Gary Yelvington, Individually, and as Co-Trustee of the Conrad Yelvington Marital Trust for the Benefit of Margaret Yelvington, as Co-Trustee of the Margaret Yelvington Revocable Trust, as Amended and Restated in 2014, and as Sole Trustee and Beneficiary of the Yelvington Trust for the Benefit of Gary Yelvington v. Darlene Yelvington, Individually, and as Co-Trustee, of the Conrad Yelvington Marital Trust for the Benefit of Margaret Yelvington and the Margaret Yelvington Revocable Trust

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case Nos. 5D2024-2189
5D2025-0048
LT Case No. 2021-30522-CICI
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DARLENE YELVINGTON,
Individually, and as Co-Trustee,
of the Conrad Yelvington
Marital Trust for the Benefit of
Margaret Yelvington and the
Margaret Yelvington Revocable
Trust, as Amended and Restated
in 2014, and Contingent and/or
Residuary Beneficiaries Susan
Yelvington, Jourdan Yelvington,
and Chadd Collins,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

GARY YELVINGTON, Individually,
and as Co-Trustee of the Conrad
Yelvington Marital Trust for the
Benefit of Margaret Yelvington,
as Co-Trustee of the Margaret
Yelvington Revocable Trust, as
Amended and Restated in 2014,
and as Sole Trustee and
Beneficiary of the Yelvington
Trust for the Benefit of Gary
Yelvington,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
_______________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Dennis P. Craig, Judge.

Timothy William Sobczak, of Dean, Mead, Egerton, Bloodworth,
Capouano & Bozarth, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

George Edward McArdle, Jr., of McArdle Franco PLLC, Miami,
and Robert Clayton Roesch, of Shuffield, Lowman & Wilson, P.A.,
Orlando, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

June 5, 2026

PER CURIAM.

This case involves a dispute between a brother and sister over
the disposition of assets in trusts established for their benefit by
their parents. The trial court entered a series of orders culminating
in a final order distributing trust assets. Both siblings have
appealed; we affirm.

The sister’s primary argument on appeal is that the language
of the trust did not permit the trial court to give her brother a 51%
interest, and her a 49% interest, in a business known as Yelvington
Jet Aviation, which the brother operates. A perfect 50% division of
each trust asset is not required, however. Instead, the language of
the trust requires that each sibling’s trust overall receives an equal
share, i.e., “Fifty percent (50%),” of trust assets. The trust also
provides discretion for distribution of an individual asset to one
sibling provided a corresponding monetary payment or asset is
credited to the other.*

* Section 10.4 of the trust (“Distributions”) says:

The trustee need not satisfy the value of a gift of a share
of assets, or of a withdrawal thereof pursuant to a power
by distribution of an undivided share in assets. Instead,
the value of a share to be distributed and the value of any
pecuniary gift may be partially or wholly satisfied in cash
or in kind or partly in each, and distributions in kind may
be made of entire properties or undivided shares.

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As such, the trial court was permitted to make a 51%/49%
distribution of Yelvington Jet Aviation and could do so regardless
of purported reliance on what the father may have wanted.

The remaining issues in this appeal involve claims that the
final distribution contained erroneous allocations of expenses, an
unbalanced overall distribution, and a lack of specificity. The
burden of showing error in an appeal from a bench trial is a high
one: “the trial judge’s findings of fact are clothed with a
presumption of correctness on appeal, and these findings will not
be disturbed unless the appellant can demonstrate that they are
clearly erroneous.” Shah v. Patel, 419 So. 3d 646, 651 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2025) (citation omitted). Upon close review of the record and
proceedings in the trial court, no error has been shown as to any of
the remaining claims under this deferential standard of appellate
review.

AFFIRMED.

JAY, C.J, and MAKAR and KILBANE, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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