Kayle B. Bates v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2023-1683
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KAYLE B. BATES,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

October 24, 2024

COURIEL, J.

Kayle Barrington Bates appeals an order of the postconviction

court denying his motion, made under Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.575, to interview a juror who served at his trial in

1983. Bates claims to have learned at some unspecified time (but

years after his conviction) that the juror is the second cousin of a

person who was married to the victim’s sister. We have
jurisdiction. 1 See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Bates’s motion is

time-barred, so we affirm.

I

In 1983, a jury found Bates guilty of the kidnapping,

attempted sexual battery, armed robbery, and first-degree murder

of Janet White. See Bates v. State, 465 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1985).

Bates attacked White in her State Farm Insurance office. Bates v.

State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1097 (Fla. 2009). He forced her into the

woods behind the building; there he beat, tried to rape, and

eventually murdered her. Id. Bates was found at the scene of the

crime with the victim’s blood on his clothing. Id. Police found other

physical evidence connecting Bates to the victim’s corpse, including

clothing fibers consistent with Bates’s pants, Bates’s knife case and

hat, a watch pin consistent with his watch, and semen on the

1. Although Bates did not style his motion as having been
made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, that is
how we review it. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(a) (“This rule shall
apply to all postconviction proceedings that commence upon
issuance of the appellate mandate affirming the death sentence to
include all motions and petitions for any type of postconviction or
collateral relief brought by a defendant in state custody who has
been sentenced to death and whose conviction and death sentence
have been affirmed on direct appeal.”).

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victim and on Bates’s underwear. Id. Bates gave inconsistent

confessions that further implicated him in the murder. Id. After he

was convicted, the jury recommended the death penalty. The court

sentenced Bates to death.

This case has a long history of appeals. In the original direct

appeal, this Court affirmed Bates’s first-degree murder conviction

but remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the death

sentence and a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors.

Bates v. State, 465 So. 2d at 493. At resentencing, Bates was once

again sentenced to death. See Bates v. State, 506 So. 2d 1033 (Fla.

1987). This Court affirmed. Id. at 1035. In 1989, in between

appeals, the Governor signed Bates’s death warrant. See Bates v.

Dugger, 604 So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 1992). The trial court stayed his

execution and ordered a new sentencing hearing; this Court,

affirming that order, found that Bates’s counsel had been ineffective

and ordered a new resentencing before a jury. Id. at 459. After that

proceeding, the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of

nine to three, and the circuit court again imposed a death sentence.

Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. 1999). This Court affirmed. Id.

at 18. Years later, Bates petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas

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corpus and raised several issues about how his jury had been

selected, among other claims. See Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d at 1097.

This Court denied relief on all claims. Id. at 1107.

II

Bates’s effort to interview one of his jurors is 40 years late.

Without a showing of good cause for the delay, his claim is time-

barred. Rule 3.575 requires that a motion seeking to interview a

juror “be filed within 10 days after the rendition of the verdict,

unless good cause is shown for the failure to make the motion

within that time.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.575 (emphasis added). We

have addressed rule 3.575 denials on direct appeal and in

postconviction proceedings. Compare Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d

40, 65-66 (Fla. 2013) (affirming postconviction appeal of 3.575

denial), and Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 739-40 (Fla. 2011)

(same), with Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98, 107, 122 (Fla. 2012)

(affirming in a direct appeal the denial of a rule 3.575 motion). But

the timing contemplated by the rule suggests that the best time for

a rule 3.575 motion is on the heels of trial, and thus in connection

with a direct appeal, when memories are fresh and facts more

readily ascertained.

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Bates does not say when he discovered the alleged family

relationship between the juror and the victim. That is the end of

the matter, for it is Bates’s burden to establish good cause to

excuse the long delay—which he is hard-pressed to do without

explaining the timing of all this. 2 Cf. Ramirez v. State, 922 So. 2d

386, 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that, after juror interviews are

granted, “the initial burden will be on the defense ‘either to show

that prejudice resulted or that the [premature deliberations or

conversations] were of such character as to raise a presumption of

prejudice’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d

594, 600-01 (Fla. 1957))); Gray v. State, 72 So. 3d 336, 338 (Fla.

4th DCA 2011) (same). That is, if he cannot establish when he

learned of the alleged relationship between the juror and the victim,

it is hard to assess why—or, obviously, for how long—the relevant

information was unknown. The courts of our state regularly hold

appellants to this burden. See Rivet v. State, 307 So. 3d 801, 807

2. The order below indicates that the motion was filed within
one year of Bates’s counsel discovering the familial connection.
However, Bates does not say when he learned the relevant
information or shared it with his lawyer.

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(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (finding motion filed 14 days after trial was

“untimely without good cause” because defense counsel discovered

the issue during trial); Belcher v. State, 9 So. 3d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2009) (finding motion time-barred where defense counsel

raised the issue in court more than a month after learning of

potential misconduct); cf. Maiya v. Kennedy, 743 So. 2d 1183, 1184

(Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“The record does not demonstrate good cause

to avoid the time limits of the rule; . . . there was no reason offered,

by proffer or otherwise, why the search could not have been

conducted within the time limits of the rule.”); Beyel Bros., Inc. v.

Lemenze, 720 So. 2d 556, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (finding motion

untimely where defendants did not file until about three months

after the final verdict). 3

3. Maiya and Beyel Bros. consider the civil counterpart to rule
3.575, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431(h). Rule 3.575 is a
newer rule with limited precedent discussing the “good cause”
requirement. See Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc., 886 So. 2d
197 (Fla. 2004) (adopting rule 3.575 for juror interviews in criminal
cases, effective 2005). Cases applying the nearly identical civil rule
are informative.

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III

Because Bates has failed to carry his burden of showing good

cause for the 40-year delay at issue, we affirm the postconviction

court’s denial of Bates’s motion.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County,
Dustin Stephenson, Judge
Case No. 031982CF000661XXAXMX

Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, James L.
Driscoll, Jr., Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and
Jeanine Cohen, Staff Attorney, Office of Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

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