Michael Barfield v. Case Confidential

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-0720
LT Case No. 2023-CC-14367
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MICHAEL BARFIELD,

Petitioner,

v.

CASE CONFIDENTIAL,

Respondent.
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Original Proceeding on Petition to Review Sealing of Judicial
Records.

Michael Barfield, Sarasota, pro se.

Nicholas P. McNamara, of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, for
Respondent.

June 5, 2026

ON PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

Michael Barfield petitioned this court under Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.100(d) to quash the trial court’s amended
order that sealed the judicial records in a residential eviction
action filed by the landlord, Shorehouse TIC I LLC, in Duval
County Court, 1 and of which Barfield was not a party.

Citing our sister court’s decision in Barfield v. Doe, 348 So. 3d
1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), which involved this same non-party
petitioner’s efforts to unseal court records in a residential eviction
proceeding, we granted Barfield’s petition by otherwise
unelaborated order and quashed both the trial court’s amended
order that had sealed the court records from public examination
and its separate order that had denied Barfield’s motion to vacate
this order.

Barfield has timely moved for the issuance of a written
opinion. He submits that despite our court’s earlier order in this
case, the pleadings and progress docket in the underlying eviction
case remain unavailable to the public.

We grant Barfield’s motion for written opinion. While our
previous ruling quashing the trial court’s orders has not changed,
we issue the following opinion in lieu of our prior order.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution provides
that “[e]very person has the right to inspect or copy any public
record made or received in connection with the official business of
any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting
on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant
to this section or specifically made confidential by this
Constitution” and that “[t]his section specifically includes the . . .
judicial branch[] of government.”

I

To the extent that the trial court, in denying Barfield’s motion

1 Barfield also filed a motion with the trial court to vacate its

order determining the confidentiality of the court records, which
the trial court denied.

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to unseal the subject court record, found that Barfield, as a non-
party, lacked standing to enforce this constitutional right, we
disagree. See Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d
113, 118 (Fla. 1988) (addressing the respondent’s motion to
intervene and to set aside a closure order in a dissolution of
marriage litigation and unequivocally providing that “both the
public and news media shall have standing to challenge any
closure order”); accord BDO Seidman, LLP v. Banco Espirito Santo
Int’l, Ltd., 201 So. 3d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (quoting Barron).

To accept Respondent’s argument that Barfield, a Florida
citizen and member of the public, lacked standing to challenge the
subject closure order would seemingly negate the public’s above-
described constitutional right of inspection. Otherwise, litigants
could, by agreement or stipulation as was done here, cause all
judicial records in a case to be closed. See Friend v. Friend, 866
So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (recognizing that the denial of
access to court records “may not be based solely upon the wishes of
the parties to the litigation”).

II
To be clear, while there is a presumption that court files are
open to the public, a trial court does possess the power and
authority to close or seal a court file. Not every record in a court
file is necessarily open to public view. Florida Rule of General
Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(1)–(10), which
implemented the aforementioned constitutional right to inspect
public records, 2 enumerates ten categories of records of the judicial
branch that are deemed confidential and thus shielded from the
public’s view. Pertinent to the present case is Rule 2.420(c)(9),
which makes:

(9) Any court record determined to be confidential in case
decision or court rule on the grounds that:

(A) confidentiality is required to:

2 See In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Jud. Admin. 2.420—Sealing

of Court Recs. & Dockets, 954 So. 2d 16, 21 (Fla. 2007).

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(i) prevent a serious and imminent threat to the
fair, impartial, and orderly administration of
justice;

(ii) protect trade secrets;

(iii) protect a compelling governmental interest;

(iv) obtain evidence to determine legal issues in a
case;

(v) avoid substantial injury to innocent third
parties;

(vi) avoid substantial injury to a party by
disclosure of matters protected by a common law
or privacy right not generally inherent in the
specific type of proceeding sought to be closed;

(vii) comply with established public policy set
forth in the Florida or United States Constitution
or statutes or Florida rules or case law.

Fla. R. Gen. P. & Jud. Admin. 2.420(c)(9)(A)(i)–(vii).

The trial court here sealed the entire court file under
subsections (c)(9)(A)(i) and (vi) of this rule. It related in its order
that the landlord had sued to evict the tenant for alleged
nonpayment of rent, to which the tenant filed a response that,
among other things, asserted that the rent had been paid in full.
Shortly thereafter, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement whereby the landlord’s suit would be dismissed with
prejudice and the tenant would be considered to have “an account
credit surplus.”

The trial court, with the landlord’s consent, thereafter
granted the tenant’s motion to seal the entire court file. The court
explained that under Rule 2.420(c)(9)(A)(i), closure was required
for the fair, impartial, and orderly administration of justice and
that it was also necessary under subsection (c)(9)(A)(vi) to prevent
a substantial risk of injury to the tenant. The court’s expressed
concern was that without the closure of the court file, any third

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person, without first verifying that the rent was not delinquent
and the lease was not in default, could obtain and then
misconstrue data from this court file and thereafter use potentially
inaccurate information in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner
adverse to the tenant.

III

A similar argument was addressed by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Barfield v. Doe, supra. In that case, the
litigants in a county court eviction proceeding sought to shield the
entire court file from public disclosure. 348 So. 3d at 1157. The
parties agreed that the landlord had filed the eviction suit despite
having previously agreed not to and after having received the
rental payments before the action was filed. Id. They further
asserted that under these circumstances, public disclosure of the
court records was potentially defamatory to the tenants and would
affect their creditworthiness. Id. Barfield, who, like here, was not
a party to the eviction action, sought to quash the trial court’s
amended order determining the confidentiality of the court
records, which the trial court denied. Id.

IV

Barfield then petitioned the Fourth District Court
requesting that it quash the trial court’s amended order. Id. The
Fourth District Court granted Barfield’s petition, explaining that
while Rule 2.420(c)(9)(A)(vi) allows a court to shield court records
from the public when confidentiality is required to “avoid
substantial injury to a party by disclosure of matters protected by
common law or privacy right not generally inherent in the specific
type of proceeding sought to be closed,” the names of the litigants
in the eviction proceeding were matters inherent to the civil
proceeding. Id. The court reasoned that, in such circumstances,
“litigants cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to matters that are inherent to their civil proceedings.” Id.
(quoting Carnegie v. Tedder, 698 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 2d DCA
1997)).

We agree with our sister court’s analysis and holding and
find it applicable here. We also find no record support that under
Rule 2.420(c)(9)(A)(i) there would be a serious and imminent

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threat to the fair, impartial, and orderly administration of justice
absent closure of the court record.

Accordingly, we quash the trial court’s orders.

PETITION GRANTED; ORDERS QUASHED.

LAMBERT, HARRIS, and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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