Rich Omoruyi v. Ana Falla

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida

Opinion filed June 24, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-1866
Lower Tribunal No. 23-21802-CA-01
________________

Rich Omoruyi,
Appellant,

vs.

Ana Falla, et al.,
Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna
Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Rich Omoruyi, in proper person.

Gray Robinson, P.A., and Jack R. Reiter, and Eric M. Yesner, for
appellee Ana Falla.

Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Rich Omoruyi, appeals the trial court’s orders granting

Appellee, Ana Falla’s, motion to strike Omoruyi’s pleadings and dismissing

Omoruyi’s negligence complaint, as well as the trial court’s order denying

Omoruyi’s subsequent motion to vacate the order of dismissal. Based on

the limited record available to us, we are constrained to affirm the trial court’s

decisions and hold the trial court committed no reversible error.

Omoruyi argues that trial court violated his due process rights by

dismissing this action while discovery disputes and motions remained

pending. But Omoruyi failed to provide necessary transcripts of several

hearings and case management conferences to confirm his arguments. In

turn, we are unable to adequately review the record to determine whether

reversible error exists. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377

So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the trial proceedings, the

appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as

to conclude that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence

or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the factual context, neither can

an appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived

the law as to require reversal.”). Therefore, we are constrained to affirm.

2
Omoruyi then argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

disqualify, reflecting judicial bias. Yet, the limited record does not establish

circumstances indicating a reasonable person would anticipate not receiving

a fair trial. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cuddihee, 272 So. 3d 796,

797 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (quotation omitted) (“A legally sufficient motion [to

disqualify a trial judge] must allege facts that would place a reasonably

prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.”). At most,

we can only conclude that Omoruyi’s fear of not receiving a fair trial stems

from the trial court’s adverse rulings; that alone is not enough to disqualify a

judge. See Montes v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 403 So. 3d 392, 396

(Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (“An adverse ruling is not a legally sufficient basis to

disqualify a judge.”). Thus, we are compelled to affirm.

Affirmed.

3