LYNNE'A SAITO AND KOICHI SAITO v. COLLIER COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA, DECUBAS & LEWIS, P.A., PRATICK PATEL, PETER LANNING, AND EXL LEGAL, PLLC

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF F LORIDA
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Case No. 6D2024-2510
Lower Tribunal No. 2024-CA-001540
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L YNNE’ A SAITO and K OICHI SAITO,
Appellants,
v.
C OLLIER COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA , D E CUBAS & L EWIS, P.A., PRATIK PATEL,
PETER L ANNING, and EXL L EGAL, PLLC,
Appellees.
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County.
Lauren L. Brodie, Judge.
December 12, 2025
PER CURIAM.
Appellants, Lynne’a and Koichi Saito, pro se, appeal four dismissal orders on
their declaratory action against Collier County, State of Florida, Pratik R. Patel, Esq.,
De Cubas & Lewis, P.A., Peter Lanning, Esq., and eXL Legal, PLLC. 	On our de
novo review of those orders, we affirm the trial court’s orders dismissing Appellants’
action against Appellees Patel, De Cubas, Lanning, and eXL Legal because the
amended complaint failed to state a cause of action against them and an amendment

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would be futile. See Riggins v. Clifford R. Rhoades, P.A., 373 So. 3d 655, 659 (Fla.
6th DCA 2023) (“A final order dismissing a complaint with prejudice is reviewed
de novo.”); Tuten v. Fariborzian, 84 So. 3d 1063, 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
(“Although leave of the court shall be freely given when justice requires, the court
need not allow an amendment that would be futile.”).
We, however, dismiss Appellants’ appeal of the orders granting Collier
County’s and State of Florida’s motions to dismiss because they are non-final, non-
appealable orders. 	See Paulino v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 106 So. 3d 985, 987
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“[I]t is well-established that an order which merely grants a
motion to dismiss, as contrasted with an order dismissing a complaint or an action,
is not a final order.”); GMI, LLC v. Asociacion del Futbol Argentino, 174 So. 3d
500, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“An order that merely grants a motion to dismiss is
not a final order. This is true even if the order grants the motion ‘with prejudice.’
For an order to be final, it must constitute an entry of a dismissal of the case. It is the
dismissal of the case that is final and appealable, not an order simply granting a
motion.” (internal marks and citations omitted)).
AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.
TRAVER, C.J., and MIZE and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur.

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Lynne’a Saito and Koichi Saito, Near Naples, pro se.
Jeffrey A. Klatzkow, County Attorney, and Ronald T. Tomasko and Derek D. Perry,
Assistant County Attorneys, Naples, for Appellee, Collier County.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Thomas A. Pratt, Assistant
Attorney General, Orlando, for Appellee, State of Florida.
Steven L. Force, of De Cubas & Lewis, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, pro se, and for
Appellee, Pratik Patel.
Steve D. Tran, of eXL Legal, PLLC, St. Petersburg, pro se, and for Appellee, Peter
Lanning.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED