Torres-Carmona v. State of Florida

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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

CARLOS ALBERTO TORRES-CARMONA,
Appellant,
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D2024-1423

January 14, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Samantha L.
Ward, Judge.

Ita M. Neymotin, Regional Counsel, Second District, and Joseph Thye
Sexton, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil
Regional Counsel, Fort Myers, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Natalia Reyna-
Pimiento, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

In a one-count indictment, the State charged Carlos Alberto Torres-
Carmona and a codefendant, Jonathan Xavier Garcia-Perello, with the
first-degree murder of Jose Irizarry-Agosto. Torres-Carmona was found
guilty of manslaughter, a lesser included offense. He was sentenced to a

fifteen-year prison term with credit for time served. In this appeal of his

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judgment and sentence, he challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress all evidence resulting from a search of his home, including two
cell phones.
The trial court denied Torres-Carmona's motion to suppress in an
unelaborated order. On appeal, he argues that the court's lack of
findings of fact or conclusions of law deprives him of meaningful
appellate review. He also argues that the affidavit for the search warrant
did not contain sufficient evidence to support probable cause to search
his residence. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that
neither argument has merit and affirm Torres-Carmona's judgment and
sentence.
"[A] trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed
with a presumption of correctness and, as the reviewing court, we must
interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived
therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's
ruling." Ferrell v. State, 391 So. 3d 645, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (quoting
Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1997)). We review the denial
of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard. See Weaver v. State,
233 So. 3d 501, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). We review the court's
application of the law to the facts of the case de novo, but we "must defer
to the factual findings of the trial court that are supported by competent,
substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Bautista v. State, 902 So. 2d 312, 314
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).
As to Torres-Carmona's challenge to the adequacy of the order
denying his motion to suppress, the lack of explicit findings does not
mandate automatic reversal. In reviewing the trial court's decision, "we
must construe the factual record in the light most favorable to the denial
of the motion." Falcon v. State, 230 So. 3d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017);

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see also State v. Keel, 557 So. 2d 907, 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
("conclud[ing] that the trial court was not required by any rule or statute
to set forth detailed findings of fact in the written order granting the
motion to suppress"). As a result, the absence of factual findings and
legal conclusions does not, in itself, support reversal. See State v.
Thomas, 332 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) ("With the exception of
certain orders which are required by law to contain recitations of findings
or reasons, if there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the
order of the trial court the judge will be presumed to have properly based
his order on that evidence.").
Regarding the sufficiency of the affidavit to support probable cause,
"a supporting affidavit for issuance of a search warrant 'must satisfy two
elements: first, that a particular person has committed a crime—the
commission element, and second, that evidence relevant to the probable
criminality is likely located at the place to be searched—the nexus
element.' " Sanchez v. State, 141 So. 3d 1281, 1284-85 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014) (quoting Burnett v. State, 848 So. 2d 1170, 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA
2003)).
Probable cause is a practical, common-sense question. It is
the probability of criminal activity, and not a prima facie
showing of such activity, which is the standard of probable
cause. The determination of probable cause involves factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
State v. Rodriguez Lopez, 378 So. 3d 691, 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)
(quoting Polk v. Williams, 565 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)).
The reasons given by law enforcement in support of a warrant
"must be sufficient to create a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed." Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1991). If the
warrant provides a substantial factual basis for the magistrate to

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conclude that a search will uncover evidence of a crime, then the test for
probable cause is met. Id. When reviewing a magistrate's decision as to
whether probable cause existed to issue a search warrant, "[t]he trial
court should afford 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision and
should not review the magistrate's decision de novo." Rodriguez Lopez,
378 So. 3d at 697 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Exantus, 59 So.
3d 359, 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).
Here, an officer with the Osceola County Sheriff's Office provided a
lengthy, detailed affidavit in support of the search warrant. The affidavit
described the information gathered through the investigative work
performed by detectives and officers with the Tampa Police Department
and the Osceola County Sheriff's Office. The victim was shot and killed
in his car. No mobile phones were located on his person or in his car,
although the victim's girlfriend informed a detective that the victim had
two cell phones and provided him with phone numbers. The detective
ran a cellular provider check for both of the victim's phone numbers and
received cell tower and call detail records.
The affidavit further disclosed the details of the investigation,
including information obtained from several individuals and cell phone
records. A neighbor reported that a few days before the victim's murder,
the victim's dogs had gotten loose from the victim's yard. The victim's
cell phone records showed that the victim called a phone number ending
in 2103 shortly after speaking with the neighbor. That phone number
was called five times over the course of twenty-three minutes. Call detail
records for that cell number provided subscriber information identifying
Torres-Carmona and listed his address and two cell phones as being
associated with the same phone number. Torres-Carmona's probation

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officer confirmed Torres-Carmona's phone number and address were
consistent with those records.
The detective learned that the phone associated with codefendant
Garcia-Perello traveled in tandem with the victim's phone from Orlando
to Tampa. The affidavit disclosed that there were multiple, frequent
contacts by phone and text between the phones of Torres-Carmona and
Garcia-Perello on the day of the murder, beginning nearly two hours
before the murder was believed to have occurred and growing in intensity
about the time when the victim was leaving the Orlando area. No further
messaging was found between those two phones after the estimated time
of the murder. Garcia-Perello's phone and the victim's phone also
traveled together for a short while after police believe the homicide
occurred, although the victim's phone eventually stopped connecting to
cell phone towers. Garcia-Perello's cell phone data indicated that he
traveled from the area of the murder to the area around the home of
Torres-Camona, who was "believed to have been in communication with
Jonathan Garcia-Perello leading up to the homicide of [the victim]." After
remaining in that area for eleven minutes, Garcia-Perello's phone data
indicated that he then traveled to eastern Orlando.
We conclude that the detailed information contained in the affidavit
satisfies both the commission and nexus elements required for a finding
of probable cause. See Sanchez, 141 So. 3d at 1284-85. Further, there
were no indications in the affidavit that any of this information was
unreliable, and the affidavit demonstrated a fair probability that evidence
of the homicide would be found as a result of the search. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (noting that "the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the

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'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place").
Nevertheless, even if an affidavit contains deficiencies, where "the
existence of probable cause presents a close question on which
reasonable minds could differ—or even that probable cause was in fact
lacking—suppression would nonetheless be unwarranted under the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule." Rodriguez Lopez, 378 So. 3d at
698. This exception "exists where evidence has been seized in
reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate, even if the affidavit in support of the warrant is later found to
have been lacking the requisite probable cause." Id. The exception is
unavailable if
(1) the issuing magistrate was misled by information included
in the supporting affidavit "that the affiant knew was false or
would have known was false" but for the affiant's "reckless
disregard of the truth," or if material information was
knowingly or recklessly omitted from the affidavit; (2) the
"issuing magistrate wholly abandoned" his detached and
neutral role; (3) the supporting affidavit is " 'so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable' "; or (4) the warrant is "so
facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid."
Id. at 699 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 922-23 (1984)).
Although we conclude that the affidavit is not deficient, even if it
was deficient, the good faith exception would be applicable. Thus, the
trial court did not err by denying Torres-Carmona's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
SLEET and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.