Barbara Shriberg and Robert Shriberg v. Florida Flooring, Inc.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
ROBERT SHRIBERG and BARBARA SHRIBERG,
Appellants,
v.
FLORIDA FLOORING, INC., a Florida Corporation,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-0162
[January 7, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Reginald R. Corlew, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2023-CC-
016181-XXXA-SB.
Stephen A. Smith, Boca Raton, for appellants.
Irwin R. Gilbert of Irwin R. Gilbert Law, P.A., Woodstock, Georgia, and
Janine 	R. 	McGuire 	of 	Conrad 	& 	Scherer, 	LLP, 	Fort 	Lauderdale, 	for
appellee.
C IKLIN, J.
Barbara 	and 	Robert 	Shriberg 	(the 	“plaintiffs”) 	appeal 	a 	summary
judgment 	order 	entered 	in 	favor 	of 	Florida 	Flooring, 	Inc. 	(“Florida
Flooring”), finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because their
home was owned by a revocable trust and not by the plaintiffs. 	The
plaintiffs argue that, as the revocable trust’s trustees, they had standing
to sue as a matter of law. 	We agree with the plaintiffs’ argument that the
trial court mistakenly determined they lacked legal standing to sue, and
we reverse.
In 2015, the plaintiffs contracted with Florida Flooring for the purchase
and installation of new engineered wood flooring in their Lake Worth home.
The plaintiffs, in their individual capacities, sued Florida Flooring in 2023
for “breach of contract/breach of warranty” based on defects that appeared
in the flooring in April 2023. Florida Flooring’s amended answer asserted,
among other affirmative defenses, that the plaintiffs lacked standing.

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Florida 	Flooring 	moved 	for 	summary 	judgment. 	Florida 	Flooring
contended that the plaintiffs had transferred title of the subject home to a
trust on August 7, 2017, so they were not the home’s owners when they
filed the complaint in September 2023, and thus, they lacked standing at
the lawsuit’s inception. Florida Flooring argued that installation of flooring
is a permanent improvement to a building, and a transferor of a building
does not retain an interest in the deeded property, so the plaintiffs lacked
a sufficient stake in the controversy to establish standing. Florida Flooring
further argued lack of standing at the lawsuit’s inception could not be
remedied by amendment to substitute a party with standing.
Attached to Florida Flooring’s summary judgment motion was a copy of
a warranty deed reflecting that the plaintiffs, “husband and wife, Grantor,”
had transferred their home to “ROBERT A. SHRIBERG and BARBARA M.
SHRIBERG, as Trustees of the ROBERT A. SHRIBERG and BARBARA M.
SHRIBERG Revocable Trust Agreement a/k/a RBSRT dated August 7,
2017” (hereinafter, the “Trust”). 	The deed also contains a note to the
property appraiser stating, “The Grantor confirms that under the terms of
the Trust referred to above, the Grantor has not less than a beneficial
interest for life and is entitled to a homestead exemption pursuant to the
provisions of Florida Statute 196.041(2).”
The 	plaintiffs 	opposed 	Florida 	Flooring’s 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment. They acknowledged that they had transferred their home to the
revocable Trust, but they correctly asserted that, as the trustees, they
retained a beneficial interest in the home per controlling Florida law. They
specifically “dispute[d] [Florida Flooring]’s assertion as an undisputed fact
that Plaintiffs were not the owners of the subject home and therefore
lacked standing,” and they argued that their unfettered ownership interest
in their home under the revocable Trust establishes a sufficient stake in
the outcome to establish standing.
The 	trial 	court 	entered 	summary 	judgment 	for 	Florida 	Flooring,
concluding the record reflected that the plaintiffs did not own the home at
the time suit was filed, so they lacked standing. 	The crux of the trial
court’s reasoning was that the plaintiffs had failed to prove a beneficial
interest in the property by failing to offer admissible evidence of the Trust
or its terms, and they had failed to allege in the complaint or their
statement of undisputed facts that they are the Trust’s beneficiaries. 	The
trial court further rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that a revocable trust’s
trustees also are trust beneficiaries as a matter of law, stating that the
determining factor is the Trust’s language, which the plaintiffs did not
present. 	Additionally, the trial court determined that lack of standing at

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the lawsuit’s inception could not be remedied by amendment to substitute
a party with standing. 	The plaintiffs appeal.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. 	Russell v.
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 239 So. 3d 98, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
Likewise, we review the trial court’s determination on standing de novo.
See id.
A trial court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). “[W]here
. . . the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a dispositive issue
at trial, the moving party need only demonstrate ‘that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” 	Rich v. Narog, 366
So. 3d 1111, 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (footnote omitted) (quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). 	“[O]nce the moving party
satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to ‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.’” 	Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
“Standing 	is 	a 	legal 	concept 	that 	requires 	a 	would-be 	litigant 	to
demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the
outcome 	of 	the 	proceedings, 	either 	directly 	or 	indirectly.” 	Hayes v.
Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006). 	“Generally,
one has standing to sue when he or she has a sufficient interest at stake
in the controversy which will be affected by the outcome of the litigation.”
Provence v. Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996). 	Standing also requires “that the claim be brought by or on behalf
of one who is recognized in the law as a ‘real party in interest.’” 	Roller v.
Collins, 373 So. 3d 35, 40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (citation omitted).
“Florida law has long recognized that it is generally the trustee, and not
a beneficiary, who is the real party in interest with authority to bring an
action on behalf of the trust.” 	Id.
Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, but a . . . trustee of an express trust . . . may
sue in that person’s own name without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is brought. 	All persons having an
interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded may join as plaintiffs and any person may be made
a defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to the
plaintiff. 	Any person may at any time be made a party if that

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person’s 	presence 	is 	necessary 	or 	proper 	to 	a 	complete
determination of the cause.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) (emphasis added). 	“Rule 1.210(a) is a rule of
enlargement rather than one of limitation of parties.” 	Marshall-Shaw v.
Ford, 755 So. 2d 162, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
A recent Third District case, Correa v. Tovar-Restrepo, 409 So. 3d 651
(Fla. 3d DCA 2025), reh’g denied (Apr. 25, 2025), is illustrative. In Correa,
the 	original 	plaintiff, 	Tovar, 	created 	three 	trusts 	in 	2015 	(the 	“2015
trusts”). 	Id. at 653. 	Several years later, individually and in his capacity
as the settlor/trustee of the 2015 trusts, Tovar sued his daughters and an
entity to invalidate his actions that made the 2015 trusts irrevocable. 	Id.
Tovar passed away in 2020, and Correa moved to be substituted as
plaintiff. 	Id. 	“Her motion relied upon a previously undisclosed trust
created by Mr. Tovar (hereinafter ‘the Colspak Revocable Trust’) to which
Mr. Tovar had assigned his causes of action against his daughters.” 	Id.
Correa asserted that she appeared “individually and as Trustee of the
Colspak Revocable Trust,” and she was eventually substituted as plaintiff.
Id. at 653-54.
The daughters moved for summary judgment, arguing that “Tovar
lacked standing when he commenced the underlying action because he
previously assigned the rights to the litigation to the Colspak Revocable
Trust,” and that “the substitution of Ms. Correa as Trustee of the Colspak
Revocable Trust, some four years after the lawsuit was filed, could not cure
the deficiency in standing that was present at the lawsuit’s inception
because the statute of limitations had since run.” 	Id. at 654. 	The trial
court granted the motion, concluding that “Tovar lacked standing to
initially commence the lawsuit because he previously assigned all his
rights to bring the lawsuit to the Colspak Revocable Trust, leaving him
with no interest to enforce,” that “Correa, individually and as Trustee of
the Colspak Revocable Trust, could not cure the standing deficiency by
being substituted as plaintiff,” and “that the relation back doctrine was
not applicable because there was no identity of interest between the
original plaintiff and the substituted plaintiff.” 	Id.
The Third District reversed, reasoning:
It was established here that the Colspak Revocable Trust
held Mr. Tovar’s “rights and interests in any and all claims
that can be, may be, or will be brought or pursued against
[his] daughters . . . .” 	It was also established that Mr. Tovar

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was the sole grantor, trustee, and beneficiary of the Colspak
Revocable Trust during his lifetime. 	As the sole trustee,
therefore, he was permitted to bring the underlying action in his
own name. 	See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a).
And he was not required to join the trust as a party. 	For
example, in Marshall-Shaw v. Ford, 755 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000), the plaintiff brought an action relating to the
alleged theft of numerous pieces of personal jewelry. 	Id. at
163. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged she was the owner
of the jewelry and did not plead the existence of a trust. Id. at
164. During the course of the action, however, it came to light
that the jewelry was actually owned by a trust, of which the
plaintiff was a co-trustee and the sole beneficiary. 	Id. 	The
defendants then argued that plaintiff was required to bring
suit in her capacity as co-trustee of the trust. 	Id.
The Fourth District, however, rejected this argument. 	Id.
at 164-65. 	Relying on Rule 1.210(a), which it described as “a
rule of enlargement rather than one of limitation of parties[,]”
the Fourth District reasoned that the plaintiff was authorized
to maintain the suit in her individual capacity because she
had standing as the sole beneficiary of the trust. 	Id. 	Here,
Mr. Tovar was both the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary of
the 	Colspak 	Revocable 	Trust 	at 	the 	time 	he 	brought 	the
underlying action. 	As such, he too had standing to bring the
action. 	Cf. Roller v. Collins, 373 So. 3d 35, 40 (Fla. 5th DCA
2023) (“Florida law has long recognized that it is generally the
trustee, and not a beneficiary, who is the real party in interest
with authority to bring an action on behalf of the trust.”).
Furthermore, Mr. Tovar was not required to allege that he
was suing in his capacity as trustee of the Colspak Revocable
Trust. Rule 1.120(a) provides that “[i]t is not necessary to aver
. 	. 	. 	the 	authority 	of 	a 	party 	to 	sue 	or 	be 	sued 	in 	a
representative capacity . . . except to the extent required to
show the jurisdiction of the court.” 	Instead, “[w]hen a party
desires to raise an issue as to . . . the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity, that party shall
do so by specific negative averment which shall include such
supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader’s
knowledge.” 	Id.

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Here, the Daughters were permitted to amend their answer
and affirmative defenses to properly raise the issue of Mr.
Tovar’s standing to sue based on his failure to allege that he
was bringing his action as trustee of the Colspak Revocable
Trust. 	They 	then 	moved 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the
defense and Ms. Correa sufficiently established that Mr. Tovar
had standing to sue at the inception of the underlying action
because he was trustee of the Colspak Revocable Trust, as
detailed above. 	Accordingly, the fact that he did not aver his
authority to sue in this representative capacity in his initial and
subsequent complaints, standing alone, did not deprive him of
standing.
The Daughters attempt to negate the foregoing by arguing
that the fact that Mr. Tovar assigned his rights to the Colspak
Revocable 	Trust 	renders 	the 	facts 	of 	this 	case 	somehow
distinct. 	In support, they rely on case law concerning parties
that have assigned their rights to third parties. 	The problem
with that argument here is that Mr. Tovar did not assign his
rights to a wholly unrelated third party, but rather he assigned
it 	to 	himself 	in 	a 	different 	capacity. 	In 	this 	sense, 	the
assignment was only a means to transfer the legal title to
himself in a different capacity. 	The fact remains that he, Mr.
Tovar, still held these rights, only now in his capacity as trustee
of 	the 	Colspak 	Revocable 	Trust. 	Accordingly, 	he 	still 	had
standing to sue.
Id. at 655-56 (second alteration added) (emphasis added).
Turning to the case at bar, as with Tovar in Correa, the plaintiffs, as
the Trust’s trustees, were permitted to bring the action in their own names.
As rule 1.120(a) provides, they were not required to specifically allege that
they were suing in their capacity as the trustees. Standing alone, the fact
that they did not aver their authority to sue in this capacity did not deprive
them of standing.
Once Florida Flooring raised the lack of standing defense and moved
for summary judgment on the defense, Florida Flooring bore the burden
of demonstrating no genuine issues of material fact existed, that is, no
evidence supported that the plaintiffs had standing. 	See generally Rich,
366 So. 3d at 1118. Florida Flooring did not meet this burden. In support
of 	the 	argument 	that 	the 	plaintiffs 	lacked 	standing, 	Florida 	Flooring
pointed to the warranty deed. 	The warranty deed demonstrates that, in
2017, the plaintiffs had transferred the property to the plaintiffs “as

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Trustees” of the Trust. 	Thus, Florida Flooring’s own evidence supported
that the plaintiffs 	were the Trust’s trustees. 	Because trustees have
standing to sue and need not allege their capacity as trustees, Florida
Flooring’s evidence supported that the plaintiffs had standing. 	Thus,
Florida 	Flooring 	did 	not 	meet 	its 	summary 	judgment 	burden 	of
demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs’ standing.
Further, because Florida Flooring did not meet its burden, the burden
never shifted to the plaintiffs to prove the existence of a genuine issue of
fact, so the trial court erred by granting summary judgment based on the
plaintiffs’ failure to meet their burden in opposition to summary judgment.
In addition to expressly evidencing that the plaintiffs were the trustees
of the Trust that held the property, the warranty deed evidences that the
plaintiffs were the Trust’s settlors, and the Trust was revocable. Contrary
to the trial court’s conclusion, a revocable trust’s settlors are the sole
beneficiaries during their lifetimes:
A revocable trust is a unique type of transfer . . . . 	Since
[the settlor] is the sole beneficiary of the trust during [the
settlor’s] lifetime, [the settlor] has the absolute right to call the
trust to an end and distribute the trust property in any way
[the settlor] wishes.
Schlossberg v. Estate of Kaporovsky, 303 So. 3d 982, 985 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Fla. Nat’l Bank of Palm Beach Cty.
v. Genova, 460 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1984)). 	Although it is conceivable
that trust language could override this legal principle, at a minimum, here,
the warranty deed evidences that, as the Trust’s settlors, the plaintiffs were
also effectively the Trust’s sole beneficiaries for their lifetimes, and status
as sole beneficiaries is another avenue for standing.
In sum, the trial court erred by entering summary judgment for Florida
Flooring based on lack of standing. 	Thus, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
KUNTZ , C.J., and S HAW , J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.