Dawn Atkinson n/k/a Dawn Elizabeth Bond v. Allen Atkinson

2025-1154Fladistctapp4

Full text

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
DAWN ATKINSON,
Appellant,
v.
ALLEN ATKINSON,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-1154
[February 18, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie 	County; 	Lillian 	B. 	Ewen, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
562024DR001719AXXXHC.
Chet Eliot Weinbaum of The Law Office of Chet E. Weinbaum, P.A., Fort
Pierce, for appellant.
Kevin M. Rollin of Napier & Rollin, PLLC, Vero Beach, for appellee.
S HEPHERD, J.
The former wife appeals the circuit court’s final judgment of dissolution
of marriage that failed to award nominal alimony and did not retain
jurisdiction to revisit alimony in the future. 	Former wife argues that the
circuit 	court 	improperly 	considered 	the 	former 	husband’s 	overstated
expenses and failed to consider factors that indicate former husband’s
financial situation would improve. We agree and reverse on this issue. We
affirm the final judgment in all other respects.
The parties had been married for eighteen years, a moderate-length
marriage under Florida law. Former husband testified at trial that he was
58 	years 	old 	and 	was 	employed 	as 	a 	programmer/analyst. 	After
mediation, the only issue to be determined at trial was the type and
amount of alimony. At trial, the parties stipulated to former wife’s financial
need for alimony. 	Former wife testified that she works part-time only to
maintain insurance.
Former 	husband 	testified 	that 	he 	was 	employed 	from 	June 	2022
through December 2024 and earned a gross income of $105,663.00 in
2
2023 and $117,511.00 in 2024. 	He testified that he left that job for new
employment in January 2025 with a gross salary of $126,768.00 and gross
monthly income of $10,564.00, as reflected in his third amended family
law financial affidavit. 	Trial testimony was contradictory regarding the
monthly income ranging from $9,926.00 to $11,260.34. 	The issue was
not clarified for the circuit court. 	The trial evidence included testimony
that former husband took a job in Florida to allow former wife to care for
her parents and to avoid having to move back to Tennessee; in doing so,
his salary decreased by approximately $20,000.00 annually. 	Former
husband conceded that his financial affidavits contained errors, including
a health insurance expense of $1,294.00 per month which was actually
$334.31. He also failed to account for the removal of former wife and their
adult daughter from his car insurance, the elimination of certain repairs
and maintenance expenses, and adjustments to utilities and telephone
costs. 	In total, the trial evidence showed former husband’s expenses in
the financial affidavits were overstated by $2,379.69.
Further, former husband testified that the mortgage for the four-
bedroom, two-bathroom former marital home was $3,437.00 monthly,
which at the time was fifty percent of his monthly income. 	Former
husband stated that he had listed the home for sale and planned to buy a
smaller home, reducing his expenses. 	Former husband also testified that
he had a storage unit for which he paid $300.00 each month to store tools
while the house was being shown to prospective buyers. The circuit court
concluded that former husband functioned at a monthly deficit of $171.31.
However, the final judgment indicates that the circuit court reduced
former 	husband’s 	allowable 	expenses 	by 	$1,789.69 	or 	possibly 	even
$2,189.69. 	The 	record 	does 	not 	demonstrate 	that 	any 	additional
discrepancies in his expenses were tabulated in reaching the bottom line.
Accordingly, 	former 	husband 	would 	have 	had 	a 	monthly 	surplus 	of
approximately $20.00, not a deficit. 	The circuit court nonetheless found
that “the Wife did not prove that the Husband has the ability to pay
alimony. 	Therefore, neither party shall be entitled to alimony, now or in
the future.”
Former wife argued at trial and on appeal that she should have received
at least nominal alimony, in part, because former husband’s ability to pay
will likely change in the future.
Florida’s 	courts 	have 	permitted 	nominal 	alimony 	only 	in 	narrow
circumstances, where a spouse would be entitled to alimony but for the
paying 	spouse’s 	temporary 	inability 	to 	pay, 	which 	is 	reasonably
foreseeable to change in the future. 	See Shaw v. Shaw, 273 So. 3d 1145
(Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Turcotte v. Turcotte, 122 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2d DCA
3
2013); Lightcap v. Lightcap, 14 So. 3d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). 	“The rule,
generally, is that where there is a likelihood of a change in circumstances
in the future that would warrant an award of alimony, the court should
retain jurisdiction.” O’Brien v. O’Brien, 396 So. 3d 585, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA
2024) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 440 So. 2d 16, 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and
citing Reed v. Reed, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)).
“Section 	61.08, 	Florida 	Statutes 	(2023), 	authorizes 	the 	award 	of
alimony, with subsection (3) setting forth factors that the court ‘shall
consider’ in determining the amount and type.” Edman v. Edman, 407 So.
3d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). 	“In determining whether to award
alimony, the trial court ‘shall first make a specific, factual determination
as to whether the party seeking support, maintenance, or alimony has an
actual need for it and whether the other party has the ability to pay
support, maintenance, or alimony.’” 	Id. 	Also, “[i]n determining a proper
award of alimony, the court may consider any factor necessary to do equity
and justice between the parties.” 	Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d
1197, 1200 (Fla. 1980) (quoting § 61.08, Fla. Stat.).
“[W]hen one party is entitled to permanent periodic alimony but the
other spouse has no current ability to pay, the trial court should award a
nominal sum of permanent periodic alimony,[1] which will give the court
jurisdiction 	to 	reconsider 	the 	award 	should 	the 	parties’ 	financial
circumstances change.”). 	Turcotte, 122 So. 3d at 957 (quoting Schmidt v.
Schmidt, 997 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). 	See Blanchard v.
Blanchard, 793 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“the trial court abused
its discretion when it failed to award the wife $1 in permanent periodic
alimony to reserve her future right to alimony in light of the husband’s
work history during this long-term marriage”); Stock v. Stock, 693 So. 2d
1080, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (affirming reservation of jurisdiction to
determine alimony award in the future when the evidence showed “a
likelihood that there will be a change in circumstances that would enable
the husband to meet his obligation to contribute to the wife’s support”).
A trial court’s factual findings regarding nominal alimony are reviewed
for abuse of discretion. 	See O’Brien, 396 So. 3d at 587; Roy v. Roy, 522
So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“[W]hether to reserve jurisdiction to
award alimony in the future lies within the court’s discretion”); Brown, 440
So. 2d at 18; Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976); Schmidt, 997 So.
2d at 454.
1 We recognize that the Florida legislature effectively eliminated permanent
alimony in 2023. However, the ability of circuit courts to award nominal alimony
was not affected. § 61.08(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023).
4
We reversed a circuit court’s order in O’Brien that failed to award
nominal alimony and retain jurisdiction, finding that while competent
substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s determination that the
former husband did not have the current ability to pay alimony, the circuit
court erred in failing to award nominal alimony. 	O’Brien, 396 So. 3d at
587. 	In O’Brien, the evidence suggested that, while the former husband
did not have the current ability to pay, he had received recent raises and
would soon pay off pending debts. 	Id. at 589. 	Just as in O’Brien, the
testimony here was that former husband’s financial circumstances would
improve when the marital home was sold, and he would have a less
expensive mortgage. Former husband also would no longer need a storage
unit after the home’s sale.
Under 	the 	circumstances 	of 	this 	case 	and 	consistent 	with 	our
precedent, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it denied former
wife nominal alimony. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the circuit
court to award nominal alimony to former wife and to reserve jurisdiction
should a future basis arise to revisit alimony. 	In all other respects, the
final judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
G ROSS and F ORST , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

DAWN ATKINSON,
Appellant,

Vv.

ALLEN ATKINSON,
Appellee.

No. 4D2025-1154
[February 18, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Lillian B. Ewen, Judge; L.T. Case No.
562024DR001719AXXXHC.

Chet Eliot Weinbaum of The Law Office of Chet E. Weinbaum, P.A., Fort
Pierce, for appellant.

Kevin M. Rollin of Napier & Rollin, PLLC, Vero Beach, for appellee.
SHEPHERD, J.

The former wife appeals the circuit court’s final judgment of dissolution
of marriage that failed to award nominal alimony and did not retain
jurisdiction to revisit alimony in the future. Former wife argues that the
circuit court improperly considered the former husband’s overstated
expenses and failed to consider factors that indicate former husband’s
financial situation would improve. We agree and reverse on this issue. We
affirm the final judgment in all other respects.

The parties had been married for eighteen years, a moderate-length
marriage under Florida law. Former husband testified at trial that he was
58 years old and was employed as a programmer/analyst. After
mediation, the only issue to be determined at trial was the type and
amount of alimony. At trial, the parties stipulated to former wife’s financial
need for alimony. Former wife testified that she works part-time only to
maintain insurance.

Former husband testified that he was employed from June 2022
through December 2024 and earned a gross income of $105,663.00 in

2023 and $117,511.00 in 2024. He testified that he left that job for new
employment in January 2025 with a gross salary of $126,768.00 and gross
monthly income of $10,564.00, as reflected in his third amended family
law financial affidavit. Trial testimony was contradictory regarding the
monthly income ranging from $9,926.00 to $11,260.34. The issue was
not clarified for the circuit court. The trial evidence included testimony
that former husband took a job in Florida to allow former wife to care for
her parents and to avoid having to move back to Tennessee; in doing so,
his salary decreased by approximately $20,000.00 annually. Former
husband conceded that his financial affidavits contained errors, including
a health insurance expense of $1,294.00 per month which was actually
$334.31. He also failed to account for the removal of former wife and their
adult daughter from his car insurance, the elimination of certain repairs
and maintenance expenses, and adjustments to utilities and telephone
costs. In total, the trial evidence showed former husband’s expenses in
the financial affidavits were overstated by $2,379.69.

Further, former husband testified that the mortgage for the four-
bedroom, two-bathroom former marital home was $3,437.00 monthly,
which at the time was fifty percent of his monthly income. Former
husband stated that he had listed the home for sale and planned to buy a
smaller home, reducing his expenses. Former husband also testified that
he had a storage unit for which he paid $300.00 each month to store tools
while the house was being shown to prospective buyers. The circuit court
concluded that former husband functioned at a monthly deficit of $171.31.
However, the final judgment indicates that the circuit court reduced
former husband’s allowable expenses by $1,789.69 or possibly even
$2,189.69. The record does not demonstrate that any additional
discrepancies in his expenses were tabulated in reaching the bottom line.
Accordingly, former husband would have had a monthly surplus of
approximately $20.00, not a deficit. The circuit court nonetheless found
that “the Wife did not prove that the Husband has the ability to pay
alimony. Therefore, neither party shall be entitled to alimony, now or in
the future.”

Former wife argued at trial and on appeal that she should have received
at least nominal alimony, in part, because former husband’s ability to pay
will likely change in the future.

Florida’s courts have permitted nominal alimony only in narrow
circumstances, where a spouse would be entitled to alimony but for the
paying spouse’s temporary inability to pay, which is reasonably
foreseeable to change in the future. See Shaw v. Shaw, 273 So. 3d 1145
(Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Turcotte v. Turcotte, 122 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2d DCA

2

2013); Lightcap v. Lightcap, 14 So. 3d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). “The rule,
generally, is that where there is a likelihood of a change in circumstances
in the future that would warrant an award of alimony, the court should
retain jurisdiction.” O’Brien v. O’Brien, 396 So. 3d 585, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA
2024) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 440 So. 2d 16, 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and
citing Reed v. Reed, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. lst DCA 1971)).

“Section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2023), authorizes the award of
alimony, with subsection (3) setting forth factors that the court ‘shall
consider’ in determining the amount and type.” Edman v. Edman, 407 So.
3d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). “In determining whether to award
alimony, the trial court ‘shall first make a specific, factual determination
as to whether the party seeking support, maintenance, or alimony has an
actual need for it and whether the other party has the ability to pay
support, maintenance, or alimony.” Id. Also, “[i]Jn determining a proper
award of alimony, the court may consider any factor necessary to do equity
and justice between the parties.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d
1197, 1200 (Fla. 1980) (quoting § 61.08, Fla. Stat.).

“(W]hen one party is entitled to permanent periodic alimony but the
other spouse has no current ability to pay, the trial court should award a
nominal sum of permanent periodic alimony,|!] which will give the court
jurisdiction to reconsider the award should the parties’ financial
circumstances change.”). Turcotte, 122 So. 3d at 957 (quoting Schmidt v.
Schmidt, 997 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). See Blanchard v.
Blanchard, 793 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“the trial court abused
its discretion when it failed to award the wife $1 in permanent periodic
alimony to reserve her future right to alimony in light of the husband’s
work history during this long-term marriage”); Stock v. Stock, 693 So. 2d
1080, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (affirming reservation of jurisdiction to
determine alimony award in the future when the evidence showed “a
likelihood that there will be a change in circumstances that would enable
the husband to meet his obligation to contribute to the wife’s support”).

A trial court’s factual findings regarding nominal alimony are reviewed
for abuse of discretion. See O’Brien, 396 So. 3d at 587; Roy v. Roy, 522
So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“[W]hether to reserve jurisdiction to
award alimony in the future lies within the court’s discretion”); Brown, 440
So. 2d at 18; Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976); Schmidt, 997 So.
2d at 454.

1 We recognize that the Florida legislature effectively eliminated permanent
alimony in 2023. However, the ability of circuit courts to award nominal alimony
was not affected. § 61.08(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023).

3

We reversed a circuit court’s order in O’Brien that failed to award
nominal alimony and retain jurisdiction, finding that while competent
substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s determination that the
former husband did not have the current ability to pay alimony, the circuit
court erred in failing to award nominal alimony. O’Brien, 396 So. 3d at
587. In O’Brien, the evidence suggested that, while the former husband
did not have the current ability to pay, he had received recent raises and
would soon pay off pending debts. Id. at 589. Just as in O’Brien, the
testimony here was that former husband’s financial circumstances would
improve when the marital home was sold, and he would have a less
expensive mortgage. Former husband also would no longer need a storage
unit after the home’s sale.

Under the circumstances of this case and consistent with our
precedent, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it denied former
wife nominal alimony. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the circuit
court to award nominal alimony to former wife and to reserve jurisdiction
should a future basis arise to revisit alimony. In all other respects, the
final judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

GROSS and FoRST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

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