Wenlei Mao v. Adam Smith and Tamara Smith

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
WENLEI MAO,
Appellant,
v.
ADAM SMITH and TAMARA SMITH,
Appellees.
No. 4D2024-2426
[April 15, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward 	County; 	Kim 	Theresa 	Mollica, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
062022SC004152AXXXNO.
Lane Weinbaum of Weinbaum P.A., Coral Springs, for appellant.
Adam Joshua Smith of BizTx Law, P.A., Parkland, for appellees.
C ONNER , J.
The Landlord appeals the order assessing attorneys’ fees and costs
against her and in the Tenants’ favor. The Landlord argues the trial court
erred in six ways. We determine that five of Landlord’s grounds for reversal
lack merit. 	However, we agree with the Landlord that the trial court
improperly 	awarded 	fees 	for 	legal 	services 	rendered 	to 	advocate 	the
amount of fees to be awarded—commonly referred to as “fees for fees.”
Thus, we reverse the “fees for fees” award, and remand for the trial court
to enter a revised attorneys’ fees award in the Tenants’ favor.
Background
The Tenants, husband and wife, filed a pro se statement of claim
against the Landlord in small claims court alleging eight causes of action.
Shortly after suit was filed, an amended statement of claim was filed
realleging the eight counts. The amended statement of claim included the
husband’s 	(an 	attorney) 	“Bar 	Number,” 	which 	was 	typed 	below 	the
husband’s 	name 	and 	above 	his 	address 	in 	the 	statement 	of 	claim’s
signature block.

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A six-day bench trial was conducted on the statement of claim. 	The
Tenants represented themselves at trial. 	The trial court entered a final
judgment in the Tenants’ favor on two of the counts, in the Landlord’s
favor on four counts, and in both parties’ favor on two counts.
After the final judgment was entered, both parties filed motions for
attorney’s fees and costs. The husband signed the Tenants’ fees and costs
motion. Subsequently, the Tenants hired a law firm to represent them on
their fees and costs motion.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the Landlord’s fees and costs
motion.
On the Tenants’ fees and costs motion, the trial court tentatively found
that the Tenants were entitled to attorney’s fees but wanted further case
law to determine if a party who is a licensed attorney appearing pro se was
entitled to fees. 	At a later entitlement hearing, the trial court found that
the 	Tenant 	husband 	was 	entitled 	to 	attorney’s 	fees 	and 	costs.
Subsequently, 	the 	trial 	court 	conducted 	a 	hearing 	to 	determine 	the
amount of fees and costs to award the Tenants.
Following two hearings to determine the amount of fees and costs to
award the Tenants, the trial court entered an order awarding substantial
attorneys’ fees to the Tenants for the work performed by the husband, the
Tenants’ post-judgment’s counsel, and the Tenants’ expert fee witness.
The trial court found that the lease’s paragraph 26, and sections 83.48
and 83.49(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2022), were broad enough to support all
attorneys’ fees and costs, including “fees and costs incurred in trying the
case to judgment and in litigating post-judgment motions, such as [the
Tenants’] defense against [the Landlord’s] claim for fees and costs, and [the
Tenants’] entitlement to fees and costs and the amount of such fees and
costs.” The trial court found that the Tenants were the prevailing party in
the action because the claim regarding the Landlord’s improper handling
and disposition of the security deposit, decided in the Tenants’ favor, was
the significant issue in the case. 	Additionally, the trial court found the
case 	was 	severely 	over-litigated 	by 	both 	parties 	and 	the 	Landlord
unreasonably delayed post-judgment proceedings on fees and costs.
After the trial court denied the Landlord’s motion for rehearing, the
Landlord gave notice of appeal.

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Appellate Analysis
The Landlord argues that the trial court’s order awarding fees should
be reversed because the lease language and the statutory provisions upon
which the trial court relied are not broad enough to support an award of
fees for fees. 	In response, the Tenants assert that the contractual and
statutory provisions are broad enough to support fees for fees as the
provisions authorize attorney’s fees for any litigation between the parties
under the lease or to enforce the statutory rights. 	Additionally, the
Tenants argue the trial court properly awarded fees for fees because such
fees are appropriate as a sanction for a party’s bad faith conduct.
When an award of attorneys’ fees is based on the interpretation of a
statute or contract, the standard of review is de novo. 	Carlin v. Javorek,
42 So. 3d 820, 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citation omitted). 	An award of
attorneys’ fees as a sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Kowallek
v. Rehm, 189 So. 3d 262, 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation omitted).
A claim for attorney’s fees has three components: “(1) time spent
litigating the case on the merits; (2) time spent litigating entitlement to
attorney’s fees; and (3) time spent litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.”
O’Boyle v. Town of Gulf Stream, 341 So. 3d 335, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)
(citing Mallas v. Mallas, 326 So. 3d 704, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)).
Attorney’s fees for litigating the proper amount of fees are referred to as
“fees for fees.” 	Id. at 338-39 (citing Mallas, 326 So. 3d at 705). 	“The
general rule in Florida is that attorney’s fees may not be awarded for
litigating the amount of fees.” 	Id. at 340; see also State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 833-34 (Fla. 1993) (limiting an attorney’s
fees award to time spent litigating the entitlement to but not the amount
of fees incurred).
A party can recover fees for fees in three circumstances: (1) if authorized
by the statute awarding fees, Michelis v. Nugent, 412 So. 3d 786, 790 (Fla.
4th DCA 2025); (2) where a contract is broad enough to encompass the
award, Isbell v. Bohrer, 414 So. 3d 204, 205-06 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025); or (3)
where the award of attorney’s fees is a sanction, Bennett v. Berges, 50 So.
3d 1154, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
The Tenants argue that the contractual language of the lease provision
authorizing attorneys’ fees, and the language of the statutory provisions
incorporated into the contract—sections 83.48 and 83.49(3)(c), Florida
Statutes (2020)—are broad enough to encompass an award of fees for fees.
The Tenants rely upon Waverly at Las Olas Condo. Ass’n v. Waverly Las
Olas, LLC, 88 So. 3d 386, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), where we determined

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that the contractual fee provision “provid[ing] for an award of fees for ‘any
litigation between the parties under this Agreement’” was broad enough to
support fees for fees. (second emphasis added). The trial court also relied
on Waverly in determining that the Tenants’ attorneys were entitled to fees
for fees based on the contract and cited statutes.
The lease’s paragraph 26 provides that “[i]n any lawsuit brought to
enforce the Lease or under applicable law, the party in whose favor a
judgment or decree has been rendered may recover reasonable court costs,
including 	attorneys’ 	fees, 	from 	the 	non-prevailing 	party.” 	(emphasis
added). 	Section 83.48 provides for entitlement to fees “in any civil action
brought to enforce the provisions of the rental agreement[.]” 	§ 83.48, Fla.
Stat. (2022) (emphasis added). 	Finally, section 83.49(3)(c) states that “[i]f
either party institutes an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to
adjudicate the party’s right to the security deposit, the prevailing party is
entitled 	to 	receive 	. 	. 	. 	a 	reasonable 	fee 	for 	his 	or 	her 	attorney.”
§ 83.49(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022) (emphasis added).
In Isbell, we held that the contractual fee provision in the noncompete
agreement was not sufficiently broad enough to support fees for fees.
Isbell, 414 So. 3d at 206. The fees provision in Isbell stated, “[s]hould any
litigation or legal proceeding be required by either party for the enforcement
of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of
reasonable 	attorneys’ 	fees 	and 	costs 	which 	they 	incurred 	in 	the
enforcement of this Agreement.” Id. We found that fees provision was not
broad enough to support fees for fees because the provision did not include
“any litigation” (with no modifiers) as the Waverly fee provision did, but
rather limited fees to the “enforcement of this Agreement.” 	Id.
Similarly, here, the lease’s paragraph 26 and section 83.48 limit fees to
enforcement 	of 	the 	agreement 	and 	statutes 	incorporated 	into 	the
agreement. Therefore, like in Isbell, those provisions are “not expansive or
wide enough to encompass an award of fees for fees.” Isbell, 414 So. 3d at
206. 	Unlike in Waverly, the contractual provision here does not provide
fees for “any litigation between the parties.” 	See Waverly, 88 So. 3d at
388. 	Likewise, section 83.49(3)(c) is not broad enough to support fees for
fees because section 83.49(3)(c) limits fees to the adjudication of “the
party’s right to the security deposit.” 	Thus, we conclude that the lease’s
paragraph 26 and sections 83.48 and 83.49(3)(c), are not broad enough to
authorize fees for fees.
Regarding an award of fees for fees as a sanction, the answer brief does
little to develop and support the argument. 	The order awarding fees
contains a clear statement by the trial court that both sides over-litigated

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this case, and the amount of fees incurred was incredibly disproportionate
to the damages amount sought. 	The order contains a finding that the
Landlord unreasonably delayed the fees and costs proceeding; however,
after our review of the order and the record, we conclude the trial court
did not implicitly award fees for fees as a sanction. 	Instead, as stated
above, the trial court explicitly awarded fees for fees after determining that
paragraph 26 of the lease and sections 83.48 and 83.49(3)(c), Florida
Statutes, were broad enough to support fees for fees. 	Thus, we find no
merit in the Tenants’ argument that fees for fees were awarded as a
sanction.
Conclusion
Because (1) the contractual and statutory language relied upon by the
Tenants is not broad enough to support entitlement to fees for fees; and
(2) fees for fees were not awarded as a sanction, we reverse the award of
fees in this case and remand for the trial court to enter an order without
an award for fees for litigating the amount of fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
M AY and L OTT , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.