CBRE, INC. v. DIDIERGROUP, LLC, BLAKE PLUMLEY, CAPITAL PURSUITS, LLC and RISON CORNERS PROPERTY, LLC

2023-3011Fla Dist Ct App 6th

Full text

S IXTH D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF F LORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 6D2023-3011
Lower Tribunal No. 2019-CA-010562-O
_____________________________
CBRE, INC .,
Appellant,
v.
D IDIER GROUP , LLC, B LAKE PLUMLEY, C APITAL PURSUITS , LLC, and R ISON
C ORNERS PROPERTY, LLC,
Appellees.
_____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County.
John E. Jordan, Judge.
March 13, 2026
NARDELLA, J.
This is an appeal following a jury trial where the jury found CBRE, Inc.
liable to DidierGroup, LLC (“DG”) for tortious interference with a business
relationship and for aiding and abetting a DG employee in breaching his fiduciary
duty to DG. 	On appeal, CBRE raises several issues, only one of which warrants
reversal. 	CBRE rightly argues that the trial court erred in refusing its request for
setoff.
Setoff determinations are governed by sections 768.041 and 46.015, Florida
Statutes. These provisions are “nearly identical”; section 768.041(2) applies to tort
2
actions, while section 46.015(2) applies to all other actions, including actions on
contracts. 	Addison Constr. Corp. v. Vecellio, 240 So. 3d 757, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA
2018). 	Section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes, states:
At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his or
her legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not
to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the
court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to
which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering
judgment.
Likewise, section 768.041(2), Florida Statutes, states:
At trial, if any defendant shows the court that the plaintiff, or any
person lawfully on her or his behalf, has delivered a release or covenant
not to sue to any person, firm, or corporation in partial satisfaction of
the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the
amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise
entitled 	at 	the 	time 	of 	rendering 	judgment 	and 	enter 	judgment
accordingly.
Setoff 	statutes 	are 	“designed 	to 	prevent 	duplicate 	or 	overlapping
compensation for identical damages.” Cornerstone SMR, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
163 So. 3d 565, 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). The test for determining whether a double
recovery would result in the absence of a setoff is whether the damages “sued for”
against the settling parties and the non-settling parties are “identical.” Addison, 240
So. 3d at 767. 	In this appeal, CBRE has shown that identical damages would be
recovered from both parties if setoff were not allowed.
DG asserted two claims for damages against CBRE, each of which were also
asserted against Rison Corners Property, LLC (“RCP”). Specifically, DG’s claims
3
for tortious interference (Count VII) and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
(Count VIII) were asserted against both CBRE and RCP. 	In both Count VII and
Count VIII, DG sought recovery of its “actual damages,” which it alleged included
“all actual profits . . . and/or all anticipated profits to be earned by the [DG]. . . .”
Before trial, DG and RCP reached a settlement, after which the trial court granted
CBRE leave to assert an affirmative defense of setoff arising from the RCP
settlement. 	Nevertheless, when CBRE moved for setoff after trial, the trial court
summarily denied CBRE’s motion. 	This was error. 	Accordingly, we reverse the
order summarily denying setoff and remand the case for the trial court to determine
the proper amount of setoff and enter an amended final judgment accordingly.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings.
STARGEL and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, and Bethany J. M. Pandher, of Greenburg
Traurig, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
Celene H. Humphries, of Celene Humphries, PLLC, Spring City, Tennessee, and
Christopher T. Hill and Rachel A. O’Brien, of Hill, Rugh, Keller & Main, P.L.,
Orlando, for Appellee, DidierGroup, LLC.
No Appearance for Appellees, Blake Plumley, Capital Pursuits, LLC, and Rison
Corners Property, LLC.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 6D2023-3011
Lower Tribunal No. 2019-CA-010562-O

CBRE, INC.,
Appellant,
v.

DIDIERGROUP, LLC, BLAKE PLUMLEY, CAPITAL PURSUITS, LLC, and RISON
CORNERS PROPERTY, LLC,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County.
John E. Jordan, Judge.

March 13, 2026
NARDELLA, J.

This is an appeal following a jury trial where the jury found CBRE, Inc.
liable to DidierGroup, LLC (“DG”) for tortious interference with a business
relationship and for aiding and abetting a DG employee in breaching his fiduciary
duty to DG. On appeal, CBRE raises several issues, only one of which warrants
reversal. CBRE rightly argues that the trial court erred in refusing its request for
setoff.

Setoff determinations are governed by sections 768.041 and 46.015, Florida

Statutes. These provisions are “nearly identical”; section 768.041(2) applies to tort

actions, while section 46.015(2) applies to all other actions, including actions on
contracts. Addison Constr. Corp. v. Vecellio, 240 So. 3d 757, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA
2018). Section 46.015(2), Florida Statutes, states:

At trial, if any person shows the court that the plaintiff, or his or

her legal representative, has delivered a written release or covenant not

to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the

court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to

which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering

judgment.
Likewise, section 768.041(2), Florida Statutes, states:
At trial, if any defendant shows the court that the plaintiff, or any
person lawfully on her or his behalf, has delivered a release or covenant

not to sue to any person, firm, or corporation in partial satisfaction of

the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the

amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise

entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment
accordingly.

Setoff statutes are “designed to prevent duplicate or overlapping
compensation for identical damages.” Cornerstone SMR, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
163 So. 3d 565, 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). The test for determining whether a double
recovery would result in the absence of a setoff is whether the damages “sued for”
against the settling parties and the non-settling parties are “identical.” Addison, 240
So. 3d at 767. In this appeal, CBRE has shown that identical damages would be
recovered from both parties if setoff were not allowed.

DG asserted two claims for damages against CBRE, each of which were also

asserted against Rison Corners Property, LLC (“RCP”). Specifically, DG’s claims

for tortious interference (Count VII) and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
(Count VIII) were asserted against both CBRE and RCP. In both Count VII and
Count VIII, DG sought recovery of its “actual damages,” which it alleged included
“all actual profits . . . and/or all anticipated profits to be earned by the [DG]... .”
Before trial, DG and RCP reached a settlement, after which the trial court granted
CBRE leave to assert an affirmative defense of setoff arising from the RCP
settlement. Nevertheless, when CBRE moved for setoff after trial, the trial court
summarily denied CBRE’s motion. This was error. Accordingly, we reverse the
order summarily denying setoff and remand the case for the trial court to determine
the proper amount of setoff and enter an amended final judgment accordingly.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings.

STARGEL and SMITH, JJ., concur.

Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, and Bethany J. M. Pandher, of Greenburg
Traurig, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.

Celene H. Humphries, of Celene Humphries, PLLC, Spring City, Tennessee, and
Christopher T. Hill and Rachel A. O’Brien, of Hill, Rugh, Keller & Main, P.L.,
Orlando, for Appellee, DidierGroup, LLC.

No Appearance for Appellees, Blake Plumley, Capital Pursuits, LLC, and Rison
Corners Property, LLC.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED

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