Samuel L. Smithers v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2025-1507
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SAMUEL L. SMITHERS,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

October 7, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Samuel L. Smithers, a prisoner under two sentences of death

and an active death warrant, appeals the circuit court’s summary

denial of his successive motion to vacate his sentences of death.

We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. As we

explain below, we affirm the summary denial of Smithers’

postconviction motion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The opinion on direct appeal, Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d

916, 918 (Fla. 2002), explained the following. In 1995, Samuel
Smithers agreed to maintain the lawn at a vacant 27-acre property

in Plant City. The property was also the site of three ponds. The

property owner gave Smithers a key to the gate that enclosed the

property but not to the house located on the property.

Smithers continued to do lawn maintenance on the property in

1996. He mowed the lawn during the week of May 20, 1996, after

which the owner paid him on May 26. A couple of days later, the

owner went to check on the property. Upon arrival, the owner

found Smithers’ truck parked outside of the carport and Smithers

sitting on the carport cleaning an axe. Smithers explained that he

had returned to the property to cut some tree limbs, but the owner

also noticed a pool of blood on the carport. Smithers suggested that

someone must have killed a small animal, and he promised to clean

the carport.

Concerned about the pool of blood, the owner contacted the

Sheriff’s Department and later met a deputy at the property. At

that point, although the blood had been cleaned up, marks in the

grass that appeared to be drag marks led to one of the ponds where

a dead woman, later identified as Cristy Cowan, was found floating

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in the water. Further searching by a dive team led to the discovery

of another body, later identified to be Denise Roach.

DNA evidence linked to Smithers was found on the property

inside of the house, and a blood stain found on the carport was

consistent with Roach’s DNA. Additional evidence linking Smithers

to the murders was found during a search of his home, and

surveillance video from a local convenience store showed Smithers

and Cowan together about one hour before the owner arrived at the

property and discovered Smithers.

After the discovery of the bodies, Smithers agreed to submit to

an interview at the Sheriff’s Department and was questioned for

almost three hours. In an interview the next day, Smithers

provided inconsistent statements and eventually admitted to the

murders of Cowan and Roach. He was arrested and charged with

both murders. Smithers filed motions to sever the two charges for

purposes of trial and to suppress his confession, both of which were

denied by the trial court.

The medical examiner’s trial testimony indicated that both

victims were strangled and sustained chop or stab wounds:

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At trial, the medical examiner testified that at the
time Cowan’s body was discovered, she had not been
dead for more than a couple of hours. There was a foam
cone around her mouth which suggested that she might
have drowned. Cowan had an injury to her eye, a
laceration under her lip, a blunt impact injury to her jaw,
a chop wound on the top of her head which penetrated
her brain, and a chop wound behind her ear. She also
had injuries consistent with manual strangulation. The
medical examiner stated that death was caused by
strangulation combined with the chop wounds.
Regarding Roach, the medical examiner testified
that the body had been in the pond seven to ten days and
was therefore very decomposed. There were two slits in
Roach’s clothing which were caused by a sharp
instrument. Her face and skull were fractured. There
were also sixteen puncture wounds to her skull, several
of which penetrated the skull. Finally, she had injuries
consistent with manual strangulation (the hyoid bone
was fractured). The medical examiner stated that death
was caused by the combined effects of strangulation,
stab wounds, and blunt impact to the head.

Id. at 920.

Smithers testified in his defense at trial and told a different

version of events than he provided to the detectives, this time

placing the blame for both murders on an unknown man. The jury

ultimately convicted Smithers of both counts of first-degree murder

and, at the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously

recommended death for both murders. Id. at 921-22. As to the

murder of Cowan, the trial court found the following aggravating

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factors: (1) prior violent felony (the contemporaneous murder of

Roach), (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel

(HAC), and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and

premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal

justification (CCP). The trial court found two aggravating factors as

to the murder of Roach: (1) prior violent felony (the

contemporaneous murder of Cowan) and (2) HAC.1 Id. at 922. The

circuit court, concluding the aggravating factors outweighed the

mitigating circumstances, sentenced Smithers to death for both

murders.

Smithers’ convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct

appeal.2 Id. at 931. His convictions and sentences became final

1. As statutory mitigation, the trial court found that (1) the
murder was committed while Smithers was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance (moderate weight), and
(2) Smithers’ capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
substantially impaired (moderate weight). The trial court also found
seven nonstatutory mitigators, each of which was assigned
moderate weight, and the court gave great weight to a request made
by Cowan’s father that Smithers be sentenced to life imprisonment.
Id. at 922.

2. This Court rejected six issues raised by Smithers on direct
appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying Smithers’ motion to sever
the two murder offenses; (2) the trial court erred in denying

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when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on

February 24, 2003. Smithers v. Florida, 537 U.S. 1203 (2003).

This Court affirmed the denial of Smithers’ initial motion for

postconviction relief and denied his petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Smithers v. State, 18 So. 3d 460, 463-73 (Fla. 2009).3

In 2017, Smithers filed a successive motion for postconviction

relief based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst

Smithers’ motion to suppress his confession; (3) the waiver of
Smithers’ presence at a pretrial hearing constituted fundamental
error; (4) the trial court erred in finding HAC as to the murder of
Roach; (5) the trial court erred in finding CCP as to the murder of
Cowan; and (6) the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s
motion for mistrial following an improper statement by a trial
witness. Id. at 922 n.3.

3. In Smithers’ initial postconviction appeal, he argued that
counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) strike a prospective juror for
cause; (2) seek exclusion of a portion of Smithers’ statement to law
enforcement; (3) adequately investigate mental health mitigation;
and (4) call an independent medical examiner as a defense expert.
Id. at 463.
Smithers raised five claims in his habeas petition: (1) the
constitutionality of rules prohibiting counsel from interviewing
jurors; (2) the jury was not adequately instructed on and counsel
was ineffective for failing to litigate the sufficiency of the jury
instructions; (3) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional as applied, and counsel was ineffective for failing
to litigate the issue; (4) cumulative error; and (5) Smithers may be
incompetent at the time of execution. Id. at 472-73.

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v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and this Court’s decision on remand

in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by

State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020). The circuit court denied

the motion, and this Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of

relief. Smithers v. State, 244 So. 3d 152, 153 (Fla. 2018).

Smithers filed a federal habeas petition raising multiple

issues. Smithers v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:09-cv-2200-T-17EAJ,

2011 WL 2446576 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2011). 4 The district court

denied each of Smithers’ claims and denied a certificate of

appealability. Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit granted a limited certificate of appealability on

the matter of penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel.

Smithers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 501 F. App’x 906 (11th Cir.

4. Smithers’ federal habeas petition raised the following
issues: (1) erroneous denial of motion to sever; (2) erroneous denial
of motion to suppress; (3) Smithers’ improper absence from pretrial
hearing; (4) HAC challenge; (5) CCP challenge; (6) erroneous denial
of motion for mistrial; (7) guilt phase ineffective assistance of
counsel; (8) penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel;
(9) challenge to validity of rules regarding juror interviews;
(10) erroneous penalty phase jury instructions; (11) challenge to the
constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty scheme; (12) cumulative
error; and (13) Smithers’ competency to be executed. Id. at *11-51.

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2012). The court considered two issues (failure to provide mental

health expert with adequate background information and failure to

consult independent expert to refute testimony of the medical

examiner) and ultimately affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Id. at

909. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review.

Smithers v. Crews, 569 U.S. 935 (2013).

Governor Ron DeSantis signed Smithers’ death warrant on

September 12, 2025. On September 19, 2025, Smithers filed his

successive motion to vacate his sentences of death pursuant to

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The motion raised one

claim, that at 72 years of age, his execution would constitute “cruel

and unusual punishment because of his advanced age and status

as elderly.” The circuit court conducted a Huff 5 hearing on

September 22, 2025, and summarily denied relief in an order dated

September 26, 2025.

Smithers timely appealed to this Court the denial of

postconviction relief. Here, his primary argument is that his

execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because of his

5. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

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advanced age and status as elderly, and he discusses four sub-

issues: (1) the circuit court erroneously denied the motion as

untimely and procedurally barred; (2) the circuit court erred in

concluding that the conformity clause and binding precedent

foreclose relief; (3) executing the elderly is inconsistent with our

evolving standards of decency; and (4) executing the elderly violates

federal and state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and

unusual punishment because such executions do not have a

deterrent or a retributive purpose. 6 However, we need not reach the

latter two sub-issues because sub-issues (1) and (2) are

determinative of Smithers’ appeal. We agree with the circuit court’s

conclusions that (1) Smithers’ claim is untimely and procedurally

barred, and (2) Smithers’ claim is foreclosed by Florida’s conformity

6. Smithers argues that executing him runs afoul of evolving
standards of decency that are relevant to an Eighth Amendment
analysis. To that end, he argues that the majority of states
(including Florida) have never executed a person 70 years of age or
older, and he points to Florida statutes that reflect a policy of
protecting the elderly. He also maintains that his execution, as an
elderly person who has served more than 26 years in prison, neither
serves as a deterrent nor has a retributive purpose. He argues that
the State’s interest in punishing him is satisfied by his continued
incarceration.

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clause. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s order summarily denying

Smithers’ successive motion seeking to vacate his sentences of

death.

II. ANALYSIS

Smithers has claimed neither intellectual disability nor

incompetency to be executed as bars to his execution. Rather, he

argues that because of his advanced age of 72 years, executing him

would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

As is the case here, the “[s]ummary denial of a successive

postconviction motion is appropriate ‘[i]f the motion, files, and

records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to

no relief.’ ” Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1022 (Fla. 2023)

(second alteration in original) (quoting Bogle v. State, 322 So. 3d 44,

46 (Fla. 2021)). We review the circuit court’s decision de novo,

“accepting the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent

they are not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the

record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.”

Id. at 1022-23 (quoting Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla.

2009)). The circuit court did not err in summarily denying

Smithers’ claim.

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1. Whether Smithers’ Claim Is Untimely and Procedurally
Barred

The circuit court correctly concluded that Smithers’

postconviction claim is untimely and procedurally barred. Under

rule 3.851(d)(1), “[a]ny motion to vacate judgment of conviction and

sentence of death must be filed by the defendant within 1 year after

the judgment and sentence become final.” Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.851(d)(1). Rule 3.851(d)(2) provides three exceptions to raising

postconviction claims outside of the one-year timeframe:

(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence, or

(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not
established within the period provided for in subdivision
(d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively, or

(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file
the motion.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A)-(C).

Smithers does not argue, nor do we conclude, that any of

these exceptions apply to his postconviction claim. Instead, he

argues that his postconviction claim only became ripe once the

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Governor signed his death warrant on September 12, 2025. We

reject this argument. As the circuit court concluded:

Defendant’s assertion that his claim is predicated
upon his current age, and therefore could not have been
previously raised and only became ripe after the signing
of the death warrant, is unavailing. Defendant
essentially seeks a categorial [sic] exemption to execution
for the elderly, which he defines as those individuals age
sixty-five years or older. By that definition, his claim
became ripe when he turned sixty-five; therefore, he
could have or should have raised his claim in prior
proceedings rather than waiting until after the signing of
his death warrant.

Smithers’ argument that his claim is “predicated upon facts that

only exist or become relevant upon the signing of a death warrant”

is without merit. While Smithers is correct that he could not have

known exactly when his death warrant would be signed, he has

known for several years that upon the signing of his death warrant

and the exhaustion of any related successive postconviction

process, he would fall within the class of individuals that he now

seeks to exempt from execution due to advanced age. Thus, his

claim is untimely and fails to meet any exception provided in rule

3.851(d)(2). We affirm the circuit court’s ruling.

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2. Whether Smithers’ Claim Is Precluded by Florida’s
Conformity Clause

Smithers argues that this Court should break new ground in

concluding that his execution, at 72 years of age, would constitute

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment and Florida’s corresponding constitutional provision,

article I, section 17. No opinion of the United States Supreme

Court or this Court has held that the elderly are categorically

exempt from execution. Even if Smithers’ claim was not untimely

or procedurally barred, we decline to extend the relief requested.

Presently, the United States Supreme Court—and this Court—

recognize only one age-based death penalty exemption, which

prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on individuals who

were under the chronological age of 18 at the time that their capital

crimes were committed. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578

(2005).

Indeed, we recently stated:

Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to limit the exemption from execution . . .
based on age to those whose chronological age was less
than eighteen years at the time of their capital crime(s),
this Court is bound by those interpretations and is
precluded from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against

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cruel and unusual punishment to exempt . . . those
whose chronological age was over eighteen years at the
time of their capital crime(s).

Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701, 713 (Fla.) (emphasis added), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 2833 (2025). Thus, to the extent we view

Smithers’ argument as precluded by United States Supreme Court

precedent, we are bound by the conformity clause. 7 As we have

explained:

This means that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the ceiling
for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in
Florida, and this Court cannot interpret Florida’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to
provide protection that the Supreme Court has decided is
not afforded by the Eighth Amendment.

Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 979 (Fla.) (quoting Barwick v. State,

361 So. 3d 785, 794 (Fla. 2023)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161

(2025).

For his part, Smithers argues that his case is distinguishable

because the United States Supreme Court has not expressly

7. “The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be
construed in conformity with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.

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addressed whether the elderly are exempt from execution and

maintains that as such, this Court may expand Eighth Amendment

protections to the execution of the elderly. However, we further

observed in Gudinas:

While the states are required to adhere to the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, neither the
Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendments require states to
expand the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment
or to interpret their own corresponding state constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment in a
more expansive manner than the Supreme Court has
interpreted the federal prohibition.

412 So. 3d at 714 (emphasis added). Consistent with our analysis

in Gudinas, we reject Smithers’ invitation to expand the prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment to include individuals 65

years of age and older, and we affirm the circuit court’s denial of

relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Smithers’ successive

motion to vacate his sentences of death.

No oral argument is necessary, no motion for rehearing will be

entertained by this Court, and the mandate shall issue

immediately.

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It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
CANADY, J., recused.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
Michelle Sisco, Judge – Case No. 291996CF008093000AHC

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Melody Jacquay-
Acosta, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann Marie
Mirialakis, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and
Mahham Syed, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Rick A.
Buchwalter, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Joshua E.
Schow, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee

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