Keosha Carn v. State of Florida

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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

KEOSHA CARN,
Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

No. 4D2024-1941
[April 1, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Howard K. Coates, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No.
50202 1CF010250BXxXxX.

Antony P. Ryan, Regional Counsel, and Louis G. Carres, Assistant
Regional Conflict Counsel of Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional
Counsel, Fourth District, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals her convictions for first-degree murder,
attempted first-degree murder, and attempted second-degree murder. She
argues the trial court erred in: (1) denying her motion to suppress the
seizure and search of her cell phone; (2) denying her full cross-examination
of a witness at trial; (3) denying her motion to preclude a trial on a degree
of homicide rejected by a prior jury in the trial of a co-defendant; and (4)
failing to recognize the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to
attempted second-degree murder. We agree with her on issue two and
reverse. We affirm on the remaining issues without further discussion.

e The Facts

The charges arose from a heated verbal confrontation between the then-
pregnant defendant, her aunt, and an acquaintance. Each party claimed
the other was the aggressor. The State argued the defendant was the

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aggressor. 	The defendant claimed she was threatened with the forced
miscarriage of her unborn child and acted only in defense.
During 	the 	altercation, 	the 	defendant 	phoned 	her 	co-defendant
boyfriend to seek assistance and protection. 	The co-defendant later
arrived and discharged a firearm, fatally striking a teenage bystander who
was unconnected to the confrontation.
It all started when the co-defendant boyfriend dropped the defendant
off at a client’s apartment to braid her hair. 	At the time, the defendant
was four months pregnant and had her two-year-old child with her. 	The
defendant’s aunt and the aunt’s sister gathered outside the apartment and
began 	hurling 	insults 	and 	making 	threats 	of 	violence 	towards 	the
defendant, urging her to come outside and fight them. This continued over
the course of several hours. While outside, the aunt wore blue gloves that
she admitted she wore during physical confrontations to prevent blood
from getting on her.
Phone records corroborated the defendant’s testimony that she made
repeated calls to family, friends, and her co-defendant boyfriend seeking
assistance with, or removal from, the situation. 	When she attempted to
leave at one point, the situation escalated, and she remained inside.
At trial, the State’s theory was that the defendant summoned her co-
defendant boyfriend to carry out a shooting. 	The defense responded that
the defendant’s calls were motivated by fear and an effort to protect herself,
her toddler, and her unborn child from an ongoing and escalating threat.
The aunt and her sister were key State witnesses. 	During cross-
examination, defense counsel sought to question the aunt about specific
statements 	she 	directed 	at 	the 	defendant 	during 	the 	confrontation,
including insults to lure the defendant outside and threats of physical
harm to cause the defendant to miscarry. 	The State objected on hearsay
grounds; the trial court sustained the hearsay objections. Defense counsel
made a proffer. 	The trial court excluded the entire line of questions as
hearsay.
• 	The Analysis
In her second issue, the defendant argues the trial court erred in
sustaining 	the 	State’s 	hearsay 	objections 	and 	limiting 	her 	cross-
examination of a key State witness regarding the verbal threats against
her, her unborn child, and her other minor child. The State responds that
the issue is unpreserved and is harmless.

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“Admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appellate review
unless there is an abuse of discretion.” 	Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218,
234 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Tundidor v. State, 221 So. 3d 587, 598 (Fla. 2017))
(citation modified). 	“However, the question of whether a statement is
hearsay is a matter of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal.” Id.
“Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. 	§ 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2023). 	Statements offered for
another purpose—such as to show their effect on the listener, to explain
subsequent conduct, or to establish state of mind—are not hearsay and
are admissible if otherwise relevant. 	See Smith v. State, 415 So. 3d 278,
291 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (“A recognized, non-hearsay use of an out-of-
court statement is to show the ‘effect on the listener.’” (quoting Blackwood
v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 407 (Fla. 2000)).
Here, defense counsel did not seek to introduce the aunt’s statements
to prove that the insults or threats were true. 	Rather, the questions were
designed to show what the defendant heard and why the defendant
repeatedly called for help. 	The statements were therefore offered for their
effect on the defendant listener and to provide context for the defendant’s
state of mind during the confrontation.
Florida courts have repeatedly recognized that statements offered to
explain a defendant’s conduct are admissible as non-hearsay. 	See Smith,
415 So. 3d at 292 (“[A] prior threat made to a defendant before the
defendant 	used 	force 	is 	not 	hearsay 	when 	offered 	to 	show 	that 	the
defendant feared that he or she was in danger of death or great bodily
harm.” (citation modified)); Jenkins v. State, 189 So. 3d 866, 869 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2015) (“When a statement is offered to prove what a person thought
after the person heard the statement, it is being offered to prove the
person’s state of mind and is not hearsay.”).
Excluding such testimony on hearsay grounds was legal error.1
Nevertheless, the State argues the defendant failed to preserve this
issue because defense counsel did not make an adequate proffer. 	We
disagree.
1 Because we conclude that the trial court’s ruling constituted evidentiary error,
we do not reach the defendant’s alternative argument that the ruling violated her
constitutional right to confrontation.

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Defense counsel advised the court of the specific statements to be
elicited from the aunt. These included the threat that she would cause the
defendant to miscarry and threats and insults about the defendant’s
toddler that were intended to provoke a fight. 	The trial court sustained
the hearsay objections categorically, ruling that all such testimony was
hearsay, irrelevant, and a more detailed proffer was unnecessary.
Where evidence is excluded as a class and the court suggests any
further proffer as unavailing, the issue has been preserved. 	See Seeba v.
Bowden, 86 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. 1956) (“[A] proffer is unnecessary where
the offer would be a useless ceremony, or the evidence is rejected as a
class, or where the court indicates such offer would be unavailing….”
(citation modified)).
Here, the substance of the excluded testimony was clear from the
questions asked and the proffer made. We are not left to “speculate about
the admissibility” of the witness’s answers to the questions. 	See Lucas v.
State, 568 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1990) (citing Salamy v. State, 509 So. 2d
1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Phillips v. State, 351 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1978)). 	The answers would have
been admissible regardless of whether the witness answered “yes” or “no”
to whether she made the threatening statements, and the jury would have
had an opportunity to assess her credibility in her answers.
And the error was NOT harmless. 	Under the harmless error standard,
the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not contribute to the verdict. 	State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129,
1138 (Fla. 1986) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Contrary to the dissent’s position, the State has not met that burden here.
The 	excluded 	testimony 	went 	directly 	to 	the 	defendant’s 	central
defense—that she acted out of fear in response to escalating threats,
including threats to her toddler, her unborn child, and herself. 	The case
largely turned on her intent in eliciting her co-defendant boyfriend’s help.
Although the dissent suggests the defendant did not assert a formal
claim 	of 	self-defense, 	the 	excluded 	evidence 	bore 	directly 	on 	her
explanation for making the calls the State relied upon as proof of intent.
The statements were offered not to justify the use of force, but to provide
context for why the defendant sought assistance and to allow the jury to
evaluate her explanation for the calls.
While not a classic self-defense case, the defendant clearly argued that
she was in fear for her life and that of her toddler and unborn child. 	For

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that reason, she made several calls asking for help, asking to be defended
from the threats made by her aunt and her aunt’s sister. 	These facts are
not so divorced from a self-defense case as to render the defendant’s intent
meaningless.
The dissent also suggests that the aunt’s credibility was not at issue or
made an issue by the defendant. 	Here, the statements by the aunt and
her friend were offered to establish the defendant’s state of mind in
requesting assistance in her phone calls. Was the assistance requested to
murder someone, or was the assistance requested to defend the defendant
from the threats and potential violence contained within them? 	Surely,
the aunt’s credibility was in question. But the real issue here was to show
the defendant’s reason for soliciting help in getting out of the situation.
By preventing the jury from hearing testimony that the aunt threatened
the 	defendant 	with 	physical 	harm 	and 	miscarriage, 	the 	defense 	was
deprived of presenting the critical context supporting the defendant’s
explanation of her conduct to the jury. 	Given the sharply conflicting
accounts of the confrontation and the importance of the jury’s assessment
of witness credibility, we cannot say there is no reasonable possibility that
the exclusion of the evidence affected the verdict.
“The unforgiving standard for harmless error in criminal appeals was
designed to protect the rights of the criminal defendant.” Judge Robert M.
Gross and David R. Maass, Harmless Error in Civil Appeals, 89 Fla. Bar J.
10, 18 (2015). 	Because the trial court erroneously excluded non-hearsay
testimony 	as 	hearsay 	and 	was 	testimony 	central 	to 	the 	defendant’s
defense, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and sentences and remand
the case for a new trial. 	Put simply, the State failed to bear its burden of
proof 	that 	there 	was 	no 	reasonable 	possibility 	the 	exclusion 	of 	this
evidence contributed to the jury’s findings.2
Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and remanded for a new trial.
M AY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
L OTT , J., dissents with opinion.
LOTT , J., dissenting.
2 We affirm on the remaining issues without discussion.

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I respectfully dissent. 	Any error was harmless, and I would affirm.3
The panel holds that the exclusion of the hearsay evidence was harmful
because the case turned on credibility and intent. 	But there is no
“reasonable 	possibility” 	that 	the 	exclusion 	contributed 	to 	the 	jury’s
findings on either credibility or intent. 	See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d
1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986) (“The harmless error test . . . places the burden on
the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or,
alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error
contributed to the conviction.”).
As to intent—this was not a self-defense case. 	The defendant did not
raise self-defense or argue that she was justified in soliciting her boyfriend
to commit murder. Rather, the parties argued at trial about what she had
said to her boyfriend. 	The state’s witnesses claimed the defendant had
explicitly asked her boyfriend to come “shoot… up” the place and made
explicitly violently threats.4 	The defendant testified that she did not
request violence and merely asked for (non-violent) assistance escaping
the situation.
In her briefing on appeal, the defendant argues that even if she had
made the “shoot… up” statements to her boyfriend,
3 I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in sustaining the hearsay
objection inasmuch as the proffered statements concerning the aunt’s threats to
the defendant were being offered for the effect on the listener rather than the
truth of the matter asserted, and that the argument was preserved.
But in addition to sustaining the hearsay objection, the trial court also appeared
to sustain the objections on grounds of relevance and Section 90.403, Florida
Statutes (although the transcript is not crystal clear). The state does not clearly
argue that the objections should have been sustained alternatively on those
grounds, so I will not address that point, but—for the same reasons underlying
the harmless error analysis I address in this dissent—there’s probably a good
argument that the trial court did not err at all when it sustained the objections
on those alternative grounds.
4 Rogena Clark testified that she heard the defendant tell her boyfriend to “shoot
that shit up.”
Shalontay Ashe testified that she heard the defendant tell her boyfriend “Get here
now, I want this bitch dead now.”
Latesha Lyman testified she heard the defendant yell “I want these hoes dead.”

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she was so threatened and fearful that she sought help from
[her 	boyfriend] 	to 	come 	shoot 	it 	up 	under 	pressure 	of
desperation and fear and not from a premeditated intent to
kill. 	The evidence would help support a defense that her
words were the reaction of a frightened victim rather than an
actual call for a premeditated murder.
In other words, the defendant argues that even if she had explicitly
asked her boyfriend (who, in fact, showed up armed and fired a gun) to
come kill them, she didn’t really mean for him to come kill them, and that
the excluded threats would have allowed the jury to find that she didn’t
really mean it. 	That argument is as weak as it sounds.
There’s no reasonable possibility that the aunt’s excluded testimony
could have contributed to the jury’s finding on the defendant’s state of
mind in soliciting her boyfriend to come “shoot that shit up” and make
“this bitch dead now.” 	If the defendant made those statements, her
murderous state of mind is not reasonably in dispute. 	There’s nothing to
provide “critical context” for.
As to credibility—the aunt’s excluded testimony was never offered to
show any witness’s credibility. 	Her testimony was offered to show effect
on the listener, as the majority holds. That concerns the defendant’s state
of mind, not anyone’s credibility. Allowing the statements for the purpose
of 	showing 	either 	the 	defendant’s 	or 	the 	aunt’s 	“credibility”—their
propensity 	to 	tell 	the 	truth 	at 	trial—was 	never 	argued 	below, 	not
meaningfully preserved in the briefing on appeal, and, in any event, is
entirely improper under sections 90.404, 90.608, and 90.609, Florida
Statutes (2023).
In sum, there’s no reasonable possibility the exclusion contributed to
the jury’s finding on whether the defendant explicitly solicited the “shoot…
up” or whether she did not. And there’s no reasonable possibility that the
exclusion could have caused the jury to believe that, if the defendant made
the “shoot… up” solicitation, her state of mind was anything other than an
intent to kill.
Any error was harmless. I would affirm the defendant’s convictions for
murder.
* 	* 	*

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.