Roderick Thomas v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
RODERICK THOMAS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-2567
[January 7, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Jeffrey Gillen and James Nutt, Judges; L.T. Case No. 50-
2021-CF-001162-AXXX-MB.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Ethan Goldberg, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	Tallahassee, 	and 	Jessenia 	J.
Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
GERBER , J.
The defendant appeals from his convictions and sentences for felon in
actual possession of a firearm or ammunition (count 1), possession of
cocaine (count 2), and possession of fentanyl (count 3), as well as the
circuit court’s order denying his dispositive motion to suppress, following
a jury trial on count 1, and his no contest pleas to counts 2 and 3.
The defendant’s appeal raises four arguments, none of which have
merit. We write to address only the defendant’s first argument, contending
the circuit court fundamentally erred by accepting his signed stipulation
regarding his convicted felon status. 	The defendant argues the signed
stipulation was not a valid waiver of his constitutional right to have the
jury prove his convicted felon status beyond a reasonable doubt.
As explained below, we disagree with the defendant’s argument, and
therefore affirm.

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Procedural History
Before trial, the state and the defendant signed a stipulation, stating:
“The Jury is instructed that these facts are to be accepted as true: … On
or around [the incident date], [the defendant] was a convicted felon.”
Just before jury selection, the parties informed the circuit court of the
signed stipulation regarding the defendant being a convicted felon. 	After
the jury was selected, but before the trial, defense counsel reiterated:
“We’re only stipulating to [the defendant] being a convicted felon.”
At the end of the state’s case, the state asked the circuit court to
instruct the jury regarding the signed stipulation. Defense counsel stated
he had no objection. 	The circuit court read the standard stipulation
instruction and the signed stipulation to the jury.
Later in the trial, defense counsel, while moving for a judgment of
acquittal on the felon-in-possession count, conceded the state had proven
the defendant was a convicted felon, and argued the state had not proven
the defendant had actually possessed the subject firearm. 	The circuit
court denied the motion. 	The jury later convicted the defendant of the
felon-in-possession count.
At sentencing, the state presented certified records of the defendant’s
six 	prior 	felony 	convictions—including 	two 	prior 	felon-in-possession
convictions.
This Appeal
The 	defendant’s 	appeal 	of 	his 	felon-in-possession 	conviction 	and
sentence argues:
In order to make a valid stipulation as to his status as a
convicted 	felon, 	[the 	defendant] 	had 	to 	make 	a 	knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to have the State
prove that element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The circuit court did not colloquy [the defendant] on this right,
and the State did not otherwise prove that [the defendant] was
a convicted felon. The failure to prove [the defendant’s] status
as a convicted felon constitutes fundamental error.
As the defendant’s argument acknowledges, because he did not raise
this argument to the circuit court, we review de novo for fundamental
error. 	State v. Smith, 241 So. 3d 53, 55 (Fla. 2018).

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The defendant’s argument primarily relies on the Florida Supreme
Court’s statements in Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1998):
[W]hen 	a 	criminal 	defendant 	offers 	to 	stipulate 	to 	the
convicted felon element of the felon-in-possession of a firearm
charge, the [trial] [c]ourt must accept that stipulation,
conditioned 	by 	an 	on-the-record 	colloquy 	with 	the
defendant 	acknowledging 	the 	underlying 	prior 	felony
conviction(s) and acceding to the stipulation. 	The State
should also be allowed to place into evidence, for record
purposes only, the actual judgment(s) and sentence(s) of the
previous conviction(s) used to substantiate the prior convicted
felon element of the charge. 	…
….
We also agree with the State that, out of the jury’s presence
and after consultation with counsel, the defendant should
be required to personally acknowledge the stipulation
and his voluntary waiver of his right to have the State
otherwise 	prove 	the 	convicted 	felony 	status 	element
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 884, 889 (emphases added).
Here, we recognize no “on-the-record colloquy” with the defendant
occurred. 	However, 	the 	record 	contains 	the 	defendant’s 	“personally
acknowledge[d]” signed stipulation. Thus, no fundamental error occurred.
As the state’s answer brief submits, and which we adopt:
[The defendant] cannot raise error with the contents of the
document 	jointly 	presented 	below[,] 	when 	he 	had 	the
opportunity to either change the [document’s] language or
refrain from signing [the document].
The fact that [the defendant] signed [the stipulation] … that
he was a [convicted] felon … shows that [the defendant] was
aware of the stipulation and … its contents.
It was to [the defendant’s] benefit to present the stipulation
and minimize the impact of his [convicted] felon status with
the jury. As is apparent from the record, the State would have
had no difficulty establishing [the defendant] was a felon[,]
and thus[,] alerting the jury to the fact that [the defendant]

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had 	been 	convicted 	of 	two 	previous 	felon-in-possession
offenses. [The defendant] cannot use this “gotcha” tactic after
knowingly signing a stipulation to being a felon at the time of
the 	offense 	(when 	this 	is 	his 	third 	felon-in-possession
conviction) to reverse his fairly obtained conviction.
….
The contents of the stipulation were exactly as required by
Brown: 	“a stipulation whereby the parties acknowledge that
the 	defendant 	is, 	without 	further 	elaboration, 	a 	prior
convicted felon.” 	719 So. 2d at 889. 	…
The defendant also relies on the Third District’s recent opinions in
Presha v. State, 2025 WL 97458 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 15, 2025), reh’g denied
(Feb. 4, 2025), and Harris v. State, 403 So. 3d 354, 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).
Both cases are distinguishable.
In Presha, the defendant went to trial on a charge of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. 	2025 WL 97458 at *2. 	Outside the jury’s
presence, defense counsel stipulated to the convicted felon element, but
the circuit court did not colloquy the defendant on the stipulation. 	Id.
During the trial, the state did not enter the defendant’s prior felony
conviction or a stipulation into evidence, nor did the state ask the circuit
court to read a stipulation to the jury. Id. at *3. Before closing arguments,
the state requested a sidebar where it told the circuit court, “I just want to
clarify for the jury that it was stipulated to that he’s a convicted felon. We
don’t have to prove that element.” Id. Defense counsel did not object. Id.
The state then argued in closing that the parties had stipulated to the
defendant’s convicted felon status. 	Id. 	The jury found the defendant
guilty. 	Id. at *4.
On appeal, the Third District reversed and remanded for entry of
judgment of acquittal. 	Id. at *6. 	Our sister court pertinently reasoned:
“In a scenario such as in the case before us, the defendant must
personally acknowledge the stipulation and his voluntary waiver.” 	Id. at
*5 (emphases added).
In Harris, the defendant also faced a felon-in-possession charge. 	403
So. 3d at 355. 	Defense counsel informed the circuit court that the
defendant was stipulating to being a convicted felon, but the circuit court
did not colloquy the defendant, and the state did not enter a stipulation or
prior felony conviction into evidence. 	Id. 	After being convicted, the

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defendant appealed. Id. The Third District, relying on Brown and Presha,
reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of acquittal. 	Id. at 356.
Here, 	the 	defendant’s 	signed 	stipulation—his 	recorded 	personal
acknowledgement of waiving his right to have the state prove his convicted
felon status—renders this case distinguishable from Presha and Harris.
In those cases, unlike here, no such recorded personal acknowledgement
existed, whether orally or in writing.
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	we 	affirm 	the 	defendant’s 	conviction 	and
sentence for being a felon in actual possession of a firearm. As referenced
above, we also affirm the defendant’s other convictions and sentences
without further discussion.
Affirmed.
L EVINE and K LINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.