Florida Public Service Commission native order document 07330-2026

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
FILED 10/14/2026
DOCUMENT NO. 07330-2026
FPSC 	- COMMISSION CLERK
In re: Petition to establish rate base value of
wastewater system of Forest Utilities, 	Inc. in
Lee County, using alternative valuation
procedure, by CSWR-Florida Utility Operating
Company, LLC._
DOCKET NO. 20260083-SU
ORDER NO. PSC-2026-0357-PCO-SU
ISSUED: October 	14, 2026
ORDER DENYING CITIZENS’ EXPEDITED MOTION FOR MODIFICATION
OF THE ORDER ESTABLISHING PROCEDURE
AND
ORDER ON CITIZENS’ MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
JOSIAH COX’S DIRECT TESTIMONY, REBUTTAL TESTIMONY, AND
EXHIBITS AND DAUBERT CHALLENGE
On September 23, 2026, the Office of Public Counsel (“OPC”) filed 	its Expedited Motion
for Modification of the Order Establishing Procedure (“Motion 	to 	Modify”). 	In 	its Motion 	to
Modify, OPC, pursuant to Rule 28-102.604(4), Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), requested
the deadline for filing any Motions to Strike Testimony be moved from September 30 to October
9, 2026. On September 	25, 2026, CSWR-Florida Operating 	Utility Operating Company, LLC
(CSWR) filed a Response in Opposition to the Expedited Motion. On September 29, 2026, OPC
filed 	its Addendum 	to 	Citizens’ 	Expedited Motion 	for Modification of the Order 	Establishing
Procedure (“Addendum”). On September 30, 2026, 	1 denied the Motion to Modify.
OPC 	then 	filed 	its 	Motion To 	Strike 	Portions Of 	Josiah 	Cox’s 	Direct 	Testimony,
Rebuttal Testimony, And 	Exhibits And Daubert Challenge (“Motion 	to 	Strike”) on September
30, 2026. Pursuant 	to Rule 28-106.204(1), “[w]hen time allows, 	the 	other parties may, within 7
days 	of 	service 	of a 	written 	motion, 	file 	a 	response 	in 	opposition.” 	Given 	that 	under 	this
calculation the deadline for responses 	to the Motion 	is October 7, 2026, and that the Prehearing
Conference 	in 	this 	matter was 	also 	set 	for October 	7, 	2026, 	I 	ruled 	that any response 	to 	the
Motion 	to 	Strike 	must be 	filed by 	October 	6, 	2026, 	at 	12:00 	p.m. 	(noon). CSWR 	filed 	its
Response 	in Opposition to Office of Public Counsel’s Motion to Strike Portions of Josiah Cox’s
Direct Testimony, 	Rebuttal Testimony, 	and 	Exhibits and Daubert Challenge 	(“Response”) on
October 6, 2026. The Prehearing Conference was held on October 	7, 2026, where argument from
both parties was heard on OPC’s Motion to Strike.
Motion to Modify
Motion
OPC filed 	its Motion to Modify prior to the expiration of the deadline 	it sought to extend
pursuant to Rule 28-106.204, F.A.C. The deadline the OPC sought to extend 	is controlled by the

ORDER NO. PSC-2026-0357-PCO-SU
DOCKET NO. 20260083-SU
PAGE 2
Order Establishing Procedure in this case, Order No. PSC-2026-0242-PCO-SU (“OEP”). The
OEP states:
Motions to strike any portion of the prefiled testimony and related portions of
exhibits of any witness shall be made in writing no later than seven days prior to
the Prehearing Conference and identify with specificity the page and line numbers
of the information to be stricken. 	Motions to strike any portion of prefiled
testimony and related portions of exhibits at hearing shall be considered untimely,
absent good cause shown.
Decision
Nothing in OPC’s Motion demonstrates the necessary good cause to extend the motion to
strike deadline. The good cause pleaded by OPC is speculative and the phrase “absent good
cause shown” within the OEP already contemplates the situation by providing an opportunity for
a party to argue good cause has arisen for a motion to strike portions of prefiled testimony after
the expiration of the deadline set by the OEP, even as late as the formal evidentiary hearing.
While that may require a showing of good cause, it also affords OPC the opportunity to
adequately prepare and file a factually supported motion. Therefore, OPC’s Motion to Modify is
hereby denied.
Motion to Strike
Motion
OPC’s Motion to Strike argues that certain portions of CSWR witness Cox’s direct and
rebuttal testimony and five sponsored exhibits should be stricken from, or not admitted to, the
record. OPC argues that the Commission has previously followed Rule 1.140(f), Fla. R. Civ. P.,
when considering motions to strike, which provides that “a party may move to strike redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matters from any pleading at any time.” OPC also cites
the language from the OEP regarding motions to strike quoted above.
OPC argues:
It is uncontested that CSWR needs to introduce the three appraisal reports and the
reports authored by the engineer in order to meet the requirements under the
alternative procedure for establishing rate base value of an acquired utility system.
However, there is no carve out in section 367.0811, [F.S.] stating the Florida
Rules of Evidence in Chapter 90 of Florida Statutes do not apply.
OPC points to several provisions of Chapter 90 of the Florida Statutes, otherwise known as the
Florida Evidence Code, including Sections 90.604, 90.701, and 90.702, F.S. which OPC cites as
limitations on what Witness Cox may or may not permissibly testify to. OPC argues, relying on
Section 90.701, F.S., that “Mr. Cox is not permitted to provide inference or opinion testimony as

ORDER NO. PSC-2026-0357-PCO-SU
DOCKET NO. 20260083-SU
PAGE 3
a lay witness when it prejudices the objecting party, and those inferences or opinions require
special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.”
In addition, OPC argues that the portions of the Florida Evidence Code that deal with
hearsay, including Sections 90.801(1)(b) and 90.803(6) apply, which define hearsay and the
business record hearsay exception, respectively, and operate to preclude the admission of the
exhibits in question. OPC argues that “applying the various Sections of chapter 90, [F.S.],
CSWR has failed to lay the foundation for Josiah Cox’s testimony relating to the five exhibits as
well as for the five exhibits themselves.”
OPC’s Motion to Strike also argues the Daubert1 standard should apply “assuming
arguendo that CSWR changes their mind and calls Mr. Cox as an expert witness.” OPC argues
that “[w]hen an expert’s testimony acts as a conduit for inadmissible hearsay, the evidence is
presented to the jury without affording the opposing party an opportunity to cross-examine and
impeach the source of the hearsay.” Doctors Co. v. Dep’t of Ins., 940 So.2d 466, 470 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2006).
Response
CSWR’s 	Response 	argues 	that 	OPC’s 	reliance 	on 	the 	Florida 	Evidence 	Code 	is
misplaced, and that while Section 367.0811, F.S., does not contain any carve out for the Florida
Evidence Code, Chapter 120 does contain such a carve out, specifically, Section 120.569(2)(g),
F.S. This Section states:
Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded, but all
other evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in
the conduct of their affairs shall be admissible, whether or not such evidence
would be admissible in a trial in the courts of Florida. Any part of the evidence
may be received in written form, and all testimony of parties and witnesses shall
be made under oath.
While agreeing that the standard for granting a motion to strike is “redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous”, CSWR argues that striking prefiled testimony is strongly disfavored
and that nothing in Witness Cox’s testimony meets the standard for such an extreme measure,
CSWR points to the Prehearing Order issued in Docket 20260020-EI as support and further
argues that a motion to strike should only be granted “if the matters that are subject to the motion
are completely irrelevant and have no bearing on the decision.” See Order No. PSC-2026-0091-
PHO-EI, issued April 15, 2026, in Docket No. 20260020-EI, In Re: Petition for determination of
need for Andytown-Oasis transmission lines project in Broward and Miami-Dade Cntys., by
Florida Power & Light Co. CSWR contends that Witness Cox testifies to his personal
knowledge of CSWR’s compliance with the applicable statute, and his testimony is authenticated
with appropriate supporting exhibits. In regard to OPC’s Daubert argument, CSWR affirmed that
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

ORDER NO. PSC-2026-0357-PCO-SU
DOCKET NO. 20260083-SU
PAGE 4
it is not offering Mr. Cox as an expert witness, and therefore the Daubert standard is not
applicable as it does not apply to lay testimony.
Decision
Rule 1.140(f), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, states that a party may move to strike or
the court may strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from any pleading
at any time. Although Rule 1.140(f), Fla. R. of Civ. P., does not control in administrative
proceedings, we have used the rule as guidance when ruling on motions to strike testimony. E.g.,
Order No. PSC-99-1809-PCO-WS, issued September 20, 1999, in Docket 971220-WS, In re:
Application for transfer of Certificates Nos. 592-W and 509-S from Cypress Lakes Associates,
Ltd. to Cypress Lakes Utilities, Inc. in Polk County. A motion to strike should only be granted if
the matters that are subject to the motion are completely irrelevant and have no bearing on the
decision. See Bay Colony Office Bldg. Joint Venture v. Wachovia Mortgage Co., 342 So. 2d
1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1977). An order granting a motion to strike is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Upland Dev. Of Cent. Florida, Inc. v. Bridge, 910 So. 2d 942, 944 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005). In Parrish & Yarnell, P.A. v. Spruce River Ventures, LLC, 180 So. 3d 1198, 1200 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2015), the Second District Court of Appeal explained that:
[B]ecause a motion to strike only tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, it is
reversible error for a court to grant a motion to strike where the pleading presents
a bona fide issue of fact that may be supported by evidence. A claim should not
be stricken simply because the judge believes that its proponent will ultimately be
unable to produce sufficient evidence to support it. To the contrary, the trial court
must resolve all doubts in favor of the pleading and keep in mind that striking a
pleading is an extreme measure that is disfavored.
(internal citations omitted).
In ruling on a party’s motion to strike, there are several important statutory requirements
to consider, including that the Florida Evidence Code does not strictly apply to administrative
proceedings in Florida. Florida Industrial Power Users Group v. Graham, 209 So. 3d 1142,
1145 (Fla. 2017). 	In proceedings held under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), F.S., all parties
must be given an opportunity to respond, to present evidence and argument on all issues, and to
conduct cross-examination, and to submit rebuttal evidence. Pursuant to Section 120.569(2)(g),
F.S., irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence must be excluded, but all other
evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their
affairs shall be admissible, whether or not such evidence would be admissible in a trial in Florida
courts.
While it appears neither party disputes the testimony and exhibits do contain hearsay,
hearsay 	is 	permissible 	in 	administrative 	proceedings. 	The 	only 	limitation 	on hearsay 	in
administrative proceedings is that an agency may use it to supplement or explain other
competent, substantial evidence, and may not use hearsay alone to support a finding of fact
unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. Section 120.57(1)(c), F.S. Rule 28-

ORDER NO. PSC-2026-0357-PCO-SU
DOCKET NO. 20260083-SU
PAGE 5
106.213(3) further specifies that hearsay shall not be sufficient to support a finding unless the
evidence falls within an exception as found in Sections 90.801-805, F.S. Rule 28-106.213(3),
F.A.C. Whether circumstances exist which would allow the use of hearsay is a determination that
occurs by the agency after all the evidence has been received. Miller v. State, 96 So. 2d 644, 646
(Fla 1st DCA 2001). Thus, to exclude the hearsay at this point in time is premature. CSWR
reaffirmed Witness Cox is being offered as a fact witness and not in the role of expert engineer
or appraiser, so to the extent OPC has challenged his status as an expert arguendo, that challenge
is likewise premature. Furthermore, OPC’s concerns about what information is presented to a
jury are unfounded in the current proceeding. The Commission will give any testimony or
evidence admitted at hearing the weight it is due, including no weight at all if appropriate.
Accordingly, OPC’s Motion to Strike is hereby denied, and that the prefiled testimony and
exhibits should be considered by the full Commission which can give it the proper weight that it
is due, if any.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED by Commissioner Michael La Rosa, as Prehearing Officer, that the Office of
Public Counsel’s Expedited Motion for Modification of the Order Establishing Procedure is
hereby denied. 	It is further,
ORDERED by Commissioner Michael La Rosa, as Prehearing Officer, that the Office of
Public Counsel’s Motion To Strike Portions Of Josiah Cox’s Direct Testimony, Rebuttal
Testimony, And Exhibits And Daubert Challenge is hereby denied. 	It is further,

ORDER NO. PSC-2026-0357-PCO-SU
DOCKET NO. 20260083-SU
PAGE 6
By ORDER of Commissioner Mike La Rosa, as Prehearing Officer, this 14th day of
October, 2026.
MIKE LA ROSA
Commissioner and Prehearing Officer
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
(850) 413-6770
www.floridapsc.com
Copies furnished: 	A copy of this document is
provided to the parties of record at the time of
issuance and, if applicable, interested persons.
TPS
NOTICE OF FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Florida Public Service Commission is required by Section 120.569(1), Florida
Statutes, to notify parties of any administrative hearing or judicial review of Commission orders
that is available under Sections 120.57 or 120.68, Florida Statutes, as well as the procedures and
time limits that apply. 	This notice should not be construed to mean all requests for an
administrative hearing or judicial review will be granted or result in the relief sought.
Mediation may be available on a case-by-case basis. 	If mediation is conducted, it does
not affect a substantially interested person's right to a hearing.
Any 	party 	adversely 	affected 	by 	this 	order, 	which 	is 	preliminary, 	procedural 	or
intermediate in nature, may request: (1) reconsideration within 10 days pursuant to Rule 25-
22.0376, Florida Administrative Code; or (2) judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court, in
the case of an electric, gas or telephone utility, or the First District Court of Appeal, in the case
of a water or wastewater utility. 	A motion for reconsideration shall be filed with the Office of
Commission Clerk, in the form prescribed by Rule 25-22.0376, Florida Administrative Code.
Judicial review of a preliminary, procedural or intermediate ruling or order is available if review
of the final action will not provide an adequate remedy. Such review may be requested from the
appropriate court, as described above, pursuant to Rule 9.100, Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure.