Giselle Capps v. Charles A. Capps, IV and One Trade Capital, Inc.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
GISELLE CAPPS,
Appellant,
v.
CHARLES A. CAPPS, IV, and ONE TRADE CAPITAL, INC.,
Appellees,
No. 4D2025-3371
[December 17, 2025]
Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit, Broward County; Kristin R. Kanner, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE-25-
012139.
Sandy T. Fox and Sara E. Ross of Sandy T. Fox, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
Paul 	Morris 	of 	Law 	Offices 	of 	Paul 	Morris, 	P.A., 	Miami, 	and 	Karen 	B.
Weintraub 	and 	Makayla 	Jacmacjian 	of 	Sidweber 	& 	Weintraub, 	P.A., 	Fort
Lauderdale, for appellees.
CONNER , J.
In this marriage dissolution proceeding, Wife appeals a nonfinal order which
suspended, on an emergency basis, her unsupervised timesharing with, and
parental responsibility for, the parties’ four minor children (ages nine, eight,
seven, and six). 	We have jurisdiction. 	Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)(b).
We affirm the emergency suspension of Wife’s temporary timesharing and
parental responsibility because the trial court properly determined an emergency
situation existed that required the children be temporarily protected, without
notice and a full evidentiary hearing, from substantial emotional abuse or
trauma created by Wife.
Background
In early July 2025, Wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage. 	Early on, the
dissolution proceeding became contentious concerning the children, and the trial
court appointed an attorney guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the children.

In mid-August 2025, the trial court heard Husband’s motion for temporary
timesharing and Wife’s motion to restrict Husband’s timesharing. After receiving
the GAL’s input, the trial court entered an order granting shared parental
responsibility 	and 	providing 	both 	parties 	with 	ample 	timesharing 	with 	the
children. 	The order also required both parties to immediately participate in
individual counseling and enroll the children in individual therapy.
On October 19, Wife filed an emergency motion to suspend Husband’s
timesharing with the children. 	The motion alleged the Department of Children
and Families (“DCF”) and law enforcement had an active investigation following
a medical evaluation of all four children that concluded “something was not
right” and the physician “suspected potential overmedication and trauma.” The
motion clearly implied Husband was the perpetrator of harm to the children.
The next day, Husband filed his sworn emergency motion to suspend Wife’s
timesharing. 	Husband’s motion alleged Wife intentionally fabricated a false
claim that Husband was administering drugs to the children. 	Husband alleged
Wife unilaterally not only took the children to the hospital to be drug tested, but
also to have an invasive pelvic examination conducted on their two daughters.
The day after the hospital examinations, Husband learned the Davie Police
Department (“DPD”) was conducting a second investigation that Husband was
sexually molesting one or more of the children. 	This was a second investigation
because in June 2025, Wife made a similar accusation to the DPD, which was
closed 	as 	unfounded. 	Husband’s 	motion 	gave 	a 	chronology 	of 	events
orchestrated by Wife to have Husband investigated for abuse since the beginning
of the dissolution proceeding. 	The motion contended Wife’s timesharing should
be suspended because Wife was subjecting the children to trauma by triggering
several investigations causing emotional harm from invasive examinations and
interviews by DCF, sexual abuse therapists, and law enforcement.
The same day Husband’s emergency motion was filed, the trial court entered
an order deferring ruling on both emergency motions until further hearing.
On October 21, the trial court heard various matters including the parties’
emergency motions. 	Regarding the emergency motions, the trial court wanted
to hear whether the GAL had any additional information about the children.
Under oath, the GAL testified he received information the children had been
taken to a hospital for testing because Wife believed Husband had drugged one
or more of the children. 	The GAL also reported DCF and the DPD had been to
the marital home to conduct investigations. 	The GAL stated more information
was forthcoming.
The GAL’s testimony prompted the trial court to set a status conference for
the emergency motions on October 31. 	At that status conference, the GAL
reported that while the status conference was occurring, the children were being
evaluated yet again at a sexual assault treatment center. The trial court deferred

ruling again on both emergency motions and set another status conference for
November 4, 2025, to obtain more input from the GAL regarding the October 31
sexual assault assessment.
At the November 4 status conference, the GAL reported that the October 31
forensic 	evaluation 	revealed 	no 	signs 	of 	sexual 	abuse. 	With 	permission,
Husband’s counsel gave the trial court a chronology of Wife’s attempt to smear
Husband. Counsel’s chronology included the events listed in Husband’s October
20 emergency motion as well as events after October 20.
Recognizing any significant change in temporary timesharing would require
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court initially again deferred ruling on the
dueling emergency motions and instructed the parties to contact the trial court’s
judicial assistant to arrange an evidentiary hearing. 	However, in reflecting
further on the situation, the trial court expressed “grave concerns” about the
children being exposed to more than one sexual assault assessment and multiple
DCF and law enforcement investigations initiated by Wife. The trial court found
the situation presented an emergency need to protect the children from “grave
danger and psychological trauma.” Thus, the trial court orally announced it was
suspending 	Wife’s 	timesharing 	until 	a 	full 	evidentiary 	hearing 	could 	be
conducted. Upon the GAL’s recommendation, the trial court allowed Wife to have
professionally supervised visitation with the children. 	The trial court again
instructed counsel to obtain an evidentiary hearing date for both motions.
On November 5, the trial court entered the order under review. Although not
orally announced at the hearing, the written order also suspended Wife’s shared
parental responsibility for the children.
On November 7, Wife filed her motion for rehearing. 	On November 12, the
trial 	court 	entered 	an 	order 	granting 	Wife’s 	rehearing 	motion 	and 	set 	an
evidentiary hearing on the parties’ competing emergency motions for December
15. 	The 	order 	granting 	rehearing 	did 	not 	modify 	the 	November 	5 	order
temporarily suspending Wife’s parental responsibility for and timesharing with
the children.
Appellate Analysis
Wife 	argues 	her 	due 	process 	rights 	were 	violated 	when 	the 	trial 	court
suspended her timesharing without sufficient notice and opportunity to be
heard. 	After a careful review of the parties’ appellate appendices, we disagree
with Wife’s arguments.
The heart of the matter is the propriety of the trial court’s order modifying a
prior temporary order regarding parental responsibility and timesharing on an
emergency basis without a full evidentiary hearing. 	We reject Wife’s argument
that due process was violated because Wife had inadequate notice.

Smith v. Crider, 932 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), is instructive. 	In Crider,
the mother appealed an order denying her motion to dissolve an ex parte
temporary injunction. 	Id. at 396. 	The injunction temporarily modified a final
marriage dissolution judgment by reducing the mother’s rights and giving the
father 	sole 	parental 	responsibility. 	Id. 	In 	analyzing 	the 	propriety 	of 	the
temporary injunction, the Second District said:
This court has recognized that under extraordinary circumstances,
a trial court may not only enter an order temporarily modifying
custody of a child, but may do so without affording prior notice to
the opposing party. 	Again, however, such an order requires an
emergency situation, such as where a child is threatened with
physical harm or is about to be improperly removed from the state.
See Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 693 So. 2d 666, 667–68 (Fla. 2d DCA
1997); see also Williams v. Williams, 845 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2003) ([first] citing Wilson v. Roseberry, 669 So. 2d 1152 (Fla.
5th DCA 1996)[;] and [then citing] Gielchinsky [v. Gielchinsky], 662
So. 2d [732,] 733 [(Fla. 4th DCA 1995])). 	Even where a trial court
properly enters such an order, an opportunity to be heard should be
provided 	to 	the 	opposing 	party 	as 	soon 	thereafter 	as 	possible.
Loudermilk, 693 So. 2d at 668. Failure to give notice to the opposing
party prior to the entry of an order when no emergency exists, or
failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard promptly
after the entry of an order when an emergency is presented, deprives
the opposing party of his or her right to procedural due process.
See, e.g., Loudermilk, 693 So. 2d at 668; Wilson, 669 So. 2d at 1154.
Id. at 398 (emphasis added). Thus, as the Second District acknowledged, Florida
caselaw has recognized that in very limited situations, a trial court can modify
prior 	child 	custody, 	parental 	responsibility, 	and 	timesharing 	orders 	on 	an
emergency 	basis 	for 	the 	protection 	of 	children 	without 	notice 	and 	a 	full
evidentiary hearing.
The language in the caselaw describing an “emergency situation” justifying
an emergency protection order as situations “where a child is threatened with
physical harm or is about to be improperly removed from the state” traces back
to our opinion in Gielchinsky. 	In Gielchinsky, a short opinion, we reviewed a
petition and emergency motion alleging the mother was hindering the father’s
visitation rights and hampering the father’s relationship with the children. 	662
So. 2d at 732. In reversing the trial court, we observed “no evidence of an actual
emergency, and once the [trial] court became apprised of that fact, it should not
have proceeded [with the temporary relief motion].” 	Id. at 733. 	We then stated:

We do not intend to discourage trial courts from taking appropriate
action where there is a true emergency, where, for example, a child
is threatened with physical harm or is about to be improperly
removed from the state. 	When the court here took such action in
the absence of an emergency, however, it essentially determined the
case without giving the parties the opportunity to have a full and
complete hearing on the issues.
Id. (emphasis added).
Gielchinsky provided an example of what could constitute an emergency
justifying 	an 	emergency 	order 	for 	the 	protection 	of 	children. 	Given 	the
Gielchinsky opinion’s brevity, we do not construe the opinion, or any other cases
citing the Gielchinsky description of an “emergency situation,” as limiting an
emergency to solely situations “where . . . a child is threatened with physical
harm or is about to be improperly removed from the state.” Given a trial court’s
inherent authority to protect children, we construe the caselaw and hold that
“emergency situations” justifying emergency child protection orders modifying
prior child custody, parental responsibility, or timesharing orders to include
situations in which a child or children are exposed to substantial emotional
abuse or trauma by a parent or custodian.
In the instant case, our review of the appendices confirms the trial court had
valid “grave concerns” that the children were being exposed to substantial
emotional abuse or trauma by Wife. 	For that reason, the trial court entered the
emergency protection order under review. 	The trial court recognized it must
afford Wife a full evidentiary hearing to allow both sides to present evidence and
argument as to the need for the order to remain in effect.
We reject Wife’s argument that the November 5 order was entered solely on
the statements of Husband’s counsel at the status conference with no sworn
proof to support the allegations. 	Husband’s October 20 emergency motion was
sworn to by Husband and the motion had attached documents which were
authenticated by Husband’s statements in the motion. 	We also note that at the
October 21 hearing, the GAL, under oath, reported the children were being tested
for drugs and investigated by DCF and the DPD for sexual abuse. 	While
Husband’s 	counsel’s 	representation 	of 	events 	after 	October 	20 	were 	very
concerning to the trial court at the November 4 status conference, we are
satisfied that Husband’s sworn October 20 emergency motion and the GAL’s
sworn October 21 testimony were sufficient to justify the emergency order
suspending Wife’s timesharing.
Conclusion
We hold the trial court’s emergency November 5 order suspending Wife’s
timesharing with the children with allowance for supervised visitation was

properly 	entered. 	The 	emergency 	suspension 	of 	Wife’s 	shared 	parental
responsibility was also proper. 	Thus, we affirm the emergency suspension of
Wife’s timesharing and parental responsibility until further order of the trial
court.
We previously issued an order denying Wife’s motion for stay and authorizing
the trial to proceed with a full evidentiary hearing on both emergency motions
on December 15, 2025. 	We issue this opinion on the assumption the full
evidentiary hearing commenced on December 15. 	If the full evidentiary hearing
did 	not 	begin 	on 	December 	15 	for 	any 	reason, 	then 	the 	trial 	court 	shall
reschedule a full evidentiary hearing on an expedited basis.
Our affirmance expresses our conclusion that the trial court ruled correctly
in determining an emergency existed which required the trial court to enter an
emergency order to protect the children. 	Nothing we have written should be
construed as suggesting or directing how the trial court should rule as to either
pending emergency motions after a full evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
KUNTZ , C.J., and C IKLIN, J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.