Michael L. King v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2026-0336
____________

MICHAEL L. KING,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

March 10, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Michael L. King was convicted and sentenced to death for the

2008 murder of Denise Amber Lee. On February 13, 2026,

Governor DeSantis issued a death warrant scheduling King’s

execution for March 17, 2026. King unsuccessfully sought

successive postconviction relief in the circuit court and now

appeals. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.;

see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla.

1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction over

sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types
of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm. We also deny King’s motion for a stay of

execution.

I

In the early afternoon of January 17, 2008, King kidnapped

Denise Amber Lee from her home where she was watching her two

children, an infant and a toddler. King took Mrs. Lee to his house,

bound her with duct tape, and raped and sodomized her. The

ordeal lasted over four hours.

Next, King forced Mrs. Lee back into his car. He took her with

him to secure supplies to dispose of her body. At some point during

the drive, Mrs. Lee, still alive and bound in the backseat of King’s

car, obtained King’s phone and called 911. On the 911 recording,

Mrs. Lee is heard crying, begging King to free her so that she could

see her husband and children again. Jane Kowalski, who would

later identify King at trial, heard screaming coming from a green

Camaro that was in the traffic lane beside her, and called 911.

King drove Mrs. Lee to an abandoned construction site, shot her in

the head, and buried her.

With a description of the green Camaro from Kowalski, officers

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pulled King over later that evening and took him into custody. Mrs.

Lee’s blood, hair, fingerprints, and ring were all recovered from the

Camaro. Inside King’s home, officers found duct tape with Mrs.

Lee’s hair attached to it. Two days after the crime, Mrs. Lee’s body

was recovered. At trial, the medical examiner would testify that she

died from a single gunshot wound to the head. The shorts Mrs. Lee

was wearing tested positive for sperm, which matched King’s DNA

profile to the exclusion of 3.5 trillion other individuals.

Following a jury trial, King was convicted of first-degree

murder, involuntary sexual battery, and kidnapping. King v. State,

89 So. 3d 209, 219 (Fla. 2012). After the penalty phase, the jury

recommended by a vote of 12-0 that he be sentenced to death. The

trial court agreed and sentenced King to death.

In pronouncing King’s sentence, the trial court determined

that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence

of four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) the murder was cold,

calculated, and premeditated; (3) the murder was committed for the

purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; and (4) the murder was

committed while King was engaged in the commission of a sexual

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battery or kidnapping. Id. at 221. The trial court further

determined that King had established the existence of two statutory

mitigating circumstances: (1) King’s capacity to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of the law was substantially impaired; and (2) his age

at the time of the offense (thirty-six years old). Id. The trial court

also found thirteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Id. 1

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed King’s conviction and

death sentence. Id. at 232. 2 In addition to rejecting King’s specific

1. The thirteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were:
(1) a head injury in 1978; (2) a PET scan with abnormal findings in
the frontal lobe, demonstrating a brain injury; (3) an IQ in the
borderline range between low-average and mentally retarded; (4)
King had repeated grades in school and had been placed in special
education classes; (5) despondency and depression in attempting to
address King’s bankruptcy, unemployment, a failed marriage, an
impending foreclosure on his home, and breaking up with his
girlfriend; (6) a history of nonviolence; (7) King was a cooperative
inmate; (8) he never abused drugs or alcohol; (9) he had a thirteen-
year-old son whom he helped raise and for whom he cares; (10) he
was a good father; (11) he was a devoted boyfriend; (12) he was a
good worker; and (13) he had a close relationship with family and
friends. Id. at 221-22.

2. King raised the following claims on direct appeal: (1) the
trial court improperly limited the cross-examination of State witness
Robert Salvador, who went to a firing range with King before the
abduction; (2) during guilt-phase closing statements, the
prosecution improperly shifted the burden of proof to King to

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claims of error, we also concluded that the record clearly supported

the convictions for the kidnapping, sexual battery, and first-degree

murder of Mrs. Lee. Id. The convictions and sentences became

final on October 15, 2012, when the United States Supreme Court

denied King’s petition for writ of certiorari. King v. Florida, 568 U.S.

964 (2012).

King then unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in both

state and federal court. In September 2013, King filed a motion to

vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.851. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit

court denied relief on all claims. We affirmed. King v. State, 211

So. 3d 866, 870 (Fla. 2017). 3 King was also one of the death row

demonstrate that he had not shot Mrs. Lee; (3) nine-millimeter shell
casings recovered from the firing range should not have been
admitted into evidence; (4) the trial court erred in declining to
conduct a hearing on the admissibility of tool-mark identification of
fired shell casings, where the weapon that fired the casings was not
available; and (5) the trial court erroneously accepted the State’s
explanation for exercising a peremptory strike to remove a juror. Id.
at 222-31.

3. This Court denied relief on the following claims from King’s
postconviction motion: (1) counsel rendered ineffective assistance
during the penalty phase because counsel failed to investigate
King’s possible exposure to toxic substances during his childhood
and when he worked as a plumber as an adult; (2) trial counsel

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petitioners in Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014), who

sought to have portions of the Timely Justice Act of 2013 declared

unconstitutional. This Court denied relief. Id. at 555. In April

2017, King sought habeas relief in federal court. See King v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corr., 793 F. App’x 834, 837 (11th Cir. 2019). The district

court denied habeas relief, and following oral argument, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at

836. 4 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review.

King v. Inch, 141 S. Ct. 303 (2020).

rendered ineffective assistance because counsel failed to preserve
an alleged error under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
during jury selection; (3) the lethal injection protocol employed by
Florida is unconstitutional; (4) section 945.10, Florida Statutes
(2014), which exempts from disclosure the identity of those
individuals who participate in the lethal injection procedure, is
unconstitutional; (5) King may be incompetent by the time he is
scheduled for execution. King, 211 So. 3d at 880-89.
Finally, during the pendency of King’s postconviction appeal,
the United States Supreme Court issued Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S.
92 (2016). While agreeing that Hurst was applicable, in light of the
unanimous jury recommendation as well as the overwhelming and
uncontroverted evidence of the four aggravating circumstances and
the comparatively weaker mitigating evidence, we concluded that
“[i]f any case were to present us with a harmless Hurst error, this is
it.” King, 211 So. 3d at 893.

4. King raised, and the Eleventh Circuit rejected, the following
three claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
preserve a challenge to a peremptory strike under Batson and J.E.B.

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Governor DeSantis signed King’s death warrant on February

13, 2026, scheduling the execution for March 17, 2026. On

February 17, 2026, the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial

Circuit held a case management conference, where King was

represented by counsel. The same day, King directed a records

demand to the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(h) and (i). FDOC filed a

response and objections, and following a hearing, the circuit court

denied King’s demand.

On February 22, 2026, King filed a successive postconviction

motion, as well as a separate motion seeking to stay the execution.

He raised two claims: (1) FDOC’s failure to follow the published

execution by lethal injection procedures is a violation of King’s

Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution

v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); (2) ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to investigate King’s exposure to
toxic substances; and (3) the district court violated due process or
otherwise abused its discretion by adopting portions of the State’s
response brief in its order denying King’s habeas petition.

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as well as his rights under the Florida Constitution;5 and (2) his

execution will violate his Eighth Amendment rights because newly

discovered evidence shows “King is a man with humanity,” “his life

has great value,” and “his case is not among the most aggravated

and least mitigated.” Following a Huff6 hearing, the circuit court

issued a written order finding that King was not entitled to any

relief on February 27, 2026.

King appealed to this Court. He raises two claims: (1) the trial

court abused its discretion in denying King’s demand for additional

records, resulting in violations of his equal protection and due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) newly

discovered evidence shows that carrying out King’s death sentence

would violate his Eighth Amendment rights. King asks us to vacate

his death sentence, or alternatively, to stay his execution and

remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.

5. In this claim, King also asked the circuit court to
reconsider its decision denying his records demand.

6. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the
circuit court to conduct a hearing to determine whether an
evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve a death penalty
defendant’s postconviction claims).

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II

We have consistently said:

Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is
appropriate if the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.
We review the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny
a successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the
movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are
not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the
record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to
no relief.

Zakrzewski v. State, 415 So. 3d 203, 208 (Fla.) (quoting Tanzi v.

State, 407 So. 3d 385, 390 (Fla. 2025)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 57

(2025). Applying this standard, we affirm the circuit court’s

summary denial of King’s successive postconviction motion.

A

King challenges the circuit court’s denial of his demand for

additional records from FDOC. He sought these records to support

his claims “for violation of his equal protection rights based on the

maladministration of the lethal injection protocol[].”7 In advancing

these claims, King directs us to evidence submitted in a federal

7. See generally Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Execution by Lethal
Injection Procedures and Certification Letter (2025), https://fdc-
media.ccplatform.net/content/download/1561/file/Execution%20b
y%20Lethal%20Injection%20with%20Certification%20Letter.pdf.

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lawsuit brought by Frank Walls, who was executed on December

18, 2025, after this Court and the United States Supreme Court

denied relief. These are the same documents this Court recently

addressed in the postconviction appeals of since-executed inmates

Ronald Heath and Melvin Trotter. 8 They include logs listing fields

such as “drug name,” “package size,” “date,” “expiration date,”

“received/used,” and “balance,” among others. Citing section

945.10, Florida Statutes, the State redacted the fields for “invoice

name/#,” “lot,” and “MFR.”

Like Heath and Trotter, King says these records “raise

substantial questions regarding FDOC’s compliance with [its]

protocol[] and ability to carry out future executions by lethal

injection.” Specifically, King contends these records show that, in

the executions of two other inmates, “lower amounts of the required

drugs were used.” Relying on these records and assertions, King

submits that he has made out viable due process and equal

protection claims. He argues that the circuit court abused its

8. See Heath v. State, No. SC2026-0112, 2026 WL 320522, at
*3 (Fla. Feb. 3), cert. denied, 2026 WL 363902 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2026);
Trotter v. State, No. SC2026-0214, 2026 WL 444544, at *2-3 (Fla.
Feb. 17), cert. denied, 2026 WL 504237 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2026).

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discretion in denying his demand for additional public records,

purportedly made in furtherance of this Fourteenth Amendment

claim.

Upon careful review, we find no error, see Muhammad v. State,

132 So. 3d 176, 200 (Fla. 2013), and conclude that King is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

1

King’s public records demand was made under Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.852(h) and (i), which permit counsel for a

defendant subject to a death warrant to request the production of

certain public records. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(h)(3). “[T]his

discovery tool is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a

fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable claim for

postconviction relief.” Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000).

So the rule prescribes meaningful limitations to records requests:

[R]ecords requests under Rule 3.852(h) are limited to
“persons and agencies who were the recipients of a public
records request at the time the defendant began his or
her postconviction odyssey,” whereas, records requests
under Rule 3.852(i) must “show how the requested
records relate to a colorable claim for postconviction relief
and good cause as to why the public records request was
not made until after the death warrant was signed.”

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Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019) (citations omitted)

(quoting Bowles v. State, 276 So. 3d 791, 795 (Fla. 2019)).

King’s argument that he is entitled to additional records

begins with his assertion that the Walls documents reveal

“numerous apparent errors” and “maladministration by FDOC of

[its] protocol[].” And based on the Walls documents, King submits

that his demand for additional records is necessary to pursue his

own claims for postconviction relief, targeting the alleged

maladministration of the protocol. King sought various records,

checklists, and logs relating to the procedures for the use and

maintenance of the chemicals used in the lethal injection protocol.

These included requests relating to drug expiration dates, storage

temperatures, protocol in the event of power loss, information as to

the training of individuals carrying out the execution, and

information regarding how the State assesses and monitors the

inmate’s consciousness during the execution. Importantly, given

King’s suggestion that the State has engaged in “disparate

treatment of individuals facing execution for first[-]degree murder

as well as sex offenses,” his assertions about maladministration are

not limited to individuals in that category, and nothing in the record

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before us reflects separate record-keeping for such individuals.

It would require speculative inferences to conclude from these

logs that the State will fail to administer the capital punishment

protocol in King’s case. The relevant log lists “drug name,”

“package size,” “date,” “expiration date,” “received/used,” and

“balance.” Information about the expiration date of the drugs and

amount of drugs in inventory is shown unredacted. King

conjectures that because some of the dates on these logs are

“around the date” of previous executions, the balance entries for

those dates correspond to the doses actually administered at the

contemporaneous executions. Yet that information reflects only the

quantity of drugs withdrawn from or deposited in inventory; those

amounts need not and likely do not match the amounts

administered. See Heath, 2026 WL 320522, at *3 (addressing the

same logs and explaining that the “suggestion that inventory

removals on dates that seemingly correspond to executions and

reflect amounts less than required by the protocol show that

incorrect doses were used is speculative” (citation modified)). The

circuit court did not err in denying relief.

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2

More fundamentally, because King has not asserted a

colorable claim for relief regarding any constitutionally redressable

disparate treatment, we find no error in the circuit court’s decision

to deny his demand for records or his motion to vacate his

judgment and sentence.

As to the records claim specifically, it is King’s burden to

demonstrate that the records sought relate to a colorable claim for

postconviction relief. Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 984 (Fla.

2018). In Heath, admittedly in assessing an Eighth Amendment

claim, we explained that an “alleged failure to document the

removal of drugs from inventory until one or two days after an

execution would not, without more, show a substantial and

imminent risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and

needless suffering during an execution.” 2026 WL 320522, at *3.

Here, in assessing King’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, our

reasoning is similar: alleged failures in documenting the movement

of drugs into and out of inventory does not give rise to a cognizable

equal protection or due process injury.

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That is because, first, as the circuit court correctly found, even

an allegation that there was a difference in the quantity of the

specific drugs administered would not constitute disparate

treatment for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. See DeYoung v.

Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding equal

protection does not “require[] a written execution protocol

sufficiently detailed to ensure that every execution is performed in a

precisely identical manner”). 9 King is right that “we have a

constitutional responsibility to ensure the death penalty is

9. Even positing King’s speculation that the records support
the inference that other inmates received varying doses of
rocuronium and potassium acetate, those drugs are administered
after the inmate has been rendered unconscious by etomidate. See
Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257, 1268 (Fla.) (noting the “well-
established fact that the administration of etomidate will render [the
defendant] unconscious likely within one minute”), cert. denied, 145
S. Ct. 2695 (2025); Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1065 (Fla.)
(noting that the “etomidate protocol . . . includes safeguards to
ensure the condemned is unconscious throughout the execution”),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 64
(2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The first step in the lethal injection
protocols currently in use is the anesthetization of the prisoner. If
this step is carried out properly, it is agreed, the prisoner will not
experience pain during the remainder of the procedure.”); Valle v.
Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1233 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that under
Florida’s protocol, a consciousness check is required and “the
execution cannot proceed until the individual is rendered
unconscious”).

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administered in a fair, consistent and reliable manner . . . .”

Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So. 2d 326, 326-27 (Fla. 1999). 10 But

he has not asserted a divergence from protocol that would result in

a manner of execution that would raise equal protection concerns.

See Ferguson v. Warden, 493 F. App’x 22, 26 (11th Cir. 2012)

(“Under Florida’s . . . protocol, all death row inmates facing

execution will be subject to the same sequence of drugs, the same

procedures, and the same safeguards in the execution process.”).

And second, King has not alleged that the State will treat him

disparately from other similarly situated persons in the sense that

is relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment. “The Equal Protection

Clause requires the government to treat similarly situated persons

in a similar manner.” Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp.

Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). King has made no

substantive allegation that administration of the protocol will

amount to disparate treatment from other similarly situated

persons. See Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180

10. The rest of that sentence reads, “as well as having an
administrative responsibility to work to minimize the delays
inherent in the postconviction process.” Id.

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(11th Cir. 2009). Nor can he allege that his execution burdens his

fundamental rights or is based on his membership in a suspect

class. For these reasons, the circuit court properly concluded that

King failed to establish even the first requirement of a viable equal

protection claim.

King’s due process challenge fares no better. He claims that

“[b]ecause [he] has been denied access to the records he

demanded,” he has been hindered in his ability to pursue his equal

protection claim; therefore, “his due process rights have been

violated.” This Court has previously rejected efforts to morph a

challenge to the denial of a public records demand into a

constitutional challenge. Randolph v. State, 422 So. 3d 166, 172

(Fla.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 2025 WL 3236523 (U.S. Nov.

20, 2025). King does not allege that he was not afforded notice and

an opportunity to be heard. To the contrary, the circuit court held

a hearing on the demand, and King’s counsel presented argument

on the issue. And in denying King’s successive motion for

postconviction relief, the circuit court gave written reasons for not

reconsidering its denial of the demand.

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The circuit court was correct to summarily deny this claim. 11

B

King next argues that newly discovered evidence shows that

carrying out his death sentence would violate his Eighth

Amendment rights because he is “a man with humanity,” “his life

has great value,” and “his case is not among the most aggravated

and least mitigated.” In support of this claim, King submits

correspondence with spiritual advisors and friends, while generally

making policy arguments against capital punishment. He further

argues that his “life is tragic and mitigating.” On this claim, King

contends that the circuit court erred in not conducting an

evidentiary hearing and asks us to remand for that purpose. We

agree with the circuit court that this claim is untimely, procedurally

barred, and meritless.

King’s claim is untimely because the allegedly “newly

discovered evidence” was ascertainable long ago by the exercise of

11. We take King at his word that, regarding this matter, he
“has not raised an Eighth Amendment claim.” So we do not analyze
the merits of such a claim here. We note only that the circuit court
correctly observed that King’s allegations are substantively identical
to the Eighth Amendment challenges we rejected in Trotter and
Heath.

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due diligence. See Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1212-13, 1215

(Fla. 2019); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). King makes no attempt

to even argue that he has submitted “new” evidence that could not

have been obtained long ago. Nor does he take issue with the

circuit court’s analysis correctly observing as much. And in fact,

the evidence that he has submitted in support of this claim,

correspondence from friends and spiritual advisors, reveals that he

has had relationships with these individuals for years. So to the

extent these individuals could speak about King, nothing has

stopped him or his counsel from mounting this evidence long before

the signing of his death warrant.

King’s claim is procedurally barred because, to the extent it

asks that we “reassess King’s life with the mitigation already found

by the trial court,” it seeks relief that we considered and rejected

when we affirmed King’s conviction and death sentence. King, 89

So. 3d at 231-32; see also Turner v. Dugger, 614 So. 2d 1075, 1078

(Fla. 1992) (barring postconviction claims, or variations thereof,

that have been raised on direct appeal).

In any case, the claim is meritless. On direct appeal, we

recounted the facts supporting the trial court’s decision that this

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presented an especially aggravated case. King, 89 So. 3d at 231.

We have no reason to revisit that conclusion. The circuit court

correctly denied relief on this claim.

III

We affirm the summary denial of King’s motion for

postconviction relief. We deny his concurrent motion to vacate his

death sentence or stay the execution for an evidentiary hearing.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court. The

mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
SASSO, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County,
Thomas W. Krug, Judge – Case No. 582008CF001087XXXANC

Eric C. Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali A.
Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Debra
R. Bell, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle
Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Scott A.
Browne, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, and
Timothy A. Freeland, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General,
Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee

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