Thomas Lee Gudinas v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2025-0794
_____________

THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

June 17, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Thomas Lee Gudinas, a prisoner under sentence of death for

whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for June 24,

2025, appeals the circuit court’s orders summarily denying his

third successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed

under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and denying his

demand for public records, which was made under rule 3.852. We

have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the denials of postconviction relief and the
demand for public records. Additionally, we deny Gudinas’s motion

for a stay of execution, filed on June 8, 2025.

I. BACKGROUND

After leaving an Orlando bar in the early morning hours of

May 24, 1994, Gudinas sexually battered and murdered M.M. 1 The

victim’s body was found in a nearby alley, naked, except for a bra

that was pushed up above her breasts. There were sticks inserted

into her genitalia, and it was also determined that she had been

vaginally and anally penetrated by something other than the sticks.

Gudinas admitted to his roommates that he killed the victim and

then had sex with her body. The medical examiner determined that

the victim’s cause of death was a brain hemorrhage resulting from

blunt force injuries to her head, probably inflicted by a stomping-

type blow from a boot. Gudinas was convicted of the victim’s

murder and two counts of sexual battery. He was also convicted of

attempted burglary with an assault and attempted sexual battery

against a second woman, whom he had attempted to attack after

1. A more complete recitation of the facts can be found in this
Court’s opinion on direct appeal. See Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d
953 (Fla. 1997).

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leaving the bar and before murdering M.M. Gudinas v. State, 693

So. 2d 953, 956-57 (Fla. 1997).

At the penalty phase, the State introduced evidence of

Gudinas’s prior felony convictions from Massachusetts, including

burglary of an automobile; assault; theft; assault with intent to

rape; indecent assault and battery; and assault and battery.

Gudinas’s mother testified about his behavioral and substance

abuse problems in his youth and his “low IQ.” Gudinas’s sister

testified about the abuse he suffered at the hands of his father. Dr.

James Upson, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified that Gudinas

was seriously emotionally disturbed at the time of the murder and

that he was “quite pathological in his psychological dysfunction.”

Dr. Upson testified that Gudinas has an IQ of 85, and that the

murder was consistent with the behavior of a person with his

psychological makeup. Dr. James O’Brian, a physician and

pharmacologist, testified that Gudinas is unable to control his

impulses in an unstructured environment and was unable to

control them at the time of the murder due to his marijuana and

alcohol consumption. The jury recommended and the trial court

ultimately imposed a sentence of death for the murder based on

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three aggravating circumstances,2 one statutory mitigating

circumstance,3 and twelve “nonstatutory” mitigating

circumstances. 4 Id. at 958-59.

This Court affirmed Gudinas’s convictions and sentences on

direct appeal, id. at 968, which became final when the United

States Supreme Court denied certiorari review in 1997, Gudinas v.

2. The court found that the following aggravating
circumstances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the
defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person; (2) the capital felony was committed
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a sexual
battery; and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel.

3. The court found one statutory mitigating circumstance
established: the capital felony was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.

4. The court found the following “nonstatutory” mitigating
circumstances established: (1) the defendant had consumed
cannabis and alcohol the evening of the homicide; (2) the defendant
has capacity to be rehabilitated; (3) the defendant’s behavior at trial
was acceptable; (4) the defendant has an IQ of 85; (5) the defendant
is religious and believes in God; (6) the defendant’s father dressed
as a transvestite; (7) the defendant suffers from personality
disorders; (8) the defendant was developmentally impaired as a
child; (9) the defendant was a caring son to his mother; (10) the
defendant was an abused child; (11) the defendant suffered from
attention deficit disorder as a child; and (12) the defendant was
diagnosed as sexually disturbed as a child.

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Florida, 522 U.S. 936 (1997); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(B)

(“For the purposes of this rule, a judgment is final . . . on the

disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari by the United States

Supreme Court, if filed.”). In the decades since, Gudinas has

unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences in state

and federal courts. See Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1099-

1100 (Fla. 2002) (affirming denial of Gudinas’s initial motion for

postconviction relief and denying his state petition for a writ of

habeas corpus); Gudinas v. State, 879 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 2004)

(affirming the denial of Gudinas’s first successive motion for

postconviction relief); Gudinas v. State, 982 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2008)

(denying Gudinas’s pro se Petition Seeking Review of Non-Final

Order in Death Penalty Postconviction Proceeding Pursuant to Rule

9.142(b)); Gudinas v. McNeil, No. 2:06-cv-357-FtM-36DNF, 2010 WL

3835776, at *65 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2010) (denying Gudinas’s

federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus), aff’d sub nom. Gudinas

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 436 Fed. App’x 895 (11th Cir. 2011);

Gudinas v. Tucker, 565 U.S. 1247 (2012) (denying certiorari review

of the denial of federal habeas relief); Gudinas v. State, 235 So. 3d

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303, 304 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of Gudinas’s second

successive motion for postconviction relief).

Governor Ron DeSantis signed Gudinas’s death warrant on

May 23, 2025. Gudinas then filed a third successive motion for

postconviction relief under rule 3.851, raising three claims: (1)

Gudinas’s lifelong mental illnesses place him outside the class of

individuals who should be put to death, and executing him will be

violative of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution; (2)

Florida’s use of its unique and obstructive “conformity clause” is

unconstitutional and violates Gudinas’s Fourteenth Amendment

due process rights and his Eighth Amendment right to a true

merits-based evaluation of his claims, premised on the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society;

and (3) applying the procedural bar in Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.851(d)(2) to Gudinas’s Claim One would violate his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, his Eighth Amendment

right to a true merits-based evaluation of his claims, premised on

the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

maturing society, and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The

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circuit court summarily denied all three claims, as well as

Gudinas’s demand for public records from the Executive Office of

the Governor. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Newly Discovered Evidence/Extension of Roper/Extension
of Atkins

In his first issue on appeal, Gudinas argues that the circuit

court erred in summarily denying his claim that his unspecified

lifelong mental illnesses place him outside the class of individuals

who should be put to death. Gudinas claims that an evaluation

conducted by Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist, on May

29, 2025, provides newly discovered evidence of “brain

impairment.” 5 He also contends that “Dr. Eisenstein finds that

Gudinas’s age at the time of crime, a little over twenty [years], is

5. In the appendix to the initial brief, Gudinas includes
writings that were apparently composed by him before the instant
proceedings, and presumably intended to support statements
contained in Dr. Eisenstein’s report, but which were not submitted
to the circuit court. We decline to consider materials that were not
presented to and considered by the circuit court. See, e.g., Altchiler
v. State, 442 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (stating it is
elemental that an appellate court may not consider material
matters outside the record).

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similar to [United States Supreme Court] precedent barring

juveniles from execution,” although he does not categorize this as

newly discovered evidence, and Dr. Eisenstein, in fact, made no

such “finding.” 6 Gudinas argues that he is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing to prove that due to “evolving standards of

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” he should be

deemed outside the class of individuals subject to capital

punishment.

Similar to a number of other recent post-warrant arguments,

Gudinas’s argument is essentially that because of his mental

illnesses and “brain impairment” and the fact that he was twenty

years old when he committed the murder, the protections of Atkins

6. Dr. Eisenstein made no mention of any Supreme Court
precedent, nor did he compare Gudinas’s case or circumstances to
that of any other defendant. The only mention in Dr. Eisenstein’s
evaluation report of Gudinas’s age was made in the “Summary &
Conclusions” section and states:

Gudinas was twenty years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Developmental literature and
neuroscience research states that there was a lack of
maturity, an undeveloped sense of responsibility,
increased vulnerability and susceptibility to outside
negative influences in a person that was not fully formed
at this age.

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v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)—which held that the Eighth

Amendment prohibits execution of the intellectually disabled—and

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)—which held that “[t]he

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death

penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their

crimes were committed”—should be extended to him, and that

these claims should be entertained at this late stage because Dr.

Eisenstein’s May 30, 2025, evaluation report constitutes newly

discovered evidence. The circuit court summarily denied this claim

as untimely, procedurally barred, and without merit.

Rule 3.851 requires that “[a]ny motion to vacate judgment of

conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant

within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.” Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). But there is an exception to this rule for

claims involving newly discovered evidence—i.e., claims predicated

on facts that “were unknown to the movant or the movant’s

attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). “[A]ny claim of newly

discovered evidence in a death penalty case must be brought within

one year of the date such evidence was discovered or could have

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been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Glock v.

Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 2001). In order to obtain relief

based on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant has the

burden to establish:

(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by
the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of
trial and it could not have been discovered through due
diligence, and (2) that the evidence is of such a nature
that it would probably produce an acquittal or yield a
less severe sentence on retrial.

Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021).

Although his convictions and sentences became final nearly

thirty years ago, Gudinas asserts that his claim is based on newly

discovered evidence and is therefore timely under the exception in

rule 3.851(d)(2)(A) to the one-year time limit for postconviction

claims. Gudinas summarily states that “[t]he newly discovered

evidence is an evaluation conducted by Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a

neuropsychologist who evaluated Gudinas at Florida State Prison

on May 29, 2025.” He alternately states that the evaluation is

newly discovered evidence of “brain impairment” and “mental

impairments.” It appears that Gudinas is using “brain” and

“mental” interchangeably rather than arguing that there are two

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different claims of newly discovered evidence, but he does not

elaborate as to what kind of brain or mental impairment he believes

has recently been discovered.

Dr. Eisenstein’s report does not use the term “mental

impairments,” and the only reference to “brain impairment” in the

report is a single conclusory statement in the section titled

“Summary & Conclusions” that Gudinas “presented with significant

brain impairment and frontal lobe dysfunction.” But Gudinas

admits in his briefing that evidence of his “mental impairment” was

presented during the penalty phase of his trial and “more” evidence

was presented during the evidentiary hearing on his initial motion

for postconviction relief. He describes his “impairments” in his

initial brief here as “life-long” and “in place at the time of the

crimes.” With regard to the specific possibility of “frontal lobe

dysfunction,” Dr. Joseph Lipman, a neuropharmacologist retained

by Gudinas during the initial postconviction proceedings, reported

in 1999 that Gudinas may have “deficits of frontal or temporal lobe

function in his brain.” That Gudinas may have “brain impairment”

or “frontal lobe dysfunction” has been known to him for at least

twenty-five or thirty years, if not longer, and has been raised

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previously. We therefore cannot determine what exactly it is that

Gudinas believes is newly discovered.

Moreover, even if we were to assume that Dr. Eisenstein’s

finding of “brain impairment” is newly discovered, to raise a facially

sufficient claim based on newly discovered evidence, it is necessary

to assert not only that there is evidence that was not and could not

have been known at the time of trial by the use of due diligence but

also that the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably

produce a life sentence on retrial. Damren v. State, 397 So. 3d 607,

610 (Fla. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1398 (2024). Gudinas has

not done this. His failure to identify any evidence that was not

previously presented and his failure to plead that whatever it is that

he believes is newly discovered would probably produce an acquittal

at retrial are fatal to any argument that this claim may be timely

under rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).

Gudinas’s contention that this claim is timely because he had

“no reason to have a new mental health evaluation until the

commencement of his clemency proceedings, and most specifically,

the signing of the death warrant” is also without support. Neither

clemency proceedings nor the signing of his death warrant has

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anything to do with the timeliness of Gudinas’s claim that he is

exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment due to “brain

impairment.”

The circuit court was also correct in concluding that this claim

is procedurally barred. Gudinas first introduced the possibility of

“brain impairment” at the penalty phase in 1995 through his

expert, Dr. Upson. Dr. Upson testified that despite extensive

evaluation and testing, he found no evidence of neuropsychological

impairment on either side or the frontal portion of Gudinas’s brain

and “ruled out” neuropsychological impairment. Dr. Upson also

testified that Gudinas’s mental health records indicated that he had

been evaluated by neuropsychologists on several prior occasions,

none of whom found any indication of “brain impairment” or

organic brain damage, although the records did indicate that

Gudinas has “significant emotional disturbances.” The trial court

considered Dr. Upson’s testimony credible and relied on it to find

mitigating circumstances in the sentencing order, including the

statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance.

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Dr. Upson testified again at the evidentiary hearing on

Gudinas’s initial motion for postconviction relief in 1999, at which

time he maintained his opinion that Gudinas had no significant

cognitive dysfunction. Despite contrary testimony at that hearing

from Dr. Lipman “that Gudinas has neuronal damage and a

developmental brain problem,” the postconviction court

concluded—a conclusion that this Court affirmed on appeal—that

there was no reasonable probability that Gudinas would have

received a life sentence had Dr. Lipman presented that opinion at

trial due to the conflicting and more credible evidence presented by

Dr. Upson. Gudinas, 816 So. 2d at 1107-08.

Because the current claim of “brain impairment” is a variation

of his prior claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

present a neuropharmacologist who would have testified that

Gudinas has “neuronal damage and a developmental brain

problem,” it is procedurally barred. Moreover, even if it were not a

variation of a prior claim, because Gudinas’s alleged “brain

impairment” in the form of “neuronal damage and a developmental

brain problem” was known at the time of his postconviction

proceedings, more than a quarter of a century ago, this claim would

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still be procedurally barred because it should have been raised

previously. See Rogers v. State, No. SC2025-0585, 2025 WL

1341642, at *4 (Fla. May 8) (“[I]n an active warrant case, a

postconviction claim that could have been raised in a prior

proceeding is procedurally barred.”), cert. denied, No. 24-7169,

2025 WL 1387828 (U.S. May 14, 2025).

Gudinas’s argument that his age of twenty years at the time of

the murder should bar his execution based on “developmental

literature and neuroscience research which states that there was a

lack of maturity, an undeveloped sense of responsibility, increased

vulnerability and susceptibility to outside negative influences in a

person that was not fully formed at this age” is also procedurally

barred, because it too could have been raised in a prior proceeding.

Gudinas does not identify any specific “literature” or “research” that

he believes would apply here, but literature, research, studies,

reports, and cases discussing maturity, age, and the fact that the

brain is not fully developed or matured by the age of eighteen or

twenty or even twenty-five have been well known in the public

domain for decades, and even before Roper was decided. See, e.g.,

Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 793 (Fla. 2023) (noting that a

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2022 “resolution” from the American Psychological Association

taking the position that the death penalty should be banned when

the offender was under twenty-one years old at the time of the

capital offense was “based on a compilation of studies, research,

data, and reports, published between 1992 and 2022 and relying on

data from as early as 1977”); Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233, 245-

46 (Fla. 2008) (mentioning a 2004 brain mapping study, which

establishes that sections of the human brain are not fully developed

until age twenty-five; a 2007 article stating that in the past few

decades, neuroscientists have discovered that two key

developmental processes, myelination and pruning of neural

connections, continue to take place during adolescence and well

into adulthood; and a 1967 article stating that brain regions

responsible for basic life processes and sensory perception tend to

mature fastest, whereas the regions responsible for behavioral

inhibition and control, risk assessment, decision making, and

emotion maturing take longer). Thus, any claim that Roper should

be extended to him based on his age at the time of the murder

could have been raised in one of Gudinas’s many prior proceedings.

The same is true for any claim that Atkins should be extended to

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him based on his “lifelong mental illnesses” or his “impairments,”

which he concedes “were in place at the time of the crime[s].” Thus,

Gudinas’s claim is procedurally barred because it could have been

raised previously. E.g., Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 795 (concluding that

extension-of-Atkins claim was procedurally barred in an active

warrant case because it could have been raised previously); Branch

v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 986 (Fla. 2018) (holding that an extension-

of-Roper claim was procedurally barred in an active warrant case

because it could have been raised previously); Simmons v. State,

105 So. 3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting as procedurally barred a

claim, based on Roper and Atkins, that the defendant was exempt

from execution based on mental illness and neuropsychological

deficits because it could have been raised in prior proceedings). The

circuit court therefore properly concluded that Gudinas’s claim of

newly discovered “brain impairment” that he argues should subject

him to protections similar to those afforded by Atkins and Roper is

untimely and procedurally barred.

Finally, this claim lacks merit. Even if Gudinas’s claim of

newly discovered evidence were facially sufficient and Dr.

Eisenstein’s finding of “brain impairment” could be deemed newly

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discovered, it cannot be said that such general and conclusory

evidence would be of such a nature that it would probably produce

a life sentence at retrial. This is especially true given the extensive

testing and evaluation that Dr. Upson performed on Gudinas, and

the credibility findings made with regard to Dr. Upson by both the

trial and postconviction courts.

Further, we have repeatedly held that “the categorical bar of

Atkins that shields the intellectually disabled from execution does

not apply to individuals with other forms of mental illness or brain

damage.” Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 795 (quoting Dillbeck v. State, 357

So. 3d 94, 100 (Fla. 2023)); see also Hutchinson v. State, No.

SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *6 (Fla. Apr. 25) (rejecting

claim that Atkins should be extended to individuals with certain

neurocognitive disorders), cert. denied, No. 24-7087, 2025 WL

1261217 (U.S. May 1, 2025); Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 100 (rejecting

claim Atkins should be extended to individual with mental illness

and neurological impairments); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 887

(Fla. 2013) (rejecting claim that the protections of Atkins and Roper

should be extended to defendant who is less culpable as a result of

mental illness as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless);

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Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 511 (rejecting as meritless claim that

persons with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with

intellectual disability due to reduced culpability); Lawrence v. State,

969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting assertion that the

Equal Protection Clause requires extension of Atkins to the mentally

ill due to their reduced culpability).

We have also repeatedly rejected the argument that Roper’s

categorial ban on the execution of individuals who were under

eighteen years old at the time they committed their capital offense(s)

should be extended to defendants whose chronological age was over

eighteen at the time of their offense(s). See Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d

973, 979 (Fla.) (rejecting claim that the protections of Roper should

be extended to Ford, who was thirty-six at the time of his capital

crimes, because he has a mental and developmental age below

eighteen years), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025); Barwick v.

State, 88 So. 3d 85, 106 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting claim that Roper

should extend to Barwick, who was nineteen when he committed

the capital crime, because his mental age was less than eighteen);

Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405, 427 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim

that Roper and the Eighth Amendment barred execution of

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defendant who had a mental and emotional age of less than

eighteen years because his chronological age at the time of his

crimes was twenty-three); Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla.

2006) (rejecting an extension-of-Roper claim and holding “Roper

only prohibits the execution of those defendants whose

chronological age is below eighteen”). Unlike many of the

defendants in the cases cited by Gudinas, Gudinas does not allege

that his mental or developmental age was under eighteen at the

time of the murder; he simply argues that Roper’s protections

should be extended to him based on his chronological age of twenty

at the time of the murder in this case. But because Gudinas was

indeed twenty years old “at the time of the murder[], it is impossible

for him to demonstrate that he falls within the ages of exemption,

rendering his claim facially insufficient and therefore properly

summarily denied.” Ford, 402 So. 3d at 979 (citing Morton, 995 So.

2d at 245) (“Because it is impossible for Morton to demonstrate that

he falls within the ages of exemption, his claim is facially

insufficient and it was proper for the court to deny Morton a

hearing on this claim.”)).

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This claim also lacks merit because, as we have explained, this

Court lacks the authority to extend Atkins or Roper.

The conformity clause of article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment, and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall
be construed in conformity with decisions of the United
States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
This means that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the ceiling
for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in
Florida, and this Court cannot interpret Florida’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to
provide protection that the Supreme Court has decided is
not afforded by the Eighth Amendment.

Id. at 979 (alteration in original) (quoting Barwick, 361 So. 3d at

794).

Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth

Amendment to limit the exemption from execution based on mental

functioning to those who are intellectually disabled or insane and

the exemption from execution based on age to those whose

chronological age was less than eighteen years at the time of their

capital crime(s), this Court is bound by those interpretations and is

precluded from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment to exempt individuals from execution whose

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mental or cognitive issues do not rise to the level of intellectual

disability or those whose chronological age was over eighteen years

at the time of their capital crime(s). This claim was therefore

properly denied as meritless.

B. Florida’s Eighth Amendment Conformity Clause

Gudinas next contends that the circuit court erred in denying

his claim that Florida’s Eighth Amendment conformity clause in

article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution is unconstitutional.

Gudinas claims that by applying the conformity clause and

foreclosing the possibility of courts interpreting the Florida

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to provide more

protections than the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the

United States Supreme Court, Florida is foreclosing Gudinas’s

access to the courts, violating his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights, and violating his Eighth Amendment right to a true

merits-based evaluation of his claims, premised on the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.

The circuit court properly determined this claim to be procedurally

barred and meritless.

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Post-warrant claims that could have been raised in a prior

proceeding are procedurally barred. Rogers, 2025 WL 1341642, at

*4. Gudinas’s reason for not raising this claim earlier is that it is a

“purely legal claim[] in support of Claim One,” which was his newly

discovered evidence/extension-of-Atkins/extension-of-Roper claim.

As we have already explained, Gudinas’s “Claim One” could have

and should have been raised in a prior proceeding, and this

“supporting” claim likewise could have been raised in a prior

proceeding.

Gudinas has also failed to show how the conformity clause in

article I, section 17 violates his federal constitutional rights. While

the states are required to adhere to the Supreme Court’s Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence, neither the Eighth nor Fourteenth

Amendments require states to expand the protections afforded by

the Eighth Amendment or to interpret their own corresponding

state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual

punishment in a more expansive manner than the Supreme Court

has interpreted the federal prohibition.

Gudinas’s assertion that Florida’s adherence to the conformity

clause in article I, section 17 has denied him access to the courts is

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baseless. Even the fact that this claim is now procedurally barred

does not violate his access to the courts or his right to be heard at

the appropriate time and in accordance with the laws and

procedural rules of this state.

C. Applicability of Rule 3.851(d)(2)

Gudinas next posits that the circuit court erred in denying his

claim that application of rule 3.851(d)(2)—which sets forth the three

exceptions to the one-year time limit for filing motions for

postconviction relief 7—is unconstitutional when applied to

successive motions filed after the signing of a death warrant. We

recently addressed and rejected this argument in Ford, 402 So. 3d

7. Rule 3.851 limits the filing of a motion for postconviction
relief to within one year of the date the defendant’s conviction and
sentence become final, unless it alleges one of the following
exceptions set forth in subdivision (d)(2):

(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence, or

(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not
established within the period provided for in subdivision
(d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively, or

(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file
the motion.

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at 977-78, which was another post-death warrant proceeding.

Gudinas concedes that our decision in Ford is directly adverse to

the arguments he presents here, but nonetheless “raises these

arguments with the good faith belief that the application of Rule

3.851(d)(2) to active warrant cases continues to raise serious

constitutional concerns.”

Gudinas, who is represented by the same attorneys who

argued Ford, presents essentially the same arguments made in

Ford. In rejecting these arguments in Ford, we explained that

finding rule 3.851(d)(2) inapplicable to defendants under an active

death warrant would allow defendants, upon the scheduling of an

execution date, to be permitted to litigate anew any claim that was

(and likely those that should have been) raised previously and

entitled to a ruling on the merits of those claims. We found this

position lacking any legal support and contrary to the intent of the

Legislature. We explained that

[i]n crafting the terms and conditions that govern
criminal appeals and collateral review, the Legislature
provided “that all terms and conditions of direct appeal
and collateral review be strictly enforced, including the
application of procedural bars, to ensure that all claims
of error are raised and resolved at the first opportunity.”
§ 924.051(8), Fla. Stat. The litigation of a successive

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motion for postconviction relief filed by a defendant
under an active death warrant is collateral review. If the
Legislature intended to suspend procedural bars for
claims raised by defendants under active death warrants,
it could have done so. See Cason v. Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt.
Servs., 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006) (“[T]he Legislature
‘knows how to’ accomplish what it has omitted in the
statute in question.”).

Id. (second alteration in original). Gudinas has provided neither a

basis on which we could rely to violate the intent of the Legislature

regarding procedural bars as applied to collateral review nor a

compelling reason to depart from our recent precedent on the

matter.

We also rejected Ford’s claims that application of rule 3.852(d)

resulted in a denial of due process and his right to access to courts.

Id. at 978. Like Ford, Gudinas has not been denied an opportunity

to bring his claims before the courts and to be heard at the

appropriate time(s) and through the appropriate channel(s).

D. Demand for Public Records

After the death warrant was signed on May 23, 2025, Gudinas

filed a demand for the production of public records from the

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Executive Office of the Governor 8 under Florida Rule of Criminal

8. The circuit court summarized the records demanded as
follows:

a) All communications between the Governor or any
current or former employee of his office with the Florida
Parole Commission and/or the Office or Executive
Clemency related “in any way whatsoever” to Defendant;

b) All communications between the Governor or any
current or former employee of his office with any other
current or former employee of the Office of the Attorney
General related “in any way whatsoever” to Defendant;

c) Any document outlining the criteria for obtaining
executive clemency and/or the process for selecting
suitable candidates;

d) Any document outlining the criteria for determining
how to grant executive clemency and the factors
considered;

e) The number of death row inmates selected for
clemency review and the number for whom review has
been completed;

f) All documents outlining the selection criteria and
processes for inmates subject to the entry of a death
warrant, including the factors considered in issuing a
warrant;

g) Names of everyone on Florida’s Death Row who have
had complete or partial clemency investigations or whose
case resulted in clemency[;]

h) Names and dates of those whom clemency was denied;
and

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Procedure 3.852(h) 9 and (i) 10. The circuit court found that the

records Gudinas requested generally related to the Governor’s

processes for granting clemency, which it concluded renders them

i) All correspondence/written communications between
the Governor’s office and the Florida Supreme Court
identifying individuals eligible for a death warrant from
January 1, 2023 to present.

9. Rule 3.852(h)(3) provides that within ten days after the
signing of a death warrant, a records request may be made to “a
person or agency from which collateral counsel has previously
requested public records.” The rule provides that upon such
request, “[a] person or agency shall copy, index, and deliver to the
[records] repository any public record: (A) that was not previously
the subject of an objection; (B) that was received or produced since
the previous request; or (C) that was, for any reason, not produced
previously.”

10. Rule 3.852(i)(1) provides that collateral counsel may
obtain public records “in addition to those provided under
subdivisions (e), (f), (g), and (h) of this rule” if counsel files an
affidavit in the trial court which:

(A) attests that collateral counsel has made a timely and
diligent search of the records repository; and

(B) identifies with specificity those public records not at the
records repository; and

(C) establishes that the additional public records are either
relevant to the subject matter of the postconviction proceeding
or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence; and

(D) shall be served in accord with subdivision (c)(l) of this rule.

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“clearly confidential and exempt from public records requests under

section 14.28, Florida Statutes (2024)[,] and the Florida Rules of

Executive Clemency.” The court also found the demands overly

broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead

to a colorable claim for relief. The court further concluded that

Gudinas’s failure to previously request documents from the

Executive Office of the Governor foreclosed any current effort to

obtain those records under rule 3.852(h)(3). We review the denial of

Gudinas’s demand for public records for abuse of discretion,

Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 200 (Fla. 2013), and find

none.

The requested records relating to the clemency process are

exempt from disclosure. Id. at 203. Section 14.28, Florida Statutes

(2024), provides that “[a]ll records developed or received by any

state entity pursuant to a Board of Executive Clemency

investigation shall be confidential and exempt from the provisions of

s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.” In other

words, they are exempt from disclosure as public records.

Additionally, rule 16 of the Florida Rules of Executive Clemency

provides:

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Due to the nature of the information presented to
the Clemency Board, all records and documents
generated and gathered in the clemency process as set
forth in the Rules of Executive Clemency are confidential
and shall not be made available for inspection to any
person except members of the Clemency Board and their
staff.

This Court has held that “to the extent section 14.28 could be

read to exclude certain clemency materials from confidentiality [i.e.,

non-investigatory documents], Rule of Executive Clemency 16,

which provides that all records in the clemency process are

confidential, controls . . . .” Chavez v. State, 132 So. 3d 826, 831

(Fla. 2014). And under section 14.28 and rule 16, only the

Governor can authorize the release or inspection of such records.

See § 14.28, Fla. Stat. (2024) (“[S]uch records may be released upon

the approval of the Governor.”); Rule 16, Rules of Executive

Clemency (“Only the Governor . . . has the discretion to allow such

records and documents to be inspected or copied.”). Thus, the

circuit court was without the authority to grant Gudinas’s demands

related to the clemency process. See Parole Comm’n v. Lockett, 620

So. 2d 153, 157-58 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a trial judge’s order to

disclose clemency records “would effectively overrule the rules of

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executive clemency, resulting in a violation of the separation of

powers doctrine”).

The circuit court also concluded that the demands were not

reasonably calculated to lead to a colorable claim for relief. The

procedures of rule 3.852(h) and (i) are “not intended to be a

procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to

a colorable claim for postconviction relief.” Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d

1054, 1065-66 (Fla.) (quoting Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 700

(Fla. 2017)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024); see also Dailey v.

State, 283 So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019) (stating that under rule

3.852(i), requests must show how the records relate to a colorable

claim for postconviction relief); Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100,

1117 (Fla. 2006) (affirming denial of records request under rule

3.852(h)(3) because the records were not related to a colorable claim

for postconviction relief).

Gudinas expressly stated in his demand that the records were

sought in hopes of discovering evidence that “Florida’s clemency

process, and the manner in which the Governor determined that

Gudinas should receive a death warrant on May 23, 2025,” are

unconstitutional. But this Court has repeatedly denied similar

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claims and consistently held that Florida’s established clemency

proceedings and the Governor’s absolute discretion to issue death

warrants do not violate the Florida or United States Constitutions.

E.g., Bolin v. State, 184 So. 3d 492, 503 (Fla. 2015) (rejecting claim

that Governor’s discretion to select an inmate for execution is

unconstitutional); Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 203-04 (concluding

that “records would not relate to a colorable claim because we have

held many times that claims challenging clemency proceedings are

meritless”); Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865, 890 (Fla. 2013)

(rejecting claim that because there are no meaningful standards

that constrain the Governor’s absolute discretion in determining

which death warrant to sign, Florida’s capital sentencing scheme

violates the Eighth Amendment); Carroll, 114 So. 3d at 887

(rejecting argument that the Governor’s power to select which death

row prisoner for whom he will sign a death warrant is arbitrary,

without standards, and without any process for review, thus

rendering the death penalty unconstitutional); Mann v. State, 112

So. 3d 1158, 1163 (Fla. 2013) (holding that records sought in the

hopes of supporting allegation that the Governor’s selection of

Mann for a death warrant was somehow tainted by public input

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were not relevant to any colorable claim, and that such a claim is

not cognizable); Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 780 (Fla. 2012)

(rejecting constitutional challenge to clemency process and warrant

selection because of Governor’s absolute discretion to sign death

warrants); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 551-52 (Fla. 2011)

(rejecting a claim that the Governor’s absolute discretion to sign

death warrants renders Florida’s death penalty structure

unconstitutional). Thus, Gudinas’s demands seeking records to

challenge the constitutionality of Florida’s clemency process and the

Governor’s absolute discretion to sign a death warrant cannot relate

to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.

We also find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s

determination that Gudinas’s demands were overly broad and

unduly burdensome, and that Gudinas’s failure to previously

request documents from the Executive Office of the Governor

foreclosed any current effort to obtain those records under rule

3.852(h)(3).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court’s

orders summarily denying Gudinas’s third successive motion for

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postconviction relief and denying his demand for public records.

We also deny his motion for a stay of execution.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court. The

mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
John E. Jordan, III, Judge
Case No. 481994CF007132000AOX

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali Shakoor,
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Adrienne Joy
Shepherd, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle
Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Leslie T.
Campbell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida, and Lisa-Marie Lerner, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Appellee

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