TANYA WALKER WALLACE v. PRACTICAL LEARNING IVY LEAGUE COLLEGE PREPARATORY ACADEMY, INC. et al

FIRST DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after
the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
October 21, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1326. WALLACE v. PRACTICAL LEARNING IVY
LEAGUE COLLEGE PREPARATORY ACADEMY, INC.
et al.
MARKLE, Judge.
In 2019, while Netty Brown, the owner of a day care called Practical Learning
Ivy League College Preparatory Academy, Inc. (“Practical Learning”), was ill and
unable to run the daycare, Tanya Walker Wallace handled Practical Learning’s
operations to ensure it remained compliant with state regulations. In doing so, Wallace
collected tuition payments, which she deposited into her own account and not the
account of Practical Learning. Brown and Practical Learning (collectively, “the
plaintiffs) then sued Wallace for conversion. Following a bench trial, the court found
in favor of the plaintiffs, and awarded them $101,763.43 in compensatory damages.

Wallace now appeals, arguing that (1) Brown failed to establish the amount of
damages; (2) Wallace was not Brown’s agent; and (3) the plaintiffs failed to establish
that there was a demand for repayment. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
damages award, and remand the case for further proceedings.
On an appeal from an entry of judgment following a bench trial, we
apply a de novo standard of review to any questions of law decided by the
trial court, but will defer to any factual findings made by that court if
there is any evidence to sustain them. Nevertheless, if the trial court
makes a finding of fact which is unsupported by the record, that finding
cannot be upheld, and any judgment based upon such a finding must be
reversed.
Sanders v. TD Auto Fin., 366 Ga. App. 376, 378 (883 SE2d 53) (2023).
So viewed, the evidence at the bench trial showed Brown was the owner of
Practical Learning day care center. In 2019, she hired Wallace, who owned Early
Education Essentials(“E3”), to assist with compliance applications and state-funded
meal programs for Practical Learning. When Brown became ill, she asked Wallace to
help with Practical Learning’s day-to-day operations. Wallace instituted software
management programs Square and Brightwheel to collect tuition; she monitored the
facility to ensure regulatory compliance; and she hired staff. When the state regulatory
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agency visited Practical Learning, Wallace told them she was the interim director and,
after they found Practical Learning out of compliance, Wallace submitted an
improvement plan.
Wallace collected tuition payments through Brightwheel and Square, but she
did not deposit those funds into Practical Learning’s bank accounts; instead she
admitted that she deposited the monies into E3’s accounts. She then transferred
money from E3’s account to her personal account. Brown had not given Wallace
permission to deposit the money in E3’s accounts. According to Wallace, following
the transfers, Practical Learning’s funds were commingled with E3’s, and she could
not discern from the bank statements which deposits belonged to Practical Learning.
When Brown realized that the funds were missing from Practical Learning’s
accounts, she asked Wallace to return the money, and, in a phone call with Brown
before the trial, Wallace promised that she would turn over the remaining money in
the account to Brown immediately. Wallace, however, failed to do so. Brown and
Practical Learning then sued Wallace for conversion, seeking the return of the funds,
plus punitive damages and attorney fees.
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At the close of evidence, Wallace moved for directed verdict, which the trial
court denied, noting that Wallace conceded the tuition payments made through
Brightwheel were identifiable in the bank statements, but others, such as the ones
through Square, were not. Brown then argued that, because Wallace acted as her
agent, Brown was entitled to the full amount of the commingled funds under OCGA
§ 10-6-29. Brown submitted the monthly bank statements showing the Brightwheel
and Square deposits totaling $101,098.43. She further argued that, as the agent,
Wallace had a fiduciary duty and bore the burden to provide an accounting.
After the parties submitted post-trial briefs on the issue of agency, the trial court
found Wallace was Brown’s agent; she owed Brown a fiduciary duty; and she was
liable for the full amount of the commingled funds. Accordingly, the court entered
judgment in favor of Brown in the amount of $101,763.43, plus punitive damages and
attorney fees. Wallace now appeals.
In related arguments, Wallace contends that the verdict cannot stand because
(1) Brown bore the burden of proof as to the amount of damages; (2) Wallace was not
Brown’s agent because Brown did not control the time, manner, and method of
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Wallace’s work; and (3) there was no evidence of any repayment demand.1 We
conclude that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Wallace to
prove the amount of damages.
“To make out a prima facie case, in an action for damages for conversion of
personal property, the plaintiff must show title to the property, possession by the
defendant, demand for possession, and refusal to surrender the property, or an actual
conversion prior to the filing of the suit.” Taylor v. Powertel, 250 Ga. App. 356, 358(2)
(551 SE2d 765) (2001) (quotation marks omitted). See also OCGA §§ 51-10-1 (“The
owner of personalty is entitled to its possession. Any deprivation of such possession
is a tort for which an action lies.”); 51-10-6(a) (“Any owner of personal property shall
be authorized to bring a civil action to recover damages from any person ... who
1 Wallace does not challenge the award of punitive damages and attorney fees.
Regardless, “conversion is an intentional tort and will support an award of attorney
fees and an award of punitive damages.” Mims v. Exclusive Ass’n Mgmt., 372 Ga. App.
777, 780(2) (906 SE2d 799) (2024) (quotation marks omitted). Nor does it matter that
Brown named only Wallace as the defendant, and not E3, because Wallace controls
E3 and directed the theft of the funds that were placed in E3’s account. See Bo Phillips
Co. v. R. L. King Prop., 336 Ga. App. 705, 710(1) (783 SE2d 445) (2016) (“A LLC
member may be held individually liable if he or she personally participates or
cooperates in a tort committed by the LLC or directs it to be done.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
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commits a theft as defined in [the criminal theft statute] involving the owner’s
personal property.”).
Although generally money cannot be the subject of a conversion claim, where,
as here, “the money comes from a specific, separate account,” the plaintiff may bring
an action to recover the amount of damages. Richardson v. Hohmann, 378 Ga. App.
677, 681(2)(a) (927 SE2d 303) (2026). See also Mims v. Exclusive Ass’n Mgmt., 372 Ga.
App. 777, 779(1) (906 SE2d 799) (2024) (“An action for conversion applies to
‘specific money’ as well as personal property” (citation modified)); Unified Serv. v.
Home Ins. Co., 218 Ga. App. 85, 89(4)(c) (460 SE2d 545) (1995) (“[M]oney can be the
subject of a conversion claim as long as the allegedly converted money is specific and
identifiable”). And, it is irrelevant if the conversion was in good faith. Levenson v.
Word, 294 Ga. App. 104, 106(1) (668 SE2d 763) (2008). Tracing is a common way to
establish damages where the defendant has converted money and commingled it with
her own funds. See Adler v. Hertling, 215 Ga. App. 769, 774(3) (451 SE2d 91) (1994).
To begin, we are not persuaded that Brown failed to make a demand. Brown
testified at trial that she made a demand, and a note written by Wallace wrote in which
she agreed to return the money immediately was admitted as evidence. It was for the
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trial court to judge the credibility of the witness. Brown v. Sapp, 368 Ga. App. 61, 62
(888 SE2d 179) (2023). Under these circumstances, there is evidence to support the
trial court’s conclusion that a demand was made. See Brown, 368 Ga. App. at 62;
Sanders, 366 Ga. App. at 378.
Wallace does not actually dispute any of the remaining elements of a conversion
claim. Instead, her arguments are relevant to the amount of damages. As Wallace
conceded at trial, the Brightwheel tuition payments are identifiable in her bank
statements, and that amounted to $43,405. She argued, however, that any additional
amount of damages was speculative because she could not match the Square deposits
to tuition payments. And she contends that the trial court erred by shifting the burden
of proof to her based on its finding that Wallace was her agent.
We agree that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant. The trial court found that “[s]ince Ms. Wallace did not provide any proof
as to the source of the Square payments, she is liable to Ms. Brown for all the mingled
funds.” The court further noted that, as the agent of Brown, it was Wallace’s duty to
account for all of Brown’s funds that had been deposited into her account. Thus, the
trial court awarded damages equal to the total amount of deposits. But in a conversion
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suit involving the conversion of specific funds, the burden is on the plaintiff to show
the specific funds that were taken. Adler, 215 Ga. App. at 774(3) (evidence was
sufficient to establish damages where plaintiff traced funds through deposits and
transfers). See also Levenson, 294 Ga. App. at 106(1), n.5.
Moreover, the trial court misapplied agency principles and OCGA § 10-6-29
to the facts of this case. Under OCGA § 10-6-29, “[a]n agent, by willfully mingling his
own goods with those of his principal, shall not create a tenancy in common; but, if
incapable of separation, the whole shall belong to the principal.” Nothing in this
statute relieves the plaintiff of her burden to prove her damages in a conversion suit.
See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 332 Ga. App. 888, 891(2)(a) (775 SE2d 276)
(2015) (plaintiff bears the burden of showing the money belongs to it); Levenson, 294
Ga. App. at 106(1), n.5 (plaintiff bears burden to show specific money she is entitled
to recover); Adler, 215 Ga. App. at 774(3) (providing for recovery of commingled
funds that can be traced). See also OCGA § 10-6-27 (“A principal may follow his
money deposited by an agent in the latter’s name and recover the same wherever
found, unless the rights of innocent third persons shall have intervened.”). Thus,
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regardless of whether Wallace acted as Brown’s agent and commingled Brown’s
money with her own, the burden remained on Brown to prove the specific amount of
funds converted. Adler, 215 Ga. App. at 774(3) (“Mingling of the funds in a mixed
bank account does not destroy their identity so as to prevent their recovery in an
action for conversion as long as the funds or a portion thereof can be traced.”
(quotation marks omitted)).
Because, the trial court erred by shifting the burden of proof to Wallace, we
must vacate the damages award, and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Barnes, P. J., and Hodges, J.,
concur.
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