JIMAINE FLOWERS v. STATE OF GEORGIA

SECOND DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
DAVIS and WHITAKER, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after
the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
October 21, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1310. FLOWERS v. THE STATE.
DAVIS, Judge.
In this civil forfeiture action, Jimaine Flowers appeals from an order of the
Superior Court of Gwinnett County ordering the forfeiture of $20,373 in US currency
in relation to a drug investigation.1 Flowers argues that (1) the trial court’s order
granting the forfeiture amounts to an excessive fine; (2) the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the forfeiture; (3) the trial court erred in finding he filed fraudulent
documents; (4) the trial court erred in using inadmissible evidence to order the
1 Throughout their briefs, both parties reference the amount at issue as $20,373
in US currency. The Notice of Seizure also indicates the amount is $20,373. But at the
final forfeiture hearing, the parties indicated the amount seized was $20,353.
Nevertheless, we will follow the lead of the parties and refer to the amount of money
seized as $20,373. We also note that the seized property included a Glock 43X 9mm
firearm, but Flowers does not contest the forfeiture of the firearm.

forfeiture; (5) there was no probable cause to seize the cash; (6) the trial court erred
in applying OCGA § 16-13-49; and (7) the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the forfeiture complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In rendering judgment on a complaint for forfeiture, the trial court is
required to make mixed findings of fact and law, which this Court must
accept unless they are clearly erroneous. And we defer to the trial court’s
judgment as to witness credibility and will affirm the trial court’s
findings if there is any evidence supporting them.
State v. Brophy, 368 Ga. App. 136, 136 (889 SE2d 337) (2023).
The record shows that on June 21, 2024, officers with the Gwinnett County
Police Department conducted undercover surveillance of Room 216 at the Super 8
Motel on Willow Oak Parkway in Gwinnett County. Officers witnessed what they
described as “activity that was indicative of illegal drug sales” and suspected “hand
to hand illegal drug activity.” Traffic stops were conducted on several individuals they
saw leaving the room, but no illegal substances were recovered, and no arrests were
made. Officers were able to take a photograph of a person coming and going from the
room who was later identified as Flowers. They discovered Flowers was on probation
with a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of his probation and that he had an
active arrest warrant for a probation violation. On June 25, 2024, officers conducted
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surveillance on the same motel room and witnessed Flowers leave the room and drive
away. Officers conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle and arrested Flowers because
of the active warrant. Flowers was searched incident to his arrest, and officers found
$20,373 in cash and the Super 8 Motel room key for the room under surveillance.
Officers entered the room to execute the Fourth Amendment waiver search and
saw in plain view a substance they suspected to be crack cocaine. At that point,
officers applied for and were granted a search warrant for the room. The search
warrant was executed and officers collected the following evidence:
1. A Glock 43X firearm;
2. A black digital scale with white powdery substance on it;
3. 250.7 grams of a white crystal-like substance that was suspected to be
methamphetamine;
4. 172.5 grams of a white clumped substance that was suspected to be crack
cocaine;
5. 10 grams of MDMA;
6. 75.3 grams of blue M 30 pills;
7. 29.1 grams of suspected cocaine gummies;
8. 121 grams of a green leafy material that was suspected to be marijuana;
9. 5.1 grams of a black and brown substance that was suspected to be fentanyl;
10. 85 pills of Xanax;
11. 22 pills of amphetamine and dextroamphetamine;
12. 58 pills of oxycodone and acetaminophen.
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Officers also found an Enterprise Rental Agreement and a traffic citation, both with
Flowers’ name on them. Flowers was served with the notice of seizure of the firearm
and the $20,373 on June 25, 2024.
On September 11, 2024, Flowers was indicted for trafficking in illegal drugs and
other crimes. Flowers moved to suppress evidence in his criminal case, and following
a hearing, the trial court granted that motion. Subsequently, the State moved to nolle
pros the criminal case against Flowers.
On July 16, 2024, Flowers mailed notice to the District Attorney’s Office that
he objected to the seizure of the cash. On July 23, 2024, the District Attorney’s Office
posted notice of the seizure at the courthouse pursuant to OCGA § 9-16-11. And on
October 17, 2024, the State filed a complaint pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49 and
OCGA § 9-16-12 seeking to obtain forfeiture of the $20,373 cash and the firearm.
Flowers was served with the complaint on December 12, 2024. On December 19,
2024, Flowers filed an answer and counterclaim, and on January 7, 2025, he filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint. On January 24, 2025, the State filed a motion for
more definite statement pursuant to OCGA § 9-16-12(c)(2). Following a hearing on
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April 1, 2025,2 the trial court denied Flowers’ motion to dismiss and granted the
State’s motion for a more definite statement. On April 16, 2025, Flowers filed an
amended answer. Thereafter, the trial court scheduled a hearing for May 7, 2025. The
State moved for a continuance on May 5, 2025 which was granted by the trial court
on May 12, 2025.3 The final forfeiture hearing was held on June 24, 2025.
In support of his amended answer, Flowers attached documents purporting to
be records from a Wells Fargo Business Checking Account for NoWorries Trucking,
LLC and a business license for NoWorries Trucking, LLC to support his claim that
the cash found on his person was legitimate business income. At the final forfeiture
hearing, the State tendered certified records from Wells Fargo showing an account
with the same account number as the one on the records Flowers provided with his
amended answer but showing a different owner for the account. Recordings of phone
calls Flowers made from jail asking for help falsifying bank records to show income for
2 The transcript from this hearing is not in the record before us.
3 The trial court’s order continuing the hearing indicates that Flowers, who was
incarcerated in the Gwinnett County Jail at the time of the motion to continue,
expected to be released on May 18, 2025, acknowledged that he would have an easier
time preparing for the hearing once he was released, and consented to the State’s
motion to continue the hearing.
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the asset forfeiture hearing were also admitted. Following the hearing, the trial court
entered an order finding the currency and the firearm were subject to forfeiture. This
appeal followed.
1. Flowers first argues the trial court’s order granting the forfeiture of the
$20,373 amounts to an excessive fine. We disagree.
Georgia’s appellate courts have long recognized that the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution applies to in rem forfeitures. Howell
v. State, 283 Ga. 24, 25(1) (656 SE2d 511) (2008).
We frame our excessiveness inquiry in terms of the following
considerations: (1) the harshness, or gross disproportionality, of the
forfeiture in comparison to the gravity of the offense, giving due regard
to (a) the offense committed and its relation to other criminal activity,
(b) whether the claimant falls within the class of persons for whom the
statute was designed, (c) the punishments available, and (d) the harm
caused by the claimant’s conduct; (2) the nexus between the property
and the criminal offenses, including the deliberate nature of the use and
temporal and spatial extent of the use; and (3) the culpability of each
claimant.
Id. at 26.
“The first factor requires a consideration of the inherent gravity of the offense
compared with the harshness of the penalty.” Howell, 283 Ga. at 25(1). Flowers argues
that the trial court’s order granting forfeiture is harsh and grossly disproportionate
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compared to the gravity of the offense. He appears to argue that because his criminal
charges were nolle prossed prior to the final forfeiture hearing, he has been exonerated
of the criminal offenses which led to the seizure of the $20,373, thus negating any
relationship between the criminal charges and the seized currency.
But Flowers misconstrues the function of the nolle pros. “The mere entry of
nolle prosequi does not indicate an absence of the commission of a criminal act or
forever clear one of the charges brought against him.” Drake v. State, 170 Ga. App.
846, 846(1) (318 SE2d 721) (1984) (quotation marks omitted). And a civil in rem
forfeiture action does not succeed or fail based on the outcome of any underlying
criminal case. Further, in a forfeiture proceeding, “[t]he State need prove its case only
by a preponderance of the evidence,” Davis v. State, 256 Ga. App. 299, 304(2) (568
SE2d 161) (2002), rather than the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
required for criminal charges. And we “will affirm the trial court’s findings if there
is any evidence supporting them.” Brophy, 368 Ga. App. at 136.
In Brophy, the underlying criminal activity was possession of less than two
grams of methamphetamine, for which the claimant was sentenced to three years
probation and a $750 fine, and the property at issue in the forfeiture complaint was a
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vehicle for which the claimant had paid $36,000. 368 Ga. App. at 138. We affirmed the
trial court’s order that forfeiture of the vehicle in those circumstances was excessive.
Id. at 142(2). Here, however, Flowers was charged in a twelve count indictment with
two counts of trafficking in illegal drugs (OCGA § 16-13-31(b)); two counts of
trafficking in cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-31(a)); trafficking methamphetamine or
amphetamine (OCGA § 16-13-31(e)); possession of a Schedule I controlled substance
with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30(b)); possession of a Schedule IV
controlled substance with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30(b)); possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30(b)); possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30(j)); possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (OCGA § 16-11-106); and possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon (OCGA § 16-11-131(b)). Plainly, Flowers’ underlying criminal
conduct is in stark contrast to Brophy, where the complainant was charged with mere
possession of less than two grams of methamphetamine.
Flowers further argues that he does not fall within the class of person for whom
the statute was designed as a deterrent because he has not been convicted of drug
related activity in 14 years. But some of the goals of Georgia’s Uniform Civil
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Forfeiture Procedure Act, OCGA § 9-16-1, et seq.,4 are to “[render] illegal behavior
unprofitable, [ensure] that persons do not profit from their illegal acts, and [remove]
from circulation forbidden merchandise and firearms unlawfully used or intended for
illegal use.” Murphy v. State, 267 Ga. 120, 121 (475 SE2d 907) (1996). A recent
criminal conviction for drug related activity is not what defines the class of persons for
whom the statute was designed as a deterrent. See Davis, 256 Ga. App. at 304(2)
(forfeiture upheld where evidence supported the inference that claimant was regularly
engaged in the drug trade).
Flowers further argues there was no harm caused by his conduct because there
were only “allegations” of narcotic trafficking – again, apparently relying on the nolle
pros of the criminal case. But the trial court found that there was a clear and present
harm caused by the illegal sale and distribution of illegal narcotics. And the trial
court’s findings were supported by testimony that officers observed Flowers engaged
in “activity that was indicative of illegal drug sales” and suspected “hand to hand
illegal drug activity.” Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding
4 The law pertaining to forfeitures was previously codified in OCGA § 16-13-49
(2004); the current codification became effective July 1, 2015. Laws 2015, Act 98, §
1-1 eff. July 1, 2015. The law is identical in all material aspects.
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under the first factor that the forfeiture was not disproportionate to the criminal
offenses.
The second factor evaluates “the nexus between the property and the criminal
offenses, including the deliberate nature of the use and the temporal and spatial extent
of the use.” Howell, 283 Ga. at 26. Here, the trial court found that there was a
sufficient nexus between the currency seized from Flowers’ person and illegal drug
activity. Flowers argues that there was no sufficient nexus because there were no
narcotics found on his person and because he was arrested away from the motel room
where the illegal drugs, scale, and the firearm were located. Flowers also argues that,
although officers suspected hand to hand drug transactions occurred out of Room 216,
their suspicions did not result in the discovery of any drugs on the individuals leaving
the room. But the testimony that officers witnessed evidence of illegal drug activity
taking place in Room 216 and the seizure of the key to Room 216 from Flowers’
person support the trial court’s findings that the currency was connected to drug
activity. Additionally, there was evidence that Flowers falsified the bank records he
submitted to support his assertions that the cash was lawfully obtained. Accordingly,
there was evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there was a sufficient nexus
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between the currency seized and the illegal drug activity. See Howell, 283 Ga. at 27(1)
(nexus was particularly close where the crime occurred only on the subject property
and the use of the property was a necessary component of the crime); compare Brophy,
368 at 141-42(2) (nexus was of a lesser degree, not requiring forfeiture, where
possession of methamphetamine occurred close to the vehicle that was seized, but the
vehicle was not necessary for the criminal conduct).
The final factor to consider in determining whether the forfeiture amounts to
an excessive fine is Flowers’ culpability for the crime itself. Howell, 283 Ga. at 27(1).
Despite the nolle pros of the criminal charges, the testimony of the officers that
Flowers was engaged in hand to hand drug sales out of Room 216 is sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that, based on the preponderance of the evidence, the
currency was a product of or related to the sale of illegal narcotics. See Davis, 256 Ga.
App. at 304(2) (the State need prove its case only by a preponderance of the
evidence).
In its order granting the forfeiture, the trial court expressly considered each of
the Howell factors in reaching its conclusion that the forfeiture amount was not harsh
or grossly disproportionate to the offenses of illegal narcotics distribution. The
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evidence in the record before us is sufficient to uphold the trial court’s findings. See
OCGA § 16-13-49(b)(2)&(3). See also, Davis, 256 Ga. App. at 304(2) (property was
properly forfeited where evidence supported the trial court’s determination that it was
used, intended for use, or proceeds derived or realized from a violation of the Georgia
Controlled Substances Act).
2. In three related enumerations of error,5 Flowers argues the evidence was
insufficient for the trial court to find that the $20,373 was related to a violation of the
Georgia Controlled Substances Act, there was no probable cause to seize the currency,
and the trial court erred in applying OCGA § 16-13-49(b)(2)&(3). These arguments
fail for many of the same reasons detailed in Division 1.
OCGA § 16-13-49(b) describes types of property which are considered
contraband and thus no person has a property right in them.
(2) Any property which is, directly or indirectly, used or intended for use
in any manner to facilitate a violation of [the Georgia Controlled
Substances Act] and any proceeds;
(3) Any property located in this state which was, directly or indirectly,
intended for use in any manner to facilitate a violation of [the Georgia
Controlled Substances Act] or the laws of the United States related to
5 We address these enumerations of error in a different order than presented in
Flowers’ brief.
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controlled substances that is punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year and any proceeds[.]
OCGA § 16-13-49(b).
Flowers argues that because he was arrested away from the motel room and no
contraband was found on his person or in his vehicle, the trial court erred in finding
that the $20,373 was directly or indirectly used to violate the Georgia Controlled
Substances Act. But there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding by
a preponderance of the evidence that the currency seized from Flowers was intended
to facilitate a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act or was derived or
realized therefrom. See OCGA § 16-13-49(b)(2)&(3). See also Davis, 256 Ga. App. at
304(2) (property was properly forfeited where claimant’s explanations for possession
of the large amount of cash were unreasonable). As described above, on June 21, 2024,
officers observed suspected drug activity occurring out of Room 216 at the Super 8
Motel. On June 25, 2024, officers watched Flowers leave Room 216 of the Super 8
Motel and get into a vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Flowers was pulled over and arrested
on an outstanding probation violation warrant, and the key to Room 216 was found on
his person along with the $20,373 in cash. Because Flowers was lawfully arrested
based on an active arrest warrant for violating the terms of his probation probable
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cause was not necessary for officers to seize the currency on his person. “When a
lawful arrest is effected, a peace officer may reasonably search the person arrested and
the area within the person’s immediate presence.” OCGA § 17-5-1(a). See also Batson
v. State, 165 Ga. App. 299 (300 SE2d 551) (1983) (search and seizure were appropriate
where officers arrested defendant who had an active arrest warrant).
Flowers further argues that because his criminal case was nolle prossed, the
charges brought against him were no more than “allegations, speculations, and
possibilities.” But as we have stated above, the law is clear that a civil in rem forfeiture
action does not succeed or fail based on the whether the underlying criminal conduct
was successfully prosecuted. “Property may be forfeited if it is, directly or indirectly,
used or intended for use in any manner to facilitate a violation of the Georgia
Controlled Substances Act or any proceeds derived or realized therefrom.” Davis, 256
Ga. App. at 304(2). And, “[t]he State need prove its case only by a preponderance of
the evidence,” id., rather than the higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard required
for a criminal conviction.
There is also evidence in the record that Flowers falsified bank records and
other documents to support his assertions that the currency was lawfully obtained.
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Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings by a
preponderance of the evidence that the currency was related to a violation of the
Georgia Controlled Substances Act. For these reasons, all three of these enumerations
of error fail.
3. In his next enumeration of error, Flowers argues the trial court erred in
finding that he filed fraudulent bank and business documents in support of his
amended answer. We disagree.
As described above, we “will affirm the trial court’s findings if there is any
evidence supporting them.” Brophy, 368 Ga. App. at 136. The evidence at the hearing
included recordings of phone calls from the Gwinnett County Jail in which Flowers
discussed falsifying documents to support his assertions that the seized currency was
lawfully obtained as well as certified records from Wells Fargo for an account that did
not belong to Flowers but showed the same account number as the records Flowers
submitted. Flowers offered no explanation to rebut this evidence. Accordingly, the
evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the documents filed by Flowers in his
amended answer were fraudulent.
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4. Flowers argues the trial court erred by using the same evidence in the
criminal case against him to order the forfeiture. Flowers argues that because his
motion to suppress was granted in the criminal case, the evidence cannot be used to
support the forfeiture. We agree that the evidence that was suppressed in the criminal
case cannot be used to support the forfeiture. But nonetheless there is sufficient other
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s order of forfeiture.
“Because forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, the exclusionary
rule has been held to apply.” Pitts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 606, 607(1) (428 SE2d 650)
(1993). “[I]f the search was illegal, it would render the evidence produced by the
search tainted and inadmissible.” Id. However, if independent evidence exists
connecting the forfeited property to illegal activities, the forfeiture action is not
barred. Id. Again, “we will not disturb a trial court’s findings if any evidence exists to
support them. This is true even where ... such findings are based upon circumstantial
evidence and the reasonable inferences which flow therefrom.” Mordica v. State, 319
Ga. App. 149, 151(1) (736 SE2d 153) (2012).
Here, despite the suppression of the evidence seized from the motel room,
there was still independent evidence on which the trial court based its findings that the
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currency seized from Flowers’ person was a product of criminal conduct such that it
supported forfeiture. The State introduced evidence that Flowers had falsified bank
records and submitted those records to the trial court to support his assertions that the
cash was lawfully obtained. The testimony of officers who witnessed Flowers
conducting what appeared to be hand-to-hand drug transactions also supported the
trial court’s findings. Further, there was testimony that a few months prior to
Flowers’ arrest, officers observed him engaging in suspected cocaine trafficking in the
same location. Although this evidence is circumstantial, “the State need prove its case
only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Davis, 256 Ga. App. at 304(2).
Accordingly, the evidence in the record was sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the money seized from Flowers was either the proceeds of or used to
further illegal drug activity.
5. Finally, Flowers argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the forfeiture complaint as untimely filed and because a hearing was not held within
60 days of filing the complaint. We agree that the forfeiture complaint was untimely,
but the hearing was held within the time frame required. Thus, the trial court was not
required to dismiss the complaint.
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The Georgia Uniform Civil Forfeiture Procedure Act, OCGA § 9-16-1, et seq.,
details the steps required for the State to secure civil forfeiture of property. “When
property that is intended to be forfeited is taken by any law enforcement officer of this
state, ... within 60 days from the date of seizure, the state attorney shall: (1) initiate a
quasi-judicial forfeiture as provided for in OCGA § 9-16-11; or (2) file a complaint for
forfeiture as provided for in OCGA § 9-16-12 or § 9-16-13.” OCGA § 9-16-7(a)-
(b)(quotation modified). For property valued at $25,000 or less, OCGA § 9-16-11(a)
describes the procedure required of the state attorney for posting notice of the seizure.
OCGA § 9-16-11(c)(1) instructs an owner or interest holder that to assert a claim to
the seized property, “within 30 days after being served or within 30 days after the
second publication of the notice of seizure, whichever occurs last,” he must send a
claim to the state attorney by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return
receipt requested. If any claim is served, the state attorney shall file a complaint for
forfeiture as provided in OCGA § 9-16-12 or § 9-16-13 within 30 days of the actual
receipt of the claim. OCGA § 9-16-11(c)(3).
Here, although the State initiated the quasi-judicial forfeiture within the time
period required by OCGA § 9-16-7(b), the State failed to comply with the timeliness
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requirements of OCGA § 9-16-11(c)(3). Pursuant to OCGA § 9-16-11, the State posted
the notice of seizure on July 23, 2024. But on July 16, 2024, the State received notice
from Flowers that he objected to the seizure of the $20,373. And OCGA § 9-16-
11(c)(3) requires the State to file a complaint for forfeiture as provided in OCGA § 9-
16-12 or § 9-16-13 within 30 days of the actual receipt of a claim to the property at
issue. In this case, the deadline for the State to file the forfeiture complaint would have
been August 16, 2024, but the State did not file the complaint until October 17, 2024.
Thus, the State failed to comply with OCGA § 9-16-11(c)(3). See State v. Profitt, 213
Ga. App. 270, 270 (444 SE2d 356) (1994) (decided under former OCGA § 16-13-49)
(“[I]f a claim to the seized property is filed within 30 days of the notice, the State
must file a civil complaint within 30 days of actual receipt of the claim.”). If the state
fails to comply with OCGA § 9-16-7(b), subsection (c) provides that “the property
shall be released on the request of an owner or interest holder, pending a complaint
for forfeiture.” OCGA § 9-16-7(c) See Smith v. State, 301 Ga. App. 870, 871 (690
SE2d 208) (decided under former OCGA § 16-13-49) (“[T]he sole remedy for
untimely filing by the State is the return of the contraband pending further forfeiture
proceedings. ... “[N]o useful purpose would be served by returning the property to
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the claimant at the hearing since a final decision would be made on the merits at the
conclusion of the hearing.”).
Flowers further argues the State failed to hold the hearing within the time frame
required by OCGA § 9-16-12(f). The procedure for in rem actions provides that “[i]f
an answer is filed, a bench trial shall be held within 60 days after the last claimant was
served with the complaint; provided, however, that such trial may be continued by the
court for good cause shown.” OCGA § 9-16-12(f).
Flowers filed his answer on December 19, 2024. On January 9, 2025, the State
filed a motion for a more definite statement under OCGA § 9-16-12(c)(2), which
tolled the time requirements provided in OCGA § 9-16-12(f) until after a sufficient
answer has been filed. See OCGA § 9-16-12(c)(2) (“If a motion for a more definite
statement is filed, the time requirements for a trial set forth in subsection (f) of this
Code section shall not commence until a sufficient answer has been filed.”). On April
16, 2025, Flowers filed his amended answer. On May 5, 2025, nineteen days after
Flowers filed his answer, the State requested a continuance and Flowers consented.
The trial court found there was good cause and granted the motion to continue.
Thereafter, the final forfeiture hearing was held within the 60-day time frame, on June
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24, 2025, fifty days after the State moved for the continuance. See Rice v. State, 246
Ga. App. 414, 416(2) (541 SE2d 58) (2000) (“The 60-day period is a statutorily
prescribed time limit within which the State must either conduct a hearing or seek a
continuance.”).
[A]lthough the State failed to timely initiate forfeiture proceedings and
failed to return the property in response to [Flowers’] request, the
property was always subject to further forfeiture proceedings. Those
proceedings have now taken place, and [Flowers] has failed to show any
harm resulting from the State’s failure to timely initiate the proceedings.
To reverse, the appellant must show error and harm.
Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 171, 172 (596 SE2d 693) (2004). Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s final judgment of forfeiture.
Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Whitaker, J., concur.
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