James Donta Pope v. State of Florida

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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

JAMES DONTA POPE,
Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

No. 4D2024-2822
[December 3, 2025]

Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Ginger Lerner-Wren, Judge; L.T. Case No.
22008590MM10A.

Gordon Weekes, Public Defender, and Lisa S. Lawlor, Chief Assistant
Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marcus Russell
Kelly II, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

May, J.

It’s a matter of proof or lack thereof in this appeal from a restitution
order. The defendant in an unlicensed contracting work case, pursuant
to sections 489.127(1)(f), 489.127(2)(a), and 489.531(1)(a), Florida
Statutes (2022), appeals a restitution order. He argues the record lacks
competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings. We
agree and reverse.

e The Facts

The victim hired the defendant to build “two efficiencies in the
backyard” of her home. According to the victim’s testimony, she had been
advised by someone from her church that the defendant was a licensed
contractor. But, in fact, neither the defendant nor his company was
licensed in Florida.

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The victim gave the defendant “money every time he requested” it and
“had him to sign a receipt for everything” paid. 	The victim claimed none
of the work was satisfactory. According to victim, the walls were defective,
“dirt’s coming out the toilet, the walls – the toilet was pushed in the wall.
You couldn’t flush it.” The work also included the construction of a fence.
The State had to refresh the victim’s recollection to elicit her testimony
that she paid the defendant “[a] hundred and two grand” cash for the work.
The State used an investigative report purportedly prepared by a Florida
Department of Business and Professional Regulation investigator. 	This
report was introduced by the State during the restitution hearing over
defense objection. 	Eventually, the victim paid for the structure to be
demolished.
The defendant pleaded no contest and received a sentence of twelve
months’ probation. 	Restitution was reserved. 	The trial court held two
days of hearings. 	At the conclusion of the hearing, the State argued:
So, Your Honor, that -- just to reiterate, yes, I will just be
relying on a series of handwritten contracts that I have here
signed by the defendant and I have a totaling amount of
86,000 	dollars 	of 	these 	handwritten 	contracts 	out 	of 	an
outstanding 102,000 that we can’t account for. The only thing
I can account for is 86,000 at this moment in time.
The court reviewed the documents, but none of the documents were
admitted into evidence.
The trial court issued a restitution order, finding the victim was elderly
and disabled. The trial court found the victim “was presented with a series
of handwritten contracts which together provided for the payment of
$86,000.00.” 	The trial court entered a restitution judgment for that
amount as a condition of probation.
From this restitution order, the defendant now appeals.
• 	The Analysis:
The 	defendant 	argues 	the 	trial 	court 	order 	requiring 	him 	to 	pay
$86,000.00 in restitution must be vacated because it is unsupported by
legally sufficient evidence. The State failed to admit any of the documents
supporting the claim into evidence during the restitution hearing. 	As the
defendant argues: 	“[T]he content of each document was not read into the
record or otherwise identified.” The defendant therefore argues the State

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failed to meet its burden of proof. 	The defendant further argues the
victim’s 	“testimony 	did 	not 	provide 	substantial 	competent 	evidence”
because she “could not answer the question as to how much she agreed
to pay” the defendant. 	Finally, the trial court failed to explain how it
arrived at $86,000 in restitution.
The State responds the restitution order should be affirmed because it
“proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the loss and damage was
[causally] connected to the [defendant’s] offense of contracting without a
license, and that the victim was entitled to the properly calculated and
imposed restitution.” 	The State suggests the victim testified as to the
deficiency of the work and how much she paid. 	The State “informed the
[trial] 	court 	that 	it 	accounted 	for 	$86,000” 	only, 	“despite 	the 	victim
testifying that she had paid $102,000.”
We review restitution orders for an abuse of discretion. 	See D.D. v.
State, 172 So. 3d 969, 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing Johnson v. State,
942 So. 2d 415, 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)).
Generally, 	“[r]estitution 	must 	be 	proved 	by 	substantial 	competent
evidence.” 	D.D., 172 So. 3d at 970 (quoting Bennett v. State, 944 So. 2d
524, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“The
amount of restitution must be based on more than speculation. . . .” Ritch
v. State, 14 So. 3d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing Glaubius v. State,
688 So. 2d 913, 916 (Fla. 1997); State v. Childers, 979 So. 2d 412, 414
(Fla. 1st DCA 2008)).
Here, the victim testified she paid the defendant $102,000, but the
State had to refresh her recollection to elicit her testimony, and it was not
supported by any documentary evidence other than the self-reported loss
in the investigator’s report. 	And while it appears that the court looked at
documents which the state represented to be “a series of handwritten
contracts . . . signed by the defendant . . . totaling . . . 86,000 dollars,”
none of them were introduced into evidence. The State conceded in closing
argument that it could account for only $86,000. Even so, the record fails
to reflect evidentiary support for that amount. 	For this reason, we must
reverse.
Reversed and remanded for a new restitution hearing.
GERBER and C ONNER , JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.