K. B. H. v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

K.B.H.,

Appellant,

v.

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

Appellee.

No. 2D2025-2005

June 12, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Caroline Tesche
Arkin, Judge.

K.B.H., pro se.

Lauren P. Benson of Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, Tampa, for
Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.
GUARD, J., Concurs separately.
GUARD, Judge, Concurring separately.
I join in the result of the court. Without a transcript, we cannot
resolve the underlying factual issues advanced by K.B.H. or conclude
that the trial court misconstrued the law to an extent requiring reversal.
See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152
(Fla. 1979). Even if that did not bar review, K.B.H. failed to attend the
hearing. Therefore, she did not object to the Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Office's evidence, enter her own evidence, or advance any
argument against the extension of the risk protection order. She also did
not file any kind of response opposing the motion's extension. By failing
to do so, she failed to preserve any issue for our review. See, e.g., Aills v.
Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108-09 (Fla. 2010) (discussing proper
preservation for appellate review); Barile v. Gayheart, 80 So. 3d 1085,
1086-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (refusing to reach issues in a domestic
violence injunction appeal when party failed to preserve the issue with a
contemporaneous objection). The only document filed in the trial court
by K.B.H. after the motion for extension was a letter from a United States
Department of Veterans Affairs psychiatrist dated July 10, 2025. But
that letter appears to have been filed after the trial court held its hearing
and granted the extension. It is unclear to me whether the trial court
even saw the letter. And K.B.H. did not move for reconsideration of the
extension or seek to vacate the risk protection order raising the
psychiatrist's letter to the trial court's attention.
Section 790.401(6)(c)3, Florida Statutes (2025), allows risk
protection orders to be extended "on the basis of a motion or affidavit
stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances
since entry of the order," as the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office did

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here. That simple assertion is only sufficient to justify if the extension is
unopposed. Id. Even then, the statute requires the Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Office to "stat[e] the reason for the requested extension." Id.
The filed motion in this case only indicates that K.B.H. has "recurring
mental health issues since the date of this document." It is my view that
mental health issues alone cannot justify a risk protection order or its
extension. Based on the statute's text, it is only when a mental health
issue rises to the level that a person "poses a significant danger of
causing personal injury to himself or herself or others" that a risk
protection order can issue or be extended.
§ 790.401(3)(b). Granted, without a transcript, I do not know what was
presented to the trial court in this case. But what documents we have in
the record appear dated, not indicative of current or future violence to
anyone, and not close to the level required by the statute for an
extension. The only documents in the record from the last year appear
limited to her filing two frivolous domestic violence petitions over three
days. While those petitions indicate that she still suffered, at least over
those three days, mental health challenges, those petitions do not
indicate that she was at risk of committing violence to herself or anyone
else at the time of the extension request.
Had K.B.H. timely responded or moved to vacate and presented the
letter, it is likely in my estimation that the extension request should have
been denied by the trial court. Or at least, the trial court should have
held another hearing to receive testimony from the psychiatrist. That
expected result would be subject to the Hillsborough County Sheriff's
Office offering fresh proof that K.B.H. "poses a significant danger of
causing personal injury to . . . herself or others by having in . . . her

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custody or control, or by purchasing, possessing, or receiving, a firearm
or any ammunition." § 790.401(3)(b).
But without a transcript or preservation of any issue, I must
concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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