Harris v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 4, 2025

S24A0910. HARRIS v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

On September 14, 2021, Emmanuel Harris and his girlfriend,

Jordan Gooch, got in a fight, and Harris stabbed and killed Gooch.

Harris claimed that he stabbed Gooch in self-defense after she “came

at” him with a knife. After a trial, he was convicted of malice mur-

der.1

1 Gooch died on September 14, 2021. On October 6, 2021, a Hall County

grand jury returned an indictment that charged Harris with malice murder
(Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and posses-
sion of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 4). After a jury trial
from November 10-18, 2022, he was found guilty of all counts. On December 9,
2022, the trial court sentenced Harris to life with the possibility of parole for
the malice murder (Count 1) and a consecutive five years to serve in prison for
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 4). The trial
court merged the aggravated assault and vacated the felony murder. It also
ordered that the sentence was to run consecutive to a sentence imposed in a
separate criminal case.
Harris timely filed a motion for new trial on January 4, 2023, which was
On appeal, Harris contends that the trial court abused its dis-

cretion by admitting evidence about his aggravated battery of his

then-girlfriend, C.A., in 2017. The trial court admitted this evidence,

which included detailed testimony from C.A. and many graphic pho-

tos of her injuries, as relevant to Harris’s “motive” to “control” his

partners with violence, as well as to show that he did not stab Gooch

by accident or mistake.

We agree that admitting this evidence was an abuse of discre-

tion. Rule 404 (b) of our Evidence Code limits the purposes for which

evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may be admitted: it may

be used as proof of an issue in the case like motive or intent, but it

may not be used merely to show that a person has bad character.2

amended on June 8, 2023. After a hearing on June 9, 2023, the trial court de-
nied the motion for new trial on September 19, 2023. Harris timely filed his
notice of appeal on October 18, 2023. The appeal was docketed to the August
2024 term of this Court and orally argued on August 20, 2024.
2 OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) provides, in relevant part that “[e]vidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a per-
son in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be ad-
missible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.”

2
That latter use is generally improper because jurors may place too

much weight on a defendant’s general bad character as evidence of

his guilt instead of requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt the specific charge against him. And we have said before that

such improper arguments based on a person’s character are often

smuggled into the case through too-generic theories of “motive”: a

motive to “obtain money and sex,” or to “control other people with

violence,” is often just another way of saying that the defendant com-

mitted the charged crime because “that’s who he is” or “that’s what

he does.” See, e.g., Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 312 (2) (d) (2) (845

SE2d 653) (2020); Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 487 (4) (b) (819 SE2d

468) (2018). That is exactly what happened here, where the State’s

generic “motive” lacked any logical connection to the evidence of

Harris’s past battery or the record in this case, and the State actu-

ally argued in closing that Harris “controlled” Gooch with “violence”

because “that’s what he does.” And to the extent accident or mistake

were at issue in this case, the minimal probative value of the other-

acts evidence as evidence that Harris did not kill Gooch by accident

3
or mistake was far outweighed by unfair prejudice given its power

as improper propensity evidence. So it was an abuse of discretion to

admit the other-acts evidence in this case.

This error requires reversal of Harris’s convictions because the

State has failed to prove that the error was harmless. An error that

does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights is harmless if

it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”

Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 283 (5) (875 SE2d 659) (2022) (cleaned

up). The other-acts evidence that was admitted in error was power-

ful and highly prejudicial: it allowed the State to cast Harris as a

violent, repeat abuser using firsthand, graphic evidence, and the

State asked the jury to rely on the impermissible inference from that

evidence that Harris murdered Gooch because he was a bad person

who had committed domestic violence before. The properly admitted

evidence, although significant, does not dispel the likelihood that the

prejudicial other-acts evidence contributed to the jury’s guilty ver-

dict, which necessarily rejected Harris’s claim of self-defense.

4
For these reasons and others set forth below, Harris’s convic-

tions are reversed. Because the evidence was sufficient to authorize

Harris’s convictions, he may be retried if the State so chooses.

1. Background

The evidence at trial showed the following. 3

(a) Harris and Gooch had been dating on-and-off for about a

year, and living together for three or four months, at the time of

Gooch’s death. They had known each other for even longer and had

dated for two or three years in the past. Gooch’s sister, who some-

times spent the night at the apartment that Gooch shared with Har-

ris, said that Gooch and Harris would sometimes “get in each other’s

faces” when they argued, but she was not aware of any physical vio-

lence in the relationship. Gooch’s mother, who knew Harris “very

well” because he had lived with the family for several months in the

early years of the relationship, said that Harris “had a problem with

3 When we assess whether an error was harmless, as we do below, we

view the evidence as reasonable jurors would have viewed it rather than in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See Ford v. State, 319 Ga. 215, 215
n.2 (903 SE2d 1) (2024). So we recount the evidence here from that viewpoint.
5
his temper” but had told her when he and Gooch resumed their re-

lationship that he had “sought help for his temper.” There is no evi-

dence in the record that Harris was ever violent toward Gooch before

the day he stabbed her. But Harris testified that in February 2021,

seven months before Gooch’s death, he and Gooch had gotten into an

argument at the airport, and Gooch had punched him in the face.

Gooch’s sister testified that she was aware of this incident.

The day before she was killed, Gooch stayed at her mother’s

home after an argument with Harris. While Gooch was with her sis-

ter, Harris called Gooch 32 times. Gooch eventually answered one of

Harris’s calls and then told her sister that Harris was coming over.

Gooch went outside and talked to Harris when he arrived, and

Gooch’s sister watched them from a distance. Gooch’s sister saw

Gooch and Harris stand by Harris’s parked car and talk for 30 or 40

minutes. Neither of them appeared “aggressive” and there was no

physical contact, yelling, or screaming. After the conversation be-

tween Gooch and Harris ended, Harris left, and Gooch went back

inside her mother’s home, where she spent the night. Gooch told her

6
sister that Harris had apologized and said he would come to Gooch’s

“mom’s house every day to check on her, and . . . apologize until she

forgave him.”

The next morning, Gooch told her mother and sister she was

going to the apartment she shared with Harris to get a change of

clothes. Late that night, Gooch’s mother and sister learned that Har-

ris had crashed Gooch’s car and was in the hospital. But Gooch had

not been in the car with Harris when he crashed, and Gooch’s

mother and sister could not get in touch with her. They were able to

get into Gooch’s and Harris’s apartment the next day, where they

found Gooch’s dead body lying on the living room floor.

Investigators arrived soon after. They found a broken knife on

the couch near Gooch’s body and saw a large amount of blood on the

knife and on the couch and carpet in the living room. The State’s

crime-scene expert opined that the blood spatter on the wall sug-

gested Gooch had been stabbed while she was on the couch, and the

pooling of blood on the floor was consistent with Gooch bleeding

while on the floor. And this evidence could be consistent with Gooch

7
being stabbed either while on the ground or while sitting on the

couch.

Harris’s fingerprints were found on the knife along with a sec-

ond set of fingerprints that could not be identified. The State’s fin-

gerprint examination expert explained that the unidentified finger-

print appeared to be a “fingertip impression” and it was “possible

that the area [the examiner] needed to see for that comparison was

not represented on” the known prints from Harris and Gooch be-

cause of the techniques used to collect them. The investigators also

connected bloody footprints seen throughout the apartment to dried

blood on Harris’s feet, and the blood samples collected from the knife

and Harris’s feet matched Gooch’s DNA.

A GBI medical examiner performed Gooch’s autopsy and deter-

mined that Gooch died from multiple stab wounds. The medical ex-

aminer opined that the stab wound to the left side of Gooch’s upper

chest, near the shoulder and armpit region, had been fatal. This

wound passed through Gooch’s ribs, lungs, and heart. Gooch also

had two stab wounds on the left side of her back, one close to her

8
shoulder and the other “lower down toward the midback”; two su-

perficial cuts on the back of her left arm near the shoulder; and a

cut on the back and side of her left wrist that was consistent with a

defensive injury due to its location. Gooch also had two scalp hem-

orrhages on the right side of the head, which could be consistent

with impact, such as being struck. The crime-scene expert opined

that, if Gooch had been fighting back, she would expect to have seen

wounds on both Gooch’s and Harris’s hands, but Harris only had

minor scratches on his body.

A GBI agent interviewed Harris two days after Gooch’s body

was found, and a recording of that interview was played for the jury.

During the interview, Harris said Gooch was mad that he was pack-

ing her things and he found her sitting on the couch with a knife by

her side. He claimed self-defense, and said Gooch attacked him. He

also said that, at some point, they “fell while fighting” over the knife,

and Gooch was “cut,” and he used a sweater to try to stop the bleed-

ing. Later, he said that they were both holding onto the knife when

they “tripped,” and he fell on top of Gooch; he could not recall where

9
the knife went into Gooch’s body. He also said he was trying to dis-

arm Gooch, and he stabbed her to protect himself.

(b) Before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce

evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) of Harris’s plea of guilty to the

aggravated battery of his ex-girlfriend, C.A., in September 2017. The

State contended that C.A’s testimony was relevant to prove that

Harris’s “motive in killing [Gooch] was to control her with violence,”

and this was the same motive shown in the 2017 incident with C.A.

The State proffered that the evidence would also rebut Harris’s

statement to police, during which he said that Gooch was stabbed

when he tried to disarm her, claimed self-defense, and, according to

the State, “said basically she had fallen on the knife.” Harris ob-

jected to this evidence and argued that the State’s alleged motive

was too broad. The trial court ruled that this evidence was admissi-

ble under Rule 404 (b) to prove motive and absence of mistake or

accident.

At trial, the court gave a limiting instruction before C.A.’s tes-

timony, directing the jury to consider the evidence only as it related

10
to the issues of motive and absence of mistake or accident.

C.A. testified as follows. She and Harris had been dating and

living together for almost a year when the battery happened, and

Harris had never been violent toward her before then. Then one day

he grew angry with her, raised his voice, and slapped her across the

face. He apologized afterwards and promised “he would never hurt

[her] again.” But the next night, Harris became upset while they

were playing a computer game, “slammed [C.A’s] laptop shut,” and

told her “something to the effect of[,] ‘You’re being a little ridicu-

lous.’” They both stood, and Harris screamed and spit in C.A.’s face,

then pushed her to the floor and kicked her “over and over again on

[her] backside.” At one point he screamed, “Die!” C.A. testified that

Harris was like “a different person” and had “pure hate in his eyes

for [her].” Harris then ripped off C.A.’s nightgown and underwear

and continued to kick her as she lay naked on the floor.

After this attack, Harris started packing his belongings and

taking them to his car. He then came back to the room, pushed C.A.

to the floor, and started kicking and pushing her again. At some

11
point, C.A. went downstairs and Harris “grabbed [her] head and

threw [her] to the ground,” and he kicked and punched her backside.

This continued “for a very long time.” Later, C.A. searched for her

phone and discovered that Harris had it in his pocket; he refused to

give it to her at first but did so after she promised not to call anyone

or tell them what he had done. After that, Harris continued to move

his belongings from their home to his car.

When C.A. thought Harris was gone, she locked herself in the

bedroom, but he returned and broke through the locked bedroom

door. She also hid in the bathroom with her dog at one point and he

broke the door down.

After Harris left, C.A. looked in the mirror and saw that she

had black bruises on her buttocks, broken nails, and injuries to her

arms. The State introduced photographs that showed C.A.’s injuries,

including a black eye, bruising with a handprint visible on her back,

and two photos showing dark bruising across three quarters of her

buttocks. After this incident, C.A. missed a week-and-a-half of work

due to her injuries and was prescribed sleeping pills and anxiety

12
medication.

Harris later called C.A., apologized, and asked if he could re-

turn to their home but C.A. told him not to. In the days that followed,

Harris sent C.A. “[a] lot of text messages.” Screenshots of the text

messages were introduced into evidence, and C.A.’s verbatim read-

ing of these messages spans nearly 19 pages of the trial transcript.

In the messages, he apologized, asked to come back, offered to pay

C.A. money, professed his love for her, and asked for forgiveness. In

the final text message that was read to the jury, Harris said he went

to a doctor and had “a slipped disk from where you shoved me down

the stairs because you were upset I was about to leave.”

After C.A. finished testifying and was excused, the parties read

a stipulation that Harris entered a guilty plea to two counts of ag-

gravated battery of C.A. Harris testified that he served 22 months

in jail with work release, meaning he was either at work or in jail

during that period.

(c) Harris testified as follows. When asked about the weekend

C.A. described in her testimony, Harris said he and C.A. “got into an

13
argument” that “escalated from . . . yelling, screaming, to . . . her

grabbing me. I slapped her that night.” The next night, Harris de-

cided to leave, packed his belongings, and was taking them to his

car when C.A. attacked him and pushed him down the stairs. Harris

“got mad,” went back upstairs, and “grabbed” C.A.; she then

“grabbed him” and he “pushed her down. And then [he] kicked her

several times on her backside.” Harris testified that he was

“ashamed” of his actions that night, pleaded guilty to charges re-

lated to that incident, and served a two-year sentence.

As to his relationship with Gooch, he testified that they had

dated for almost three years in the past, broken up, and later re-

sumed their relationship; she stayed at his apartment most nights

and kept her belongings there. But Gooch would sometimes stay

with her mother or a friend “for a couple days” when she and Harris

had a “dispute.” In July 2021, Harris and Gooch “had a big blowout”

and he “kicked her out and moved all her stuff out.” But they recon-

ciled after “two or so weeks give or take a couple days,” and Gooch

moved back in.

14
Two nights before Gooch’s death, Harris and Gooch got into an

argument after Harris “made a snide remark.” Gooch broke a plate

during that argument, and Harris broke a lamp. They got into an-

other argument the next morning, after Harris complained that he

“wished [Gooch] would clean up more.” Gooch “got into [Harris’s]

face,” Harris asked her to leave, and she left. Later that day, Harris

could not find his car keys and suspected Gooch took them when she

left because she had previously taken his keys, phone, or wallet

when she got mad at him. Harris called Gooch more than 20 times

before she answered, and then he met her outside her mother’s

home. According to Harris, they discussed their relationship and

Gooch did not want to end things, but Harris did, so he told Gooch

they could arrange a future time for her to pick up her belongings

from their apartment. Harris then returned home.

The next day, Gooch returned to the apartment and let herself

in with her key while Harris was on a Zoom call. When Harris fin-

ished his call, he found Gooch sitting on the couch and she seemed

“pissed off.” She wanted to talk, but Harris went to the bedroom and

15
started packing Gooch’s belongings. Gooch was “physically trying to

stop” Harris and yelling at him. Eventually, she left the room and

Harris continued to pack Gooch’s belongings.

When Harris left the bedroom to go to the kitchen, he saw

Gooch “standing there” with “a big silver kitchen knife in her hand.”

She had a “glare in her eye” and was holding the knife in her right

hand. Gooch then “came at” Harris with the knife. Harris “caught

her hand, her knife hand, and [he] kind of staggered back because it

was dangerously close to hitting [him].” He was “scared” and in “sur-

vival mode,” and he “manipulated” the knife in her hand and drove

it into her shoulder. Gooch fell towards Harris, and he stabbed her

again in the shoulder and they both fell. Harris testified that he

stabbed Gooch “multiple times. It was a reaction, a survival in-

stinct.”

When asked why he did not take the knife from Gooch and toss

it, Harris testified that she “came at” him fast and “with enough

force” that he “lost control or full control trying to disarm her” and

“reacted” because he “felt like [he] was about to die.” After stabbing

16
Gooch, he “immediately panicked” and tried to stop the bleeding.

Harris did not call 911 because Gooch “died quickly,” he “panicked,”

and he was worried about the “optics” in part because he was “on

probation.” He then “popped some Klonopins” after he realized

Gooch was dead and “blacked out.” 4 So he did not remember what

he did with the knife or what happened next, including leaving in

Gooch’s car and crashing it.

(d) The prosecutor argued in closing that Harris’s “motive is to

control romantic partners with violence. That’s what he does. That’s

what he did in this case.” The prosecutor argued that this motive

was shown by the evidence that Harris “ripped off [C.A.’s] nightgown

and left that handprint on her back and did this to her as she was

lying in a fetal position on the ground and he is kicking her like a

dog over and over” and his “incessant calls and text messages to C.A.

and Gooch.” The prosecutor also noted that Harris told both C.A.

and Gooch that he was not going to give up on their relationship and

4 Investigators found a prescription in Harris’s name for clonazepam, the

generic drug name for Klonopin, in the apartment.

17
he “doesn’t take no for an answer.”

The prosecutor argued that it was not a case of self-defense,

“[a]nd if it’s not self-defense, then it’s murder. Since it’s not self-de-

fense, it has to be murder.” Turning back to the State’s motive the-

ory, the prosecutor said, “You know from the evidence you heard

that leaving — one of the partners leaving is not only generally a

dangerous time, but it’s a very dangerous time with Mr. Harris. You

heard [C.A.] say that she sustained those injuries when he’s leaving,

when he’s no longer in control.” Then, as to Gooch, the prosecutor

argued that “[w]hen Harris could not control [Gooch] with the inces-

sant texts and apologies and the things he always tries, he am-

bushed [Gooch] and he exerted the ultimate and final control, the

ultimate and final control. Twice in the back, twice in the back, and

once through the heart and lungs.” And, referring to broken clothes

hangers found at the crime scene, the prosecutor argued “this explo-

sive, violent behavior is how he kept [Gooch] off balance and con-

trolled her.”

(e) With respect to the Rule 404 (b) evidence, the trial court

18
instructed the jury that “the State may show motive and absence of

mistake or accident” and has “offered evidence of another crime al-

legedly committed by the accused” to do so. The jury was instructed

that this evidence could only be considered “insofar as it may relate

to those issues and not for any other purpose” and should “not infer

from such evidence that the defendant is of a character that would

commit such crimes.” If the jury found that Harris had committed

these other acts, it “must then determine whether the acts shed any

light on the issues for which the acts were admitted in the crimes

charged in the indictment in this trial. Remember to keep in mind

the limited use and the prohibited use of this evidence about other

acts of the defendant.” The court also instructed the jury on the de-

fense of justification. The jury was not instructed on what must be

shown to establish the defenses of accident or mistake.

2. Analysis

(a) Rule 404 (b) Error

Harris contends that the trial court erred by not excluding un-

19
der OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (Rule 404 (b)) evidence about his aggra-

vated battery of his ex-girlfriend in 2017. We review that ruling for

an abuse of discretion. See Harris, 314 Ga. at 264 (3) (a).

If evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence . . . more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence,” it is relevant. OCGA § 24-4-401. And

relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless it is “limited by con-

stitutional requirements,” or applicable “law or other rules” provide

otherwise. Id. § 24-4-402.

Rule 404 (b) is one such law that requires the exclusion of po-

tentially relevant evidence. That rule limits the admission of “[e]vi-

dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” which is sometimes called

“extrinsic” or “other-acts” evidence. Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229,

235 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 501) (2022). Evidence of a defendant’s past

wrongdoing is treated with caution because of the danger that the

jury will view it as evidence of general bad character, and then con-

vict the defendant because that bad character makes it more likely

that he committed a crime — instead of determining whether the

20
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the

charged offense. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-

476 (69 SCt 213, 93 LEd 168) (1948) (“[Evidence of the defendant’s

bad character to establish a probability of his guilt] is not rejected

because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh

too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge

one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to

defend against a particular charge.” (footnote omitted)).5 Evidence

used in that impermissible way is commonly called “propensity evi-

dence” because it relies on the theory that the defendant has a nat-

ural inclination or inherent tendency to behave in a certain (bad)

way. See White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 398-399 (903 SE2d 891) (2024)

(Peterson, P.J., concurring) (“[W]hen a jury is informed that the

criminal defendant in front of them did other bad things, jurors (like

5 We often look to precedent from federal appellate courts interpreting

the pertinent federal rule for guidance in applying our state rules of evidence
when the corresponding federal rule is materially the same as ours because
Georgia’s Evidence Code is based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Harris,
314 Ga. at 264 (3) (a).
21
all human beings) are naturally more inclined to think the defend-

ant did the separate bad thing at issue in the prosecution. We often

call this inference ‘propensity,’ and label the State’s effort to intro-

duce evidence for propensity ‘improper’ and ‘impermissible.’”). To

guard against this improper use of other-acts evidence, our Evidence

Code says that such evidence may not be admitted “to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-

with.” OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). 6 On the other hand, other-acts evidence

6 The dissent suggests that introducing evidence for the purpose of prov-

ing that the defendant acted in conformity with his character is entirely ac-
ceptable as long as it is also relevant for some other purpose. But that is not
what the statute says: Although Rule 404 (b) says that other-acts evidence may
be admissible for “other purposes,” its first sentence makes clear that such ev-
idence “shall not be admissible” to prove a person’s character to show “action
in conformity therewith,” full stop. This is why courts must determine, as we
do here, whether the evidence in question was actually relevant to another
purpose, or just a cover for smuggling in propensity evidence. See, e.g., Pritch-
ett, 314 Ga. at 778 (2) (b); Harris, 314 Ga. at 271 (3) (e); Strong, 309 Ga. at 312
& n.19 (2) (d) (2); Kirby, 304 Ga. at 486-487 (4) (b); Brooks v. State, 298 Ga.
722, 726-727 (2) (783 SE2d 895) (2016). And it is why courts give limiting in-
structions even when other-acts evidence is admitted for other purposes that
tell the jury that it may not “infer from such evidence that the accused is of a
character that would commit such crimes.” Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 8 (2)
(885 SE2d 790) (2023). In support of the contrary reading, the dissent relies on
a handful of our past decisions. See State v. Williams, 316 Ga. 249, 253 (887
SE2d 285) (2023); Lowe v. State, 314 Ga. 788, 793 (2) (a) (879 SE2d 492) (2022);
Mattei v. State, 307 Ga. 300, 303 (2) (835 SE2d 623) (2019). But none of these
decisions go so far as to hold that other-acts evidence is admissible to prove

22
is admissible for “other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-

tity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. And we have made clear

that such evidence is offered “for other purposes,” and thus not in-

admissible under Rule 404 (b), if the State can show that it is rele-

vant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s character.

Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2) (847 SE2d 172) (2020).

If other-acts evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other

than the defendant’s character, it is not inadmissible under Rule 404

(b). But it would still be subject to exclusion under OCGA § 24-4-403

(Rule 403) “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice.” Analysis of that question under Rule 403

is done in tandem with the analysis of relevance for a non-character

issue required for Rule 404 (b), as part of a three-part test governing

the admission of other-acts evidence. Under that test, (1) the evi-

propensity, because none of them describe the evidence that was admitted as
even partly propensity evidence.
23
dence must be relevant to an issue in the case other than the defend-

ant’s character; (2) the probative value of the evidence must not be

substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice; and (3)

there must be sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the

acts at issue. See Kirby, 304 Ga. at 479 (4).

Here, the State argued and the trial court agreed that the evi-

dence of Harris’s aggravated battery in 2017 was relevant to explain

Harris’s motive for killing Gooch and to show that stabbing her was

not an accident or mistake. We address each argument in turn.

(i) Motive

Speaking generally, motive is the defendant’s “reason” for com-

mitting a crime. Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 726 (2) (783 SE2d 895)

(2016). Motive is not an essential element of any crime, so the State

need not prove it, but the State often wants to introduce evidence of

motive because it can help prove that a defendant had the required

criminal intent. See id. (describing motive as “the reason that

nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent”)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

24
When the State seeks to use other-acts evidence to show mo-

tive, the danger that the evidence will be used as improper propen-

sity evidence is acute. The problem is that motives are too easily

described in “too generic a fashion.” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 487 (4) (b). An

alleged motive to “obtain money and sex,” id., or to “control other

people with violence,” Strong, 309 Ga. at 312 (2) (d) (2) (punctuation

omitted), for instance, can be just a “classic improper propensity ar-

gument” in disguise, because it focuses on an aspect of the defend-

ant’s bad character as the generic “motive” to act. Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Harris, 314 Ga. at 270 (e).

To separate propensity arguments from motive arguments

when the State seeks to use other-acts evidence to show motive, we

require the alleged motive to have a “specific logical link to the al-

leged crimes.” Id. (citing Strong, 309 Ga. at 312 (2) (d) (2)). Put an-

other way, if the other-acts evidence actually tends to show the jury

that the defendant had a specific reason for committing the charged

crime, it is relevant to motive. If, on the other hand, the evidence

25
answers “why” a defendant committed the charged crime with “be-

cause that’s what he does,” it is more likely just propensity evidence

in disguise. See, e.g., Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 778 (2) (b) (879

SE2d 436) (2022) (argument that defendant “committed violent ac-

tions against those with whom he had a relationship to control them

. . . . goes to propensity and is not a proper purpose to admit this

[other-acts] evidence”).

Applying these principles here, the State’s argument that the

other-acts evidence was relevant to show Harris’s “motive” does not

hold up. The State argued that Harris’s battery of his ex-girlfriend

in 2017 showed that he had a “motive to control intimate partners

with violence.” We have rejected this same generic motive as a “clas-

sic improper propensity argument” before. Strong, 309 Ga. at 312 (2)

(d) (2). See also Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 778 (2) (b).7 And nothing here

7 The State and the dissent rely heavily (almost exclusively) on Smart v.

State, 299 Ga. 414 (788 SE2d 442) (2016), where we concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a past incident of domestic vio-
lence as evidence of a motive to control the victim with violence. Some of us
have doubts about whether Smart was correctly decided. But in any event, our
decisions after Smart have made clear that a generic motive to “control with

26
suggests that the argument is a proper motive argument this time

around. None of the other-acts evidence the State offered has any

apparent logical connection to a motive of “controlling with vio-

lence,” either then or as to the charged crime. There was no evidence

that Harris had been violent towards either woman (for “control” or

otherwise) before the respective incidents that led to criminal

charges, and the evidence about the battery in 2017 was instead that

Harris had a “temper” and he “got mad” during an argument with

his ex-girlfriend and battered her. Finally, were there any doubt

that the other-acts evidence was not truly about motive, the State’s

closing argument would seem to dispel it: in describing the “motive”

argument in closing, the prosecutor argued that Harris’s “motive is

violence” is better understood as a propensity argument, thus cabining Smart
to its unique facts, which included specific testimony about the manner in
which the defendant used violence repeatedly against a past victim that
“demonstrated that the violence was a mechanism for control of his intimate
partners,” and “very little evidence to show why [the] defendant ‘lashed out at
his wife.’” Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 778 (2) (b). See also White v. State, 305 Ga. 111,
122 (3) n.10 (823 SE2d 794) (2019) (“When a high court finds discordant opin-
ions among its own horizontal precedents the court generally follows its deci-
sion in the most recent case, which must have tacitly overruled any truly in-
consistent holding.”) (cleaned up).

27
to control romantic partners with violence. That’s what he does.

That’s what he did in this case.” In other words, the State told the

jury that Harris had a natural tendency to behave in a particular

way, and that is what he did to the victim here. That is a propensity

argument, not a permissible basis for admitting the evidence of Har-

ris’s past battery. 8

(ii) Absence of Accident or Mistake

The trial court also admitted the other-acts evidence as rele-

vant to show the absence of accident or mistake. At trial, Harris tes-

tified that he acted in self-defense — not that the stabbing was an

8 The dissent does no better than the State in this regard. Indeed, the

dissent merely repeats the State’s argument that the other-acts evidence
shows Harris’s “motive to control domestic partners with violence” and later
notes that Harris’s relationships with C.A. and Gooch “followed a very similar
pattern.” But like the State, the dissent fails to connect this argument with
any specific evidence that tends to show that Harris stabbed and killed Gooch
for a specific reason, as our precedent requires. See, e.g., Strong, 309 Ga. at
312 (2) (d) (2); Kirby, 304 Ga. at 487 (4) (b); Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533,
540 (III) (A) (807 SE2d 899) (2017). In short, like the State’s motive arguments,
the dissent’s arguments that the other-acts evidence was relevant to prove mo-
tive reduce to propensity arguments: that Harris had a natural tendency to
behave in a particular way, and that he probably acted in conformity with that
tendency here.
28
accident or mistake — and the jury was instructed on what was re-

quired to prove the defense of justification but not on what was re-

quired to prove the defenses of accident or mistake. Nonetheless, the

State contends that it was required to disprove accident or mistake

even though Harris did not raise those defenses at trial because he

said in his recorded police interview (which was played for the jury)

that he and Gooch “fell” during the struggle over the knife, and she

was stabbed when she “fell” or “tripped.”

To be admissible under Rule 404 (b), evidence must be relevant

to a non-character issue that is “in the case.” Hood, 309 Ga. at 499

(2). See also OCGA § 24-4-401 (evidence is relevant if it has “any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the action” more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence (emphasis added)). It is not clear

that Harris’s brief statement in his police interview that he stabbed

Gooch when they “fell” or “tripped” put the defenses of accident or

mistake at issue, particularly given that Harris affirmatively took

them off the table at trial. Harris testified, and his counsel argued,

29
that he acted in self-defense — that is, on purpose to protect himself,

not by accident or mistake — and so the jury was instructed on the

defense of justification, but not on the defenses of accident or mis-

take. That makes this case different from the cases the State relies

on, where the defendant’s intent or the absence of mistake or acci-

dent were put at issue in some way and the defendant “made no af-

firmative steps to remove intent as an issue.” Naples v. State, 308

Ga. 43, 51 (2) (e) (838 SE2d 780) (2020). Compare Harrison v. State,

310 Ga. 862, 867 (3) (855 SE2d 546) (2021) (other-acts evidence rel-

evant to show intent where defendant “claimed the shooting was ac-

cidental”) with Parks v. State, 300 Ga. 303, 306 (2) (794 SE2d 623)

(2016) (other-acts evidence not relevant “to show appellant’s

knowledge and absence of mistake or accident as to the crimes

charged” because “his knowledge was not at issue where the defense

was justification, and he made no claim that he accidentally or mis-

takenly shot the victim” (emphasis omitted)).9

9 We have left open the question whether the defense of accident or mis-

take must have been advanced for the State to introduce other-acts evidence

30
But even assuming mistake or accident were at issue and that

the evidence that Harris battered C.A. was relevant to disproving

those defenses, the evidence still had to be excluded if the probative

value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice.10 The probative value of evidence is a function of

its “logical force to prove a point and the need at trial for evidence

on that point,” and the need for such evidence “depends on the mar-

ginal worth of the evidence — how much it adds, in other words, to

the other proof available to establish the fact for which it is offered.”

Harris, 314 Ga. 263 (3) (a) (cleaned up). And unfair prejudice results

when relevant evidence “lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on

an improper basis rather than on proof specific to the offense

charged.” Id.

relevant to disproving such a defense. See Thompson, 302 Ga. at 541 (III) (A)
(“Setting aside whether a defense of mistake or accident is a prerequisite to
admission of evidence under Rule 404 (b) for [the purpose of proving lack of
accident or mistake], the circumstances here do not support admission.”).
10 The parties do not dispute that there was sufficient evidence that Har-

ris committed the battery of C.A. See Kirby, 304 Ga. at 479 (4).
31
The only conceivable theory that Harris’s battery of C.A. sev-

eral years before was relevant to proving that Harris did not stab

Gooch by accident or mistake would be that his battery of C.A. on

purpose made it less likely that he stabbed Gooch by accident or

mistake. The logical force of that argument is quite weak, especially

considering the length of time between the incidents and the signif-

icant differences between them. And because Harris’s defense at

trial was that he stabbed Harris on purpose in self-defense, not by

accident or mistake, the State’s need to disprove accident or mistake

was quite low. By contrast, encouraging the jury to find that Harris

stabbed Gooch on purpose because he had committed an act of vio-

lence against a girlfriend in the past invited the jury to use that ev-

idence for an improper purpose: to find that Harris stabbed Gooch

merely because he had “d[one] other bad things,” White, 319 Ga. at

398-399 (Peterson, P.J., concurring). And the other-acts evidence

put graphic images and details of the battery in front of the jury,

including photos of C.A.’s nude back and buttocks covered in dark

bruises. In other words, this evidence was just the sort of evidence

32
that Rule 403 is designed to protect against: a matter of “scant . . .

probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial

effect.” Harris, 314 Ga. at 262-263 (3) (a).

*

Because the other-acts evidence the State put forward here

was not relevant to prove motive and its minimal probative value as

to the issues of accident or mistake was substantially outweighed by

its unfair prejudicial effect, the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the evidence. See Harris, 314 Ga. at 262-263 (3) (a), 270

(3) (e); Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 778 (2) (b); Strong, 309 Ga. at 312 (d) (2)-

(3).

(b) Harmless Error

Having concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to admit

the evidence of Harris’s battery of his ex-girlfriend in 2017, we must

consider whether that error requires reversal of his convictions. Re-

versal is required unless the State proves that the error is harmless.

See Platt v. State, 319 Ga. 1, 11 (3) (901 SE2d 114) (2024). An error

33
that does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights is harm-

less if it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the

verdict.” Harris, 314 Ga. at 283 (5) (cleaned up). To apply this stand-

ard, we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we

would expect reasonable jurors to have done. Id. “Generally, we have

found Rule 404 (b) errors harmless ‘where the properly admitted ev-

idence . . . was so strong that the prejudicial effect of the other-acts

evidence had no significant influence on the guilty verdicts.’” Nun-

dra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 6 (2) (885 SE2d 790) (2023) (quoting Heard

v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 91 (3) (g) (844 SE2d 791) (2020)).

When the error is admitting evidence that should not have

been admitted, the harmless-error question turns on how much the

wrongly admitted evidence likely mattered to the jury’s decision to

convict. See Heard, 309 Ga. at 91 (3) (g) (concluding that wrongly

admitted other-acts evidence was harmful where it was the only ev-

idence of the defendant’s “involvement in violent acts,” so the gen-

eral principle that wrongly admitted evidence is harmless when it

“had no significant influence on the guilty verdicts” did not apply).

34
See, e.g., Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 779 (2) (c) (wrongly admitted other-

acts evidence had “little bearing” on the case and was harmless).

That assessment is usually made by considering how powerful the

wrongly admitted evidence was relative to the overall mix of evi-

dence. If, for instance, the wrongly admitted evidence was “rela-

tively benign” or “merely cumulative” of properly admitted evidence

and the remaining evidence of the defendant’s guilt was quite

strong, the State may be able to prove that the error was harmless.

Harris, 314 Ga. at 284 (5). See, e.g., Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 105-

106 (4) (786 SE2d 648) (2016) (wrongly admitted evidence of drug

deals was harmless given “strong” evidence of defendant’s guilt and

other properly admitted evidence that he had distributed drugs to

people other than the murder victim); Kirby, 304 Ga. at 487 (4) (c)

(any prejudice caused by wrongly admitted other-acts evidence was

“offset” by properly admitted evidence that the defendant had com-

mitted other violent crimes and “other compelling evidence” of his

guilt). By contrast, if the wrongly admitted evidence was weighty —

35
perhaps because it carried a “high risk of prejudice” or was im-

portant to proving an element of the State’s case — only the “most

compelling properly admitted evidence of guilt” might prevent re-

versal. Strong, 309 Ga. at 317 (4). See, e.g., Harris, 314 Ga. at 288-

289 (5) (wrongly admitted evidence only “weakly supported” the

State’s motive theory, and there was “substantial evidence both sup-

porting and undermining” that the defendant intended to kill the

victim); Heard, 309 Ga. at 91-92 (3) (g) (wrongly admitted evidence

was “highly prejudicial and not at all cumulative” and properly ad-

mitted evidence of guilt “was not compelling” and largely circum-

stantial). The same can be said when the other-acts evidence so in-

fects the trial that it affects the jury’s perception of the defendant

and its assessment of his credibility. Compare, e.g., Strong, 309 Ga.

at 318 (4) (“[A]lthough the jury could have found Appellant guilty if

it believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved Appellant, we can-

not say that it is highly probable that the trial court’s erroneous ad-

mission of the voluminous evidence that Appellant had previously

committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the

36
guilty verdicts that the jury returned.”); Baker v. State, 318 Ga. 431,

451 (2) (d) n.20 (899 SE2d 139) (2024) (explaining that “[a]lthough

the jury was authorized to disbelieve” the defendant’s account, the

prosecutor’s “repeated use of the [wrongly admitted] video to empha-

size [the defendant’s] alleged propensity for gun violence would have

significantly undermined his credibility with the jurors,” and cast-

ing him as “a violent gunman” before it heard the defendant’s own

account “made it more likely that the jury would disbelieve” him “be-

cause he had been portrayed as the sort of person who would commit

a crime like the one with which he was charged”) with Bowman v.

State, 319 Ga. 573, 584-585 (3) (905 SE2d 605) (2024) (assuming ev-

idence that defendant used violence against his ex-wife was wrongly

admitted and concluding that the assumed error was harmless be-

cause the “marginal harm” of the other-acts evidence “was unlikely

to have significantly altered the jury’s perception of [the defendant],

given that the jury heard substantial other evidence, unchallenged

on appeal, of [the defendant’s] violence and jealousy against [the

murder victim]”); Rodrigues v. State, 306 Ga. 867, 871-872 (2) (834

37
SE2d 59) (2019) (error in admitting other-acts evidence was harm-

less given that the “overwhelming evidence” undermined defend-

ant’s sole defense — that he stabbed the victim in self-defense —

and the “marginal harm of learning [the defendant] was previously

convicted of involuntary manslaughter related to a stabbing [was]

unlikely to have substantially impacted the jury’s perception of [the

defendant], given that they were already aware that [the defendant]

was incarcerated at the time of [the murder],” which took place at a

prison).

The wrongly admitted evidence here was powerful and highly

prejudicial. As we discussed above, evidence of a defendant’s past

bad acts is excluded precisely because jurors will give it too much

weight, relying on the seductive logic that a defendant who does bad

things probably did this bad thing, too. See White, 319 Ga. at 398-

399 (Peterson, P.J., concurring); Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-476.

That is all the more likely when the specific content of the other-acts

evidence is itself inflammatory, see Strong, 309 Ga. at 316-317 (4)

38
(considering “the severity of the prior acts and their resulting inju-

ries” when assessing harm), or when the State relies on the wrongly

admitted evidence in a significant way, see Harris, 314 Ga. at 283,

288-289 (5) (court erred by admitting a “substantial amount of evi-

dence about Appellant’s sexual activities” that “weakly supported”

the State’s motive theory); Heard, 309 Ga. at 91, 94 (3) (g) (wrongly

admitted evidence was “shaky” and the only evidence of prior vio-

lence). Both things are true here. Harris’s ex-girlfriend told the jury

in explicit detail about his sudden and intense episode of domestic

violence against her, which the State documented for the jury by in-

troducing many graphic photos of the serious injuries he inflicted on

her and having her read to the jury 19 transcript pages worth of text

messages he sent after the incident. C.A. was also the last witness

called by the State, so the jury heard her testimony immediately be-

fore hearing from Harris. And Harris spent the first portion of his

testimony addressing the battery of C.A. rather than what he was

on trial for – killing Gooch. This was also the only evidence that

Harris had ever used violence against anyone before he stabbed

39
Gooch; without it, the evidence showed only that Harris had a “tem-

per,” that his relationship with Gooch was volatile emotionally, and

that she once punched him during an argument. See Heard, 309 Ga.

at 91-92 (3) (g) (concluding that wrongly admitted other-acts evi-

dence was harmful in part because “there was no other evidence of

[the defendant’s] involvement in violent acts”). And the State not

only relied on this evidence but leaned into the classic propensity

argument throughout its closing, telling the jury that his battery of

his ex-girlfriend showed that Harris’s “motive is to control romantic

partners with violence. That’s what he does. That’s what he did in

this case.” See Baker, 318 Ga. at 448-449 (2) (d) (concluding that trial

court’s error in admitting 30-second rap video under OCGA § 24-4-

403 was harmful in part because the prosecutor “emphasized during

her closing argument that [the defendant] and other rap artists ‘pro-

moted’ gun violence, because ‘that’s all they know,’ a pointed argu-

ment that reinforced to the jury [the defendant’s] alleged violent

character”) (alterations accepted). In sum, the other-acts evidence

40
here “added sharper, more damning, and more plainly criminal de-

tails to the State’s portrayal of Appellant as a man of despicable

character who deserved punishment.” Harris, 314 Ga. at 284 (5).11

We cannot discount the effect that such powerful and prejudi-

cial character evidence could have had on the jury’s decision to find

Harris guilty of murder. It is true that, apart from the other-acts

evidence, the State also marshaled significant properly admitted ev-

idence that tended to make Harris’s claim of self-defense less likely.

Gooch’s autopsy showed that she died from a stab wound to her side

but also had head wounds and two other stab wounds near her

shoulder blade, only Harris’s fingerprints were definitively identi-

fied on the knife, and Harris fled the scene. But Harris offered an

explanation consistent with self-defense and the evidence for each

point: He was “scared” and in “survival mode” when he “manipu-

lated” the knife in Gooch’s hand and drove it into her shoulder, and

11 The dissent all but ignores the substantial unfair prejudice that results

from inflammatory other-acts evidence framed and argued by the State as im-
proper propensity evidence. But our precedent is clear that such evidence tips
the scale heavily against a finding of harmless error. See, e.g., Strong, 309 Ga.
at 316-318 (4); Baker, 318 Ga. 449-450 (2) (d); Harris, 314 Ga. at 284 (5).
41
then stabbed her again as they both fell. The crime scene expert’s

testimony that the blood spatter and other evidence could be con-

sistent with Gooch being stabbed when she was on the couch or the

floor matched his story that Gooch fell into him as they fought over

the knife in her hand and then they both fell to the ground as he

stabbed her. A second set of fingerprints were observed on the knife

but not matched to anyone, which the examiner explained could be

because it was a fingertip print and none of the known fingerprints

from Harris or Gooch included such prints. And he left without call-

ing 911 because he was worried how it would look considering his

probation status, and then blacked out after taking Klonopin, an

anti-anxiety medication for which he had a prescription. And the

only other evidence of physical violence between the two was when

Gooch punched Harris, an incident that was confirmed by Gooch’s

sister. So we cannot say that the State’s theory of the case was so

strong that it was highly probable that the improperly admitted and

prejudicial evidence had no influence on the jury’s verdict. Of course,

Harris’s account of self-defense depended on the jury believing him.

42
But the chance that the jury would credit his story was likely all but

eliminated by the powerful and prejudicial evidence portraying Har-

ris as a violent repeat abuser, wrongly admitted and introduced as

part of the State’s case against him before he ever took the stand. It

is one thing for a jury to not believe a defendant because his story is

not believable; it is quite another for a jury to not believe a defendant

because he has already been shown to be a bad person who does bad

things. 12 And any such inclination would have been driven home by

the State’s pure propensity argument in closing. See Strong, 309 Ga.

at 318 (4). It is quite possible that the jury would have found Harris

guilty even without the highly prejudicial evidence of Harris’s past

violence against his ex-girlfriend. But that was a decision for the

jury to make based on properly admitted evidence, and we cannot

12 This is why we must reject the dissent’s assertion that “contradictions

and gaps in Harris’s testimony” compel a finding of harmless error. If the case
for harmless error turns on Harris’s credibility as the dissent claims, then the
State cannot make that case, because we cannot rule out that the wrongly ad-
mitted other-acts evidence (and the propensity arguments that accompanied
it) contributed to the jury’s decision to not believe Harris. The standard for
harmless error is not whether we think the jury likely would have convicted
the defendant anyways, but whether the State has shown it is highly probable
that the error did not contribute to the jury’s decision. See Platt, 319 Ga. at 11
(3); Harris, 314 Ga. at 283, 287-289 (5).
43
rule out the likelihood that the jury instead reached that verdict

based at least in part on the extensive, graphic, and highly prejudi-

cial evidence of Harris’s past violent acts. See Rouzan v. State, 308

Ga. 894, 901 (2) (843 SE2d 814) (2020). In short, the State has not

proved that it is “highly probable” that this highly prejudicial evi-

dence, admitted in error, did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.

3. Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, the trial court abused its discre-

tion by admitting the evidence of Harris’s past battery in this case,

and the State failed to prove that the error was harmless. Harris’s

convictions must therefore be reversed. The evidence of Harris’s

guilt was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process, so the

State may retry him if it so chooses. See Harris, 314 Ga. at 289 (6).

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua, J.,
who dissents.

44
LAGRUA, Justice, dissenting.

“Rule 404 (b) is a rule of inclusion[.]” Henderson v. State, 318

Ga. 752, 754 (1) (900 SE2d 596) (2024) (citation and punctuation

omitted). The rule is designed to limit “the introduction of other acts

evidence when it is offered for the sole purpose of showing a

defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit a crime.” Id. at

754-755 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).

However, if relevant evidence is being offered to prove something

other than criminal propensity—which may include one of the

permissible reasons listed in the language of the rule—such

evidence is presumptively admissible, subject to the balancing test

set forth in Rule 403. See OCGA §§ 24-4-401 to 24-4-404 (b)

(evidence may “be admissible for other purposes, including, but not

limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident”) (emphasis

supplied). Put differently, “Rule 404 (b) is an evidentiary rule of

inclusion which contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes other than

bad character for which other acts evidence is deemed relevant and
may be properly offered into evidence.” State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296,

300 (773 SE2d 700) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted;

emphasis supplied). The majority’s opinion departs from this long-

established precedent and continues the Court’s trend of moving

away from this principle of inclusion. Therefore, I must respectfully

dissent.

1. As noted by the majority, evidence is relevant if it has “any

tendency” to make the existence of “any” consequential fact “more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule 401”). And “[a]ll” relevant evidence “shall

be admissible” unless otherwise limited by law. OCGA § 24-4-402

(“Rule 402”). We have said that “[t]he standard for relevance is a

liberal one, and relevant evidence is admissible even if it has only

slight probative value.” Carter v. State, 317 Ga. 689, 693 (2) (895

SE2d 295) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis

supplied). See also, e.g., Siders v. State, 320 Ga. 367, 374 (3) (a) (907

SE2d 645) (2024) (“The standard for relevant evidence is a liberal

one, and such evidence is generally admissible even if it has only

46
slight probative value.”) (cleaned up); Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728,

738 (8) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (same, cleaned up). Although Rule 404

(b) disallows the admission of relevant evidence if it is offered to

prove “the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith,” such evidence is admissible if it proves, among other

things, “motive” or “absence of mistake or accident,” OCGA § 24-4-

404 (b), which is exactly what the State used it for here.

At trial, the State presented the C.A. evidence to prove Harris’s

motive in killing Gooch: namely, his motive to use violence to control

a domestic partner as the romantic relationship with that partner

was ending. See State v. Williams, 316 Ga. 249, 253 (887 SE2d 285)

(2023) (“Even evidence that reflects on a person’s character or a trait

of character . . . may be admitted under Rule 404 (b) . . . [as] proof of

motive[.]”) (cleaned up). Harris’s motive in violently assaulting C.A.

was relevant to his motive in his violent encounters with Gooch, i.e.,

to control domestic partners with violence as the relationship ends.

Thus, the C.A. evidence was relevant even though it “incidentally

place[d] [Harris’s] character in issue.” Mattei v. State, 307 Ga. 300,

47
303 (2) (835 SE2d 623) (2019) (cleaned up).

In Smart, a case the majority indicates may have been wrongly

decided, we held that other-act evidence of spousal abuse was

relevant and admissible if it “help[ed] the jury understand why [an

a]ppellant might have used violence” against his wife. Smart, 299

Ga. at 418 (2) (a). And, while the majority distances itself from

Smart by stating that “[s]ome of us have doubts about whether

Smart was correctly decided,” we have not cabined Smart. On the

contrary, we have cited Smart explicitly referencing the holding so

fundamentally important here. See Lowe v. State, 314 Ga. 788, 793

(2) (a) (879 SE2d 492) (2022) (citing Smart for its holding that,

“evidence of prior acts of violence was relevant under Rule 404 (b) to

help the jury understand that the defendant used violence to control

the victim”); Thompson v. State, 308 Ga. 854, 858 (2) n.5 (843 SE2d

794) (2020) (noting Smart’s holding that prior domestic violence

against the defendant’s ex-wife “was relevant to the severe beating

and strangulation death of his current wife because it demonstrated

defendant’s motive to control family members with violence and his

48
intent to harm his intimate partners”) (cleaned up).

Thus, both in Smart and elsewhere, we have held that evidence

of extrinsic domestic violence is admissible to prove motive in a

domestic violence case under Rule 404 (b), and I believe it was

likewise admissible here. See Smart, 299 Ga. at 418 (2) (a). See also

McWilliams v. State, 304 Ga. 502, 510 (3) (820 SE2d 33) (2018)

(holding that evidence of extrinsic acts of physical abuse of romantic

partners “was needed to adequately explain that appellant became

violent with his romantic partners after consuming alcohol,

including inflicting blows to their heads”).

Additionally, the State presented the C.A. evidence at trial to

prove the absence of accident or mistake in the killing of Gooch. See

OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). Although Harris did not argue those defenses

to the jury, the State still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that Gooch’s death was not an accident or mistake because Harris

told the police that Gooch “fell on the knife.” The trial court gave the

jury a limiting instruction expressly permitting the jury to consider

the C.A. act with respect to absence of accident or mistake.

49
Thus, “[a]lthough the defense did not expressly contend that

[the charged murder] was an accident, the State bore a heavy

burden to overcome this implication[.]” Naples v. State, 308 Ga. 43,

52 (2) (e) (838 SE2d 780) (2020).13 Accordingly, I believe the C.A.

evidence was also admissible under Rule 404 (b) to prove the

absence of accident or mistake. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b).

Moreover, in this case, the majority has underemphasized Rule

403’s inclusive nature in considering the admissibility of the C.A.

evidence. Rule 403 allows the admission of unfairly prejudicial

evidence—it is only when the unfair prejudice “substantially”

outweighs the probative value that Rule 403 mandates exclusion.

See OCGA § 24-4-403. Again, “Rule 404 (b) is a rule of inclusion” and

Rule 403 is merely an “extraordinary exception to that inclusivity.”

West v. State, 305 Ga. 467, 474 (2) (826 SE2d 64) (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). See also Baker v. State,

13 The majority correctly notes that Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 541

(III) (A) (807 SE2d 899) (2017), pretermits whether a defendant must raise the
defense of accident or mistake before other-act evidence may be admitted ad-
dressing those issues. Because Naples issued after Thompson, Naples controls
here.
50
318 Ga. 431, 442 (2) (a) (899 SE2d 139) (2024) (noting that “the

exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy

which should be used only sparingly”) (citation and punctuation

omitted). As such, “in reviewing the admission of evidence under

Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its

admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its

undue prejudicial impact.” Wilson v. State, 312 Ga. 174, 190 (2) (860

SE2d 485) (2021) (cleaned up; emphasis supplied). See also Morrell

v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 259 (2) (b) (869 SE2d 447) (2022) (holding that,

pursuant to Rule 403, “courts must look at the evidence in a light

most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and

minimizing its undue prejudicial impact”) (cleaned up).

“The probative value of evidence is a combination of its logical

force to prove a point and the need at trial for evidence on that

point.” Harris, 314 Ga. at 263 (3) (a) (citation and punctuation

omitted). The prosecutorial need for the C.A. evidence to prove

Harris’s motive and the absence of accident or mistake in this case

was very high. The only two theories of motive offered at trial were

51
the State’s theory that Harris used violence as a means of controlling

Gooch because he sought to control his domestic partners through

violence whenever that relationship was ending, and Harris’s

counter-theory that Gooch attacked Harris with a deadly weapon

because Harris was “kick[ing her] out of the apartment for the

umpteenth time.” Gooch obviously could not testify about what

happened and why, and there were no other eyewitnesses except

Harris. Just as in Smart, we have “very little evidence” explaining

why Harris would have “lashed out” against Gooch (or why she

would have attacked him, as Harris maintained). Smart, 299 Ga. at

419 (2) (b). Thus, this case is directly in line with our precedent

which admits extrinsic evidence pursuant to Rule 403 in the face of

high probative value. See McWilliams, 304 Ga. at 510 (3). See also

Harrison v. State, 310 Ga. 862, 868 (3) (855 SE2d 546) (2021)

(holding that evidence that the appellant “had a history of

committing jealousy-fueled violent acts against a romantic partner”

had “significant probative value in establishing that his conduct . . .

was intentional and not accidental”) (citation and punctation

52
omitted).

The danger of unfair prejudice from the admission of the C.A.

evidence was limited and did not substantially outweigh its

prejudicial effect. In Smart, supra, we admitted evidence of Smart’s

abuse of his previous spouse – that he would “often punch” his ex-

wife, and that he “shoved her out of [a broken] window” when she

was eight-months pregnant, such that she was “injured and bloody,”

and then, when she finally made it inside the house, he “forcefully

dragged” her back out of it – because “there was nothing inherent in

this evidence that would create a risk” that the jury convicted Smart

on a ground “different from proof specific to the offense charged.”

Smart, 299 Ga. at 416, 419 (2) (cleaned up). Here, the C.A. evidence,

including C.A.’s testimony and the photographs depicting C.A.’s

bruising, though troubling, was not unduly “graphic.” See Flowers v.

State, 307 Ga. 618, 623 (2) (837 SE2d 824) (2020) (citing Smart,

holding that the danger of unfair prejudice of testimony and video

evidence of a previous “beating” did not substantially outweigh its

probative value, because there was nothing “inherent” in the

53
evidence creating a risk that the appellant “would be convicted on a

ground different from proof specific to the offense charged”).

Moreover, Harris testified that he and Gooch “kind of went through

[a violent] cycle over and over again” and continued to have “some

turmoil, lots of ups and downs” in the weeks before Gooch’s death,

including the argument where Gooch broke a plate and Harris broke

a lamp.

Harris’s relationship with C.A. followed a very similar pattern,

also resulting in a violent end.14 As the State observed, both C.A.

and Gooch were involved in arguments with Harris that lasted for

several days, following which Harris packed his own belongings or

his partner’s belongings with the intention of ending the

cohabitation and likely the relationship itself. Additionally, at some

point during the respective arguments, Harris apologized profusely,

and then, just as the relationship ended, violence ensued. Indeed,

14 Extrinsic evidence offered to prove motive need not reflect “overall sim-

ilarity” with the charged crime; the extrinsic evidence only needs to be “logi-
cally relevant and necessary to prove something other than the accused’s pro-
pensity to commit the crime charged.” Mattei, 307 Ga. at 303 (2) (cleaned up).
54
the jury heard Harris describe himself as “abusive” three times to

C.A. And, after the fact, Harris accused both women of having

initiated the violence.

Thus, looking at the C.A. evidence “in a light most favorable to

its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its

undue prejudicial impact,” Wilson, 312 Ga. at 190 (2) (citation and

punctuation omitted), the trial court did not clearly abuse its

discretion in admitting the C.A. evidence.

2. It is also highly probable that any error in the admission of

the C.A. evidence did not contribute to the verdict against Harris in

this case. See Smart, 299 Ga. at 416-419 (2). Although the C.A.

evidence was disturbing, it is highly unlikely that it caused the jury

to convict “on a ground different from proof specific to the offense

charged.” Id. at 419 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Moreover, the State successfully impeached Harris’s credibility

on several points, including his claim of self-defense, making it

highly probable that evidence of the C.A. incident did not contribute

to the verdict. Harris admitted at trial that he lied when he told

55
investigators that he saw a knife next to Gooch on the couch; he

contradicted his statement to investigators that Gooch “fell on the

knife” by testifying that “she was stabbed before” she fell; and

although he told investigators that “it was a full-on fight” that

“lasted minutes,” he testified that it happened “very, very fast,” and

lasted “[a] couple of seconds, maybe.”

Additionally, Harris’s trial testimony regarding what he did

after Gooch’s death was inconsistent; first stating that he drove

away in Gooch’s car after he killed Gooch, but he could not recall

where he went; then admitting that he used a map program on his

iPad for directions on where to go, but he could not recall his

password to access the iPad. And the text messages between Harris

and Gooch had been intentionally deleted from Harris’s cell phone

and were irretrievable, but all his other text messages remained.

The contradictions and gaps in Harris’s testimony are glaring,

and combined with the physical evidence, are compelling evidence

of Harris’s guilt. See Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 263-264 (2) (773

SE2d 263) (2015) (noting that in combination with other evidence,

56
“a statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the jury[,] may be

considered as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt”) (citing

United States v. McCarrick, 294 F3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002)

(emphasis in original)).

Notably, any undue prejudice arising from the C.A. evidence

was minimized when Harris told the jury that he pleaded guilty to

the aggravated battery of C.A. and spent two years in a work-release

program. This admission “reduce[d] the risk that the jury convicted

[Harris] to punish him for his other crime[],” because the jury heard

that Harris “had already been punished for [that crime].” Nundra v.

State, 316 Ga. 1, 7 (2) (885 SE2d 790) (2023). 15 The trial court’s

limiting instructions also mitigated any undue prejudice arising

from the C.A. evidence because “we presume that the jury followed

the instructions not to consider it for any other purpose.” Thomas v.

State, 314 Ga. 681, 688 (1) (c) (878 SE2d 493) (2022) (citation

15 Harris further minimized the risk that the jury would convict him for

his crime against C.A. when he testified that the C.A. attack was “[j]ust com-
pletely ugly and inexcusable,” that he “messed up really bad” and was
“ashamed . . . . completely ashamed,” and that it was “one of the lowest points
of [his] life.”
57
omitted); McWilliams, 304 Ga. at 511 (3) (“Any prejudicial impact of

the extrinsic acts evidence was mitigated when the trial court gave

the jury specific instructions about the limited purpose of the

evidence.”) (citation omitted). And the State did not unduly

emphasize the C.A. evidence at trial. The record reflects that 17

witnesses testified about what happened in this case, and while the

majority correctly notes that C.A.’s verbatim reading of her text

conversation with Harris spanned roughly 19 pages of trial

testimony, that text exchange consisted mainly of Harris’s apologies

to C.A. and his begging for the chance to make things right. During

the State’s closing argument, the State referenced the C.A. evidence

very briefly. The majority of the State’s closing argument addressed

Harris’s credibility, the contradictions in his depiction of how the

killing happened, his self-defense claim, and the physical evidence,16

without any reference to the C.A. evidence.

16 The State pointed out to the jury that evidence showed that Harris

was 6’1” and 225 pounds, and he was admittedly an ex-marine with years of
combat and martial arts training, specifically including with knives. Kennedy
Gooch testified that Gooch was 5’8” and that Harris was “way stronger and
bigger than her.”
58
With respect to the State’s reference to the C.A. evidence

during closing argument, the State argued that Harris’s motive for

killing Gooch was “hard to understand,” which was why the C.A.

evidence was necessary to prove that Harris’s “motive [wa]s to

control romantic partners with violence” and to show that Gooch was

in the most danger when she tried to leave, just like C.A. was.

In sum, Harris’s contradictory testimony and the evidence

presented against him at trial were compelling evidence of his guilt,

and the evidence pertaining to the incident with C.A. was not

inherently prejudicial, both because the jury heard that Harris

pleaded guilty to the related aggravated battery charge and because

the State did not unduly emphasize, or unfairly characterize, the

C.A. evidence during trial or in closing. Thus, even if admission of

the C.A. evidence was an abuse of discretion, it is “highly probable

that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Nundra, 316 Ga. at

6 (2) (cleaned up).

As such, I dissent.

59