In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2022-1123
____________

IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 3.191.

March 13, 2025

PER CURIAM.

The Court, on its own motion, amends Florida Rules of

Criminal Procedure 3.191 (Speedy Trial) and 3.134 (Time for Filing

Formal Charges).1 The Court previously held oral argument on a

prior version of proposed changes to rule 3.191. After oral

argument, the Court indicated that it would consider an alternative

proposal to amend rule 3.191. The new proposal was published for

comment by the Court in the February 1, 2024, edition of The

Florida Bar News, and 35 comments were received.

After considering the oral argument on the prior proposal and

the comments on the current proposal, we amend rule 3.191 in four

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; see
also Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.140(d).
main ways. First, subdivisions (a) and (d) are amended to provide

that speedy trial for purposes of this rule now starts from the date

that formal charges are filed rather than from the date of arrest.

Second, we make clear that the recapture period is mandatory in all

situations by deleting subdivision (o) and, after relettering current

subdivision (p) as (o), amending subdivision (o)(3). Third, the

recapture period is increased from 10 days to 30 days, as noted in

subdivision (o). Finally, we amend subdivisions (n) and (o)(3) to

provide that dismissals under this rule will be without prejudice

unless a defendant’s constitutional right to speedy trial has been

violated, which requires dismissal with prejudice.

Based on the comments received on the Court’s proposal,

additional modifications beyond the Court’s published proposal are

adopted, namely: the dates in subdivision (b) are modified to match

the new recapture period; the wording in subdivision (e) is modified

to match the definition of “formally charged” in subdivision (d); “or

the court” is removed from newly relettered subdivision (o)(3) to

clarify that the court is not required to act until a defendant files

the required documents; and rule 3.134 is amended to include a

mechanism for a defendant to be released from pretrial restraints if

-2-
formal charges are not brought within a reasonable time.

Additionally, the Court will refer the traffic and juvenile speedy trial

rules, 6.325 (Speedy Trial: Infractions Only) and 8.090 (Speedy

Trial), to their respective committees to consider changes consistent

with these amendments.

Accordingly, we amend the Florida Rules of Criminal

Procedure as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New

language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by

struck-through type. The amendments to the rules shall become

effective July 1, 2025, at 12:01 a.m. We appreciate the insight

provided by the commenters and those who presented oral

argument to the Court.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THESE AMENDMENTS.

LABARGA, J., dissenting.

I dissent to the amendments adopted by the majority, which

further relax the speedy trial rule applicable to criminal cases in

-3-
Florida’s state courts and which I consider unwarranted. These

changes further my existing concerns about the potential impact of

speedy trial rule modifications, especially on individuals who are

subjected to protracted criminal investigations.

First, I strongly disagree with the majority’s decision to define

“speedy trial for purposes of this rule [as starting] from the date

that formal charges are filed rather than from the date of arrest.”

Majority op. at 2. Five years ago, in Davis v. State, 286 So. 3d 170

(Fla. 2019), this Court adopted the formal arrest standard as the

starting point for the running of the speedy trial clock. There, I

dissented to the majority’s position that “the speedy trial right is in

no way implicated by the length of an investigation or by the fact

that an individual under investigation is a known suspect.” Id. at

174. To the contrary, I observed that “[a] formal arrest standard

would allow law enforcement to repeatedly detain an individual for

an extended period of time without triggering any procedural

protections.” Id. at 176 (Labarga, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

Now, today’s amendments go even further, potentially placing

the start of the speedy trial period even further down the road and

-4-
increasing, for affected individuals, the likelihood of what I

described in my dissent in Davis as “procedural limbo.” Id.

Second, I disagree with (1) extending the long-standing

recapture period from 10 days to a mandatory 30 days, and

(2) providing that any discharge is without prejudice unless a high

burden is met—the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right is

violated. Indeed, 10 days is a sufficient period of time for the State

to proceed to trial on a prosecution that has already allowed the

speedy trial period to lapse. Additionally, a discharge with

prejudice places an appropriate check on the State to ensure that

speedy trial requirements are satisfied.

For these reasons, I dissent.

Original Proceeding – Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure

Hon. Laura E. Ward, Chair, Criminal Procedure Rules Committee,
Tampa, Florida, Jason B. Blank, Past Chair, Criminal Procedure
Rules Committee, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Joshua E. Doyle,
Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and
Michael Hodges, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee,
Florida; Bradley T. Wilson of Brewer & Wilson, PLLC, Bartow,
Florida; Donna Peterson of Peterson Law, LLC, Jacksonville,
Florida; Anthony C. Musto, on behalf of the Florida Bar Public
Interest Law Section, Hallandale Beach, Florida; Patricia Dawson,
Chair, Criminal Law Section of The Florida Bar, Tampa, Florida,
and Warren W. Lindsey, Chair, Speedy Trial Subcommittee,
Criminal Law Section of The Florida Bar, Winter Park, Florida;
Christine Riley Davis, Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, St.

-5-
Petersburg, Florida; Kareem J. Foreman, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida;
Paul L. Figueroa of Paul L. Figueroa Law, P.A., Lithia, Florida; Chad
Sinckler, on behalf of Beyond the Bars, Miami, Florida; Jason
Cromey, Co-Chair, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Pensacola, Florida, and Jude Michael Faccidomo of Ratzan &
Faccidomo, LLC, on behalf of Florida Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, Miami, Florida; Peter J. Brewer of Brewer &
Wilson, PLLC, Sebring, Florida; Andrew J. Pouget of Fowler Law
Group, P.A., Sarasota, Florida; Paul L. Figueroa, President,
Hillsborough County Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Lithia, Florida; George Pavlidakey, Clearwater, Florida; Andrea
Flynn Mogensen of The Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, P.A.,
Sarasota, Florida; Curtis S. Fallgatter, Jacksonville, Florida; Gene
Mitchell, Pensacola, Florida, and John Beroset, Pensacola, Florida;
Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Paul S.
Rothstein, Gainesville, Florida; Karla Y. Campos-Andersen of Law
Office of Karla Y. Campos-Andersen, Esq., P.A., Fort Myers, Florida;
Donald C. Barrett of Donald C. Barrett, P.A., Key West, Florida;
Elizabeth J. Loeffler, Sarasota, Florida; Anthony G. Ryan, Sarasota,
Florida; Bartholomew Stoddard of Stoddard Law Firm, PLLC,
Sarasota, Florida; Andrew W. Cummer, Sarasota, Florida; Melissa
Wilson, Tampa, Florida; AnneMarie Rizzo, Sarasota, Florida;
Hon. Joseph A. Bulone, Chair, Criminal Court Steering Committee,
Clearwater, Florida, and Hon. Thomas D. Winokur, on behalf of the
Criminal Court Steering Committee, Tallahassee, Florida; Jack
Campbell, President, Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association,
Tallahassee, Florida, Amira Fox, Vice President, Florida Prosecuting
Attorneys Association, Fort Myers, Florida, Brian Haas, Secretary,
Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, Bartow, Florida, Bill
Gladson, Treasurer, Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association,
Ocala, Florida, Ed Brodsky, Past President, Florida Prosecuting
Attorneys Association, Sarasota, Florida, and Larry Basford, Speedy
Trial Workgroup Member, Panama City, Florida; Heatha Trigones,
Daytona Beach, Florida; Antoinette M. Peck of Peck Law Office,
P.A., Fort Myers, Florida; Christa Diviney, Destin, Florida; Michael
A. Catalano of Michael A. Catalano, P.A., Miami, Florida; Robert R.
Berry, Tallahassee, Florida; John Hager, President, Broward County
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
and Todd Onore, Vice-President, Broward County Association of

-6-
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; James
Uthmeier, Attorney General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy
Solicitor General, and Kevin Andrew Golembiewski, Senior Deputy
Solicitor General, Tampa, Florida; Lauren Krasnoff, President,
Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Miami Chapter,
Miami, Florida, Dianne E. Caramés, Past President, Florida
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Miami Chapter, Miami,
Florida, and Daniel J. Tibbitt, Amicus Chair, Florida Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Miami Chapter, Miami, Florida; Brian
Lee Tannebaum of Brian L. Tannebaum, P.A., Miami, Florida; and
David L. Redfearn of Longwell Lawyers, Orlando, Florida,

Responding with comments

-7-
APPENDIX

RULE 3.191. SPEEDY TRIAL

(a) Speedy Trial without Demand. Except as otherwise
provided by this rule, and subject to the limitations imposed under
subdivisions (e) and (f), every person charged with a crime shall be
brought to trial within 90 days of arrest if the crime charged is a
misdemeanor, or within 175 days of arrest if the crime charged is a
felony. If trial is not commenced within these time periods, the
defendant shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in
subdivision (po). The time periods established by this subdivision
shall commence when the person is formally charged with a
crimetaken into custody as defined under subdivision (d). A person
charged with a crime is entitled to the benefits of this rule whether
the person is in custody in a jail or correctional institution of this
state or a political subdivision thereof or is at liberty on bail or
recognizance or other pretrial release condition. This subdivision
shall cease to apply whenever a person files a valid demand for
speedy trial under subdivision (b).

(b) Speedy Trial upon Demand. Except as otherwise provided
by this rule, and subject to the limitations imposed under
subdivisions (e) and (g), every person charged with a crime by
indictment or information shall have the right to demand a trial
within 60 days, by filing with the court a separate pleading entitled
“Demand for Speedy Trial,” and serving a copy on the prosecuting
authority.

(1) [No Change]

(2) At the calendar call the court shall set the case for
trial to commence at a date no less than 5 days nor more than 4560
days from the date of the calendar callfiling of the demand.

(3) [No Change]

-8-
(4) If the defendant has not been brought to trial within
5060 days of the filing of the demand, the defendant shall have the
right to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (po).

(c) [No Change]

(d) Custody. For purposes of this rule, a person is taken into
custody:

(1) when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct
or criminal episode that gave rise to the crime charged; or

(2) when the person is served with a notice to appear in
lieu of physical arrest.Formally Charged. For purposes of this rule,
a person is formally charged with a crime by information, or by
indictment, or in the case of alleged misdemeanors by whatever
documents constitute a formal charge.

(e) Prisoners outside Jurisdiction. A person who is in federal
custody or incarcerated in a jail or correctional institution outside
the jurisdiction of this state or a subdivision thereof, and who is
charged with a crime by indictment or information issued or filed
under the laws of this state, is not entitled to the benefit of this rule
until that person returns or is returned to the jurisdiction of the
court within which the Florida charge is pending and until written
notice of the person’s return is filed with the court and served on
the prosecutor. For these persons, the time period under
subdivision (a) commences on the date the last act required under
this subdivision occurs. For these persons the time period under
subdivision (b) commences when the demand is filed so long as the
acts required under this subdivision occur before the filing of the
demand. If the acts required under this subdivision do not precede
the filing of the demand, the demand is invalid and shall be
stricken upon motion of the prosecuting attorney. Nothing in this
rule shall affect a prisoner’s right to speedy trial under law.

(f)– (l) [No Change]

-9-
(m) Effect of Mistrial; Appeal; Order of New Trial. A person
who is to be tried again or whose trial has been delayed by an
appeal by the state or the defendant shall be brought to trial within
90 days from the date of declaration of a mistrial by the trial court,
the date of an order by the trial court granting a new trial, the date
of an order by the trial court granting a motion in arrest of
judgment, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate,
order, or notice of whatever form from a reviewing court that makes
possible a new trial for the defendant, whichever is last in time. If a
defendant is not brought to trial within the prescribed time periods,
the defendant shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set
forth in subdivision (po).

(n) Discharge with Prejudice from Crime; Effect. Discharge
with prejudice from a crime under this rule shall operate to bar
prosecution of the crime charged and of all other crimes on which
trial has not commenced nor conviction obtained nor adjudication
withheld and that were or might have been charged as a result of
the same conduct or criminal episode as a lesser degree or lesser
included offense.

(o) Nolle Prosequi; Effect. The intent and effect of this rule
shall not be avoided by the state by entering a nolle prosequi to a
crime charged and by prosecuting a new crime grounded on the
same conduct or criminal episode or otherwise by prosecuting new
and different charges based on the same conduct or criminal
episode, whether or not the pending charge is suspended,
continued, or is the subject of entry of a nolle prosequi.

(po) Remedy for Failure to Try Defendant within the
Specified Time.

(1) – (2) [No Change]

(3) No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a
notice of expiration of speedy trial time, the court shall hold a
hearing on the notice and, unless the court finds that one of the
reasons set forth in subdivision (j) exists, shall order that the

- 10 -
defendant be brought to trial within 1030 days. This recapture
period is mandatory before any remedy will be given under this
rule. A defendant not brought to trial within the 1030-day period
through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant or the
court, shall be forever discharged from the crime. This discharge
shall be without prejudice unless there is a determination that the
defendant’s constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated. If
there is a determination that the constitutional speedy trial right
has been violated, discharge shall be with prejudice as set forth in
subdivision (n).

Committee Notes

[No Change]

RULE 3.134. TIME FOR FILING FORMAL CHARGES

(a) Defendants in Custody.

(1) The state shallmust file formal charges on defendants
in custody by information, or indictment, or in the case of alleged
misdemeanors by whatever documents constitute a formal charge,
within 30 days from the date on which defendants are arrested or
from the date of the service of capiases upon them.

(2) If the defendants remain uncharged, the court on the
30th day and with notice to the state shallmust:

(A)(1) Order that the defendants automatically be
released on their own recognizance on the 33rd day unless the state
files formal charges by that date; or

(B)(2) If good cause is shown by the state, order that
the defendants automatically be released on their own recognizance
on the 40th day unless the state files formal charges by that date.

- 11 -
(3) In no event shallmay any defendants remain in
custody beyond 40 days unless they have been formally charged
with a crime.

(b) Defendants Not in Custody.

(1) The state must file formal charges on defendants on
pretrial release by information, or indictment, or in the case of
alleged misdemeanors by whatever documents constitute a formal
charge, within 60 days from the date on which defendants are
arrested or from the date of the service of capiases on them. If the
defendants remain uncharged, the court on the 60th day and with
notice to the state must:

(A) Order that the defendants automatically be
released on their own recognizance on the 63rd day unless the state
files formal charges by that date; or

(B) If good cause is shown by the state, the Court
may continue the defendant on pretrial release for up to an
additional 30 days unless the state files formal charges.

(2) On the expiration of the time period prescribed in
subsection (1), and on motion with notice to the state, the court
shall order that the defendant be released from all requirements of
bail and all conditions of pretrial release unless the defendant has
been formally charged with a crime.

- 12 -