William E. Wells, III v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2021-1001
____________

WILLIAM E. WELLS III,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

April 13, 2023

GROSSHANS, J.

William E. Wells III appeals his judgment of conviction of first-

degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction.

See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons given below,

we affirm in all respects.

BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2019, Wells, aided by Leo Boatman, murdered

fellow prison inmate, William Chapman. At the time, Wells was
serving seven consecutive life sentences—six for first-degree murder

and one for attempted premeditated murder. 1

At least a month before Chapman’s death, Wells and Boatman

began planning the murder. As Wells would later explain, he hoped

to receive the death penalty and be placed on death row where he

anticipated better living conditions.

With this goal in mind, Wells decided to target Chapman,

believing that Chapman intended to recruit him for sexual favors.

In preparation for the murder, Wells and Boatman collected two

ten-inch-long metal shanks, sharpened them over the course of

several days, and ultimately hid them near the dayroom. Wells also

crafted ligatures from his bed sheet and pillowcase to be used

during the attack.

On the day of the murder, Wells packed his belongings so that

authorities could easily collect them. Later, Wells, Boatman,

1. In 2003, Wells murdered his wife, her father, her brother,
and two other males in Mayport, Florida. After killing them, Wells
remained in his trailer for two weeks with the “rotting bodies.” He
pled guilty to these murders and received life sentences. Eight
years later, while serving those sentences (and another life sentence
for attempted murder), Wells brutally murdered a fellow inmate
using a shank and ligatures. A jury found him guilty of first-degree
murder but ultimately recommended a life sentence.
-2-
Chapman, and several other inmates were ushered into the

dayroom, which was equipped with a surveillance camera. About

ten minutes before the attack, Boatman left the dayroom to walk to

the bathroom and, upon his return, Wells did the same. Once

Wells returned, Boatman approached Chapman, spoke to him, and

the two walked to an area of the room in the camera’s blind spot.

Wells removed a ligature—which had been concealed in his

clothing—and walked toward them.

Upon joining Boatman and Chapman, Wells wrapped the

ligature around Chapman’s neck and began choking him. As

Chapman struggled to break free, Boatman started punching him.

Anticipating that corrections officers would soon try to intervene,

Boatman moved in front of the only door to the dayroom, blocked it

with his foot, and brandished the two shanks. When corrections

officers pushed on the door, Boatman shouted that he would kill

them if they entered.

While Boatman was blocking the door, Wells dragged

Chapman over to him. Struggling to breathe, Chapman pled for his

life, begging: “Please don’t kill me.” Disregarding Chapman’s pleas,

Wells and Boatman continued the assault.
-3-
Boatman began stabbing Chapman in the eyes with the

shanks. Eventually, the responding corrections officers pushed the

door open enough to deploy a chemical agent into the dayroom.

But the chemical agent had no effect on Wells or Boatman. At some

point when the door was slightly ajar, Chapman managed to get his

fingers in the gap between the door and the frame. But even with

Chapman’s efforts, the officers could not open the door.

As the brutal attack continued, Boatman handed Wells a

shank, which Wells used to forcefully stab Chapman in his back.

By this time, Chapman was offering no resistance and lying face

down on the floor. Sensing that Chapman was still breathing, Wells

urged Boatman to keep stabbing him. To buy them more time and

prevent corrections officers from entering the dayroom, Wells tied

the door handle to the nearest bench—which was bolted to the

floor. With the door secured in this way, Wells and Boatman

continued beating and stabbing Chapman without intervention.

Toward the end of the twelve-minute assault, Boatman plunged a

shank into Chapman’s neck and stomped on it, doing so with such

force that the shank went completely through Chapman’s neck and

bent under the pressure of being driven into the floor.
-4-
Eventually, Wells and Boatman ceased their attack and

allowed a tactical team and corrections officers to enter the room.

The officers apprehended Wells and Boatman and removed

Chapman, still breathing, from the dayroom. Despite receiving

medical care, Chapman died shortly after the attack due to the

extensive injuries inflicted by Wells and Boatman.

Meanwhile, shortly after law enforcement apprehended Wells,

he made several unsolicited statements. Referring to his “last

murder,” Wells criticized the jury for sparing his life by “not giving

[him] the death sentence.” Wells also joked about using Chapman’s

body “as a doorstop” to prevent the officers from intervening. While

still discussing the attack, Wells bragged about how deep he

inserted the shank into Chapman’s body. Wells also acknowledged

that he had, in fact, made plans to murder Chapman.

The day after the murder, law enforcement agents conducted a

recorded interview of Wells. After the agents advised Wells of his

Miranda 2 rights, he made multiple incriminating statements—giving

2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

-5-
the reasons he selected the victim and disclosing his plans and

preparations for carrying out the murder.

Ultimately, the State indicted Wells on charges of premeditated

first-degree murder and possession of a weapon by a state prisoner.

Based on the charge of first-degree murder, the State filed a notice

of intent to seek the death penalty.

The day after the indictment, Wells filed a motion requesting

to represent himself and another motion asking to waive a penalty-

phase jury. Before ruling on these motions, the trial court

appointed Dr. Harry Krop to perform a competency evaluation on

Wells. After conducting that evaluation, Dr. Krop found that Wells

was competent to stand trial.

At the arraignment, the court addressed Wells’s motion to

represent himself. The court underscored the benefits of using

appointed counsel over proceeding pro se and also noted pitfalls

associated with self-representation. Wells acknowledged the court’s

concerns but maintained that he wished to represent himself. The

court then conducted a thorough Faretta 3 inquiry, and upon

3. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
-6-
completion, granted Wells’s motion for self-representation. At that

same hearing, the court appointed regional counsel to function as

Wells’s standby counsel and accepted his plea to the weapons

possession charge.

Wells, however, soon changed his mind and requested

representation. The court granted that request. Then, two months

later, Wells again decided to proceed pro se and requested that

regional counsel be discharged. Following another Faretta inquiry,

the court granted Wells’s request.

After the Faretta inquiry, Wells informed the court that he

wanted to plead guilty to the first-degree murder charge. After a

lengthy colloquy with Wells and the prosecutor’s presentation of a

factual basis, the court accepted the guilty plea, finding it to be

knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given. Then, as he

had done before, Wells expressed his intent to waive a penalty-

phase jury and not present mitigating evidence during the bench

penalty phase. Notwithstanding Wells’s decision on mitigation, the

court ordered that the mitigating evidence from Wells’s prior capital

case be made available. According to the court, its intent was to

-7-
review and take notice of that mitigating evidence during the

forthcoming penalty phase.

Several months later, while Wells was still representing

himself, standby counsel moved to continue. Standby counsel

asserted that they had not had an opportunity to undertake the

necessary preparations should they be reappointed. Standby

counsel did not claim that the motion was filed at Wells’s direction

or with his consent. The court denied the motion without prejudice.

Ultimately, the penalty phase began nine months after the

charges were filed. At the outset, Wells reiterated that he did not

want counsel appointed or a jury impaneled. And he again stated

that he would not present any mitigating evidence.

During the State’s case, it introduced several exhibits,

including: (1) surveillance videos of Chapman’s murder, (2) a video

of Wells’s initial comments, (3) a recording of Wells’s interview with

law enforcement agents, and (4) the medical examiner’s report

showing Chapman’s manner and cause of death. 4

4. Consistent with Wells’s stipulation, the court took judicial
notice of the judgments and sentences for Wells’s six prior murders.
-8-
The State also called four witnesses. One witness, a special

agent, testified about interviewing Wells after the murder. The

agent explained that, after receiving the Miranda warning, Wells

discussed his plans to commit the murder, emphasizing that

preparations were made days in advance. According to Wells, those

advanced preparations showed that the murder was clearly “cold,

calculated, and premeditated.” For its final witness, the State

called Dr. William Hamilton, the medical examiner who autopsied

Chapman.

Just prior to Dr. Hamilton taking the stand, Wells requested

the appointment of regional counsel. The court granted that

request. Given the sudden change of circumstances, counsel

immediately moved for a continuance. The court granted the

motion but allowed the State to proceed with Dr. Hamilton’s

examination before continuing the penalty phase. The court gave

regional counsel the option to cross-examine Dr. Hamilton that day,

but noted that counsel would be permitted to again cross-examine

the witness when the penalty phase resumed. The court also

notified regional counsel that the mitigation specialist who

-9-
investigated and prepared mitigating evidence for Wells’s prior

death-penalty case was available.

Seven months later, regional counsel moved to continue,

requesting more time to prepare. The trial court denied the request.

Five days before the penalty phase was scheduled to resume,

defense counsel filed another motion to continue, which the court

also denied.

The penalty phase ultimately resumed over eight months after

the State completed its case. At the resumed penalty phase, the

defense presented mitigating evidence over the course of three days.

In total, the defense offered eight witnesses, including four experts.

Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, a forensic psychiatrist, was the first

expert witness. Based on his review of extensive records and an

interview with Wells, Dr. Danziger opined that Wells suffered from

serious psychiatric and mental health issues, significant brain

injury, schizoaffective disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD), cognitive deficits and limitations, and multiple adverse

childhood experiences.

Dr. Heather Holmes, a clinical and forensic psychologist,

evaluated Wells in connection with the prior death-penalty case,
- 10 -
met with him twice in the instant case, and reviewed extensive

records. Dr. Holmes testified to the traumatic effects of Wells’s

childhood experiences, including an abusive alcoholic father who

gave Wells alcohol at age four, shot him in the foot as a

punishment, and forced him to have sex with a prostitute on his

thirteenth birthday. Dr. Holmes added that Wells also suffered

traumatic experiences as an adult. These adult traumatic

experiences included the death of a stepchild and a suicide attempt

following the shooting of his second wife.

Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and expert in neuroimaging and

forensic psychiatry, also testified for the defense. He reviewed

records and Wells’s neuroimaging scans. Based on his experience

and training, Dr. Wu opined that Wells’s scans showed brain

abnormalities consistent with traumatic brain injury,

schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder, which can result in difficulty

regulating impulses. Dr. Wu also noted that Wells’s worsening

condition was consistent with chronic traumatic encephalopathy

(CTE). According to Dr. Wu, Wells suffered at least nine traumatic

brain injuries that could contribute to CTE. Dr. Wu ultimately

concluded that Wells suffered from traumatic brain injury, fetal
- 11 -
alcohol spectrum disorder, childhood neglect and abuse, psychosis

or schizophrenia, mood disorder, and was at high risk for CTE.

Dr. Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist, was the final expert witness.

Dr. Kupers testified about the negative effects of solitary

confinement and close management levels, especially on the

mentally ill. He opined that it was impossible to provide adequate

mental health treatment in these conditions, and that this

accelerated the deterioration of Wells’s mental health. Dr. Kupers

further opined that, in his view, Wells was under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he murdered

Chapman, and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or conform to the requirements of law was substantially

impaired at that time.

Four lay witnesses testified to different aspects of Wells’s life.

The first witness, Johnny Hodges, was an inmate. Hodges testified

that Wells was upset with the ineffectiveness of the prison

psychiatric staff. Another witness, Gwendolyn Lockwood, a prison

therapist and Wells’s case manager, described the difficulties in

providing adequate mental health treatment in prison. Lockwood

recounted observing Wells’s mental decline leading up to the
- 12 -
murder, including hallucinations, anxiety, agitation, and

flashbacks. She reported her concerns to the medical director who,

to her knowledge, never visited Wells. The other two witnesses

described Wells as a likeable individual, who had been devastated

by personal loss.

Following the penalty phase, the State and Wells filed

sentencing memoranda. In arguing for the death penalty, the State

relied on four statutory aggravating factors, contending that they

outweighed any established mitigating circumstances. For his part,

Wells asked the court to find 96 mitigators, including some

specified in Florida’s death-penalty statute, see § 921.141(7), Fla.

Stat. (2021) (listing seven specific mitigators and one catchall

provision). As for two statutory factors, Wells claimed that he

committed the murder while under an extreme emotion or mental

disturbance and that, when he murdered Chapman, his “capacity

to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.”

- 13 -
After receiving the sentencing memoranda, the court held a

consolidated Spencer5 and sentencing hearing. No additional

evidence was presented other than Wells’s own statements made

under oath. Based on the evidence presented at the penalty phase,

the court found four aggravating factors proven beyond a

reasonable doubt: Wells committed the capital felony after

previously being convicted of a felony and under the sentence of

imprisonment (great weight); Wells was previously convicted of

another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of

violence (very great weight); the murder was especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and Wells committed the

murder in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner (CCP) (great

weight).

Turning to mitigation, the trial court found that Wells failed to

prove any statutory ground. According to the court, while Wells

suffered from significant mental health and emotional issues, he did

not “reasonably establish that he was acting under the influence of

an extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed

5. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
- 14 -
the crime.” The court emphasized that Wells’s actions were

controlled and carried out deliberately to accomplish the goal of

improving his living conditions by being placed on death row. The

court further found that there was no credible evidence that Wells’s

ability to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired

or that he did not know that killing the victim was wrong; nor was

there any evidence that Wells was not thinking clearly before,

during, or immediately after the murder.

Though rejecting the statutory mitigators, the court found

several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to be supported by

the evidence: Wells experienced extreme childhood abuse, neglect,

and other traumatic events in his early adulthood (slight weight);

Wells suffered from serious mental illness, neurocognitive issues,

and was in solitary confinement or close management for thirteen

years (some weight); Wells cooperated with authorities after the

incident (slight weight); Wells took responsibility for the offense

(slight weight); Wells respected FDOC staff and the court

throughout the proceedings (some weight); Wells struggled with

substance abuse and alcoholism throughout his life (slight weight);

- 15 -
Wells’s mental health needs were neglected by FDOC (slight weight);

and Wells showed remorse for the murder (slight weight).

Ultimately, the court concluded that the aggravating

circumstances far outweighed the mitigating circumstances,

warranting a sentence of death. Wells now appeals.

ANALYSIS

Wells raises five issues for our review. At the outset, he

challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant him additional

preparation time for the penalty phase. He next argues that the

trial court abused its discretion in rejecting two statutory mitigating

circumstances. Additionally, he claims fundamental error in the

court’s failure to make certain findings in the sentencing order. He

concludes by raising two constitutional challenges to his death

sentence. And though not raised by Wells, we must also determine

whether his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

made.

Motion to Continue

After the State charged Wells with first-degree murder, he

chose to proceed pro se. He, however, changed his mind two

months later, and the trial court appointed regional counsel
- 16 -
pursuant to his request. Almost three months later, Wells again

changed course and dismissed regional counsel, noting that he did

not wish to present any mitigating evidence. At that time, the trial

court designated regional counsel to function as standby counsel.

Wells then pled guilty and proceeded pro se until the second day of

the penalty phase—just before the State completed presentation of

aggravating evidence. Stating unspecified family reasons, Wells

asked for regional counsel to again fully represent him. The court

granted that request and gave the defense a continuance. Roughly

eight months later, as the scheduled date for resuming the penalty

phase neared, regional counsel asked for a continuance on multiple

occasions. The court denied those requests. According to Wells,

the refusal to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion. We

disagree.

We review the denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of

discretion. Carr v. State, 156 So. 3d 1052, 1064 (Fla. 2015). Under

this “highly deferential” standard, In re Doe, 325 So. 3d 99, 100

(Fla. 5th DCA 2019), we will uphold a trial court’s ruling unless it

“is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d

1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247,
- 17 -
1249 (Fla. 1990)). Put differently, we will not find an abuse of

discretion unless the trial court makes a ruling which no

reasonable judge would agree with. See Kelley v. State, 974 So. 2d

1047, 1051 (Fla. 2007). Here, Wells cannot show that the trial

court’s decision—to deny a continuance before the resumption of

the penalty phase—meets this standard.

Here, counsel had more than eight months after their

reappointment to focus on the mitigation component of the penalty

phase. 6 In developing mitigating evidence, counsel did not start

from scratch. Instead, counsel had the benefit of mitigating

evidence presented in 2017 in Wells’s prior death-penalty case—

mitigating evidence that resulted in a jury recommendation of life in

prison. Also, counsel had the assistance of a mitigation specialist

who was already familiar with Wells and his background—having,

in fact, conducted the investigation which led to much of the

mitigation at the prior penalty phase. With the benefit of these

leads, counsel presented a significant amount of mitigating evidence

6. Wells does not argue that the trial court committed error by
not reopening the State’s case so that defense counsel could have
the opportunity to cross-examine all of the State’s witnesses.

- 18 -
at the penalty phase. Indeed, crediting substantial portions of that

evidence, the trial court found eight nonstatutory mitigating

circumstances. Accordingly, based on the amount of time the

defense had to prepare a mitigation case and the availability of

strong leads, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to grant an undefined additional period of

time to prepare. 7

Mitigating Evidence

Wells next argues that the trial court erred in rejecting two

statutory mitigating circumstances. Concluding that the record

supports the court’s findings as to these mitigators, we reject

Wells’s argument.

Under our case law, a trial court has the authority to reject a

mitigator outright when the State presents evidence incompatible

with it. Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 16 (Fla. 2020). For example,

we have said, “A mitigator may . . . be rejected if the testimony

7. Consistent with a finding made by the trial court, we note
that Wells’s own decisions regarding counsel adversely affected the
time regional counsel had to prepare. See McKay v. State, 504 So.
2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (recognizing defendant’s own
conduct in shortening preparation time as factor in determining
whether court abused its discretion in denying continuance).
- 19 -
supporting it is not substantiated by the actions of the defendant,

or if the testimony supporting it conflicts with other

evidence.” Bright v. State, 299 So. 3d 985, 1005 (Fla. 2020)

(alteration in original) (quoting Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 445

(Fla. 2012)). This principle applies even when the defense presents

expert evidence supporting a mitigator—and even if the State does

not counter that evidence with an expert of its own. Id. at 1005.

Here, competent, substantial evidence supports the court’s

rejection of the extreme-disturbance and substantial-impairment

mitigators. As to the extreme-disturbance mitigator, the

surveillance video shows Wells engaging in calm, deliberate conduct

during the vicious attack while methodically carrying out his plans

to kill Chapman. In particular, during the attack, Wells gave

specific and lucid instructions to his accomplice, casually retrieved

his eyeglasses after temporarily losing them, and secured the

dayroom door with no indication of panic. Put simply, this evidence

does not substantiate Wells’s claim that he was acting under

extreme duress during the attack.

As for the other statutory mitigator, Wells’s conduct during

and after the murder reveals that he was aware of the criminal
- 20 -
nature of his conduct. See Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040,

1047 (Fla. 2019) (upholding rejection of substantial-impairment

mitigator when defendant’s purposeful actions during and after

crime revealed awareness of criminality of conduct). During the

attack, Wells ignored the instruction of corrections officers to stop

the attack, and he prevented them from entering the dayroom until

he felt confident that Chapman was dead. Then, after the murder,

Wells admitted that the attack was “cold, calculated and

premeditated,” explaining that he carried out the attack to achieve

his goal of being placed on death row. Thus, as demonstrated by

his conduct and statements, Wells knew that killing Chapman had

specific legal consequences in the criminal context and the record

contains competent, substantial evidence inconsistent with the

substantial-impairment mitigator.

However, even if the trial court had committed error in

rejecting the statutory mitigators, that error would be harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt under circumstances of this case. The

murder of Chapman was highly aggravated. Indeed, three of the

“qualitatively weightiest aggravators in Florida’s capital sentencing

scheme”—namely the CCP, HAC, and prior-violent-felony
- 21 -
aggravating factors—applied here. See Allen v. State, 322 So. 3d

589, 602 (Fla. 2021). What is more, the trial court gave each

aggravating factor great or very great weight, while assigning the

nonstatutory mitigating circumstances only slight or some weight.

Thus, based on these facts, Wells would not be entitled to a reversal

even if the court had erred in rejecting the extreme-disturbance and

substantial-impairment mitigators. See Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d

45, 56 (Fla. 2020).

In sum, Wells is not entitled to relief on this issue either.

Failure to Make Findings

Wells also argues that the trial court committed fundamental

error in failing to expressly find beyond a reasonable doubt that

sufficient aggravating circumstances warranted the death penalty

and that such circumstances outweighed the mitigating

circumstances. This argument is meritless.

Wells’s argument depends on the premise that the sufficiency

and weighing determinations called for by section 921.141, Florida

Statutes (2021), are elements of the crime of capital murder and, as

a result, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We have rejected

that premise time and again, consistently holding instead that
- 22 -
neither the sufficiency nor weighing determination is subject to the

reasonable-doubt standard. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d

872, 885-86 (Fla. 2019); State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 502-03 (Fla.

2020); Deviney v. State, 322 So. 3d 563, 572 (Fla. 2021); Bell v.

State, 336 So. 3d 211, 217-18 (Fla. 2022). Though Wells argues

that our case law is wrong, he has provided us with no substantial

reason to question our prior holdings. See McKenzie v. State, 333

So. 3d 1098, 1105-06 (Fla. 2022) (declining to revisit Poole);

Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1248 (Fla. 2021) (finding that

arguments comparable to Wells’s did not present compelling reason

to recede from Poole).

As part of his failure-to-make-findings argument, Wells

criticizes the sentencing order for not containing express findings as

to the sufficiency of the four aggravating factors. Though the trial

court did not specifically say that these four factors were “sufficient

. . . to warrant the death penalty,” see § 921.141(4), the sentencing

order did, in fact, contain findings that all four aggravating factors

were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Poole, 297 So. 3d at

502 (noting that sufficiency for purposes of section 921.141 means

“one or more” aggravating factors; rejecting argument that
- 23 -
sufficiency demands qualitative analysis). But even if sufficiency in

section 921.141(4) has a qualitative component, the court’s finding

that the four aggravating factors “far outweigh[ed]” the mitigating

circumstances—coupled with the particular aggravators found and

the weight individually assigned to them—necessarily implied that

the court found the aggravating circumstances to be sufficient in a

qualitative sense to warrant the death penalty in this case. Thus,

assuming there was error due to the absence of a separate

sufficiency finding, that error did not rise to the level of

fundamental error. See Smith v. State, 320 So. 3d 20, 28 (Fla.

2021) (“In capital cases, a fundamental error is one that is ‘so

significant that the sentence of death “could not have been obtained

without the assistance of the alleged error.” ’ ” (quoting Poole v.

State, 151 So. 3d 402, 415 (Fla. 2014))).

Since Wells’s arguments are inconsistent with our case law

and otherwise lack merit, they do not support relief.

Facial Overbreadth Challenge

As the first constitutional challenge to his death sentence,

Wells argues that Florida’s death-penalty statute is facially

unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. This constitutional
- 24 -
infirmity, Wells contends, stems from the sheer number of

aggravating factors in the statute combined with our holding in

Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 552 (Fla. 2020) (finding

comparative proportionality incompatible with conformity clause in

article I, section 17 of Florida’s constitution). We disagree with

Wells’s argument.

We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the death-

penalty statute violates the Eighth Amendment because it fails to

sufficiently narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death

penalty. See Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 961 (Fla. 2007);

Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2006). We have done so

recently—even with the statute in its current form. See Joseph v.

State, 336 So. 3d 218, 227 n.5 (Fla. 2022); Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d

695, 730 (Fla. 2021); Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 15-16 (Fla.

2020); Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 214 (Fla. 2020); cf. Ch. 2019-

167, § 129, Laws of Fla. (most recent legislation involving death-

penalty statute; merely reenacting subsection (9) of statute); Ch.

2010-120, § 1, Laws of Fla. (most recent change to aggravating

factors; adding a sixteenth factor).

- 25 -
Lawrence’s abandonment of comparative proportionality

review does not alter our analysis. In receding from case law to the

contrary, Lawrence recognized that comparative proportionality

review was not an integral component of the Eighth Amendment.

308 So. 3d at 548-50, 552. Accordingly, our abandonment of this

type of review does not bolster Wells’s Eighth Amendment

challenge. And Wells provides no pre- or post-Lawrence case law

undermining that conclusion.

For the reasons above, Wells has failed to establish a

constitutional defect with Florida’s death-penalty statute.

Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Extension of Atkins v. Virginia to the Mentally Ill

Wells also argues that he is exempt from the death penalty

because he has a serious mental illness. According to him, Atkins

v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that federal constitution

prohibits execution of individuals who are intellectually disabled),

should be extended to categorically bar imposition of the death

penalty on those who suffer from serious mental illness. Wells’s

argument lacks merit.

- 26 -
We have consistently refused to extend Atkins. See Lawrence

v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007); Schoenwetter v. State,

46 So. 3d 535, 562-63 (Fla. 2010); Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d

176, 207 (Fla. 2013); Dillbeck v. State, No. SC23-190, 2023 WL

2027567, at *4 (Fla. Feb. 16, 2023) (citing Gordon v. State, 350 So.

3d 25, 37 (Fla. 2022)). We are not alone in this respect. State and

federal courts alike have uniformly rejected arguments similar to

the one Wells now advances. See Lewis v. State, 620 S.E.2d 778,

786 (Ga. 2005); State v. Dunlap, 313 P.3d 1, 36 (Idaho 2013);

Matheney v. State, 833 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ind. 2005); State v.

Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 447-48 (Kan. 2016); Dunlap v. Com., 435

S.W.3d 537, 616 (Ky. 2013); State v. Mammone, 13 N.E.3d 1051,

1089-90 (Ohio 2014); Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010); Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir.

2014); Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 455 (6th Cir. 2012);

Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1370 (11th Cir. 2009); United

States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 406 (C.A.A.F. 2015).

Based on the foregoing authority, we reject Wells’s second

constitutional challenge.

- 27 -
Voluntariness of Plea

In death-penalty cases, we have “a mandatory obligation to

independently review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying [a

first-degree murder] conviction, and the ‘customary review’

evaluates whether the conviction is supported by competent,

substantial evidence.” Davidson, 323 So. 3d at 1250 (alteration in

original) (quoting Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 180

(Fla. 2020)). But when, as here, a defendant’s guilty plea results in

the death-eligible conviction, we instead review the record to

determine whether the defendant made that plea knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. Doty v. State, 170 So. 3d 731, 738

(Fla. 2015). In carrying out this review, we “scrutinize the plea to

ensure that the defendant [1] was made aware of the consequences

of his plea, [2] was apprised of the constitutional rights he was

waiving, and [3] pled guilty voluntarily.” Fletcher v. State, 343 So.

3d 55, 60 (Fla. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Ocha v. State,

826 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 2002)).

In this case, the trial court conducted an extensive plea

colloquy. During that colloquy, the court apprised Wells of the

constitutional rights he would forfeit based on the guilty plea. The
- 28 -
court also accurately informed Wells of the two potential sentencing

outcomes resulting from such a plea—life in prison or the death

penalty. The court also assured itself that Wells was in satisfactory

physical and mental health to make this decision. And for his part,

Wells confirmed that he was making the plea freely, knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily—with a full understanding of the

significance of the guilty plea and the rights he was giving up.

Finally, the evidence of Wells’s guilt was overwhelming, including

video evidence of the brutal murder, his unsolicited incriminating

statements on the day of the murder, and his post-Miranda

confession.

Thus, having independently reviewed the record, we conclude

that Wells’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

given.

CONCLUSION

Based on our analysis above, we affirm Wells’s first-degree

murder conviction and sentence of death.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY and COURIEL, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
FRANCIS, J., did not participate.
- 29 -
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v.

State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned

this Court’s decades-long practice of comparative proportionality

review in direct appeal cases, I can only concur in the result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bradford County,
Mark W. Moseley, Judge
Case No. 042019CF000706CFAXMX

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Janine D. Robinson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

- 30 -