Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission v. Kaiser Consulting Group, LLC, Bradley

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-3228
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FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION COMMISSION,

Appellant,

v.

KAISER CONSULTING GROUP,
LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company; PATSY BRADLEY, as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Drew Kaiser, and
JOHN WILSON,

Appellees.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
John C. Cooper, Judge.

June 10, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC)
appeals a nonfinal order denying its motion for summary
judgment. In that motion, FWC argued in part that Appellees’
inverse condemnation claim was barred by sovereign immunity.
We have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(F)(iii).
As relevant here, FWC raises two grounds for reversal. 1 First,
it contends that Appellees failed to identify a compensable
property interest capable of supporting an inverse condemnation
claim. Alternatively, it contends that Appellees’ claim, despite its
label, seeks monetary damages for an alleged denial of procedural
due process. We agree with FWC on the first ground and therefore
do not reach the second.

We review de novo an order denying sovereign immunity. See
Plancher v. UCF Athletics Ass’n, Inc., 175 So. 3d 724, 725 n.3 (Fla.
2015). The State and its agencies are generally immune from suit
unless immunity has been waived or an exception applies. Fla.
Fish and Wildlife Conser. Comm’n v. Daws, 256 So. 3d 907, 912
(Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Sovereign immunity does not bar a properly
pleaded claim based on a violation of the state or federal
constitution. Id. But that exception applies only when the plaintiff
pleads a legally sufficient constitutional claim. Id. at 915.

Appellees’ amended complaint contains a single count styled
as inverse condemnation. In that count, Appellees seek
compensation for what they characterize as an unconstitutional
taking arising from FWC’s suspension or revocation of Authorized
Gopher Tortoise Agent permits issued to Drew Kaiser and John
Wilson—permits that FWC later reinstated. When the
government effectively takes private property without formally
exercising its eminent domain power, the claim is one for inverse
condemnation. See Pembroke Ctr., LLC v. State, Dep’t of Transp.,
64 So. 3d 737, 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

A legally sufficient takings claim, however, requires the
plaintiff to identify a compensable property interest. See Bojorquez
v. State, 411 So. 3d 404, 408 (Fla. 2025). In determining whether a
government-issued authorization is compensable property, courts
look beyond labels to the source and terms of the asserted right,

1 FWC’s other arguments do not pertain to sovereign
immunity and therefore fall outside the scope of this Court’s
review. See Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. City of Coral Springs, 187
So. 3d 287, 288 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

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including the rights conferred on the holder and the government’s
retained control over the continued existence of those rights. Id. at
409–10; see also Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d
1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (considering transferability,
exclusivity, and the government’s retained authority to revoke,
suspend, or modify fishery permits in determining whether the
permits were compensable property); Conti v. United States, 291
F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (considering the absence of
traditional indicia of property, including transferability and
exclusionary rights, and the government’s retained authority to
alter, suspend, or revoke the permit).

Measured against that framework, the permits here do not
bear the hallmarks of compensable property. They allowed
specified gopher-tortoise survey and relocation activities under
FWC’s regulatory scheme. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-
27.003(2)(f)5. They were nontransferable; did not confer exclusive
rights; were subject to applicable statutes, rules, guidelines,
applications, assurances, and permit conditions; and were
expressly subject to FWC’s authority to suspend, revoke, or decline
renewal for just cause. Taken together, those circumstances show
that the permits did not confer a compensable property interest
sufficient to support Appellees’ inverse condemnation claim. 2

Because Appellees failed to establish a legally sufficient
takings claim, the constitutional-claim exception to sovereign
immunity does not apply. The trial court therefore erred in
denying FWC’s motion for final summary judgment. We reverse
and remand with directions to enter summary judgment in favor
of FWC on Appellees’ inverse condemnation claim.

2 Under the circumstances of this case, we need not decide

whether Appellees have a protected property interest for purposes
of a due process claim. Cf. Tampa-Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway
Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994) (“[T]he
analysis under due process is different from the analysis under
just compensation.”); Gulf Coast Transp., Inc. v. Hillsborough
Cnty., 352 So. 3d 368, 381 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (explaining that
“property” is construed differently for purposes of a due process
claim than it is for a takings claim).

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REVERSED and REMANDED.

RAY, WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Rhonda E. Parnell, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission, Tallahassee, and Robert Jacob
Sniffen and Kristen Candice Diot of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Kenneth G. Oertel of Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellees.

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