In the Matter of Charles M. Dalziel, Jr

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 22, 2025

S25Y0775. IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES M. DALZIEL, JR.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of Special Master Adam M. Hames, who

recommends that Charles M. Dalziel, Jr. — State Bar No. 203730,

admitted 1980 — be suspended for at least one year for violating
Rules 1.6 (a),1 1.15 (I) (c),2 and 1.16 (d)3 of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) and that he not be reinstated until

a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist certifies that he is mentally

competent to practice law. The special master concluded that Dalziel

violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly account for a client’s

retainer; violated Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing to refund

an “unearned” portion of the retainer, thereby converting it to his

personal use; and violated Rule 1.6 (a) by improperly disclosing

1 Rule 1.6 (a) provides:

A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the
professional relationship with a client, including information which the
client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would
be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the
client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by
these rules or other law, or by order of the court.
Disbarment is the maximum penalty for violating this rule.
2 Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides, in relevant part, “a lawyer shall promptly

deliver to the client . . . any funds . . . that the client . . . is entitled to receive
and, upon request by the client . . . , shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property.” Disbarment is the maximum penalty for violating
this rule.
3 Rule 1.16 (d) provides, in relevant part, “[u]pon termination of
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . refunding any advance payment of
fee that has not been earned.” A public reprimand is the maximum penalty for
violating this rule.

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confidential information about the client in response to a Bar

grievance filed by the client. Having carefully reviewed the record,

we agree that Dalziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c)’s accounting

provision, and we conclude that the proper sanction is a six-month

suspension with Dalziel’s reinstatement conditioned on certification

that he is fit to practice law.

1. Procedural History

In March 2023, the Bar filed a formal complaint charging

Dalziel with violating Rules 1.6 (a), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.16 (d).4 Dalziel

filed an answer in which he admitted some of the Bar’s factual

allegations but denied the rule violations. The Bar deposed him in

November 2023. The special master held a disciplinary hearing in

4 The Bar’s complaint also charged Dalziel with violating Rule 1.16 (a),

which states that a lawyer “shall withdraw from the representation of a client
if: (1) the representation will result in the violation of the [GRPC] or other law;
(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s
ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged.” The complaint
did not specify which subsection Dalziel violated, but the special master
assumed the Bar was referring to subsection (3), and the special master
concluded that the evidence for this allegation was insufficient. The Bar has
not challenged this conclusion.

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December 2024, at which the only witness was Dalziel’s client,

“W.G.” Dalziel did not attend the hearing or notify the Bar or the

special master that he would not be there. The special master filed

his report and recommendation in January 2025. Neither Dalziel

nor the Bar filed exceptions to the special master’s report, and they

did not seek review by the State Disciplinary Review Board.

2. Relevant Facts

In October 2020, W.G., a financial advisor, got a demand letter

from a law firm representing one of his clients for losses the client

claimed to have sustained through W.G.’s investments. W.G. hired

Dalziel, an experienced securities lawyer, to represent him. W.G.

paid Dalziel a retainer of $3,650, which covered 10 hours at Dalziel’s

rate. In early November 2020, Dalziel sent a written response to the

claimant’s lawyer. Later that month, while the demand matter was

still open, W.G. requested and received Dalziel’s assistance with an

issue related to one of the claimant’s pending investments. The

demand matter was still open on January 25, 2021, when W.G.

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asked for and got Dalziel’s advice on the possibility of compromising

with the claimant.

Ultimately, the claimant filed no suit against W.G. On

February 20, 2021, Dalziel called W.G. to let him know that Dalziel

was closing W.G.’s file. W.G. once again asked for an accounting of

the retainer — he had already asked for an accounting several times

in the preceding months, but Dalziel had not given him one. Dalziel

said he would get back to him, but W.G. did not hear from Dalziel

until four months later, when Dalziel sent him the bill for his

services. The bill, which the Bar submitted into evidence at the

disciplinary hearing, indicated that Dalziel spent a total of 17.4

hours on several tasks. Dalziel spent at least 10 hours on the

demand matter — including 9.6 hours through when the demand

response was sent and at least 0.4 hours advising W.G. on the

claimant’s pending investment and whether to compromise with the

claimant. The invoice indicated that Dalziel applied the $3,650

retainer to the balance, and W.G. owed an additional $2,701. When

W.G. did not pay the bill, Dalziel left voice messages in which he

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threatened to get an arrest warrant for theft of services and warning

that “heads” would “roll” if Dalziel did not get paid. W.G. also

received an email from Dalziel in which Dalziel described himself as

“dying,” “desperate,” and “totally besieged financially.” In the end,

W.G. paid Dalziel no additional money, and Dalziel did not refund

any portion of the retainer to W.G.

W.G. filed a Bar grievance against Dalziel. In Dalziel’s multiple

responses to the Bar, he claimed that W.G. had filed the grievance

to avoid paying the bill. Dalziel also called W.G. a “deadbeat” (and

other names); alleged that W.G. was hiding assets from creditors;

and disclosed information related to W.G.’s prior bankruptcy — in

which Dalziel did not represent W.G. In Dalziel’s deposition

testimony, he said he learned of the bankruptcy from public records

after W.G. filed the grievance. At the disciplinary hearing, W.G. did

not testify to whether he told Dalziel about the bankruptcy or the

alleged asset hiding. W.G. said he had worked with many alcoholics

and Dalziel’s conduct appeared to be due to alcohol abuse, and W.G.

no longer trusted lawyers because of Dalziel. Dalziel was evaluated

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by a psychologist, whose report was put into evidence. Based on the

report, the special master found that Dalziel had a long history of

alcohol abuse and significant mental-health issues, both of which

were present when Dalziel represented W.G.

In its formal complaint, the Bar alleged that Dalziel violated

Rule 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing to account for W.G.’s retainer

despite numerous requests; Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing

to return the “unearned” portion of the retainer;5 and Rule 1.6 (a) by

disclosing confidential client information in his grievance-response

disclosures.

3. Special Master’s Conclusions of Law

The special master concluded that Dalziel violated Rule

1.15 (I) (c) by failing to provide the accounting despite W.G.’s

requests. The special master also concluded that Dalziel violated

5 We note that the wrongful retention of unearned fees is typically
charged not as a violation of Rule 1.15 (I) (c), for which disbarment is
authorized, but as a violation of Rule 1.16 (d), for which the maximum penalty
is a public reprimand. See In the Matter of Cleveland, 317 Ga. 515, 516 n.10
(893 SE2d 692) (2023).

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Rules 1.15 (I) (c) and 1.16 (d) by failing to return the “unearned”

portion of the retainer and that, by failing to return it, Dalziel

converted it to his personal use. In this regard, the special master

acknowledged that it was “not crystal clear” that Dalziel owed W.G.

a refund. As noted above, Dalziel’s bill indicated that he worked at

least ten hours on the demand matter — which would have

consumed the retainer — from October 2020 through January 25,

2021, when it was undisputed that Dalziel performed work for W.G.

Despite this evidence, the special master concluded that Dalziel

“billed for more time than the client’s requested scope of work.”

Finally, the special master concluded that Dalziel’s grievance

response violated Rule 1.6 (a). In this regard, the special master

determined that the bankruptcy information and purported asset

hiding gave Dalziel no defense to the grievance. See Rule 1.6 (b) (1)

(iii) (lawyer may reveal information gained in professional

relationship with client if lawyer reasonably believes disclosing it is

necessary to respond to allegations concerning lawyer’s

representation of client). However, the special master did not

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address whether or to what extent Dalziel gained that information

in the course of his professional relationship with W.G.

Following this Court’s precedent, the special master relied on

the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA

Standards”) to determine the appropriate discipline. See In the

Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996). In relevant

part, the special master determined that Dalziel intentionally

violated duties owed to his client, which falls under ABA Standard

4.0. The special master noted that suspension is generally

appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is not

properly dealing with a client’s property, knowingly and improperly

reveals information related to the representation of a client, or

engages in a pattern of neglect and the lawyer’s acts or omissions

actually or potentially injure the client. See ABA Standards 4.12,

4.22, 4.42 (b). Regarding injury to W.G., the special master

concluded that, while the financial harm from the fee issue was not

significant and any damage from the disclosures was hard to

measure, the potential injury from Dalziel’s unprofessional conduct

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could have been great, the disclosures were “embarrassing,” and

W.G. “expressed his distrust of all lawyers as a result of Dalziel’s

actions.”

Turning to aggravation and mitigation, the special master

determined that Dalziel acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, see

ABA Standard 9.22 (b); there were multiple offenses in the matter,

see ABA Standard 9.22 (d); and Dalziel showed no understanding of

the wrongful nature of his conduct, see ABA Standard 9.22 (g). Also

aggravating were Dalziel’s substantial experience as an attorney,

see ABA Standard 9.22 (i), and Dalziel’s threatening voice

messages.6 In mitigation, the special master noted that there was no

evidence Dalziel had any prior disciplinary history, see ABA

Standard 9.32 (a), and that Dalziel was experiencing personal and

emotional problems, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c). The special master

concluded that Dalziel’s alcohol abuse and mental-health issues

6 The special master noted that the voice messages did not “fit neatly”

into the ABA’s aggravating-factor categories, but, as the special master
recognized, the ABA’s standards are generally instructive but are not
controlling. Cf. In the Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 271 (6) (892 SE2d 761)
(2023).

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were not mitigating under ABA Standard 9.32 (i) because there had

been no meaningful, sustained period of rehabilitation.

Although the Bar sought a suspension of at least six months,

the special master, relying on cases in which attorneys improperly

converted client funds, recommended that Dalziel be suspended at

least one year. See, e.g., In the Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470 (851

SE2d 590) (2020).

4. Analysis

This Court generally defers to a special master’s factual

findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly

erroneous, but we review de novo the special master’s conclusions of

law as to what rules were violated and what discipline is

appropriate. See In the Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 258 (2) (892

SE2d 761) (2023). Moreover, because this Court has ultimate

discretion in attorney-discipline cases, we need not defer to

factfinders in such cases to the same degree that we defer to them

in other appeals. See id. at 258-259 (2) (citing In the Matter of Turk,

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267 Ga. 30, 31 (1) (471 SE2d 842) (1996); and Inquiry Concerning

Coomer, 316 Ga. 855, 860 (2) (a) n.5 (892 SE2d 3) (2023)).

The record amply supports the special master’s determination

that Dalziel violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to provide an

accounting of the retainer despite W.G.’s requests. We agree with

the special master that Dalziel’s violation of the rule was mitigated

by his lack of disciplinary history and his personal and emotional

problems. We also agree that Dalziel’s alcohol abuse and behavioral-

health issues were not mitigating without a sustained, meaningful

period of rehabilitation and that Dalziel’s infraction was aggravated

by his substantial experience as a lawyer and his refusal to

acknowledge his wrongful conduct. Whether Dalziel violated Rule

1.15 (I) (c)’s accounting provision intentionally or through a pattern

of neglect, a six-month suspension is proper, particularly given his

apparent lack of remorse. Cf. In the Matter of Coleman, 278 Ga. 864,

864 (607 SE2d 556) (2005) (accepting attorney’s petition for

voluntary discipline and six-month suspension where she failed to

provide requested accounting). We agree that Dalziel should not be

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reinstated until a licensed behavioral-health professional certifies

that he is fit to practice law.

With regard to the other rule violations, we question whether

the evidence supports the conclusions that Dalziel retained or

converted unearned fees or that he owed W.G. a refund; that Dalziel

gained the bankruptcy information in his professional relationship

with W.G.; or that Dalziel’s disclosures were wholly irrelevant to his

grievance defense.7 But we need not resolve these issues because it

would not change the appropriate discipline in this case.

Accordingly, based on Dalziel’s violation of Rule 1.15 (I) (c)’s

accounting provision, we order that he be suspended from the

practice of law for at least six months, effective from the date this

opinion is issued, and that he not be reinstated until a licensed

psychologist or psychiatrist certifies that he is mentally competent

to practice law. See Coleman, 278 Ga. at 864 (accepting attorney’s

petition for voluntary discipline and six-month suspension where

7 However, we strongly disapprove of the personal insults that riddled

Dalziel’s responses to the Bar.

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she failed to provide requested accounting). When Dalziel believes

that the conditions for his reinstatement have been met, he shall

demonstrate compliance in a petition for reinstatement submitted

to the Review Board, which will then issue a report and

recommendation to this Court. Dalziel shall not undertake the

practice of law until this Court issues an opinion granting his

petition for reinstatement. He is reminded of his duties under Bar

Rule 4-219 (b). See In the Matter of Lank, 300 Ga. 479, 482-483 (796

SE2d 252) (2017).

Six-month suspension with condition on reinstatement.
Warren, P.J., and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin,
and Pinson, JJ., concur. Peterson, C.J., not participating.

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