on
when defendant had “becom[e] aware” of her injuries, was mixed question of
law and fact); Dozier v. Baker, 283 Ga. 543, 544-545 (2) (661 SE2d 543) (2008)
(question of person’s domicile is mixed question of law and fact). See also Harry
T. Edwards & Linda A. Elliott, Federal Courts Standards of Review: Appellate
Court Review of District Court Decisions and Agency Action 8 (3d ed. 2018)
(mixed questions of law and fact require “nuanced assessment or characteriza-
tion of the historical facts in light of the governing legal norms”).
We do not address here, however, the precise division of labor for judge
and factfinder in determining whether a landlord-tenant relationship is pre-
sent. We have said that some mixed questions are ordinarily for the factfinder,
but may be determined by the court as a matter of law when the evidence is
undisputed or the answer to the question is “plain and palpable.” Dozier, 283
Ga. at 544 (2). See also, e.g., Harvey, 311 Ga. at 820 (2) (b) (ii) n.9; Pirkle v.
Turner, 281 Ga. 846, 848 (2) (642 SE2d 849) (2007) (adverse possession is “usu-
ally a mixed question of law and fact” where “jury decides whether the claimant
has presented sufficient evidence to establish the elements of adverse posses-
sion”) (punctuation omitted). Other times, as when the mixed question is a
“fact-intensive, mixed question[ ] of constitutional law,” the ultimate mixed
question may be for the judge to answer (and when reviewing the mixed ques-
tion on appeal, although we accept the trial court’s underlying factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous, we “independently apply the law to the
facts”). State v. Gilmore, 312 Ga. 289, 292 (2) (a) (862 SE2d 499) (2021) (quoting
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-137 (V) (119 SCt 1887, 144 LE2d 117)
(1999)). But these decisions have not explained this different treatment of
mixed questions, nor have we set out a consistent framework for determining
when mixed questions of law and fact are decided by the judge or the factfinder.
Compare Edwards & Elliot, supra at 8, 14, 17-18 (explaining that a federal
appellate court reviewing a mixed question of law and fact “should consider the
nature of the decisional process implicated in light of the respective institu-
tional strengths” of trial courts, which can weigh the credibility and demeanor
of witnesses and articulate historical facts, and appellate courts, which can
exercise “reflective dialogue” and “collective judgment” to clarify legal princi-
ples). We leave these questions for another day because we do not need to re-
solve them here: the trial court served as both judge and factfinder below, and
will continue to do so on remand.
35
On to this case. Neither court below had the benefit of the an-

alytical framework we set out above. So, although each court circled

around some of the right questions with respect to the landlord-ten-

ant relationship—for instance, the Court of Appeals noted that Nea-

son and Preston lived at the Lodge with the Lodge’s “permission and

consent”—neither court assessed the legal significance of any such

findings or conclusions under the legal framework we have set out

above. Instead, both courts conflated that question to some degree

with the separate question whether the parties’ relationship was one

of innkeeper and guest and at times seemed to treat the questions

as fully interchangeable: if the parties were not innkeeper and

guest, then they must be landlord and tenant. See, e.g., Efficiency

Lodge, 363 Ga. App. at 27 (1) (a) (explaining that the Lodge was re-

quired to initiate dispossessory proceedings because the facts were

not “consistent with the idea that Efficiency Lodge treated the Plain-

tiffs as the transient guests of a hotel”). But as we noted above, the

two questions are not strictly either/or in nature. A landlord-tenant

relationship is created by the transfer of the right of possession, see

36
OCGA § 44-7-1, while the innkeeper-guest relationship is marked by

payment of a fee “for the purpose of entertainment at” an inn, OCGA

§ 43-21-1 (1). See also OCGA § 43-21-1 (2) (defining an “inn” as a

“tavern[ ],” “hotel[ ],” or “house[ ] of public general entertainment”).

To be sure, a transfer of the right of possession is inconsistent with

the transitory, fee-for-entertainment relationship of innkeeper and

guest, so proving that the parties are in one of these relationships

would prove that they are not in the other.7 But applying the appro-

priate legal standard and proving that the parties are not in one of

these relationships does not necessarily prove that they are in the

other one. For example, our innkeeper statutes provide that “[p]er-

sons entertaining only a few individuals, or simply for the accommo-

dation of travelers, are not innkeepers but are depositories for hire

7 The Restatement (Second) of Property offers a helpful illustration of

the point that a true innkeeper-guest relationship does not involve any trans-
fer of the right to possession. If a person with a hotel reservation arrives to find
that her reserved room is occupied, neither she nor the hotel would contem-
plate that she has a remedy against the other occupant. Instead, the hotel can
just offer her another room. This is because she was not granted a right to
possess a particular room but, in the words of Georgia’s statute, paid a fee for
the purpose of entertainment at the inn. See Restatement (Second) of Property,
Land. & Ten. § 1.2, Illustration 1 (1977); OCGA § 43-21-1.
37
and are bound to ordinary diligence.” OCGA § 43-21-2. Someone who

qualifies as a depository for hire under this provision is not an inn-

keeper, but neither is he likely a landlord to travelers passing

through. The point is that each inquiry must be conducted sepa-

rately to ensure that the proper legal test is applied to determine

whether the asserted relationship exists.

Because we are generally a court of review, we leave it to the

trial court in the first instance to apply the legal framework we have

set out here to the facts of this case. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI,

Sec. VI, Par. II (“The Supreme Court shall be a court of review . . .

.”); Wallace v. Wallace, 301 Ga. 195, 198-200 (II) (800 SE2d 303)

(2017) (declining to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in

the first instance, and remanding for trial court to do so). To that

end, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision with direction to va-

cate the trial court’s orders and remand for further proceedings.

On remand, the question whether the parties created a land-

lord-tenant relationship turns on whether Efficiency Lodge

“granted” to the plaintiffs the right “simply to possess and enjoy the

38
use of” their rooms. OCGA § 44-7-1 (a). To answer that question, the

trial court should apply the legal framework we have laid out here.

If the grant was not made expressly, the trial court should determine

whether the transfer of the right of possession is properly implied

based on the evidence, including the written agreement and, if nec-

essary, the parties’ conduct relevant to the questions of possession

and consent.

Consistent with this opinion, the parties’ written rental agree-

ments are the place to start. Although we do not reach any conclu-

sions here as to the effect of those agreements, we note that each one

says that “the relationship of Innkeeper and Guest shall apply and

not the relationship of Landlord and Tenant.” As we explained

above, the substance of the relationship controls “no matter the no-

menclature assigned” to it, Atlanta Bread Co., 285 Ga. at 589 (2).

But this language may well be evidence of the parties’ intent not to

transfer the right of possession to the plaintiffs or to consent to their

possession, at least at the time the agreement was signed. It is up to

the trial court on remand to determine the weight to give this and

39
other language in the agreement, as well as the other evidence in

the record, in its analysis.

If the trial court concludes that the Lodge was in a landlord-

tenant relationship with any plaintiff, then the Lodge will need to

obtain a writ of possession to evict that plaintiff. If the trial court

concludes that the Lodge was not in a landlord-tenant relationship

with any particular plaintiff, the court may revisit the separate

questions whether the parties were in an innkeeper-guest relation-

ship and, if so, whether Efficiency Lodge could properly take ad-

vantage of the “lockout” remedy granted to innkeepers under the

conditions set out in OCGA § 43-21-3.2.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.

40
Decided June 21, 2023.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 363 Ga. App.

19.

The Barnes Law Group, Roy E. Barnes, for appellant.

Lindsey M. Siegel, Charles R. Bliss, David A. Webster, Rachel

M. Lazarus, Elizabeth A. Guerrant; Harold T. Daniel, Jr., for appel-

lees.

Miriam F. Gutman, Jamie B. J. Rush, amici curiae.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 21, 2023

S22G0838. EFFICIENCY LODGE, INC. v. NEASON, et al.