Whisnant v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 12, 2025

S25A0523. WHISNANT v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Karen Michelle Whisnant was convicted of felony murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of her husband,

Michael Whisnant. 1 On appeal, Whisnant contends that the evi-

dence was not sufficient to support her convictions. She also claims

1 The shooting occurred on February 4, 2020. On February 13, 2020, a

Jackson County grand jury indicted Whisnant for malice murder, felony mur-
der predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, cruelty to children
in the second degree, cruelty to children in the third degree, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Whisnant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon and was tried by a jury on the other charges from January 9 to 12,
2023. The jury found Whisnant not guilty of malice murder and guilty of all
other counts. On July 11, 2023, the trial court entered final judgment sentenc-
ing Whisnant to life in prison for felony murder, 10 years in prison for cruelty
to children in the second degree, and 10 years in prison for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, all to be served concurrently, and five years of
probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, to be
served consecutively to the other sentences. The remaining convictions merged
for sentencing. Whisnant filed a timely motion for new trial, which she later
amended through new counsel. On October 11, 2024, the trial court denied
that the trial court erred in declining to grant a new trial based on

the “general grounds” set out in OCGA § 5-5-20 and OCGA § 5-5-21,

that the verdict was contrary to the principles of justice and equity

and strongly against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial

court failed to fully consider Whisnant’s defense of battered person

syndrome when it denied her motion for immunity from prosecu-

tion. 2

Whisnant’s claims fail. The evidence was constitutionally suf-

ficient to support her convictions, because there was no dispute that

Whisnant’s motion for new trial. Whisnant filed a timely notice of appeal. The
case was docketed to the April 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.

2 Whisnant’s brief on appeal, which was prepared by counsel, is so sparse

that it comes dangerously close to abandoning Whisnant’s claims of error. The
brief contains a total of two citations to the record, and none of its handful of
case citations gives the page of the opinion where we may find the proposition
for which it is cited. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any enumerated error or
subpart of an enumerated error not supported by argument, citations to au-
thority, and citations to the record shall be deemed abandoned.”); Supreme
Court Rule 22 (2) (“[B]riefs must contain full and complete citations of author-
ity. Georgia case citations must include the case name, volume, and page num-
ber….”). Counsel is admonished in the future to comply with our Rule 22 by
fully supporting his briefs with full citations to authority and to the record.
2
Whisnant shot and killed Michael, and the jury was free to disbe-

lieve that the shooting was accidental or done in self-defense, as

Whisnant asserted. Whether to grant a new trial based on the gen-

eral grounds is left to the sole discretion of the trial court, and there

is no evidence that the trial court here failed to exercise that discre-

tion. Finally, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that

Whisnant was not entitled to immunity because she did not show by

a preponderance of the evidence that she killed Michael in self-de-

fense. So her convictions are affirmed.

1. Whisnant and Michael lived together with their blended

family, including Whisnant’s son, Alex Garcia 3, Michael’s daughter,

Alexis Whisnant, and Alexis’s half-sister through another mother,

Haley Jordan.

On the day of the shooting, Michael accused Whisnant of cheat-

ing on him with one of his friends. The two argued about it until

Whisnant, Michael, and Garcia agreed to go to the friend’s home to

3 Alex Garcia was a minor at the time of the shooting but over 18 at the

time of trial.
3
resolve the situation. Alexis and Jordan were also in the home dur-

ing this time, but they were in a back bedroom and were not part of

the discussion about the friend.

Whisnant and Garcia went to sit in the car. Michael, however,

was taking a long time coming out of the house. Garcia went to check

on him, and he found Michael in his room, loading his gun and say-

ing, “[D]on’t let him jump on me,” referring to the friend. Garcia

went back out to the car to tell Whisnant that Michael did not seem

to be coming.

Whisnant went into the house. She encountered Michael, and

the two started shoving and yelling at each other. Alexis and Jordan

heard the argument from the back bedroom. Then, as Garcia told it,

Whisnant picked up a gun at some point, and “next thing you know,

he pushed her and you just hear, boom, and he falls to the ground.”

Michael was shot in the upper chest. He later died from his injury.

Alexis and Jordan heard the gunshot. Alexis called 911, and

the first responding officers arrived to find Whisnant next to Mi-

4
chael on the floor, holding a towel over his gunshot wound and re-

peating, “[P]lease don’t leave me.” Whisnant was placed in handcuffs

and brought outside to a patrol car. She told the officers that Michael

had been “beating on her all day,” and that she had not known the

gun was loaded. The officers did not notice any injuries to Whisnant.

At the police station, Whisnant waived her Miranda 4 rights

and gave an interview to officers. Portions of the interview were

played for the jury. In the interview, Whisnant described Michael as

“the devil.” She said that she and Michael had “been fighting for

three years now,” and that over that span she had left him 26 times,

but had always come back. She also said that Michael had not

pointed a gun at her on the day of the shooting, but that when she

shot him, he was charging at her and grabbing her while holding

two shotguns and a 9mm handgun.

At the end of the interview, Whisnant also prepared a written

statement, which was read aloud at trial by an investigator. The

statement differed in some respects from the account in Whisnant’s

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).

5
interview. The written statement recounted that, the day before the

shooting, Michael had begun accusing Whisnant of cheating on him

with the friend. On the day of the shooting, Whisnant, Michael, and

Garcia agreed to go “face” the friend to settle the matter. Whisnant

and Garcia went to the car while Michael loaded his gun. Whisnant

then went back into the house to see if Michael was ready to go.

When Whisnant got inside, Michael came toward her, “cuss[ed]” her,

slapped her, and said, “I’m going to f**k all y’all up.” He briefly

walked away, then turned back toward Whisnant and said, “[B]***h,

I’m going to settle this.” At that point, Michael “looked like the devil

was in him.” As Michael approached Whisnant, she “got” a gun that

was nearby and warned, “I will shoot you if you put your hands on

me again.” Michael continued coming towards Whisnant, so, in her

words, “I pulled the trigger not knowing it was loaded.”

At trial, Whisnant asserted a defense of justification based on

battered person syndrome. Evidence established that Michael was

six feet two inches tall, “about 250, 300 pounds,” and “stronger than

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most other people,” and that he had methamphetamines in his sys-

tem when he was killed. There was also evidence that Michael had

been violent or threatening with Whisnant in the past. One witness

testified that about three months before the shooting, Michael had

pinned Whisnant against the house with his truck. And two other

witnesses talked about times when Whisnant and Garcia came to

stay at the witnesses’ homes to get away from Michael. On one of

those occasions, Whisnant was “shaken,” with bruises on her face

and an injury to her jaw, and the witness was “concerned she was

going to lose all of her teeth.”

Whisnant also called a psychologist, Dr. Alfred Hughes, who

was qualified as an expert in human psychology, dynamics of family

violence, and battered person syndrome. Dr. Hughes testified that

he had reviewed evidence, documents, and transcripts from the

State’s investigation and prosecution of Whisnant. He said that in

his opinion, Whisnant was a victim of family violence, and that her

experience was consistent with battered person syndrome. He de-

scribed the syndrome as akin to post-traumatic stress disorder, with

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symptoms including “learned helplessness, depression, anxiety,

sleep dysfunction, sexual dysfunction and personal difficulties.” A

person with battered person syndrome may live in a “hyper-aroused

state of fear,” and can perceive things as threatening when others

would not find them alarming. Dr. Hughes testified that, although

there was evidence that Whisnant had sometimes been violent to-

ward Michael, those acts “[did] not hold the same purpose” because

“[t]hey were not to have control over [Michael]” or “to intimidate

him, to minimize him, to bully him, to isolate him.” Dr. Hughes went

on to suggest that any discrepancies between Whisnant’s two ac-

counts of the shooting (her interview and her written statement), or

between her accounts and other witnesses’ accounts, could be ex-

plained by people’s varying personal histories and different physical

perspectives and by Whisnant having just experienced a trauma.

The State presented some evidence to undermine Whisnant’s

defense and her accounts of the shooting. In regard to any potential

claim that Whisnant’s gun fired accidentally, the State called a bal-

listics expert from the GBI, who testified that the gun required

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about 5.75 pounds of force to fire, which is the amount of force it

would take to pull a gallon of milk across a table. As to Whisnant’s

statement that Michael charged at her with two shotguns and

grabbed hold of her, a police investigator testified that no “long

guns” were found at the crime scene, and GBI experts testified that

Whisnant’s gun was at least five feet away from Michael when it

was fired, based on the lack of “stippling” and gunpowder residue on

Michael’s body, the minimal damage to his shirt, and the placement

of the bullet wound. As to Whisnant’s statement that she was un-

armed until she “got” a gun to shoot Michael, an investigator testi-

fied that Garcia told police that Whisnant already had a gun with

her as she went into the house from the car. And as for the claim

that Whisnant did not know the gun was loaded, Jordan testified

that Whisnant had loaded the gun earlier that day. Finally, the

State elicited testimony from Alexis and Jordan about occasions

when Whisnant had been violent or threatening toward Michael.

One time, she nearly stabbed him with a screwdriver. Two days be-

fore the shooting, she “[came] at” him with a knife. And on the day

9
of the shooting, she kicked a chair out from under Michael, threat-

ened to “cut out his voicebox so nobody could hear him complain an-

ymore,” and told him that she could “kill him and get away with it

and only spend 70 hours in a nut house.”

2. Whisnant contends that the evidence at trial, which she

characterizes as entirely circumstantial, was not sufficient to sup-

port her convictions, either as a matter of constitutional due process

or under Georgia statutory law.

We evaluate a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence by “viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most

favorable to the verdicts, and asking whether any rational trier of

fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 72 (2023). “[C]onflicts or in-

consistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasona-

ble inferences to be derived from the facts” are for the jury to resolve.

Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

10
Under that standard, the evidence was constitutionally suffi-

cient to support Whisnant’s conviction for felony murder predicated

on aggravated assault. Whisnant was charged in Count 2 of the in-

dictment by causing Michael’s death, “irrespective of malice, by

shooting him.” A person commits aggravated assault, a felony, when

she “[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another”

“[w]ith a deadly weapon.” OCGA §§ 16-5-20(a)(1) & 16-5-21(a)(2).

And a person commits felony murder when she “causes the death of”

another person, “irrespective of malice,” while “in the commission of

a felony.” OCGA § 16-5-1(c). Here, there was no dispute that Whis-

nant shot and killed Michael, so the only question for the jury was

whether the shooting was legally excused. Whisnant claimed early

on that she shot Michael by accident because she did not know the

gun was loaded, but the jury was free to disbelieve that claim, espe-

cially given the testimony that Whisnant had loaded the gun earlier

that day. See Hopwood v. State, 307 Ga. 305, 306 (2019) (jury was

free to disbelieve the claim that the shooting was unintentional). At

trial, Whisnant’s defense centered more on justification, but the only

11
evidence supporting that defense — the claim that Michael was at-

tacking Whisnant when she fired — was Whisnant’s own self-serv-

ing testimony, and the jury was free to disbelieve that testimony,

too. See Maynor v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 497–98 (2023) (jury was free

to disbelieve the defendant’s self-serving testimony that he shot the

victim in self-defense). Viewed in the light most favorable to the ver-

dict, the evidence authorized the jury to find that Whisnant shot Mi-

chael intentionally and without justification. That evidence author-

ized the jury to find that Whisnant and Michael had a history of

violence toward each other; that on the day in question, she got out

of the car, returned to the house with a gun, and began arguing with

Michael; and that she shot him from across the room. The jury was

thus authorized to find Whisnant guilty of felony murder, even if it

did not find that she intended to kill Michael. See Scott v. State, 306

Ga. 417, 423 (2019) (“Unlike malice murder, felony murder does not

require intent to kill; rather, the defendant only must have intended

to commit the underlying felony.”) (citation and punctuation omit-

ted).

12
To the extent Whisnant challenges the sufficiency of the evi-

dence supporting her conviction for cruelty to children against Alex

Garcia, that evidence was sufficient as well. A person commits cru-

elty to children in the second degree when she “with criminal negli-

gence causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical

or mental pain.” OCGA § 16-5-70(c). The evidence was sufficient to

show that Whisnant shot Michael intentionally and without justifi-

cation in the presence of Garcia. That act met the elements of the

offense. See Alexander v. State, 274 Ga. 787, 789 (2002) (evidence

sufficient to authorize conviction for cruelty to children in the second

degree when the defendant physically assaulted someone in the

presence of a young child). See also Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 599

(2018) (“A jury may assess the circumstances of the nature of the

injuries suffered to infer that pain inflicted by a defendant was cruel

and excessive.”).

Whisnant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence under

Georgia statutory law, relying on OCGA § 24-14-6, which provides

that a conviction resting entirely on circumstantial evidence cannot

13
stand unless the evidence “exclude[s] every other reasonable hy-

pothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” But the statute does

not apply to her convictions. There was direct evidence that she shot

Michael: she admitted to the police that she shot him, and Garcia

testified as an eyewitness to the shooting. See Bates v. State, 317 Ga.

809, 815 (2023) (eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as

the perpetrator is direct evidence of guilt); Walker v. State, 314 Ga.

390, 394 (2022) (defendant’s admissions are direct evidence of guilt).

If any direct evidence of guilt is presented, the circumstantial-evi-

dence statute does not apply. See Bates, 317 Ga. at 815 (citation

omitted). And although Whisnant argues that her claim of justifica-

tion is an “alternative hypothesis” that must be “excluded” under the

statute, the evidence authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Whisnant did not shoot Michael in self-defense, as ex-

plained above.

3. Whisnant also argues that the trial court erred in declining

to grant a new trial based on the “general grounds” set out in OCGA

§ 5-5-20 and OCGA § 5-5-21. Under those statutory provisions, a

14
trial court may grant a new trial if the verdict was “contrary to evi-

dence and the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-20, or

“decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence,” OCGA

§ 5-5-21. But a trial court’s decision as to the general grounds is “left

to the sole discretion of the trial court.” Anderson v. State, 319 Ga.

56, 60 (2024). See also, e.g., Adams v. State, 318 Ga. 105, 114 (2024);

King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2023). On appellate review, our role

is limited to determining whether the trial court exercised that dis-

cretion. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 304 Ga. 799, 802 (2018) (“[A]ppellate

courts do not have the same discretion [as trial courts] to order new

trials.”) (citation omitted). And absent affirmative evidence to the

contrary, we presume that the trial court did so. See Anderson, 319

Ga. at 60; Ward v. State, 316 Ga. 295, 299 (2023). Here, in denying

Whisnant’s motion on the general grounds, the trial court explained

that it had considered conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the

evidence, and the credibility of the evidence. None of that is affirm-

ative evidence that the trial court did not exercise its discretion to

consider whether to grant a new trial based on the general grounds,

15
so this claim fails. See Anderson, 319 Ga. at 60; Ward, 316 Ga. at

299.

4. Finally, Whisnant contends that the trial court “failed to

fully consider” Whisnant’s claim of self-defense or the expert testi-

mony on battered person syndrome. We understand this contention

to refer to the trial court’s denial of Whisnant’s motion for immunity

from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. That statute provides,

among other things, that a person may be immune from prosecution

if she used force in a manner that would qualify for a defense of jus-

tification under OCGA § 16-3-21(a) — that is, if the defendant rea-

sonably believed that she had to use force to prevent great bodily

injury. To prevail on a motion for immunity on that basis, the de-

fendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that she

acted in self-defense. See Russell v. State, 319 Ga. 556, 560 (2024).

When we review a trial court’s order granting or denying such a mo-

tion, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s

ruling, and we accept the trial court’s findings of fact and judgments

of credibility if there is any evidence to support them. See State v.

16
Copeland, 310 Ga. 345, 346 (2020). But we review de novo the trial

court’s application of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 to the facts. See id.

Here, in the order denying Whisnant’s motion, the trial court

recounted the evidence presented at trial and at a pre-trial hearing

on the motion. The court found that Whisnant “has frequently been

a victim of [Michael’s] aggression and violence,” which sometimes

resulted in injuries to Whisnant. But the court also credited testi-

mony that Whisnant could be violent toward Michael, and that the

two “were engaged in a mutual, consensual cycle of violence against

each other.” The court found that Whisnant likely suffered from bat-

tered person syndrome, but it found that battered person syndrome

did not account for all the inconsistencies between Whisnant’s ac-

counts of the shooting and the trial testimony of Garcia, Jordan, and

Alexis. The court found that on the day of the shooting, Whisnant

left her car, went into the house where Michael was, argued with

Michael, and after some time, shot Michael. But the court found that

“[n]othing else has been made clear about the events on the night of

17
the shooting,” including whether Whisnant and Michael were phys-

ically fighting when the shot was fired. The court concluded that

Whisnant had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

she reasonably believed she had to shoot Michael to prevent great

bodily harm.

The trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence. Most

of the evidence at trial did not support Whisnant’s claim of self-de-

fense. Garcia testified that “[Michael] pushed [Whisnant] and you

just hear, boom, and he falls to the ground.” Alexis and Jordan, who

were in another part of the house, heard only arguing followed by a

gunshot. And Whisnant herself told police both that she shot Mi-

chael as he was attacking her and that she did not know the gun

was loaded. In short, there was some evidence to support the trial

court’s finding that Whisnant had not shown that she shot Michael

under circumstances that qualified as self-defense. As a result, we

do not disturb that finding. See Copeland, 310 Ga. at 346.

Whisnant argues that the trial court failed to properly consider

the evidence about battered person syndrome. But that syndrome is

18
not an independent defense, only a component of the defense of jus-

tification. See Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 299 (2019). In practice,

whether a person has battered person syndrome bears on the ques-

tion whether a defendant could reasonably believe that deadly force

was necessary. A person with battered person syndrome might rea-

sonably perceive a threat in circumstances where a person without

battered person syndrome might not. See Demery v. State, 287 Ga.

805, 807 (2010) (“The evidence of battered person syndrome is ad-

missible to show the defendant had the requisite mental state [for

the defense of justification] although the actual threat of harm to

the defendant did not immediately precede the homicide.”). Here,

the trial court found that Whisnant likely did suffer from battered

person syndrome, but it found that the syndrome did not fully ac-

count for the murky facts around the shooting. The court found that

Whisnant had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

any circumstances existed that would have justified the use of

deadly force. It found that the evidence could just as easily support

the conclusion that Whisnant killed Michael in anger or retaliation,

19
and that she was lying about being attacked, and thus that she did

not establish immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rus-

sell, 319 Ga. at 560. Under this view of the evidence, battered person

syndrome played no role in Whisnant’s decision to shoot Michael. So

this argument does not rescue Whisnant’s claim about the trial

court’s immunity finding, and so that claim fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Land, J., not
participating.

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