Walton v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 26, 2025

S25A0794. WALTON v. THE STATE.

MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Richard Walton appeals his convictions for felony murder and

other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Brian

Christopher Johnson. 1 On appeal, Walton contends that the trial

Johnson died on October 19, 2016. On December 30, 2016, a
1

Washington County grand jury jointly indicted Walton and Clifford
Duckworth, III, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault (Count 3), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault
(Count 7), and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony (Counts 2, 4, 6, and 8). Duckworth’s charges were later dismissed
without prejudice. At a trial held from March 7 through March 9, 2018, the
jury acquitted Walton on the malice murder count and on one firearm count
but found Walton guilty on all remaining counts. The trial court sentenced
Walton as a recidivist offender to serve two concurrent life sentences in prison
without the possibility of parole for felony murder (Count 3) and for armed
robbery (Count 5), plus consecutive five-year sentences in prison for the related
firearm counts (Counts 4 and 6) to be served concurrent with each other.
Counts 7 and 8 merged with Counts 3 and 4, respectively, for sentencing
purposes.
Walton filed a timely motion for new trial on March 15, 2018, which he
amended through new counsel on September 5, 2019. After the hearing held
from February 6 through March 5, 2020, the trial court denied Walton’s motion
court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and

committed reversible error in admitting certain evidence. Walton

also contends that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally

ineffective assistance in several respects and that he was prejudiced

by cumulative harm resulting from trial counsel’s alleged

deficiencies. Because we conclude that Walton did not preserve his

claim of error with respect to his motion for a directed verdict, the

trial court did not plainly err in admitting the evidence contested by

Walton, and Walton failed to show constitutionally ineffective

assistance by his trial counsel, largely through his abandonment of

most of those claims, we affirm.

The evidence presented at trial showed that on the morning of

October 19, 2016, Johnson left his home in Tennille, Georgia, that

he shared with his fiancée and children to ride to work with his

employer. At the time, Johnson had his wallet, identification, food

stamp card, a cell phone, and approximately $45 in cash. He also

for new trial, as amended, on August 23, 2024. Walton timely filed a notice of
appeal on September 17, 2024, and the case was docketed to this Court’s April
2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
received $120 in cash after working that day. On his way home,

Johnson purchased beer and a bottle of liquor and then was dropped

off near his home sometime around 4:00 p.m. One of Johnson’s

neighbors, Jerry Hooks, saw Johnson begin walking across a nearby

field after exiting his employer’s vehicle. Although Hooks testified

that he did not know Johnson’s destination at the time, Hooks

confirmed that a woman named “Lilly” hosted card games in the

area.

Around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m., Johnson arrived at his cousin’s house

at Parson’s Crossing in Sandersville, where he was met by his

cousin, Darlene Poole, Poole’s son, Jeffrey, and one of Poole’s

neighbors, Gary Worthen. At the time, Johnson was riding in a red

Dodge truck with two other men later identified as Walton and

Duckworth. The three men stopped by Poole’s house because

Johnson wanted to see her for her birthday. According to Poole, she

asked Johnson about the men with him, and Johnson explained that

the two men were his cousin-in-law and a friend. She further

recalled seeing that Walton, who only briefly exited the vehicle to

3
change seats, “had [a] coat tied on his hand.” Jeffrey testified that

he recalled seeing that the men also had cocaine and marijuana with

them. Poole, Jeffrey, and Worthen each claimed that Johnson

appeared intoxicated and possibly on drugs when he arrived at

Poole’s house but otherwise happy and as though he were having a

good time with the two men. After giving his cousin a couple of

dollars for her birthday and explaining that his remaining cash was

for his rent and light bill, Johnson stated that he was going to

Riddleville to “handle some business.” He then left with Walton and

Duckworth.

In the early morning hours of the next day, Johnson’s body was

discovered on a dirt road that travels toward Riddleville, in a wooded

area, and located only a few miles from Parson’s Crossing. He had a

single gunshot wound to the face, and three of his pants pockets

were pulled inside out. Only a receipt and $0.25 were found with his

body; he had no wallet, cash, identification, or cell phone. A single,

spent .40-caliber cartridge casing was found above his head on the

roadway. Other than the single gunshot wound to Johnson’s face,

4
the crime scene showed no other signs of violence or evidence of a

struggle. Johnson’s autopsy revealed that he died from the gunshot

wound. The medical examiner testified that no soot or stippling was

found on Johnson’s body, suggesting that the gun that killed

Johnson was fired from several feet away or closer but with

something between the gun’s muzzle and Johnson.

That same day, officers interviewed family and witnesses and

learned that Johnson was last seen with Walton and Duckworth;

that the truck that the men rode in belonged to Duckworth; and that

Johnson had a cell phone that was last active near Walton’s

residence that day. Moreover, officers learned from Duckworth’s

girlfriend that Duckworth told her about the events leading to

Johnson’s death. After interviewing Duckworth and further

investigation, officers obtained video surveillance from a liquor store

and gas station that confirmed portions of the route that

Duckworth’s truck had reportedly taken that day. Officers also

obtained and executed search warrants for Duckworth’s truck and

Walton’s house. While searching the truck, officers discovered and

5
took samples of what appeared to be blood on the rear driver’s side

bumper and collected six pieces of paper with handwritten notes

that appeared to be “gang type literature,” including a “gangster

prayer,” from the center console. Searching Walton’s house led to the

additional discovery of what appeared to be blood on a pair of

Walton’s tennis shoes and blue jeans, which were also collected as

evidence. In Walton’s backyard, officers observed a 55-gallon barrel

reportedly used as a burn barrel. Although officers searched through

the top few inches of its wet contents, they found nothing of

evidentiary value and did not search any further. Officers did not

find any of Johnson’s missing possessions, including his wallet or

cell phone.

While other officers searched Walton’s home, the lead GBI case

agent, Eugene Howard, interviewed Walton about the prior day’s

events.2 During that interview, Walton initially stated that he saw

Johnson earlier at Lilly’s house and that he, Johnson, and

2 Walton’s October 20, 2016, interview was video-recorded and played in

full for the jury.
6
Duckworth shared a bottle of alcohol. Walton denied going anywhere

else after Duckworth took him home, except to purchase lottery

tickets. But, after being confronted about witnesses seeing him at

Parson’s Crossing and with the fact that officers had obtained videos

confirming that Duckworth’s vehicle was seen at two other locations,

Walton changed his story. He then admitted that he had gone to

Parson’s Crossing and to the gas station and liquor store seen in

those videos. Nevertheless, when asked whether he was present at

the location where the murder occurred, Walton denied being there.

He also denied having a physical altercation with Johnson and that

Johnson’s blood would be on his belongings for any reason.

Walton was arrested the following day on October 21, 2016.

Following his arrest, he voluntarily submitted to another interview

with Agent Howard, during which he admitted in response to

questioning that he was once “head of security” for the criminal

street gang Gangster Disciples.3 However, upon being interrogated

3 Walton’s October 21, 2016, interview was audio-recorded. Only the
portion of the audio recording concerning Agent Howard’s attempts to question
Walton about Johnson’s shooting was played for the jury.
7
specifically about the murder, Walton ended the interview, telling

Agent Howard that he “didn’t want to make any comment,” and that

he was “waiting to see what [the investigators] got.”

Weeks later, after learning that the murder weapon – a High

Point .40-caliber pistol – was owned by and came from Duckworth’s

“brother,” Darius Lawrence, officers located the firearm in Baldwin

County where Lawrence lived. Although unable to confirm that the

bullet recovered from Johnson’s body was fired from Lawrence’s

firearm, a GBI firearms examiner confirmed that the spent cartridge

casing found near Johnson’s body was fired from that weapon.

Additionally, although testing of the stains found on Duckworth’s

truck bumper and on Walton’s blue jeans was inconclusive for blood,

the GBI crime lab confirmed the presence of Johnson’s blood on both

of Walton’s tennis shoes.

At trial, the State presented testimony from Kavionne

Robertson, who was Duckworth’s girlfriend around the time of the

murder, and from David Mitchell, who was Walton’s cellmate while

Walton was awaiting his trial. Robertson testified that an

8
intoxicated Duckworth came to her home the night of the shooting

around 8:30 p.m., crying and shaking. Duckworth told her that he

was riding in his truck with two other men on a dirt road, heading

“somewhere to pick something up,” when one of the men identified

as “Rick” asked Duckworth to pull over to use the restroom. After

doing so, an argument occurred between Rick and the other man,

during which Rick walked back to the truck, pulled out a gun, and

then shot the other man in the face.

Mitchell testified that Walton similarly told him that Walton

was riding in a pickup truck with Duckworth and Johnson when

Walton and Johnson began arguing about “money or something.”

According to Mitchell, Walton stated that he made Duckworth stop

on a dirt road near Riddleville, shot Johnson in the face using

Duckworth’s .40-caliber firearm, “wound up with [Johnson’s] phone

and his wallet,” and then burned both items in a barrel behind his

residence. When asked about Walton’s gang affiliation, Mitchell

testified that Walton told him that he was “in enforcement” in the

Gangster Disciples.

9
The State also presented testimony from Captain Trey

Burgamy with the Washington County Sheriff’s Office, who was

tendered as a gang investigations expert, and from Lawrence about

his experiences with the Gangster Disciples and concerning how his

firearm became involved in the shooting. Burgamy testified that the

Gangster Disciples is a Chicago-based street gang with a presence

in Georgia; that the gang’s chain of command includes a chief of

security, who protects the gang members, and a chief enforcer, who

enforces the gang’s rules; and that the chief enforcer is the person

who authorizes the killing or physical punishment of anyone who

violates the gang’s rules. Burgamy further testified that, to become

a member, the gang requires recruits to commit a crime typically

involving homicide, prostitution, or firearms.

Lawrence, who admitted to being a longtime member of the

Gangster Disciples, testified that Duckworth was also a Gangster

Disciples member. Lawrence also claimed that there was no real

difference between the gang’s head of security and the gang’s

enforcer; that, in both positions, one could authorize unlawful acts

10
for retribution or retaliation; and that if Walton was head of

security, Walton could authorize such acts. Regarding the murder

weapon, Lawrence maintained that he did not know that his firearm

was involved until after officers came to his home to collect the

weapon. Yet, on cross-examination, Lawrence admitted that

Duckworth had previously requested to borrow his firearm.

Lawrence was also impeached with his recorded statement, in which

he admitted that Duckworth was not a full-fledged member of the

Gangster Disciples and that Duckworth told him that his firearm

was involved in the shooting after an argument about money.

Burgamy and Lawrence both confirmed that the notes found in

Duckworth’s truck were legitimate Gangster Disciples literature.

1. Walton contends in his brief that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for a directed verdict as to “Count 4 Felony

Murder based upon armed robbery and Count 5 Possession of a

firearm during the commission of the armed robbery.” Although not

enumerated as error, Walton also appears to assert a sufficiency of

the evidence claim with respect to those two counts. These claims

11
fail for several reasons.

To begin, Count 4 of his indictment did not charge him with

felony murder predicated on the commission of an armed robbery.

In fact, Walton was not charged with that offense at all. Instead, the

trial record shows that Count 3 charged him with felony murder

predicated on aggravated assault. Because Walton did not move for

a directed verdict on the grounds that he now asserts on appeal,

Walton’s claim that the trial court should have granted a directed

verdict on the non-existent charge of felony murder predicated on

armed robbery has not been preserved and necessarily fails. See

Clements v. State, 317 Ga. 772, 788–89 (2023) (concluding that the

defendant failed to preserve his claim of error in the trial court’s

denying a motion for a directed verdict for certain counts of the

indictment because the defendant did not move for a directed verdict

on those counts at trial).

Next, while Walton was charged with possession of a firearm

during the commission of an armed robbery, which was designated

as Count 6 of his indictment rather than Count 5 as he alleges, the

12
subject of his motion for a directed verdict at trial was solely armed

robbery. Walton never moved the trial court for a directed verdict on

the related firearm count. Accordingly, Walton’s argument with

respect to the firearm count was also not preserved for our review.

See Clements, 317 Ga. at 788–89.

Moreover, to the extent that Walton asserts that the evidence

was not sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to

support his convictions, we conclude that the claim has been

abandoned. We have previously declined to address arguments, like

this one, that were not enumerated as error. See, e.g., Mims v. State,

310 Ga. 853, 854 n.2 (2021) (declining to address passing argument

regarding competency issue not enumerated as error, citing Wallace

v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 37–38 (2018) (“[A]n appealing party may not

use its brief to expand its enumeration of errors by arguing the

incorrectness of a trial court ruling not mentioned in the

enumeration of errors.”)). Moreover, Georgia Supreme Court Rule

22(1) provides that, in all briefs filed in cases, except those involving

death penalty matters, “[a]ny enumerated error or subpart of an

13
enumerated error not supported by argument, citations to authority,

and citations to the record shall be deemed abandoned.” Walton’s

entire sufficiency argument is: “There was insufficient evidence,

even in the light most favorable to the State, that the murder

transpired from anything other than an argument.” We have

declined to address sufficiency arguments under similar

circumstances. See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 321 Ga. 222, 226 (2025).

2. Walton also enumerates as error that the trial court should

have granted his motion in limine and excluded evidence about his

gang affiliation and activity from trial as impermissible “other acts”

evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”).4 However,

4 OCGA § 24-4-404(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” However, such
evidence may be admitted for other purposes, including to prove “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.” Id. The party offering other acts evidence for a proper
purpose under Rule 404(b) “must show that (1) it is relevant to an issue in the
case other than the defendant’s character; (2) its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice under OCGA § 24-4-403; and
(3) there is sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant committed the other act.” Mitchell v. State, 317 Ga. 107,
110 (2023). On appeal, Walton addresses only the first and second prongs of
this test.
14
despite generally asserting that the trial court erred in denying his

motion in limine that sought to exclude all gang related evidence

associated with him, including but not limited to testimony by Agent

Howard and Mitchell concerning Walton’s statements that he was a

member of the Gangster Disciples, Walton only specifically points to

the trial testimony describing the gang literature and argues that

the evidence should have been excluded. Therefore, we limit our

consideration to whether this evidence should have been admitted

under Rule 404(b), as Walton has abandoned his claim to the extent

that his motion in limine requested exclusion of other gang evidence,

including his statements admitting to his gang membership. See Ga.

Sup. Ct. R. 22(1). See also Johnson v. State, 321 Ga. 422, 426 (2025)

(deeming claim that the trial court erred in admitting gang

membership evidence abandoned, where the defendant failed to

make any arguments or cite to the record in support of his claim).

Walton first argues that the description of the six pieces of

paper found in Duckworth’s truck as “gang type literature” that

included a “gangster prayer” was not relevant to proving murder. As

15
support, he asserts that the State’s theory of the case at trial was

that he shot Johnson following an argument, and the State failed to

introduce evidence showing that the murder was gang related. In

arguing the prejudice prong under the Rule 404(b) test, Walton

asserts that “once the gang inference is made, it is unfairly and

overwhelmingly prejudicial,” and that the evidence “should have

been restricted from the jury’s hearings [sic] as it was more unfairly

prejudicial than probative.”

As an initial matter, our review is for plain error only because

Walton failed to preserve this claim for ordinary appellate review.

See Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 564 (2023) (noting that only plain

error review is available for an unpreserved challenge to the

admission of alleged improper character evidence, in the form of

testimony that the defendant held a “gangster style” gun). The trial

record shows that Walton’s motion in limine seeking to exclude gang

evidence made no reference to Rule 404(b) and instead only asserted

that the evidence was not relevant and more prejudicial than

16
probative under OCGA §§ 24-4-402 and 24-4-403.5 In denying the

motion, the trial court ultimately ruled that it would determine the

admissibility of the contested gang evidence in each instance where

the State sought to introduce the evidence at trial, if requested by

counsel or deemed necessary by the trial court in its discretion. But

the trial transcript reveals that, although Walton did object to the

testimony describing the gang literature at trial, his objection

simply reminded the trial court of his motion in limine, which

asserted different grounds for exclusion than what Walton now

raises on appeal.

Because Walton did not preserve this Rule 404(b) claim for

ordinary review, we consider whether the trial court’s decision not

to exclude the contested gang evidence constitutes plain error under

the standard set forth in Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 326–27 (2016)

5 Regarding the admission of evidence at trial, OCGA § 24-4-402
provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]vidence which is not relevant shall not be
admissible.” OCGA § 24-4-403 provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”
17
(adopting the federal plain error standard for reviewing claims of

unpreserved evidentiary error under OCGA § 24-1-103(d)).

To establish plain error:

First, there must be an error or defect – some sort of
“[d]eviation from a legal rule” – that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,
affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and
finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error –
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
“‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”

Gates, 298 Ga. at 327 (quoting Kelly v. State, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2011)

(punctuation and emphasis omitted)). This Court has explained that

“[s]atisfying all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should

be.” Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 86 (2024) (citation and punctuation

omitted). And this Court need not analyze all prongs of the plain

error standard where the appellant fails to establish any one of

them. See Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 490, 496 (2023).

18
Assuming without deciding that the trial court clearly erred in

admitting into evidence the testimony concerning the gang

literature under Rule 404(b), we conclude that Walton has not

established that the alleged error affected his substantial rights. In

his brief, Walton makes only conclusory assertions about prejudice

to support his claim and fails to provide any substantive argument

demonstrating how the admission of the contested gang evidence

affected his trial’s outcome. Moreover, that evidence was cumulative

of other admitted evidence. Agent Howard and Walton’s cellmate,

Mitchell, both testified that Walton admitted to being a gang

member. Walton did not object to that testimony at trial and has

abandoned any claim regarding its admission on appeal. Finally, the

evidence introduced at trial supporting Walton’s guilt was strong.

The trial evidence included testimony that Walton admitted to

shooting Johnson on a dirt road near Riddleville, taking Johnson’s

wallet and cell phone, and then burning both items in a barrel

behind his home. Those admissions were corroborated by other

witnesses testifying to seeing Walton with Johnson a few miles from

19
the murder scene, during the hours immediately before the shooting;

Robertson testifying that Duckworth told her that Walton shot

Johnson on a dirt road; Agent Howard testifying to Walton’s

confirming during one of his recorded police interviews that he was

with Johnson in the hours before the shooting, as revealed by

witnesses and video surveillance; and other witnesses testifying

that Johnson’s body was found on a dirt road that traveled toward

Riddleville, with his pants pockets pulled inside out, and his wallet

and cell phone missing. The trial evidence also included testimony

that Johnson’s cell phone was last active near Walton’s home on the

day that Johnson was killed. Lastly, forensic evidence was

introduced showing that Johnson’s blood was found on both of

Walton’s tennis shoes. Given this strong evidence supporting his

convictions, the cumulative nature of the contested gang evidence,

and Walton’s superficial treatment of this claim, Walton has not

shown that any error in the admission of the testimony regarding

the gang literature likely affected the outcome of his trial. See

Johnson v. State, 319 Ga. 562, 572 (2024) (holding that the appellant

20
failed to show that the alleged error affected his substantial rights,

where the contested testimony was cumulative and the evidence of

guilt was overwhelming); Pittman v. State, 318 Ga. 819, 830 (2024)

(holding that the appellant failed to show that the alleged error in

admitting his statements likely affected his trial’s outcome,

considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the appellant’s

cursory treatment of the claim). Accordingly, there was no plain

error.

3. Walton next contends that the trial court erred in permitting

the State to use a transcript that the State prepared to assist the

jurors in listening to Walton’s first recorded police interview without

the trial court first making a specific finding of accuracy concerning

the transcript and instructing the jury accordingly. Specifically, he

asserts that the trial court should have “factually determine[d] the

accuracy of the transcript” before permitting its use and,

acknowledging that the trial court gave limiting instructions to the

jury, he argues that the trial court erred in not including a specific

21
finding that the transcript was accurate. 6

As Walton concedes, this claim is subject to plain error review,

because he did not object to the trial court’s instructions or the

transcript’s use at trial. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d). See also, e.g.,

Horton v. State, 310 Ga. 310, 319–21 (2020) (reviewing unpreserved

instructional error claim for plain error); Rickman v. State, 304 Ga.

61, 63 (2018) (reviewing unpreserved claim contesting the admission

of photographs used as a demonstrative aid for plain error). Here,

Walton has failed to meet his burden as to the standard’s third

prong, requiring that the error likely affected the outcome of the

proceedings. See Gates, 298 Ga. at 327 (reviewing unpreserved

6 To support his claim, Walton cites only two cases from the Court of

Appeals – Montgomery v. State, 173 Ga. App. 570, 572 (1985), and Elliott v.
State, 168 Ga. App. 781, 785–86 (1983). We note that neither case cited by
Walton stands for the proposition that a trial court must make findings of
accuracy before allowing a transcript to be used as a demonstrative aid. See
Montgomery, 173 Ga. App. at 572 (holding that the trial court did not err in
permitting the use of certain transcripts, as a proper foundation had been laid,
they were used for the limited purpose of allowing the jurors to follow along
with the recordings, the trial court charged the jury on that limited use, and
the transcripts were not admitted into evidence); Elliott, 168 Ga. App. at 785–
86 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
use of a transcript that it determined was accurate, and explaining that such
use is permissible when a proper foundation has been laid).
22
evidentiary claim for plain error); Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (reviewing

unpreserved instructional claim for plain error).

The record reveals that, when the State sought to introduce the

video recording of Walton’s police interview, the State laid a

foundation for its admission by eliciting testimony from the

interrogating officer, Agent Howard, who testified that he was

familiar with the recording, had reviewed it, and had determined

that it was a true and accurate depiction of his interview with

Walton. The State then requested permission to provide the jurors

with copies of a transcript of the recording that had been

professionally prepared, albeit not certified by a court reporter, to

aid the jurors in following along with the recording. In connection

with the use of that transcript, the trial court instructed the jury as

follows:

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Prosecution has prepared a
transcript from the – from this interview. Now, it is their
– it’s the Prosecution’s understanding of what was said.
You heard an audio yesterday and you know how difficult
it was to understand. So this is not something that a court
reporter has prepared and certified. … So do you
understand it’s what they say the audio says. Which you’ll

23
be listening to the audio. So don’t be bound by the
transcript. It can be helpful to you, but remember you’ve
got to make the decisions in the long run about what it
says.

Upon defense counsel’s request, the trial court further instructed

the jury that: “The evidence is the audio, not the transcript. You’re

not going to have these transcripts in the jury room to deliberate. …

It’s merely demonstrative as we say in nature to use the

transcripts.” Finally, after resolving some concerns that arose

during the playing of the recording about necessary redactions to the

recording and transcript outside the presence of the jury, the trial

court reiterated to the jury upon its return to the courtroom:

“[R]emember what I told you, this is the State’s version of what they

say is said on the audio. But what you actually hear on the audio, if

you hear it differently, the audio is the evidence as well as the video.”

Even assuming clear or obvious error, Walton has not carried

his burden of showing that the outcome of the trial likely would have

been different had the trial court first made findings about the

accuracy of the transcript and instructed the jury about those

24
findings. That is because Walton does not assert that the transcript

was an inaccurate representation of what was said on the recording,

and the record on appeal does not include a copy of the transcript for

that determination to be made. See Crawford v. State, 288 Ga. 425,

427 (2011) (“An appellant has the burden of proving trial court error

by the appellate record, and must compile a complete record of what

transpired in the trial court.”). Moreover, the trial court instructed

the jury that the transcript was not evidence and that the audio was

the evidence that the jury should consider. “Qualified jurors are

presumed to follow jury instructions.” Schmitt v. State, 318 Ga. 835,

846 (2024). For these reasons, this claim fails.

4. Walton contends that the trial court abused its discretion

under Rule 404(b) in allowing evidence to be admitted at trial that

he went to prison on an unrelated criminal charge and in not sua

sponte giving a curative instruction related to that evidence.

The trial record reveals that Mitchell testified that he was

Walton’s cellmate at the Washington County jail from December

2016 to July 2017, and, during that time, Walton told him about the

25
events leading to Johnson’s shooting and Walton’s actions during

those events. Defense counsel cross-examined Mitchell about the

source of his knowledge of the specific facts related to the crimes and

accused Mitchell of having read Walton’s discovery materials. In

response, Mitchell denied the accusation and claimed that “[Walton]

was still waiting on his discovery package after [he and Walton]

parted ways.” On redirect, the State asked Mitchell: “Just to clarify,

when you left [the jail] – who left first, you or Mr. Walton?” Mitchell’s

response that Walton now challenges on appeal was: “Mr. Walton

left and went to prison.”

Because Walton did not object to Mitchell’s testimony or

request a curative instruction at trial, we review these issues for

plain error only. See Davis v. State, 302 Ga. 576 (2017) (unpreserved

Rule 404(b) objection to testimony concerning the defendant’s prior

altercations and trial court’s failure to sua sponte give a limiting

instruction reviewed for plain error). We conclude that Walton has

failed to show clear or obvious error, as required under the second

prong of the plain error standard. As even Walton concedes,

26
Mitchell’s testimony that Walton went to prison was unresponsive

to the question being asked by the State and was fleeting and

undetailed, such that the passing reference to Walton’s going to

prison, without more, would not lend itself to the inevitable

conclusion that Walton had unrelated criminal charges against him

and thus did not impugn Walton’s character. See Swims v. State,

307 Ga. 651, 655 (2020) (“A passing reference to a defendant’s

incarceration does not place his character in evidence.”); Wade v.

State, 304 Ga. 5, 10 (2018) (holding that the unresponsive, brief

testimony that the defendant stated that he was “not going back to

prison” did not place the defendant’s character in issue in violation

of Rule 404(b)). “Given that our case law runs contrary to [Walton’s]

position, it cannot be seriously contended that the trial court

committed ‘clear or obvious’ error” in allowing Mitchell’s testimony

into evidence. Kelly, 290 Ga. at 34 (holding that the trial court did

not commit clear or obvious error, where the appellant’s argument

conflicted with controlling precedent).

And, with respect to Walton’s argument that the trial court

27
should have given a curative instruction, the alleged error was also

not clear or obvious, because Walton has not identified any

controlling precedent that requires a trial court to give a curative

instruction under these circumstances, and we are not aware of any

such authority. See Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. 370, 374 (2016) (“An

error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on

point.”). Accordingly, Walton’s claim of plain error fails.

5. Walton contends that the trial court plainly erred in allowing

Robertson to testify to Duckworth’s out-of-court statements to her

about the events leading to Johnson’s death in violation of the

Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. See generally US Const. Amend. VI (“In

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be

confronted with the witnesses against him.”). In addition, Walton

argues in passing that the out-of-court statements were

inadmissible hearsay pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-801. 7 We conclude

7 Walton also concedes that this claim is subject to plain error review, as

he failed to object to Robertson’s testimony at trial. See Grier v. State, 313 Ga.

28
that Walton has not shown that either the alleged error in admitting

Duckworth’s statements under the Confrontation Clause or based

on statutory hearsay grounds affected the outcome of his trial, as

required under the third prong of the plain error standard. See

Castillo-Velasquez v. State, 305 Ga. 644, 653 (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

The Confrontation Clause imposes an absolute bar to

admitting out-of-court statements into evidence that are testimonial

in nature when the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-

examine the declarant. See McCord v. State, 305 Ga. 318, 321 (2019).

Robertson testified to Duckworth’s statements to her after Johnson’s

shooting that Walton asked Duckworth to stop on a dirt road to use

the restroom, an argument ensued between Walton and Johnson,

and then Walton shot Johnson. Duckworth did not testify at trial

and, thus, was not subject to cross-examination by Walton.

Assuming without deciding that Duckworth’s statements to

236, 240 (2022) (unpreserved Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections
reviewed for plain error only).
29
Robertson were testimonial and should have been excluded under

the Confrontation Clause, the alleged erroneous admission of those

statements “did not give rise to the reasonable probability that the

outcome of the trial would have been different.” Grier v. State, 313

Ga. 236, 245 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). Not only was

the evidence against Walton strong in this case, but Duckworth’s

statements to Robertson were also cumulative of other, uncontested

evidence. That evidence included Walton’s admissions that

described the circumstances surrounding Johnson’s shooting in a

similar manner to what was testified to by Robertson. Moreover,

Agent Howard’s testimony from the preliminary hearing, a

transcript of which was admitted into evidence and not challenged

on appeal, also described similar statements by Duckworth about

the shooting. Because the evidence was strong and the contested

out-of-court statements by Duckworth are cumulative of other

admitted evidence, Walton’s claim of plain error based on the

Confrontation Clause fails. See Grier, 313 Ga. at 245 (no plain error

in admitting testimony that violated the Confrontation Clause,

30
where the evidence of guilt was strong, and the improperly admitted

hearsay was duplicative of other properly admitted evidence).

Likewise, Walton’s claim of error in the admission of

Duckworth’s statements to Robertson based on hearsay also fails.

Assuming without deciding that Duckworth’s statements to

Robertson constitute inadmissible hearsay under OCGA § 24-8-

801(c), and should have clearly been excluded, those statements

were cumulative of other evidence, as previously noted. And, again,

the evidence against Walton was strong in this case. Given that,

Walton has not shown that the alleged error affected his substantial

rights, as required by the plain error standard’s third prong. See

Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 416–17 (2020) (no plain error in

admitting hearsay, because the contested statements were

cumulative of other evidence, including the defendant’s

unchallenged admission to his cellmate that he participated in the

crime, and the evidence against the defendant was strong); Anglin

v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 336 (2017) (“[T]he erroneous admission of

hearsay is harmless where substantial, cumulative, legally

31
admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced.”).

6. Finally, Walton contends that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance in several ways. To prevail on

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show

that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient

performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland

test, a defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel “performed at

trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the

circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”

Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 683 (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. To satisfy the

prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” Burke

v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 708 (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted).

See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The defendant’s burden under

Strickland, “though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one.” Hayes

32
v. State, 320 Ga. 505, 514 (2024). And, if a defendant fails to make a

sufficient showing on one prong of the Strickland test, we need not

address the other prong. Starks v. State, 320 Ga. 300, 304 (2024)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) Walton first contends that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance in not objecting under Rule 404(b) or moving

for a mistrial in response to Mitchell’s testimony that Walton went

to prison, as discussed in Division 4. This claim fails, as Walton has

not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.

As we concluded in Division 4, Mitchell’s fleeting, unresponsive

testimony did not place Walton’s character into evidence. Thus, any

objection or motion for mistrial based on Rule 404(b) would have

been meritless, and “the failure to make a meritless objection is not

deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 367 (2022). See

also Brown v. State, 307 Ga. 24, 33 (2019) (trial counsel not deficient

for not objecting to a passing, non-responsive reference to the

defendant’s being identified using a “jail database,” as that

33
testimony was not improper character evidence). Accordingly,

Walton’s ineffective assistance claim fails.

(b) Walton next argues that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance in not objecting to the State’s allegedly leading

questions during the State’s direct examination of Agent Howard. In

his brief on appeal, Walton discusses some testimony elicited from

Agent Howard, mostly about the timeline of the investigation into

Johnson’s death, and certain evidence that was discovered. Then,

without pointing to a single, specific question by the State that

Walton finds objectionable, he argues: “Throughout this extensive

direct examination of this key witness, trial counsel for the

Appellant did not make any objections to any of the obviously

leading questions asked by the State. This lack of objections, along

with other errors by trial counsel [sic] constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel.”

Although Walton provides sufficient page citations and

references to specific testimony in his brief to determine the portions

of the State’s direct examination that he finds objectionable, Walton

34
omits any substantive legal analysis or citation to authority

explaining which questions by the State were objectionable, why

trial counsel’s lack of objections here constitute deficient

performance, and how that prejudiced him. See Byrd, 321 Ga. at 225

(“[L]itigants must do more than just make an argument or cite

authority, but must now ensure that argument, citation to

authority, and citation to the record are all present to avoid having

an enumeration deemed abandoned.”). See also Taylor v. State, 315

Ga. 630, 650 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted) (“It is not the

function of this Court to cull the record for a party to find alleged

errors or to form arguments on the appellant’s behalf.”). For these

reasons, we determine that Walton has abandoned this claim under

Supreme Court Rule 22 (1), and decline to consider it.

(c) With respect to his third ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, Walton argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance in not reviewing the State’s transcript of his recorded

statement for accuracy, as discussed in Division 3. And in his fourth

claim of ineffective assistance, Walton argues that trial counsel

35
should have objected and moved for a mistrial when it became clear

that the recording of his statement was improperly redacted; the

recording should have omitted any mention of charges that he had

pending in Valdosta but the word “Valdosta” was heard in the

recording. For both claims, Walton cites to the portion of the trial

record involving the bench conference about the State’s transcript

and the discussion concerning redactions to the transcript and

recording to exclude mention of Walton’s Valdosta criminal charges,

as the trial court had granted Walton’s pretrial motion to exclude

that information. However, Walton only makes bare assertions

about how his counsel was deficient and provides no meaningful

argument as to how trial counsel performed deficiently or how

Walton was prejudiced as a result. Walton also cites no authority to

support these claims. Accordingly, Walton’s cursory arguments are

deemed abandoned. See Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 22(1). See also, e.g., Guyton

v. State, 321 Ga. 57, 62 n.5 (2025) (deeming ineffective assistance

claim based on trial counsel’s not moving for a mistrial based on

allegedly objectionable testimony abandoned, where the appellant

36
failed to argue claim beyond a bare assertion of ineffective

assistance); Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816 n.21 (2024) (not

addressing several ineffective assistance claims, where the

appellant made no specific arguments or cited any supporting

authority).

(d) Although not enumerated, Walton asserts in passing that,

taken together, “the cumulative, collective, and prejudicial effect of

errors by trial counsel” deprived him of a fair trial. However, this

claim fails. Not only has Walton not substantively argued this claim

of cumulative prejudice, as already discussed, he has abandoned

three of his four ineffective assistance claims. And, with respect to

the remaining claim concerning trial counsel’s not objecting to

Mitchell’s passing reference to Walton’s incarceration, Walton did

not show that trial counsel performed deficiently. As such, we need

not assess cumulative prejudice under Strickland. See Scott v. State,

309 Ga. 764, 771 (2020) (“Assessing cumulative prejudice is

necessary only when multiple errors have been shown.”).

7. Finally, we have assumed without deciding three trial court

37
errors – permitting the admission of gang literature; allowing the

use of a transcript of Walton’s recorded interview without making

findings of accuracy or instructing the jury on the same; and

allowing Robertson to testify about Duckworth’s out-of-court

statements about Johnson’s shooting. However, we concluded for

each assumed error that Walton has not shown harm. Moreover,

Walton makes no argument that we should conduct a cumulative-

error review or how we should aggregate harm arising from these

errors. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18 (2020) (“[A] defendant who

wishes to take advantage of the [cumulative-error rule] should

explain to the reviewing court just how he was prejudiced by the

cumulative effect of multiple errors.”). Given this, we discern no

apparent cumulative error on this record that would require a new

trial. See Johnson, 321 Ga. at 427 n.3; Robbins v. State, 320 Ga. 19,

28 n.3 (2024).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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