Michael W. Jones v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2023-0696
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MICHAEL W. JONES,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

July 10, 2025

GROSSHANS, J.

Michael Wayne Jones appeals his convictions of first-degree

murder and sentences of death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,

§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm in

all respects.

I

A

Michael and Casei Jones married in 2017. They settled in

Summerfield, Florida, along with four children—Cameron and

Preston Bowers were Casei’s sons from a previous marriage; while
Mercalli and Aiyana Jones were Jones and Casei’s daughters in

common.

One mid-July evening in 2019, Jones and Casei got into an

argument which escalated into a screaming match. According to

Jones, Casei picked up a baseball bat. Jones grabbed the bat away

from Casei and proceeded to beat her to death with it. Jones then

wrapped Casei’s body in a shower curtain, stuffed her body in a

plastic storage box, and hid the box in the back bedroom. The

children were not aware of their mother’s death or the location of

her body.

Shortly after Casei’s murder, Jones reached out to his ex-wife

Sarah in an attempt to rekindle a relationship with her and develop

a bond with the children they had together. While communicating

with Sarah, Jones claimed that he separated from Casei and that

she had moved to live near her mother.

As he continued his efforts to foster a relationship with Sarah,

Jones began to field questions from Casei’s children about their

mother’s whereabouts. In response to one such question, Jones

said that he and Casei were taking a break. Jones also lied to

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Casei’s extended family, often impersonating her in texts and on

social media.

In late July, all four children left for extended visits with family

members, resulting in less questions about Casei. In August, just

days before school began, Jones picked up the children and

returned with them to the house in Summerfield. Jones realized

the problem posed by the boys going to school and worried they

might reveal they had not seen their mother for weeks. As he would

later confess to police, “One day I just realized school is starting.

The boys are school age and I started to just choke them out.”

First, Jones killed nine-year-old Cameron by climbing on top

of the sleeping boy and strangling him to death with his bare

hands. Once Cameron was dead, Jones put his body inside a

suitcase and left the suitcase in the boys’ bedroom.

The next day, Preston (age four) asked Jones about his

brother. That night, after Preston fell asleep, Jones filled up the

bathtub and placed a large zip tie around Preston’s throat. Jones

carried Preston to the bathroom where he held the child facedown

in the bathtub until he drowned. Jones then put Preston’s body in

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a trash bag and left it in the bathroom overnight. He would later

place the body into a storage box.

With the death count now at three, traces of the murders

became evident inside the home. To reduce such signs, Jones

scattered cat litter over the floor that was stained with the bodily

fluids of the victims. He also wrapped the body-containing boxes in

plastic to suppress the smell of decomposition.

Having taken these measures, Jones continued to live in the

home with his two daughters, notwithstanding the presence of the

three decaying bodies. But near the end of August, Jones received

an eviction notice. The day before the scheduled eviction, Jones

carried Mercalli (age two) to the bathroom where he drowned her

facedown in the bathtub. Jones then returned to the living room

for one-year-old Aiyana. He drowned her just as he had her sister.

He put the girls’ bodies in separate trash bags, before placing

them into one box. Jones then placed the five bodies—all now

contained in plastic storage boxes—in Casei’s minivan. He drove

the van to Jacksonville to stay with Sarah, telling her that he and

Casei had separated and that the children were with Casei.

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Jones kept up this ruse for almost two more weeks, continuing

to impersonate Casei in text messages. Ultimately, Casei’s family

grew suspicious of the irregular communication. In mid-

September, Casei’s mother contacted the Marion County Sheriff’s

Office and asked officers to conduct a wellness check on Casei.

When the responding detective entered the Summerfield home, he

noticed a strong odor, which he believed to be from decomposition

and bleach. Subsequently, after obtaining a warrant, law

enforcement secured physical evidence from the home. Meanwhile,

having learned that Casei’s vehicle was missing, law enforcement

published a “be on the lookout” for Casei, her four children, and the

minivan.

As the investigation continued, law enforcement learned of

Sarah and reached out to her. On a call—with Jones directing

her—Sarah said that she had last seen Jones, Casei, and the kids

at a McDonald’s in Palatka, Florida, just a few days earlier. These

statements were false. Sarah, for her part, later admitted lying to

police. Eventually, Sarah told Jones that “clearly something [was]

going on” and that “he needed to talk to [the police].”

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In response, Jones fled Florida, driving north. After crossing

into Georgia, he left the boxes containing the bodies of the four

children in a heavily wooded area. Jones then continued north,

eventually running off the road and crashing into a culvert. The

responding officer, Deputy Wade Bennett, arrived at the crash scene

and smelled the odor of decomposition coming from the wrecked

van. When asked what he was doing in Georgia, Jones volunteered

that the smell was from his dead wife whom he had killed. Deputy

Bennett then asked if Jones had any children, and he stated he did,

but that they were with their grandmother.

Deputy Bennett took Jones to a Georgia jail for questioning.

There, Jones confessed to the five killings and provided a detailed

account of the surrounding events and circumstances. At the

request of the officer, Jones led law enforcement to the children’s

remains. 1

After these developments, Jones was transferred to a nearby

sheriff’s office. There, a detective from Marion County (who had

learned of the recent developments in Georgia) interviewed Jones.

1. The bodies were confirmed by a Georgia medical examiner
to be those of Preston, Cameron, Aiyana, and Mercalli.

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As part of this interview, Jones described in detail the murders of

the four children. When the detective asked Jones why he

committed the murders, Jones said that “everything” was on him

and that all the pressure got to him.

Jones was later transported back to Florida and interviewed a

third time. During that interview, the detective again questioned

Jones about his motive:

DETECTIVE BARTLETT: Okay. I’m trying to think
of everything to make sure we covered everything.
Obviously the one question is, everybody’s asked me
why. I know -- I understand why Casei. Why the
boys, why your daughters?
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know. It’s just everything
mounted up. Just seemed like no way out.

B

A grand jury indicted Jones on four counts of first-degree

murder (for the death of the children) and one count of second-

degree murder (for Casei’s death). That same day, the State filed a

notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Ultimately, Jones pled

guilty to all five murders as charged in the indictment. Following a

colloquy with Jones and the prosecutor’s presentation of the factual

basis for the crimes, the court accepted Jones’s guilty pleas.

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C

At the penalty phase, the State sought to prove six aggravating

factors for each first-degree murder count: (1) the defendant was

previously convicted of a violent felony; (2) the murder was

committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; (3) the murder

was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (4) the murder

was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); (5) the victim was a

person less than twelve years of age; and (6) the murder was

committed by a person in a position of familial authority. Of those

six, Jones chose only to dispute the “avoid arrest” aggravator. 2

Specifically, the defense argued that Jones killed the children

due to a psychotic episode. To support that theory, Jones

presented several expert witnesses. Dr. Harold Bursztajn, a

neuropsychiatrist who met with Jones fifty-two times, testified that

2. In addition to challenging this aggravator, the defense
sought to prove fifty-four mitigating circumstances, including three
statutory mitigators. Those statutory mitigators were: (1) the
defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2)
the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (3) the
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
substantially impaired.

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Jones’s “delusions and hallucinations are most consistent with an

illness . . . called the schizoaffective spectrum.” Dr. Stephen

Nelson, a pediatric neurologist and epileptologist, diagnosed Jones

with a neurodevelopmental disorder and testified that this disorder

“would make him prone to psychosis.” The final expert, Dr. John

Fabian, a forensic psychologist and neuropsychologist, diagnosed

Jones with “major depressive disorder with psychotic features” and

opined Jones underwent a psychotic break after killing Casei.

Relying in part on this expert evidence, the defense requested

a special jury instruction that included additional nonstatutory

considerations. The court declined to give the requested

instruction, and instead read the standard instruction to the jury.

At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended

sentences of death for the four first-degree murder counts.

Consistent with the jury’s recommendation, the court imposed four

death sentences.3 In its sentencing order, the court found that the

State had proven all six aggravating factors—to which it assigned

great weight. As to mitigation, the court found one statutory

3. Jones waived his right to a Spencer hearing. Spencer v.
State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

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mitigator—that Jones had no significant history of prior criminal

activity—and assigned it little weight. The court also determined

that the defense had proven forty nonstatutory mitigating factors,

with assigned weights ranging from slight to none. In its

conclusion, the court found that the aggravators “substantially

outweigh[ed]” the mitigating circumstances, warranting imposition

of the death sentences.

This appeal followed.

II

Jones raises three issues for our review. First, Jones argues

that the trial court’s refusal to supplement the standard jury

instruction on the avoid-arrest aggravator was improper. Next, he

contends that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme

unconstitutionally permits the arbitrary imposition of death

sentences. For his final argument, Jones claims that the death

penalty violates the Eighth Amendment in light of evolving

standards of decency. And though not raised by Jones, we also

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review whether his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily entered. 4

A

Jones contends the trial court erred by denying his request for

a special jury instruction. 5 To prevail on this claim, Jones has the

burden to demonstrate “(1) the special instruction was supported by

the evidence; (2) the standard instruction did not adequately cover

the theory of the defense; and (3) the special instruction was a

correct statement of the law and not misleading or confusing.”

Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 112 (Fla. 2008) (citing Stephens v.

State, 787 So. 2d 747, 756 (Fla. 2001)). The State concedes prongs

one and three, thus we focus our discussion solely on the disputed

prong.

In analyzing the second prong, we look to the instructions as a

whole to see if they “adequately address the applicable legal

standards.” See Stephens, 787 So. 2d at 755. And we have found

standard instructions adequate even when those instructions do

4. See Altersberger v. State, 103 So. 3d 122, 128 (Fla. 2012).

5. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.
Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 2001).

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not contain judicially crafted interpretations of the aggravators. See

Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1193 (Fla. 1997); Stephens, 787

So. 2d at 755; see also Loyd v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080, 1095 (Fla.

2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 188 (2024).

Here, the jury was instructed to determine if “[t]he First Degree

Murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a

lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.” That standard

instruction tracks the statutory text. See § 921.141(6)(e), Fla. Stat.

(2022) (listing as an aggravating factor that “[t]he capital felony was

committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest

or effecting an escape from custody”). The statute and standard

instruction both focus on the purpose for which the murder was

committed—i.e., to avoid arrest.

Jones contends that the standard jury instruction, as given,

was insufficient. We disagree and find the instruction adequately

encompassed Jones’s theory of defense. See Davis, 698 So. 2d at

1192-93 (rejecting argument that an avoid-arrest instruction that

tracked the statute was legally inadequate because it did not

include a comparable special instruction).

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As a defense to the aggravator, counsel argued that Jones did

not kill the children for the purpose of avoiding arrest because his

actions were instead the product of a psychotic episode. Jones’s

defense also emphasized that the children had not witnessed the

crimes, so killing them would not have aided him in avoiding arrest.

It is true that the instruction Jones requested had additional

language not contained in the standard instruction. Indeed, the

requested instruction would have added the victim’s status as a

consideration: “Where the victim of the homicide is not a law

enforcement officer, the State must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the sole or dominant motive for the murder was to avoid

a lawful arrest.” 6

However, the absence of this instructional language did not

prevent defense counsel from emphasizing the status of the

children as non-eyewitnesses and non-law enforcement. Nor, as

seen above, did its absence foreclose an argument that Jones’s

6. Neither the standard instruction, nor the statute,
addresses the status of the victim. The additional language
proposed by Jones derives from this Court’s holding in Mullens v.
State, 197 So. 3d 16, 27-28 (Fla. 2016) (holding that the State bears
a heightened burden of proof when the avoid-arrest aggravator is
applied to non-law enforcement victims).

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psychotic break was the real reason for the children’s murders. The

fact that the jury categorically rejected Jones’s defense in this

regard does not render the instruction itself inadequate.

For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in declining to give the instruction Jones requested.

However, even if Jones succeeded in showing an abuse of

discretion, any instructional flaw would be harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

We begin with the observation that the jury found five other

aggravators—including the CCP, HAC, and prior-violent-felony

aggravators. The trial court, for its part, gave great weight to all the

aggravators, noting that either the CCP or HAC aggravators

standing alone would have justified the death penalty. See

Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 176 (Fla. 2020)

(characterizing CCP and HAC as the weightiest aggravators).

Apart from aggravation, we also consider the mitigating

circumstances presented at the penalty phase. Here, those

mitigators pale in comparison to the magnitude of the unchallenged

aggravators. Consequently, “[t]here is no reasonable possibility that

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[the] potential error affected the sentence.” Lowe v. State, 259 So.

3d 23, 60-61 (Fla. 2018).

B

Jones next asks us to find that Florida’s capital sentencing

scheme is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

According to Jones, the elimination of proportionality review 7 and

the number and breadth of aggravating factors in section

921.141(6) results in arbitrary and unconstitutional sentences.

We have repeatedly rejected this argument and others like it.

See Cox v. State, 390 So. 3d 1189, 1200 (Fla. 2024) (rejecting

comparable argument and characterizing it as “well-worn”), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 1084 (2025); Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005,

1015-16 (Fla. 2023) (rejecting as meritless the argument that

Florida’s death-penalty statute fails to sufficiently narrow the class

of murderers eligible for the death penalty in violation of the Eighth

Amendment). Jones has given us no reason to revisit this

precedent, nor has he established any constitutional defect in

7. Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020).

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Florida’s death-penalty statute. Accordingly, he is not entitled to

relief.

C

As his final claim, Jones argues that the death penalty violates

the Eighth Amendment based on “evolving standards of decency.”

We have consistently held that Florida’s death-penalty scheme

satisfies both the state and federal constitutions. See Cox, 390 So.

3d at 1199-1200. The mere fact that other states may have shifted

in their penological objectives does not render Florida’s death

penalty unconstitutional. See, e.g., Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938,

945 (Fla. 2019) (holding that Florida’s death-penalty methods do

not violate the Constitution simply because of the policy choices of

other states). Jones is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

III

In death-penalty cases, we “independently review the

sufficiency of the evidence underlying [a first-degree murder]

conviction, and the ‘customary review’ evaluates whether the

conviction is supported by competent, substantial evidence.”

Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1250 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in

original) (quoting Santiago-Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 180). When a

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defendant’s guilty plea results in a death-eligible conviction, we

examine the record to determine whether the defendant made that

plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Doty v. State, 170 So.

3d 731, 738 (Fla. 2015). In carrying out this review, we “scrutinize

the plea to ensure that the defendant [1] was made aware of the

consequences of his plea, [2] was apprised of the constitutional

rights he was waiving, and [3] pled guilty voluntarily.” Fletcher v.

State, 343 So. 3d 55, 60 (Fla. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting

Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 2002)).

Here, the trial court informed Jones of the nature of the

charges, the consequences of his pleas, and the rights he would

give up as a result of the pleas. Jones acknowledged all these

things, but nevertheless remained firm in his decision to accept

guilt. In addition, the court determined that Jones was in

satisfactory physical and mental health and was making the

decision to plead based on his own free will. Moreover, the evidence

of Jones’s guilt was overwhelming. He made incriminating

statements on the day he was arrested and confessed in two

recorded interviews. Physical evidence and witness testimony also

decidedly pointed to Jones’s guilt. The prosecutor noted this

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evidence in its factual basis, which Jones acknowledged as

adequate.

Thus, having independently reviewed the record, we conclude

that Jones’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

entered.

IV

For the reasons given above, we affirm Jones’s four

first-degree murder convictions and death sentences.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ.,
concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

I fully concur in the decision to affirm the first-degree murder

convictions in this case. Moreover, I recognize that the majority has

rejected this Court’s decades-long practice of conducting

comparative proportionality review in cases involving the direct

appeal of a sentence of death, and it has since repeatedly rejected

such challenges.

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However, I concur in result because I continue to adhere to

the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. State,

308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020).

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Marion County,
Anthony M. Tatti, Judge
Case No. 422019CF003487CFAXXX

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Robert J. Pearce III,
Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit of Florida,
Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Naomi
Nichols, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellee

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