Ramsey Frank v. Peter John Conlan, et al.,

DISTRICT COURT OF A PPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
RAMSEY C. FRANK,
Appellant,
v.
PETER JOHN CONLAN, in his individual capacity and
as personal representative of the ESTATE OF SUZANNE FRANK,
JOHN CONLAN III, and JANICE BYRNE,
Appellees.
Nos. 4D2024-1876 and 4D2024-2423
[April 1, 2026]
Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit, Palm Beach County; Charles E. Burton, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502022CP006727XXXXNB.
Bill Boyes of Boyes, Farina, Matwiczyk, Palm Beach Gardens, and
Matthew Sarelson and Zachary Stoner of Dhillon Law Group, Inc., West
Palm Beach, for appellant.
Rebecca Mercier Vargas and Stephanie L. Serafin of Kreusler-Walsh,
Vargas & Serafin, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and Theodore S. Kypreos
and Alexander L. Brams of Jones Foster P.A., West Palm Beach, for
appellees Peter John Conlan, individually, John Conlan III, and Janice
Byrne.
Nichole J. Segal of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach,
for appellee Peter John Conlan, as personal representative of the Estate of
Suzanne Frank.
L OTT , J.
This probate appeal, as is perhaps the case with many such appeals,
arises from a rather unique set of facts.
From 10,000 feet: the Decedent executed a will in January 2022. 	In
addition to some smaller bequests (not at issue here), the Decedent’s estate
plan utilized a separate trust containing the bulk of the estate to leave 75%

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to the Decedent’s son (the “Son” or “Appellant”) and 25% to the Decedent’s
three siblings (the “Siblings” or “Appellees”).
The Decedent decided to modify that structure as a result of a contract
with her former husband in June 2022 and transferred much of the trust
assets to a new holding company, intending to execute a new will that
passed her assets in that same proportion directly through the will instead
of a trust. 	She executed that will in December 2022, two days before she
passed away.
On appeal, the Son now challenges the December 2022 Will, raising
questions about the Decedent’s testamentary capacity to execute the will
at that time. The Son also challenges the subsequent orders admitting the
December 2022 Will to probate and appointing one of the Siblings as the
personal representative (the “PR Sibling”).
The Siblings, in an unusual twist, oppose the Son’s challenge and argue
that the Son lacks standing to contest the December 2022 Will because he
would be much worse off—and they, in turn, would be much better off—if
he succeeds in his challenge. If the January 2022 Will is reinstituted, they
argue, the bulk of the estate assets would pass to them, because much of
the trust assets contemplated by that will have been transferred. 	(Again,
they oppose this outcome.)
The Son responds that he is actually better off if he succeeds in
contesting the December 2022 Will, because if the January 2022 Will is
reinstituted and the Siblings take more assets under it, he is left with a
creditor claim against the Siblings arising from the June 2022 contract,
which, if successful, would push more net tax burden onto the Siblings,
and less tax burden onto him.
How that all plays out is neither here nor there, for now. The question
is whether the Son has standing to contest the will—or, more aptly put,
the two questions are (1) whether he has standing, and (2) whether he is
an “interested person” as the term is defined in section 731.201(23),
Florida Statutes (2022), with the statutory ability to contest the will.
We hold, under the very unique set of facts here, both that the Son has
standing and that he is an “interested person” who may contest the
December 2022 Will. 	We accordingly reverse the probate court’s grant of
summary judgment on that ground and remand for trial on the question
of whether the Decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute the

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December 2022 Will.1 We also reverse the orders admitting the December
2022 Will to probate and appointing the PR Sibling as the personal
representative.
I. 	Background
A. Before the Petition
The Decedent and her former husband divorced in October 2021. Their
marital settlement agreement required the former husband to create and
fund an irrevocable trust with the Decedent as the sole lifetime beneficiary.
The Trust provided that the Son would receive at least 75% of the Trust’s
net assets upon the Decedent’s death, after payment of death taxes and
administrative expenses. The Trust provided the Decedent with the power
of appointment over the remaining 25% of the Trust’s net assets. 	Any
property not otherwise disposed of would pass equally to the Decedent’s
siblings.
In January 2022, the Decedent executed a will prepared by her estate
planning attorney. We’ll call this the “January 2022 Will.” The will devised
specific property to the Son and the Decedent’s siblings and exercised the
Decedent’s power of appointment over the Trust’s remaining 25% in favor
of her residuary estate, which passed equally to her siblings. 	In other
words, the Son would take 75%, and the Siblings would take 25%, of the
Trust assets. The will provided death taxes “on property not passing under
my Will shall be apportioned to and paid from such property by those
succeeding 	to 	such 	property 	. 	. 	. 	.” 	The 	will 	further 	provided 	that
distributions would be made “after the payment of Death Taxes and
Administrative expenses.”
In mid-2022, the Decedent and her former husband agreed to modify
their 	separation 	agreement. 	Consistent 	with 	this 	agreement, 	they
transferred the Trust assets to a newly-formed holding company. 	The
holding 	company’s 	Class 	B 	membership 	units 	were 	assigned 	to 	the
Decedent outright. 	The contractual stipulation required the Decedent to
provide, by will or otherwise, that the Son receive at least 75% of the
holding company’s Class B units of at the Decedent’s death.2
1 As explained below, we summarily affirm as to the question of whether the will
was validly executed under section 732.502, Florida Statutes (2022).
2 Note that the January 2022 Will, in effect at the time of the mid-2022 contract,
did not address the newly-created holding company interests, and so those
interests would pass to the Siblings under that will’s residuary clause, unless
and until it was modified.

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From August through December 2022, the Decedent’s physical and
mental health deteriorated. 	She experienced repeated hospitalizations,
and medical records and witness testimony described her as confused,
disoriented, lethargic, and cognitively impaired. 	She was discharged to
home hospice on December 4, 2022.
On December 5, 2022, the Decedent executed a new will, which we will
call the “December 2022 Will.” 	It was substantively identical to the
January 2022 Will, with the exception that it devised 75% of the holding
company’s Class B membership interests in to the Son. 	In other words,
75% of the holding company assets would pass to the Son, and 25% to the
Siblings. 	The new will also directed the death tax provision with respect
to the Son’s devise be apportioned and paid at the marginal rate, and
added provisions governing the holding company’s administration.
The evidence below raised substantial questions about the Decedent’s
testamentary capacity to execute the 	December 2022 Will, given the
severely declined state of her mental and physical health.
The Decedent died two days after execution of the December 2022 Will.
B. Petition for Administration
The Decedent is survived by her Son and three Siblings. The Decedent’s
December 2022 Will nominated one of the Decedent’s Siblings as personal
representative consistent with her prior wills.
A petition for administration seeking admission of the December 2022
Will to probate and appointment as personal representative was filed. The
Son filed a caveat four days later. The same day when the caveat was filed,
the court admitted the December 2022 Will to probate and issued letters
of administration appointing the PR Sibling as personal representative.
The Son moved to vacate, asserting lack of formal notice, and the court
vacated its prior order and revoked the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the Son filed an answer and counter-petition challenging
the 	December 	2022 	Will 	on 	grounds 	of 	improper 	execution, 	lack 	of
testamentary capacity, and undue influence, and seeking appointment of
a personal representative other than the personal representative initially
appointed by the probate court. 	Thereafter, the court appointed the PR
Sibling as curator.

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C. Summary Judgment
The Siblings moved for summary judgment, arguing the Son lacked
standing to contest the December 2022 Will, the will was validly executed,
and was not the product of undue influence. The Son withdrew his undue
influence claim but opposed summary judgment, asserting standing based
on alleged adverse tax consequences under the December 2022 Will. 	The
Son did not present expert testimony or record evidence quantifying any
tax difference, arguing he did not need to show he would receive more
assets under the December 2022 Will to prove standing. 	The Son also
argued that the will’s execution was invalid because the Decedent lacked
testamentary capacity to sign the will, and contradictory testimony from
the witnesses created a genuine dispute of fact as to whether they had
signed the will and self-proving affidavit in each other’s presence.
The 	probate 	court 	ultimately 	granted 	summary 	judgment 	for 	the
Siblings and concluded the Son lacked standing because he would not
benefit from invalidation of the December 2022 Will, which the court found
to be substantially and functionally identical to the Decedent’s January
2022 Will except for devising the Son 75% of the holding company’s
interests. 	The court further held that the Son failed to present record
evidence of any tax-related harm sufficient to establish standing.
The probate court also found prima facie evidence of formal execution
under section 732.503, Florida Statutes (2022), relying on a self-proving
affidavit and unrebutted testimony of the witnesses present at execution.
The court further rejected the Son’s argument of lack of capacity, finding
the Son “alleges improper execution pursuant Section 732.502, Florida
Statutes, which does not contemplate Decedent’s alleged incapacity” and
that “[a] testator’s capacity is contemplated by Section 732.501, Florida
Statutes.”
The Son appealed the summary judgment order. 	After the appeal was
filed, the probate court admitted the December 2022 Will to probate and
reappointed the PR Sibling as personal representative. 	The Son appealed
that order as well. 	We consolidated those appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de
novo. 	See Patient Depot, LLC v. Acadia Enters., Inc., 360 So. 3d 399, 406
(Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Gromann v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 345 So. 3d

6
298, 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). 	Florida’s summary judgment standard,
applied in accordance with the federal standard, provides a court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” 	Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a).
“We also review de novo the interpretation of statutes.” 	Delbrouck v.
Eberling, 226 So. 3d 929, 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citing Duncombe v.
Adderly, 991 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)); see also Westport
Recovery Corp. v. Midas, 954 So. 2d 	750, 752 (Fla. 	4th DCA 2007)
(“Whether a party is the proper party with standing to bring an action is a
question of law to be reviewed de novo.”); Bivins v. Rogers, 147 So. 3d 549,
550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A dismissal based on lack of standing raises a
question of law that is reviewed de novo.” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)); GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Choengkroy, 98 So. 3d 781, 781 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2012) (“The review of a final order dismissing a cause of action for
lack of standing is de novo.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
B. “Standing” to contest a will
“Standing is the legal doctrine that defines when a litigant has a stake
in a controversy sufficient to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”
Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State, 384 So. 3d 67, 89 (Fla.
2024) (Sasso, J., concurring); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024) (defining “standing” as “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek
judicial enforcement of a duty or right based on the party’s having a
sufficient interest in a justiciable controversy.”).
By statute, only a person who is an “interested person” is permitted to
contest administration of a will. An “interested person” is “any person who
may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular
proceeding involved . . . .” 	§ 731.201(23), Fla. Stat. (2022).
Because the “interested person” inquiry is similar to, and draws upon,
concepts from “standing,” we and other courts have often referenced the
concept of “standing to contest a will,” or something to that effect. 	See,
e.g., Rudolph v. Rosecan, 154 So. 3d 381, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A
person’s status as an ‘interested person’ with standing in a guardianship
proceeding is dependent upon whether the person would be affected by
the outcome of the proceedings.”); Bivins, 147 So. 3d at 551 (“We agree
with the trial court that the son did not have standing to request the
affirmative relief of changing the residence of the ward. 	Instead, the
statutory scheme gives any interested person, which would include the
son as next of kin, the right to petition for interim judicial review. . . .”);

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Delbrouck, 226 So. 3d at 935 (“As an interested person, appellant had
standing to contest the will.”); Agee v. Brown, 73 So. 3d 882, 886 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2011) (discussing “standing to contest” and “standing to challenge” a
will); In re Lewis’ Estate, 411 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (“Florida
has adopted a statute which grants automatic standing to any personal
representative. s 731.201(21), Florida Statutes (1979).”); see also Smith v.
DeParry, 86 So. 3d 1228, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“Under the Probate
Code, the term ‘interested person’ refers to a person’s or entity’s standing,
i.e., the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in a particular
proceeding pending in a probate or guardianship matter.”).
But as set out below, “standing” and “interested person” are distinct
inquiries. 	We set out each inquiry below and then apply each to the facts
of this case.
1. Standing
“Standing 	is 	a 	legal 	concept 	that 	requires 	a 	would-be 	litigant 	to
demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the
outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly.” 	Shriberg v. Fla.
Flooring, Inc., 2026 WL 60973, at *2 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 7, 2026) (quoting
Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006)).
In State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2004), the Florida Supreme Court
listed “three requirements that constitute the ‘irreducible constitutional
minimum’ for standing”:
First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury in fact,” which
is 	“concrete,” 	“distinct 	and 	palpable,” 	and 	“actual 	or
imminent.” 	Second, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	establish 	“a 	causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of.” 	Third, a plaintiff must show “a ‘substantial likelihood’
that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.”
Id. at 1113 n.4 (citations omitted).3
3 Justice Sasso, in her Planned Parenthood concurrence, recently suggested that
standing jurisprudence in Florida remains messy. 	384 So. 3d at 89 (Sasso, J.,
concurring). 	She explains that although “the Florida Constitution is textually
distinct from the Federal Constitution because it does not contain an explicit
cases and controversies clause,” the “[Florida Supreme] Court has at times
reflexively adopted federal standing tests without examining whether the Florida
Constitution demands similar requirements,” and at other times “[has] concluded
that standing in Florida is less restrictive than at the federal level.” Id. at 89–90.

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2. The “interested person” who has the ability to contest
a will
Pursuant 	to 	the 	Florida 	Probate 	Code, 	“[a]ny 	interested 	person,
including a beneficiary under a prior will, unless barred under s. 733.212
or s. 733.2123, may commence [a proceeding to revoke the probate of a
will] before final discharge of the personal representative.” 	§ 733.109(1),
Fla. Stat. (2022). 	“A petition for revocation of probate shall state the
interest of the petitioner in the estate and the facts constituting the
grounds on which the revocation is demanded.” 	Fla. Prob. R. 5.270.
Section 731.201(23) defines an interested person as “any person who
may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular
proceeding involved” and “may vary from time to time and must be
determined according to the particular purpose of, and matter involved in,
any proceedings.” 	§ 731.201(23), Fla. Stat. (2022); see also Hayes, 952
So. 2d at 507 (explaining that the definition of “interested person” requires
the trial court to evaluate the nature of both the proceeding and the
interest asserted).
“In a probate proceeding, a person ‘may reasonably be expected to be
affected by the outcome’ of the proceeding if they are a beneficiary of the
estate.” 	Christie v. Qualls, 392 So. 3d 801, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024); see
also Dean v. Bentley, 848 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting that
“[i]f Bentley was the beneficiary of a valid will, he certainly would have
been affected by the outcome of the probate proceedings”); Rudolph, 154
So. 3d at 385 (noting the “fluid nature” of who may be an “interested
person”). 	“[W]hether a person is an ‘interested person’ is an element that
must be established by the petitioner seeking revocation of probate.”
Gordon v. Kleinman, 120 So. 3d 120, 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting
Wehrheim v. Golden Pond Assisted Living Facility, 905 So. 2d 1002, 1006
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005)).
Justice Sasso suggests, going forward, “we should consider from where our
standing requirements are derived” and, once decided, courts need to: “clarify the
scope of any standing requirements, such as whether parties may assert both
legal and factual injuries or whether only a legal injury will suffice;” “examine
whether standing requirements are truly subject to waiver, or instead whether
they are jurisdictional in nature”; and “provide a principled methodology to help
litigants understand which tests to apply when.” 	Id. at 93 (also stating “I
encourage parties to critically assess these and other standing issues and present
argument to this Court should the opportunity arise”).

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To be sure, the statutory “interested person” inquiry draws on concepts
from standing jurisprudence. 	As our Supreme Court noted, “[i]n defining
an ‘interested person’ as any person ‘who may reasonably be expected to
be 	affected 	by 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	proceeding,’ 	section 	731.201(21)
incorporates the general standing principles . . . .” 	Hayes, 952 So. 2d at
507–08; see also Griffin v. Pearson, 2025 WL 2088700, at *2 (Fla. 6th DCA
July 25, 2025) (“[T]hough the trial court did not expressly refer to the
statutory definition, its finding that Griffin lacks standing to challenge the
2012 will is tantamount to finding Griffin is not an ‘interested person’
under the Probate Code.”).
But whether a person is an “interested person” is ultimately a merits
question based on the definition set forth in the statutory text; it concerns
who the legislature would permit to challenge a will in particular cases.
See Gordon, 120 So. 3d at 121 (“whether a person is an ‘interested person’
is an element . . .”) (quotation omitted). The “interested person” inquiry is
distinct from the inquiry of whether a person has standing to appear in
court—the “require[ment]” that “a would-be litigant . . . reasonably expects
to 	be 	affected 	by 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	proceedings, 	either 	directly 	or
indirectly.” 	Shriberg, 2026 WL 60973 at *2 (quotation omitted).
C. Application to these facts
Applying this framework here, we find the trial court erred in holding
both that the Son lacked standing and that he was not an “interested
person.”
If the Son succeeds in his challenge to the December 2022 Will, the
January 	2022 	Will 	would 	be 	reinstituted. 	The 	January 	2022 	Will
contemplated that many assets would pass to the Son through a trust.
However, that trust no longer governs disposition of the bulk of the estate
assets. 	The assets that used to be in the trust would accordingly pass to
the Siblings through the January 2022 Will’s residuary clause. 	The Son,
in turn, claims he, as a beneficiary of the June 2022 contract, would have
a creditor claim against the Siblings for the assets that otherwise would
have passed through the trust. He also claims he would pay less taxes as
a creditor under the January 2022 Will than as a legatee4 under the
December 2022 Will.
4 “Legatee” means “someone who is named in a will to take personal property;
one who has received a legacy or bequest.” Legatee, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th
ed. 2024).

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As 	to 	standing—the 	Son 	has 	shown 	standing 	under 	these
circumstances. 	He has an injury-in-fact inasmuch as he would have a
materially 	different 	status 	(creditor 	versus 	legatee) 	with 	disparate
monetary consequences if he succeeds in his challenge. 	The patently
different tax treatment of what he would pay if his challenge fails—as
legatee in accordance with the tax terms dictated under the December
2022 Will—and if his challenge succeeds—as a potential creditor of assets
the Siblings were to pay taxes on as the sole legatees under the January
2022 Will—obviates the need for expert testimony of the dollar figure which
he 	expects 	to 	pay 	under 	each 	scenario.5 	Further, 	the 	Son 	has
redressability inasmuch as the challenge would allow him to set aside the
will. 	And there is causation inasmuch as the challenged will treats him
differently than the previous will.
As to whether the Son is an “interested person”—whether he is actually
financially better off having a (not yet adjudicated) creditor claim than he
would be simply taking the assets under the December 2022 Will is not
dispositive of his “interested person” status. 	Those are two very different
circumstances (potential creditor or legatee) for the Son to be in vis-a-vis
the estate, and thus he is “affected” by the outcome. 	That makes him an
“interested person” able to challenge the will. 	§ 731.201(23), Fla. Stat.
(2022).
In Delbrouck, we reached a similar result. 	226 So. 3d at 930. 	There,
the decedent’s son petitioned for revocation of probate, alleging lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, and overreaching of the personal
representative. 	Id. 	The personal representative moved for summary
judgment, which the court granted. Id. at 932. On appeal, the decedent’s
son argued summary judgment was improper because “he is a substantial
beneficiary under the will and a putative heir under intestacy law, making
him an ‘interested person’ in every sense of the term.” Id. He also argued
genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	existed 	as 	to 	undue 	influence 	and
testamentary capacity. 	Id.
We held the Delbrouck appellant—the decedent’s son—qualified as an
5 That the Son’s creditor status is contingent on a successful outcome in a
subsequent creditor claim does not deprive him of standing. A trial-within-a-trial
is unnecessary to determine that claim’s actual viability of that claim; it is
sufficiently colorable that he has at least the bare constitutional minimum to
appear in court in this case. Indeed, if it were not so colorable and were instead
frivolous, the Siblings could rest easy, knowing they would take the entirety of
the holding company assets under the January 2022 Will if the Son succeeds in
his challenge to the December 2022 Will.

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“interested 	person” 	within 	the 	meaning 	of 	section 	733.109(1) 	(and
733.201(23)), because he was both a beneficiary under the will and an heir
at law, and because he would have been affected by the outcome of the
revocation 	petition. 	Specifically, 	a 	successful 	revocation 	would 	have
subjected 	the 	personal 	representative 	to 	removal 	under 	section
733.504(10). 	Id. at 933. 	We further explained “[t]here is no requirement
in the plain language of the statute that appellant prove his share of the
estate would have been different if his revocation attempt succeeded.” 	Id.
Here, as in Delbrouck, although the Son did not present evidence
quantifying the precise tax benefit which he might obtain, he was not
required “to prove his share of the estate would have been different if his
revocation attempt succeed[s].” Id. He was required to prove what section
731.201(23)’s 	plain 	language 	and 	our 	caselaw 	interpreting 	section
731.201(23) require—that he would be “affected” by the outcome. 	Under
the unique facts here, he showed as much.
D. On 	remand, 	the 	testamentary 	capacity 	question 	should
proceed to trial
The Son also raised a challenge to the Decedent’s testamentary capacity
to execute the December 2022 Will. 	The Siblings did not move for
summary judgment on that question. At oral argument, both parties noted
that if we reversed on the standing question, they would proceed to trial
on the question of testamentary capacity.
We 	summarily 	affirm 	the 	trial 	court’s 	grant 	of 	partial 	summary
judgment on the question of whether the execution of the December 2022
Will complied with the strictures of section 732.502, Florida Statutes
(2022). 	We write to explain the impact of this affirmance on the issues at
trial on remand, and in particular the question of testamentary capacity.
The question of testamentary capacity, or a sound mind, is a separate
question from whether a will is validly executed in accordance with the
strictures of section 732.502. Section 732.501 provides “[a]ny person who
is of sound mind and who is either 18 or more years of age or an
emancipated minor may make a will.” 	§ 732.501, Fla. Stat. (2022).
To 	execute 	a 	valid 	will, 	the 	testator 	need 	only 	have
testamentary capacity (i.e. be of “sound mind”) which has
been described as having the ability to mentally understand
in a general way (1) the nature and extent of the property to
be disposed of, (2) the testator’s relation to those who would
naturally claim a substantial benefit from his will, and (3) a

12
general understanding of the practical effect of the will as
executed.
Raimi v. Furlong, 702 So. 2d 1273, 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see also In re
Bailey’s Estate, 122 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) (holding the
same); In re Wilmott’s Estate, 66 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1953) (“The making
of a will does not depend upon a sound body but upon a sound mind.”).
“Testamentary capacity is determined only by the testator’s mental
capacity at the time he executed his will.” Jervis v. Tucker, 82 So. 3d 126,
128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Hendershaw v. Estate of Hendershaw,
763 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)); see also Skelton v. Davis, 133
So. 	2d 	432, 	435 	(Fla. 	3d 	DCA 	1961) 	(“The 	principle 	of 	law 	that
testamentary capacity is to be judged solely at the time of the execution of
the will is irrefragable and no authority need be cited.”).
Valid execution, provided by section 732.502, is a separate concept that
involves compliance with statutory procedural formalities for creating a
legally enforceable will.6 	To properly execute a will, it must be signed at
the end by the testator and in the presence of two witnesses who witness
the execution (or an acknowledgement by the testator) in the presence of
each other. See § 732.502(1), Fla. Stat. (2022); see also Allen v. Dalk, 826
So. 2d 245, 247 (Fla. 2002) (“A testator must strictly comply with these
statutory requirements in order to create a valid will.”); Manson v. Hayes,
539 So. 2d 27, 28 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (noting that “[t]he purpose of the
statute is to assure not only that the signature on the will is that of the
testator, but to provide reasonable assurance of the circumstances under
which the signature was affixed to the document”); In re Swanson’s Estate,
397 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (explaining that “[e]ach of the
subsections [of section 732.502] deals with some procedural formality
required 	for 	a 	valid 	execution” 	and 	“does 	not 	purport 	to 	deal 	with
substantive considerations such as mental capacity or undue influence”).
Both 	requirements—testamentary 	capacity 	and 	proper 	execution—
must be satisfied independently for a will to be valid, and a will can fail for
lack of either element even if the other is present. 	See, e.g., Tendler v.
Johnson, 332 So. 3d 521, 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“The probate of a will
signifies that a will was properly executed and witnessed, and that the
testator had testamentary capacity when executing the will . . . [t]he use
of the word ‘validity’ in chapter 733 pertains to the compliance with the
technical requirements of execution—signatures and witnesses—and to
6 Again, this is the question on which the trial court granted partial summary
judgment, which we summarily affirm.

13
the testamentary capacity of the testator—the required factors for a will to
be probated.”); Blits v. Blits, 468 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
(separately 	assessing 	issues 	of 	testamentary 	capacity 	and 	proper
execution).
Because 	we 	summarily 	affirm 	on 	the 	issue 	of 	whether 	execution
according to the strictures of Section 732.502 was valid, on remand, the
parties should proceed to trial on the separate question of testamentary
capacity.
III. 	Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the question
of standing and “interested person” status. 	The Son meets the threshold
for standing and is an “interested person” with the statutory ability to
challenge the December 2022 Will. 	We summarily affirm the trial court’s
grant 	of 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the 	question 	of 	whether 	the
December 2022 Will was executed in accordance with the strictures of
section 732.502, and remand for trial on the question of whether the
Decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute the December 2022
Will, and any other issues that may be appropriately raised by the parties
that are not inconsistent with this opinion.
In the consolidated appeal, the Son argues that if we reverse the
summary judgment order, we should also reverse the orders admitting the
December 	2022 	Will 	to 	probate 	and 	appointing 	the 	personal
representative. 	These orders were entered after summary judgment. 	In
light of our reversal above, we also reverse the orders admitting the
December 2022 Will to probate and appointing the PR Sibling as personal
representative.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
M AY and CONNER , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.