Terrence Mathis v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
TERRENCE MATHIS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-1543
[April 8, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward 	County; 	Bernard 	Isaac 	Bober, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
062017CF010225A88810.
Daniel 	Eisinger, 	Public 	Defender, 	and 	Mara 	Catherine 	Herbert,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	Tallahassee, 	and 	Jessenia 	J.
Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
FORST , J.
Appellant Terrence Mathis appeals his conviction and life sentence for
second-degree murder. Mathis argues that (I) the trial evidence was legally
insufficient 	to 	sustain 	his 	conviction 	and 	failed 	to 	support 	the 	jury
instruction on “Principals,” and (II) the prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”)
statute is unconstitutional. 	We affirm on issue II without discussion and
affirm on issue I because the evidence was sufficient to sustain Mathis’s
conviction and supported the jury instruction on “Principals.”
Background
The Trial Evidence
The victim was found deceased in the driver’s seat of his van, which
was 	parked 	outside 	his 	Lighthouse 	Point 	condominium. 	The 	victim
sustained two gunshot wounds to the head and neck.

2
The police located two spent casings near the victim’s van, each bearing
a unique marking (star-dash-star). 	Two law enforcement officers with a
combined twenty-four years’ crime scene processing experience testified
they had never seen ammunition with this unique marking before.
As the investigation narrowed in on Mathis as a potential suspect,
police searched Mathis’s residence. 	After emptying a hamper of dirty
clothes located in one of the bedrooms, which contained mail addressed to
Mathis, an officer located a live round bearing the same unique star-dash-
star marking.
The live round was tested for DNA, which originated from a single
contributor, and the results were consistent with Mathis’s profile. In fact,
the testifying forensic scientist explained that the chance of selecting a
random unrelated individual from the general population with that profile
is rarer than 1 in 400 billion.
While no firearm was recovered, a firearms analyst testified that the two
spent casings and the live round all shared common “manufacturing
marks,” which suggested a common manufacturing origin. 	Additionally,
one of the spent casings and the live round shared marks consistent with
“lip marks.” While the firearms analyst could not state with certainty that
a firearm created these marks, she confirmed these marks could be
created when a live round is loaded into a magazine.
The victim was found deceased in the early morning hours. Mere hours
before his death, the victim was seen on surveillance footage at the liquor
store that he managed, and then shopping at a Walmart located near his
condominium. This Walmart is in the opposite direction of Mathis’s Miami
Gardens residence in relation to the liquor store.
The liquor store surveillance footage, which was admitted into evidence,
showed Mathis exiting his car’s driver’s seat, entering the liquor store,
walking past the victim, purchasing a bottle of liquor, and then reentering
the driver’s seat. The footage showed Mathis’s car circling the liquor store
parking lot and then following behind the victim’s van once it leaves. 	The
Walmart footage, also admitted into evidence, revealed a similar pattern.
As the victim shopped for groceries, Mathis’s car circled the Walmart
parking lot and then backed into a parking space. 	After the victim
returned to his van, which then exited the Walmart parking lot, Mathis’s
car exited the Walmart parking lot.
A testifying digital forensics witness analyzed the victim’s and Mathis’s
cell phones, which revealed that “there were numerous locations, about

3
four of them that were very consistent in time on both of the phones.”
These locations were in a commercial area not far from this Walmart
location.
License plate readers in the city of Lighthouse Point captured Mathis’s
car following behind the victim’s van in the early morning hours as the
victim’s van was driving towards the victim’s condominium. 	Two other
license 	plate 	readers 	subsequently 	captured 	Mathis’s 	car 	leaving
Lighthouse Point in the same timeframe that a condominium neighbor
reported hearing “bangs” nearby. Mathis’s car was in Lighthouse Point for
six minutes, and the license plate reader database indicated that Mathis’s
car had never been in Lighthouse Point before.
Data from Mathis’s phone revealed that the phone traveled southward
through Hollywood and then was located in Miami Gardens when police
initially responded to the Lighthouse Point homicide scene. 	Additionally,
in 	the 	early 	morning 	hours, 	Mathis’s 	phone 	reflected 	several 	Google
searches, including “Pompano news,” “man found dead in Pompano,” and
“cost to change license plate.” 	Some of these searches occurred before
police 	had 	responded 	to 	the 	homicide 	scene, 	and 	Mathis’s 	phone
continued to reflect similar searches throughout the day.
During 	the 	investigation, 	Mathis 	spoke 	with 	a 	detective, 	and 	this
detective testified about his conversation with Mathis. 	The detective
testified that Mathis confirmed he had been driving his car, no one
had borrowed his car, and Mathis had his phone in his possession that
night. 	The 	detective 	also 	showed 	Mathis 	the 	liquor 	store 	footage.
According to the detective, Mathis verified he was at the liquor store and
indicated that he did not know the victim, but recognized him from the
liquor store.
At one point, the liquor store footage showed a person entering the
passenger side of Mathis’s car, but the camera is too far away to tell who
this person was. 	The victim’s van passed the camera in the foreground
around the same time. When the detective asked Mathis who had entered
his car, Mathis responded that it was “either a prostitute or the pimp”
because he had been in the area seeking a prostitute. 	The detective
testified that when he confronted Mathis with the Lighthouse Point license
plate readers data, Mathis denied being in Lighthouse Point and could not
provide a reason for his car being there.
Mathis’s trial strategy largely focused on pinning the homicide on his
brother, 	whom 	his 	counsel 	called 	“the 	real 	shooter.” 	While 	cross-
examining the detective, Mathis’s counsel asked the detective whether he

4
knew if Mathis’s brother was or was not at the liquor store on the night of
the murder, and the detective responded, “I don’t know for a fact, no.”
Mathis testified in his own defense. 	Mathis claimed that he and his
brother were at the liquor store, drove to a nearby parking lot where they
“hung out” for five to ten minutes, and then they ended up “kicking it” in
an alleyway with a friend (who Mathis explained was “a pimp”) and two
women whom Mathis believed were prostitutes. 	Mathis contended that
his brother then left in Mathis’s car for about an hour, purportedly to go
and see the brother’s “baby mama”—leaving Mathis behind (with the friend
and two women), without his phone, which he claimed was in his car
charging the whole time.
During the nearly three-hour window encompassing the timestamps on
the liquor store footage, Walmart footage, and Lighthouse Point license
plate readers, Mathis’s phone was “unlocked” nineteen times. 	Mathis’s
phone required a passcode or a thumbprint for access. 	Mathis testified
that when his brother returned, Mathis was “completely out of it” due to
having mixed prescription Percocet with beer and liquor. 	When pressed
for details about what happened after his brother had returned in Mathis’s
car, including if anyone was with him, Mathis testified, “I’m not sure. 	I’m
not sure. I -- I don’t even remember really, like getting in the car when he
came back.” Mathis testified that he woke up in his car’s back seat as his
car was on the expressway headed towards Miami Gardens. 	Mathis
further recalled a conversation in which his brother stated he “got into
something up there in Broward County” and “you might have to change
your license plate or even burn the car.” 	Mathis recalled that his brother
mentioned “Pompano,” which Mathis claimed prompted him to make
various searches on his phone about Pompano-related news.
“Principals,” Closing Arguments, and Verdict
A grand jury indicted Mathis for first degree murder with a firearm. The
charge 	included 	“Principals” 	theory 	language: 	“or 	intentionally 	aiding
another person as a principal to such shooting.” 	The prosecutor and
Mathis’s counsel also discussed “Principals” theory during voir dire with
the use of a hypothetical.
During the charge conference, the trial court stated, “[a]nd 3.5(a)
Principals, seems to be standard for that.” 	Mathis’s counsel answered,

5
“Seems correct. 	Yes. 	Exactly standard.”1 Later, the trial court asked the
attorneys 	to 	review the 	final 	instructions, 	to 	which 	Mathis’s 	counsel
responded, “Looks good, Judge.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor primarily argued that Mathis
was the shooter. 	However, the prosecutor also explained how providing
the car or the ammunition could support the “Principals” theory. 	During
the defense’s closing argument, Mathis’s counsel at one point stated,
“[t]here is no direct evidence whatsoever in this case that Mr. Mathis killed
[the victim]. 	There is circumstantial evidence that suggests he may have
been involved. 	And what we tried to present to you is evidence to show
you that there -- that cuts both ways.”
The 	jury 	found 	Mathis 	guilty 	of 	second-degree 	murder, 	a 	lesser-
included offense for the charged first-degree murder. 	The jury answered
“no” to the verdict form’s questions of whether Mathis actually possessed
a firearm, discharged a firearm, and actually inflicted death to the victim
as a result of discharging a firearm in his possession. This appeal follows.
Analysis
“The test for the legal sufficiency of the evidence ‘is simply whether the
State presented competent, substantial evidence to support the verdict.’”
Alford v. State, 413 So. 3d 132, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (quoting Bush v.
State, 295 So. 3d 179, 200 (Fla. 2020)). 	“All conflicts in the evidence and
all reasonable inferences therefrom must be resolved in favor of the verdict
on appeal.” 	Id.
“A trial court’s decision regarding jury instructions is reviewed under
the abuse of discretion standard.” 	Terrien v. State, 94 So. 3d 648, 649
1 “If the defendant helped another person or persons commit or attempt to commit
a crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if he had done all
the things the other person or persons did if:
1. the defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done;
and
2. the defendant did some act or said some word that was intended to and
which did incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise the other person or
persons to actually commit or attempt to commit the crime.
To be a principal, the defendant does not have to be present when the crime is
committed or attempted.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.5(a).

6
(Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation omitted). Because Mathis’s counsel failed to
contemporaneously object to the “Principals” jury instruction, we review
for fundamental error under a de novo standard of review. 	See id.
“Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, provides that a principal in the first
degree is one who ‘commits any criminal offense against the state, whether
felony 	or 	misdemeanor, 	or 	aids, 	abets, 	counsels, 	hires, 	or 	otherwise
procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or
is attempted to be committed.’” 	Salter v. State, 77 So. 3d 760, 763 (Fla.
4th DCA 2011) (quoting § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2009)). “To convict under a
principals theory, the State is required to prove that: (1) ‘the defendant
had 	a 	conscious 	intent 	that 	the 	criminal 	act 	be 	done’; 	and 	(2) 	‘the
defendant did some act or said some word which was intended to and
which did incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise the other person or
persons to actually commit or attempt to commit the crime.’” 	Farris v.
State, 406 So. 3d 951, 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (quoting Hall v. State, 100
So. 3d 288, 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). 	“The elements of aiding and
abetting—assisting the actual perpetrator in some way and intent to
participate—‘may 	be 	proven 	by 	a 	combination 	of 	surrounding
circumstances from which a jury can reasonably infer a defendant’s guilt.’”
Salter, 77 So. 3d at 763 (quoting Parker v. State, 795 So. 2d 1096, 1099
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).
Here, ample evidence exists from which the jury could infer that Mathis
had a conscious intent for another person to shoot the victim unjustifiably,
and that Mathis did some act which was intended to assist that other
person. 	See Farris, 406 So. 3d at 958 (“To convict a defendant of second-
degree murder, ‘it is not necessary for the State to prove the defendant had
an intent to cause death.’” (quoting Fla. Std. Jury. Instr. (Crim.) 7.4)).
The Evidence Implicating Mathis
The two spent casings recovered from the homicide scene had the same
unique star-dash-star marking as a live round found in a room in Mathis’s
residence. The DNA on the live round originated from a single contributor
consistent with Mathis’s profile and the chance of selecting a random
unrelated individual from the general population with that profile is rarer
than 1 in 400 billion. 	Testimony also indicated commonalities in the
markings on the spent casings and the live round.
The liquor store surveillance footage placed Mathis at the liquor store
that the victim managed mere hours before the victim was found dead,
and Mathis can be seen exiting and reentering the driver’s seat of his car.
The admitted surveillance footage shows this car circling two parking lots,

7
appearing to wait for the victim as he worked and shopped. 	License plate
readers tracked this very car following the victim’s van into Lighthouse
Point—a city which Mathis’s car had never entered before and in the
opposite direction of Mathis’s Miami Gardens residence. The license plate
readers registered Mathis’s car leaving Lighthouse Point in the same
timeframe that a condominium neighbor had reported hearing “bangs.”
Cell phone data placed Mathis’s phone and the victim’s phone in close
proximity in the early morning hours. 	Moreover, Mathis’s phone made
several incriminating searches about Pompano-related news of a shooting
and the cost to change a license plate, with some of these searches
occurring before police had initially responded to the Lighthouse Point
homicide scene. Mathis’s phone had also been “unlocked” nineteen times
over a three-hour period encompassing the liquor store, Walmart, and
Lighthouse Point timestamps, which is inconsistent with Mathis’s claim
that his phone was passively left on a charger as his brother left in Mathis’s
car.
Mathis’s defense theory revolved around identifying his brother as “the
real shooter.” 	To advance this theory, Mathis placed himself with his
brother in the time period leading up to and after the homicide and claimed
that he had lent his brother his car, leaving Mathis behind in an alleyway,
without a phone, for approximately an hour. 	Yet, the State proffered
testimonial evidence that Mathis initially told a detective that no one had
borrowed Mathis’s car on the night of the murder. The jury had the benefit
of considering Mathis’s testimony, and “the jury was free to accept those
portions of the defendant’s testimony or statement that it found worthy of
belief, 	and 	it 	was 	likewise 	permitted 	to 	reject 	those 	portions 	of 	the
defendant’s testimony that were not.” 	See Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d
98, 119 (Fla. 2012). 	Also, Mathis’s counsel posed questions to witnesses
in a manner which left open the possibility that the brother may have been
responsible for the homicide, or the possibility that additional occupants
may have been in Mathis’s car.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the “Principals”
instruction based on the trial evidence and Mathis’s theory of the case.
See Senser v. State, 243 So. 3d 1003, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the “Principals”
instruction because “through his evidence and questioning of various
witnesses, Appellant advanced a theory that there was another person
involved in the Victim’s death”).
We also note that both the prosecutor and Mathis’s counsel were well
aware that a “Principals” argument could come into play even before trial

8
was underway. The grand jury indictment included “Principals” language,
and both the prosecutor and Mathis’s counsel discussed “Principals” with
the venire panel with the aid of a hypothetical. 	See Thomas v. State, 617
So. 2d 1128, 1128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“The state’s information charged
the defendant under the principal theory. The state’s questioning, as well
as the defendant’s cross-examination, reflect that both parties were aware
of this theory. 	The proper charge to be given to the jury rested in the
sound discretion of the trial judge and no abuse was demonstrated in the
court’s decision to give the jury the principal instruction.”).
Conclusion
Because no error, let alone fundamental error, occurred when the trial
court gave the “Principals” instruction, and the evidence is sufficient to
sustain Mathis’s conviction for second-degree murder, we affirm Mathis’s
conviction and life sentence.
Affirmed.
KLINGENSMITH and S HEPHERD, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.