Michael G. Lane v. State of Florida

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 26, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-0712
Lower Tribunal No. F19-11445B
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Michael G. Lane,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Richard Hersch, Judge.
Michael G. Lane, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Yolande M. Samerson,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and MILLER, JJ.
EMAS, J.

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Michael G. Lane appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion
to correct jail credit, purportedly pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.801. However, Lane’s motion did not actually seek additional
jail credit (i.e., credit for time spent in a county jail before sentencing), but
instead sought credit for gain time, awarded by the Florida Department of
Corrections while Lane was serving the prison portion of his split sentence.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.
Lane’s motion contains the following relevant allegations, which we
accept as true for purposes of this appeal:
● Lane was arrested in July of 2019 in case number F19-11445B, and
remained in the Dade County Jail until August 16, 2021.
● On that date, the trial court imposed a split sentence of four years’
state prison followed by three years’ reporting probation. The trial court
awarded all credit for time served in the county jail prior to sentencing.
● While serving his four-year prison sentence, Lane was awarded 150
days gain time by the Florida Department of Corrections.
● Lane was released from prison and began serving the probationary
portion of his split sentence.
● On May 2, 2024, while on probation, Lane was arrested and charged
in three separate felony cases. He was also charged with violating his
probation by committing the new felony offenses.
● On December 3, 2024, Lane entered a negotiated global plea to all
four cases. As to his original case (F19-11445B), the trial court

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revoked Lane’s probation and sentenced Lane to 103.725 months in
prison, with credit for all jail time and prison time previously served.
On March 17, 2025, Lane filed the instant motion for correction of jail
credit in his original felony case (F19-11445B). In that motion, Lane
acknowledges he was awarded the correct amount of credit for time spent in
the county jail, and that he was also awarded the correct amount of credit for
time actually served in prison. For these reasons alone it is evident the trial
court correctly denied his motion to correct jail credit under rule 3.801(a),
given Lane’s candid concession that the jail credit awarded was not in need
of correction. After all, as rule 3.801(a) provides:
A court may correct a final sentence that fails to allow a
defendant credit for all of the time he or she spent in the
county jail before sentencing as provided in section 921.161,
Florida Statutes.
(Emphasis added). As the Florida Supreme Court has held:
[G]ain time is no longer to be considered as time served for all
purposes. While the award of gain time reduces an inmate's
release date, just as actual time spent incarcerated, it is clearly
not synonymous with actual time served. On the contrary, gain
time is time not served. It is merely an incentive device used by
the Department for purposes of encouraging good behavior both
in prison and on supervision.
Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 2000).
Lane contends however, that he is entitled to continue receiving credit
for 150 days of prison gain time awarded by the Florida Department of

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Corrections during the period he served his original four-year prison term.
While this is beyond the scope and purpose of rule 3.801, we write to address
the application and subsequent forfeiture of prison gain time in the context
of a split sentence.
As indicated earlier, Lane was properly awarded credit for each day he
actually served in the county jail (awaiting his original sentence and awaiting
his subsequent sentence following the violation of his probation) and for each
day he actually served in prison on the incarcerative portion of his original
split sentence.
In addition, Lane correctly notes that, in the sentencing order following
the revocation of his probation, the trial court indicated Lane was to receive
credit for “all prior prison and gain time.” (Emphasis added).
It is the above language that Lane relies upon for his motion, alleging
that after returning to prison to begin serving his new sentence (103.725
months) the Florida Department of Corrections forfeited his accrued prison
gain time of 150 days. However, the above language in the sentencing order
is not determinative of whether Lane’s accrued prison gain time will be
retained or forfeited.
When a split-sentenced prisoner is released from prison and remains
under supervision (e.g., probation), is thereafter found to have violated that

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probation, and the trial court revokes probation and imposes a subsequent
prison sentence, the trial court may “recommend” that a defendant’s accrued
prison gain time not be forfeited. However, the statutory authority to declare
a forfeiture of accrued prison gain time does not reside in the trial court.
Since October 1, 1989, such authority has resided exclusively with the
Florida Department of Corrections, even if the trial court recommends that
such gain time be retained. Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla.
2001) (“The authority to regulate gain time resides exclusively within the
Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes.”);
Eldridge, 760 So. 2d at 890-91. The Legislature conferred this exclusive
authority on the Florida Department of Corrections by enacting section
944.28(1), Florida Statutes (2024). The relevant statutory language has
remained virtually identical since its 1989 adoption, and provides in pertinent
part:
If . . . probation or community control as described in chapter 948, . . .
granted to the prisoner is revoked, the department may, without notice
or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned according to the
provisions of law by such prisoner prior to. . . his or her release under
such . . . probation, community control, provisional release, control
release, or parole.
See also § 948.06(7), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, whenever probation, community control, or control release,
including the probationary, community control portion of a split sentence, is

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violated and the probation or community control is revoked, the offender, by
reason of his or her misconduct, shall be deemed to have forfeited all gain-
time or commutation of time for good conduct, as provided by law, earned
up to the date of his or her release on probation, community control, or
control release. This subsection does not deprive the prisoner of his or her
right to gain-time or commutation of time for good conduct, as provided by
law, from the date on which the prisoner is returned to prison.”).
Notwithstanding the recommendation contained in the trial court’s
written sentence, the Florida Department of Corrections determined that
Lane’s accrued prison gain time should be forfeited upon his return to prison
to serve a term of incarceration following revocation of his probation. The
trial court correctly denied Lane’s motion to correct jail credit.1
Affirmed.
1 Our affirmance is without prejudice to Lane seeking an administrative
remedy with the Florida Department of Corrections, to the extent such may
be available. See, e.g., Dunbar v. State, 225 So. 3d 971 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017);
Mairs v. State, 215 So. 3d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).