Miguel Barrera v. Denisse Rodriguez-Orengo and Carl Lillquist

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
MIGUEL BARRERA,
Appellant,
v.
DENISSE RODRIGUEZ-ORENGO and CARL LILLQUIST,
Appellees.
No. 4D2024-2661
[April 8, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward 	County; 	Keathan 	Briscoe 	Frink, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
062022CA007814AXXXCE.
Benedict P. Kuehne and Michael T. Davis of Kuehne Davis Law, P.A.,
Miami, and Joseph C. Madalon and Susan E. Lee of Madalon Law, Fort
Lauderdale, for appellant.
Yvette Rose Lavelle of Boyd Richards Parker & Colonnelli, P.L., Miami,
for appellees.
LOTT , J.
Miguel Barrera, Appellant and Plaintiff below, was involved in a motor
vehicle accident with Appellees. 	He sued for his injuries and asked the
jury for over $1 million in damages. 	The jury awarded him $20,000. 	He
now appeals, arguing that the trial court should have: (1) ordered a new
trial 	or 	at 	least 	ordered 	post-verdict 	juror 	interviews 	based 	on 	the
undisclosed litigation history of two jurors that came to light after trial;
and (2) awarded additur up to approximately $36,000, the amount of
damages 	that 	the 	defense 	conceded 	was 	reasonable 	during 	closing
argument to the jury.
With the benefit of oral argument, we reject his first argument and
accept his second. 	Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions
to award the requested additur.
I. 	BACKGROUND

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On November 17, 2021, Appellant Miguel Barrera was rear-ended by
Appellee 	Denisse 	Rodriguez-Orengo 	while 	stopped 	at 	a 	red 	light 	in
Pembroke 	Pines. 	The 	vehicle 	which 	Rodriguez-Orengo 	operated 	was
owned by Appellee Carl Lillquist. 	Barrera was transported by ambulance
to Memorial West Hospital, where he remained overnight. 	Appellant
thereafter underwent medical treatment, including therapy and orthopedic
visits, injections, imaging studies, and three surgeries. 	Appellant argued
that his past medical expenses exceeded $663,000, his past lost wages
totaled $78,880, and his projected future lost earnings were $567,120.
Appellees did not dispute that Rodriguez-Orengo rear-ended Appellant
or that Appellant’s initial medical treatment was reasonable. 	Instead,
Appellees contested causation as to the more serious injuries. 	Defense
expert 	Dr. 	Neil 	Schechter 	testified 	that 	Appellant’s 	complaints 	were
attributable to preexisting degenerative spinal conditions rather than the
collision. 	During closing argument, Appellees told the jury that $36,670
represented reasonable damages for emergency services, hospital care,
diagnostic testing, and chiropractic treatment.
During voir dire, the trial court instructed prospective jurors to disclose
any prior lawsuits in which they had been involved and emphasized
truthful answers were required. The court asked whether anyone had ever
sued or been sued. 	Juror McNabb responded as follows:
THE COURT: 	Okay. 	Anybody else sued or been sued? 	Ms.
McNabb . . . .
VENIREWOMAN MCNABB: 	Yes. 	Construction. 	A lien
turned into a very large case.
. . .
VENIREWOMAN MCNABB: 	And then a foreclosure.
THE COURT: 	Somebody did some work on your house, they
claim you didn’t pay them, they filed a lien?
VENIREWOMAN MCNABB: 	Correct.
THE COURT: 	And it ultimately ended up in foreclosure to
foreclose the lien?
VENIREWOMAN MCNABB: 	Correct.

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THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else, lawsuits? 	Back row,
number -- is it Nottingham?
McNabb 	was 	ultimately 	selected 	as 	jury 	foreperson. 	Post-verdict
investigation revealed McNabb had participated in at least seven lawsuits
in two counties, including appellate litigation in this Court, involving
defamation, 	real 	estate 	development 	disputes, 	lien 	foreclosures, 	and
tortious interference claims. 	In one such case, the record contained an
email from McNabb expressing strong cynicism toward the legal system
and describing it as slow, costly, and ultimately hopeless.
Another juror, Brenden, disclosed no prior litigation. 	Post-verdict
investigation revealed Juror Brenden and his spouse had been plaintiffs
in a 2015 inverse condemnation action against Broward County, although
they were two of many plaintiffs and nothing indicated they had been
actively involved in the litigation.
On May 16, 2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Rodriguez-Orengo
100% at fault but awarding Barrera only $20,000 in damages—$19,300
for past medical expenses and $700 for past lost wages—while awarding
nothing for future medical expenses, future lost earnings, or non-economic
damages. 	The amount awarded was substantially less than the damages
Appellees had acknowledged were reasonable during closing arguments.
Appellant moved for a new trial or, alternatively, for juror interviews
based on the nondisclosure of material litigation history by the two jurors
discussed above, and separately moved for additur, arguing the verdict
was materially below even the minimum damages the defense conceded
were reasonable. The trial court denied both motions, concluding that the
jurors’ 	failure 	to 	disclose 	their 	litigation 	history 	was 	not 	relevant 	or
material.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“The standard of review for an order on a motion for juror interviews is
abuse of discretion.” 	Sterling v. Feldbaum, 980 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2008).
“A trial court’s order on a motion for new trial grounded on juror
concealment 	of 	information 	is 	reviewed 	for 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion.”
Gamsen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 68 So. 3d 290, 293 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011).

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Orders granting or denying additur in motor vehicle negligence cases
are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Moore v. Perry, 944 So. 2d 1115,
1117 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). 	In evaluating additur, the trial court must
apply section 768.74, Florida Statutes (2024), which requires the court to
determine whether a verdict is “clearly excessive or inadequate in light of
the facts and circumstances.” 	Id. 	The earlier statute, section 768.043,
Florida Statutes (2024), “addresses remittitur and additur with respect to
cases arising out of the operation of motor vehicles,” while section 768.74
later “extended the capacity of a trial judge to order remittitur or additur
in any case where the trier of fact determines that liability exists . . . and
renders a verdict awarding money damages.” 	Id. at 1116. 	Regardless,
“[t]he statutes are substantially similar.” 	Id.
Appellate review of that determination is highly deferential. 	A ruling
under section 768.043 may be reversed only where it “fails the test of
reasonableness.” 	Arias v. Porter, 276 So. 3d 49, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Thus, where “reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action
taken by the trial court,” no abuse of discretion occurs. 	USAA Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Deehl, 400 So. 3d 689, 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (quotation omitted).
B. New 	trial 	and/or 	post-verdict 	juror 	interviews 	based 	on
nondisclosure of prior litigation history
“Post-trial juror interviews should be rarely granted and the sanctity of
the jury process as well as the privacy rights of the jurors themselves
should be closely guarded and protected.” 	Sterling, 980 So. 2d at 599
(quotation and citation omitted).
We have not stuttered: protecting the jury system is essential to the
integrity of the judicial process. “Maintaining the sanctity of the jury trial
is both critical and integral to the preservation of a fair and honest judicial
system. It is also significant to the trust and confidence our citizens place
in the judicial system.” 	Matarranz v. State, 133 So. 3d 473, 476 (Fla.
2013). 	“The privacy and sanctity of jury deliberations are critical to the
right of a jury trial.” 	Cave v. State, 476 So. 2d 180, 187 (Fla. 1985).
Improperly 	subjecting 	jurors 	to 	post-verdict 	questioning 	can 	chill 	“a
citizen’s willingness to participate in the sacred privilege and noble duty of
jury service.” 	Huether v. Baroni, 394 So. 3d 1245, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA
2024).
Nonetheless, “our appellate courts have reversed for jury interviews or
new trials, where jurors allegedly failed to disclose a prior litigation history
or where other information relevant to jury service was not disclosed.” De

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La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1995). For a new trial to be
warranted, the so-called De La Rosa test requires three things:
First, 	the 	complaining 	party 	must 	establish 	that 	the
information is relevant and material to jury service in the case.
Second, 	that 	the 	juror 	concealed 	the 	information 	during
questioning. 	Lastly, 	that 	the 	failure 	to 	disclose 	the
information was not attributable to the complaining party’s
lack of diligence.
Id.
“A party who believes that grounds for legal challenge to a verdict exist
may move for an order permitting an interview of a juror or jurors to
determine whether the verdict is subject to the challenge.” 	Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.431(h). 	Post-trial juror inquiry is “never permissible unless the moving
party has made sworn factual allegations that, if true, would require a trial
court to order a new trial.” 	Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So.
2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1991). 	“When the basis of a request for post-trial juror
interviews is a juror’s nondisclosure of information during voir dire, the
motion should demonstrate entitlement to a new trial under the three-part
test of De La Rosa . . . .” 	Rodgers v. After Sch. Programs, Inc., 78 So. 3d
42, 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).1
1. Juror McNabb
Appellant 	first 	argues 	that 	Juror 	McNabb’s 	non-disclosure 	of 	her
litigation history entitles him to a new trial or, alternatively, an interview.
We 	assume, 	without 	deciding, 	that 	Juror 	McNabb’s 	unusually
extensive litigation history was “material” under the De La Rosa test.
But we find that the other two prongs of the test were not satisfied
here.2
1 The parties did not cite, and we did not find, authority clearly delineating under
what circumstances a court should simply grant a new trial without juror
interviews versus when a court should grant juror interviews to determine
whether a new trial is necessary on account of apparent misconduct. Appellant
requests both as alternative remedies. 	We need not pass on the question; both
inquiries are governed by the De La Rosa test and as explained below, Appellants
do not satisfy that test.
2 Although the trial court ruled on materiality, an appellate court may affirm if
the result is correct on any basis supported by the record—the so-called “tipsy

6
As to concealment, McNabb did disclose some litigation history. 	She
disclosed “Construction, [a] lien turned into a very large case,” “and then
a foreclosure.” 	It was unclear whether she disclosed one litigation (a
construction 	lien 	turned 	into 	a 	very 	large 	case 	and 	subsequently 	a
foreclosure) or two litigations ((1) a construction lien turned into a very
large case, and (2) a foreclosure). Either of these would be consistent with
her proffered litigation history.
And after McNabb disclosed litigation(s) in response to the trial court’s
question, the trial court moved on to the next juror without following up
or pressing for additional litigation. McNabb may well not have understood
the trial court’s question(s) to require her to rattle off all seven of the
lawsuits that she had been involved in over a roughly fifteen-year period.
See Gamsen, 68 So. 3d at 294 (“The moving party must demonstrate
(among other things) that the voir dire question was straightforward and
not reasonably susceptible to misinterpretation. 	A juror’s answer cannot
constitute concealment, where the juror’s response about litigation history
is 	ambiguous, 	and 	counsel 	does 	not 	inquire 	further 	to 	clarify 	that
ambiguity.”) (cleaned up) (citations and quotations omitted); Rodgers, 78
So. 3d at 45 (same); Child.’s Med. Ctr., P.A. v. Kim, 221 So. 3d 664, 670
(Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“Here, the question was generic and imprecise. 	A
differently phrased question may well have resulted in disclosure. . . .
Plaintiffs’ counsel did not articulate to the prospective jurors that the
litigation history question sought disclosure of all prior legal matters.”)
(quotation omitted); Wiggins v. Sadow, 925 So. 2d 1152, 1155 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2006) (“No information was squarely asked for and concealed . . .”).
Turning to diligence—given the potential ambiguities in the trial court’s
questioning, 	the 	potential 	ambiguities 	in 	McNabb’s 	answer, 	and 	the
disclosure of one (or two) litigations, including a “very large case,” it
became incumbent on the parties to inquire further if they wanted to know
more about her litigation history. They did not do this at all. See Pembroke
Lakes Mall Ltd. v. McGruder, 137 So. 3d 418, 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“If
a juror mentions involvement in litigation and the complaining party does
not ask follow-up questions, the party cannot then obtain a new trial
because of undisclosed information relating to the litigation.”) (citation
omitted); Hoang Dinh Duong v. Ziadie, 125 So. 3d 225, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA
coachman” doctrine. See Carraway v. Armour & Co., 156 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1963);
Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999)
(explaining an appellate court will uphold a trial court’s ruling that “reaches the
right result, but for the wrong reasons” “if there is any basis which would support
the judgment in the record”).

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2013) (“Despite the rather brief inquiries by Ziadie’s counsel, Dr. Duong’s
counsel did not ask prospective Juror S or Juror F any follow-up questions
about their litigation experiences and failed to ask Juror M any questions
about any litigation.”); accord Taylor v. Pub. Health Tr. of Dade Cnty., 546
So. 	2d 	733, 	734 	(Fla. 	3d 	DCA 	1989) 	(“[T]he 	subject 	response 	was
ambiguous in nature and did not constitute, as urged, a misrepresentation
of 	fact 	concerning 	the 	juror’s 	involvement 	with 	a 	pending 	lawsuit;
moreover, the plaintiff’s counsel made no inquiry into this matter and did
not seek to clarify the ambiguous response.”); Birch ex rel. Birch v. Albert,
761 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“The fact that the defendants did
not follow up on the information Ferrer–Young provided is significant for
two 	reasons. 	First, 	because 	a 	juror’s 	answer 	cannot 	constitute
concealment, where the juror’s response to a question about litigation
history is ambiguous, and counsel does not inquire further to clarify that
ambiguity. . . . And second, because defense counsel did not diligently
discover this information.”) (citations omitted).
And we note as we have before, and now with all the more force, that
modern 	technology 	allows 	for 	quick, 	low-cost 	discovery 	of 	a 	juror’s
litigation history. 	Nine years ago, we noted that “while the diligence test
does not require counsel to discover the concealed facts prior to the return
of a verdict . . . counsel should check juror records without delay where
possible.” 	Child.’s Med. Ctr., 221 So. 3d at 671 (citation and quotations
omitted). 	We noted that we would consider “trial counsel’s failure to run
a juror’s litigation history as one of several factors under a due diligence
inquiry.” 	Id. 	Technology is better now than in 2017, and it will continue
to get better. 	Given the ambiguities cited above, trial counsel’s apparent
failure to use technology to explore Juror McNabb’s litigation history prior
to the verdict further supports our finding that they did not exercise
sufficient diligence.3
3 We noted more than a decade ago that
Our technology has come a long way in the past ten years since
Roberts [ex rel. Estate of Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So. 2d 334, 340 (Fla.
2002)], was decided. 	All counties now have their official public
records online, and court files are also online. 	A paralegal in the
courtroom can most likely search the public records of each juror
as the juror is called during voir dire. While such searches are not
perfect and would be able to pull records only in the county in which
the case is being tried, it could result in catching obvious non-
disclosures, such as the case here. 	The time may have come to
rethink how the courts handle juror non-disclosure so as to prevent
so much litigation over the issue and so many retrials of cases to
the detriment of the entire judicial system.

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In 	sum, 	because 	the 	concealment 	and 	diligence 	prongs 	were 	not
satisfied, Appellant is not entitled to an interview or a new trial as to Juror
McNabb’s nondisclosure of her complete litigation history.
2. Juror Brenden
Appellant argues that Juror Brenden’s non-disclosure of his litigation
history requires a new trial or, alternatively, a juror interview. 	But we
easily find that Juror Brenden’s nondisclosure was not material.
“Nondisclosure is considered material if it is substantial and important
so that if the facts were known, the moving party may have been influenced
to peremptorily challenge the juror from the jury.” 	Child.’s Med. Ctr., 221
So. 3d at 669 (cleaned up) (citations and quotations omitted). “The test is
not simply whether information is relevant and material in general, but
whether it is relevant and material to jury service in the case.” 	Roberts ex
rel. Estate of Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So. 2d 334, 340 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis
in 	original) 	(citations 	and 	quotations 	omitted). 	“Materiality 	must 	be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and [caselaw] does not mandate an
automatic new trial whenever there has been a nondisclosure of litigation
information.” 	Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
Juror Brenden was shown to have been one of about 188 plaintiffs in
an inverse condemnation procedure originally filed approximately nine
years before. 	He was not added to the litigation until a third amended
complaint was filed—approximately two years after the initial filing—
wherein dozens of new plaintiffs were added, apparently to satisfy standing
or similar concerns raised during the litigation, which was previously
being brought only by an association. 	See Michael Sherwin et al. v.
Broward County, No. CACE-15-013865 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2015). 	Nothing
indicates that Brenden had any active or meaningful participation in the
litigation. 	The trial court correctly held that disclosure of this litigation
would not have caused Appellant to exercise a peremptory strike.
We reiterate that juror interviews are the exception, not the rule.
Hillsboro Mgmt., LLC v. Pagono, 112 So. 3d 620, 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). That
rings all the more true today. In an appropriate case, the Florida Supreme Court
may wish to rethink the meaning of diligence under the De La Rosa test and
consider whether, in light of modern technology, counsel must investigate and
raise the issue prior to the jury’s dismissal in order to preserve such a challenge.

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Accord, e.g., Parra v. Cruz, 59 So. 3d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“[T]he
general policy is that [juror interviews] are disfavored.”) (citation omitted);
Huether, 394 So. 3d at 1249–50 (“Florida law has long recognized that
post-verdict juror interviews are strongly disfavored and should be rare . .
. 	In 	doing 	so, 	Florida 	law 	protects 	jurors 	from 	over-reaching 	and
discontented counsel that may seek to badger them following a verdict.”).
The De La Rosa test ensures that only where a material nondisclosure
occurs that could not and would not have been discovered with proper
diligence can citizens carrying out their venerated civic duty of jury service
be recalled, placed in the witness stand, and grilled about their purported
wrongdoing.
Because that test was not met in this case, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of the request for interviews and a new trial.
C. Additur
“Where there is undisputed evidence supporting an award of damages
and the jury fails to make such an award, it is error for the trial court to
deny a motion for additur.” Garrett v. Miami Transfer Co., Inc., 964 So. 2d
286, 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Appellees conceded at closing argument that certain items of
damages, totally $36,670.00, were reasonable and ought to be awarded by
the jury:
Fire rescue was $584. Emergency room was $14,000. He had
some 	diagnostic 	tests 	at 	various 	places, 	approximately
$2,000. The actual number is $1,907. Another place, $1,200,
1,219 to be exact. Dr. Haslett, because it’s reasonable for him
-- someone who has been involved in an automobile accident
to 	go 	to 	a 	chiropractor, 	$11,110, 	and 	some 	additional
diagnostic tests for roughly 7,850. 	That’s reasonable. 	I
believe 	that’s 	reasonable 	because 	it’s 	consistent 	with
what the actual evidence shows. 	It’s even consistent with
what Dr. Haslett says, which is why he didn’t see him after
February 10th of 2022 . . .
(emphasis added). 	Appellees cannot be heard to argue that such an
amount, which they told the jury was “reasonable,” was not “clearly
. . . inadequate in light of the facts and circumstances which were

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presented to the trier of fact.” 	§ 768.043(1), Fla. Stat. (2024).4
Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to enter an appropriate
amount of additur.
III. 	CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the request for juror interviews or
alternatively 	a 	new 	trial 	based 	on 	two 	jurors’ 	nondisclosure 	of 	prior
litigation history, but reverse for the trial court to enter an appropriate
amount of additur and any other proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
GROSS and C IKLIN, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
4 That is, of course, not to suggest any inherent fault with Appellees’ strategic
decision to concede these damages. The conceded damages were a fraction of the
more than $1 million requested.