State of Florida v. Dr. Bruce Kammerman

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
v.
LEWIS STOUFFER, JOSEPH BUFFALINO, JEFFREY REITER, ROGER
GORDON, COURTLAND TWYMAN, JEFFREY CLARK THOMSON,
BRUCE KARLIN, CRAIG TURTURO, DALE ANDREW GATLIN, BRUCE
KAMMERMAN, MICHAEL BENGALA, and SONJAY TRIVEDI,
Appellees.
Nos. 4D2024-0546, 4D2024-0548, 4D2024-0550, 4D2024-0551,
4D2024-0552, 4D2024-0553, 4D2024-0554, 4D2024-0557,
4D2024-0559, 4D2024-0561, 4D2024-0562, 4D2024-0563
[February 18, 2026]
Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit, Indian River County; Robert B. Meadows, Judge; L.T. Case Nos.
312012CF000882A, 	312012CF000882B, 	312012CF000882C,
312012CF000882D, 	312012CF000882E, 	312012CF000882F,
312012CF000882G, 	312012CF000882J, 	312012CF000882K,
312012CF000882L, 	312012CF000882M, 	312012CF000882N.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Kimberly T. Acuña, Assistant
Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Logan T. Mohs, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellees Jeffrey Reiter and Roger Gordon.
Antony Ryan, Regional Counsel, and Danielle Forté, Office of Criminal
Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, West Palm Beach, for appellee Joseph
Buffalino.
Tama Kudman of Kudman Trachten Aloe Posner LLP, Palm Beach
Gardens, for appellee Courtland Twyman.
Daniel 	Aaronson 	of 	Benjamin, 	Aaronson, 	& 	Patanzo, 	P.A., 	Fort
Lauderdale, for appellee Jeffrey Clark Thomson.

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Bernard Cassidy of Lubell & Rosen, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Bruce
Karlin.
David 	Weinstein 	of 	Jones 	Walker 	LLP, 	Miami, 	for 	appellee 	Craig
Turturo.
Shannon Day and Jesse Dreicer of Tassone Dreicer & Hill, Jacksonville,
for appellee Dale Andrew Gatlin.
Lance 	Richard 	of 	Lance 	P. 	Richard, 	Stuart, 	for 	appellee 	Bruce
Kammerman.
Michael Bengala, Pompano Beach, pro se.
Matthew Kachergus of Sheppard, White, Kachergus & DeMaggio P.A.,
Jacksonville, for appellee Sonjay Trivedi.
LEVINE , J.
The state appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion
to dismiss for “constitutional” speedy trial violations. 	We find that, when
applying the four factors of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the
defendants were not deprived of their right to a speedy trial under the
United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution. 	Specifically, as
to the second Barker factor—the reason for delay—the trial court erred
when it based its dismissal on the state’s alleged failure to comply with the
requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 	Competent
substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that
the state failed to comply with discovery and further its obligations under
Brady. 	Thus, we find that the trial court erred in granting the motion to
dismiss, and, as such, we reverse the dismissal and remand to reinstate
the charges and for further proceedings.
Facts
The case started in 2012 when the state filed a 114-count criminal
information 	against 	fourteen 	defendants. 	The 	information 	included
charges of racketeering, conspiracy, delivery of a controlled substance,
illegally 	prescribing 	a 	controlled 	substance 	by 	a 	practitioner,
manslaughter, worker’s compensation fraud, money laundering, and drug
trafficking. 	The charges included allegations that the defendants were
involved in a statewide “pill mill” operation that dispensed prescriptions
for controlled substances without medical necessity, such as oxycodone
and other types of opioids. 	As a result of these numerous charges, the

3
defendants filed multiple motions to compel discovery. 	In response, the
state filed forty supplemental discovery disclosures. 	Throughout the
prosecution, the state listed 535 witnesses and provided voluminous
documents.
During the proceedings, the defense sought materials related to (1) the
federal investigation of Detective Dilks, who signed a wiretap affidavit in
this case, (2) the state’s civil lawsuit against pharmaceutical companies
(“Big Pharma”) alleging fraud that caused opioid misuse, (3) information
relating to a confidential informant, and (4) the patient file for the alleged
manslaughter victim. 	The trial court ultimately found that the state’s
delays in producing these materials, especially those relating to Dilks and
Big 	Pharma, 	gave 	rise 	to 	a 	constitutional 	speedy 	trial 	violation 	and
dismissed the case.
I. 	Detective Dilks
In 	October 	2014, 	the 	defense 	moved 	for 	specific 	Brady 	material1
requesting 	confirmation 	that 	Detective 	Dilks, 	who 	signed 	a 	wiretap
affidavit in this case, was the target of an FBI criminal investigation. That
investigation was unrelated to the instant case. In October 2014, the state
responded that no Brady material existed. However, during a hearing the
same month, the state represented that information related to Dilks could
be disclosed after resolution of the investigation.
In August 2018, after the apparent conclusion of the investigation, the
defense filed a renewed motion for specific Brady material regarding the
Dilks investigation, representing that the state had advised it was not in
possession of any reports. The trial court granted the motion and ordered
the state to retrieve all reports related to the Dilks investigation from any
state or federal law enforcement agency. 	The trial court ordered the state
to provide Brady material to the defense, with disputed materials to be
provided to the court for an in camera examination.
In November 2018, the state filed an amended notice of discovery,
listing “Brady Material” and “Dilks Interviews.” 	In December 2018, the
parties and the trial court entered an agreed “gag” order regarding the
production of alleged Brady material. The agreed gag order prohibited the
defense from copying the documents or using the documents in motions
without court permission. 	At the conclusion of the case, the documents
1 Brady material is information favorable to the defense, either exculpatory or
impeaching, that is within the state’s possession or control. Dailey v. State, 283
So. 3d 782, 789 (Fla. 2019).

4
were “to be returned to the Federal Agency who provided it.”
In February 2019, the defense filed a motion for relief from the gag
order. 	In April 2019, the defense filed a motion for complete Brady
disclosure, detailing items that appeared to be missing from the Brady
materials provided by the state. 	The same month, the state responded
that Dilks had not been charged with any crime and that the requested
items did not exist, were not in its possession, or were not Brady material.
During a hearing in April 2019, the state represented it was waiting for
federal agents to comply with its requests for some of the materials. 	The
state had brought other materials for the court to review in camera
because the state believed the items were not Brady material. 	Thus, two
sets of documents were at issue: one provided to the defense and subject
to the gag order and a second set provided to the trial court for in camera
review. 	At a December 2020 status hearing, the trial court stated the in
camera materials were discoverable and it would issue an order permitting
disclosure. 	In July 2023, the trial court issued an order requiring the in
camera documents to be disseminated to the defense. 	In response, in
August 2023, the state produced three DEA reports.
During a hearing in September 2023, the trial court stated that the gag
order could now be lifted. 	The defense indicated that additional relevant
material was still missing. 	The state again responded that the items were
not in the state’s possession, no charges were filed against Dilks, and the
state had met its Brady obligations.
During an October 2023 hearing, the trial court stated the defense was
entitled to all Dilks investigation material. 	At the hearing, the trial court
acknowledged “there have been oversights by the Court causing delay . . .
.” In December 2023, the trial court issued an order granting the defense’s
motion for Brady disclosure compliance, directing that the state produce
specific documents. Three days later, in response to the trial court’s order,
the state filed an amended discovery response, providing a list of additional
witnesses and reports.
II. “Big Pharma”
In June 2018, the defense moved for specific Brady materials, seeking
“copies of the documents in its possession which support the allegations
made in the civil suit” filed by the Office of the Attorney General against
twenty pharmaceutical companies (“Big Pharma”) in May 2018 in Pasco

5
County.2 	That lawsuit claimed Big Pharma engaged in a deliberate effort
to mislead doctors regarding the safety of opioid therapy and employed
medical professionals “to endorse and promote the use of opioids.” 	The
Big Pharma litigation did not involve the defendants in the instant case.
Nevertheless, the defendants claimed documentary evidence from Big
Pharma would be potentially exculpatory for the defense.
During 	a 	hearing 	in 	November 	2018, 	the 	state 	argued 	that 	the
documents were not Brady material because the Big Pharma complaint
had nothing to do with the present case. In December 2018, the trial court
entered a written order granting, in part, the defense’s motion for specific
Brady material. The order directed the state to “review the materials relied
upon by the OAG [Office of Attorney General] in filing their complaint and
provide any Brady material to the Defendants on or before January 10,
2019.” 	In 	February 	2019, 	the 	state 	responded 	that 	it 	was 	not 	in
possession of any Brady material. 	The state maintained that, based on
“conversations 	with 	the 	attorney 	working 	on 	the 	civil 	litigation, 	the
material in that case is not Brady in our case.”
Thereafter, the defendants continued to seek Brady material relating to
Big Pharma, and the state continued to maintain no Brady material
existed. 	At a November 2023 hearing, the trial court stated it had
previously ruled in 2018 that the documents were Brady material and
needed to be turned over.
During a January 2024 hearing, the trial court heard testimony from
another attorney, whose private firm worked as outside counsel for the
state, in the Big Pharma opioid litigation. 	That attorney testified that the
case resulted in a “$3.1 or $3.2 billion” judgment for the state, following
settlements. 	According 	to 	outside 	counsel, 	a 	lot 	of 	the 	voluminous
discovery went to “damages or mitigation damages or the abatement plan,”
which had nothing to do with the instant case. 	The state reiterated that
the Big Pharma documents were not Brady material. 	The trial court
responded 	that 	it 	had 	previously 	ruled 	the 	information 	was 	Brady
material.
III. Additional Discovery
In March 2014, the defense filed a motion for further discovery, seeking
reports 	and 	medical 	records 	regarding 	the 	efforts 	of 	a 	confidential
informant (“CI”) to seek treatment at one of the clinics. In June 2018, the
defense filed another motion for disclosure and production of the CI. 	The
2 See State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2018-CA-00138 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct.).

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motion stated that the CI went to one of the clinics in an attempt to obtain
controlled substance prescriptions, but was turned away initially because
of an issue with an MRI and later because she failed the clinic’s drug test
by testing positive for cocaine. In July 2018, the defense filed an amended
motion for disclosure and production of the CI. In August 2018, the state
filed an amended notice of discovery identifying the CI’s name and listing
the CI as a witness.
In February 2019, the defense filed a motion seeking an order directing
the state to provide the CI files from the Indian River County Sheriff’s Office
and the DEA. 	At a hearing in April 2019, the state reported that the CI
file from the sheriff’s office was destroyed. The trial court ordered the state
to produce the DEA file within thirty days. In May 2019, the state filed an
amended notice of discovery providing the CI’s undercover file as well as
the CI’s “Information Letter,” “Agreement,” and “Criminal History.”
Further, in December 2012, the state filed an amended notice of
discovery, disclosing the autopsy report and death investigation report of
the victim named in the manslaughter count. 	In October 2013 and June
2016, the state provided multiple patient files to the defense, but did not
provide the victim’s file. 	During a November 2023 hearing on a motion to
dismiss the manslaughter count, the defense alleged that the victim
intended to commit suicide and that, if the medical examiner had had this
information, “he would have looked more into it.” 	The defense further
argued that the standard of care was impossible to prove because the
medical record no longer existed. In January 2024, the state produced the
victim’s medical records.
IV. Motion to Dismiss
In December 2023, the defense filed a motion to dismiss based on
constitutional speedy trial violations, alleging that the state had refused to
produce Brady materials concerning Dilks for over eight years. 	The
defense further alleged it was prejudiced because the CI had died, the
sheriff’s office had destroyed the CI’s file, and three other witnesses were
unavailable, including the medical examiner. 	According to the defense,
the CI’s testimony would have refuted Dilks’s wiretap affidavit, wherein he
stated that the CI could not get into a pain clinic because she did not have
a sponsor. 	The defense claimed the CI would have testified that the real
reason was because she tested positive for cocaine.
During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the defense also argued
that the state failed to produce Big Pharma Brady material. At the hearing,
the defense conceded there was no delay from 2012 to October 2014. The

7
defense also admitted that a predecessor judge “sat on the case for three
years and virtually did nothing.”
The 	trial 	court 	granted 	the 	defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	for
“constitutional” speedy trial violations. The trial court determined that the
state, through the gag order, had effectively prevented the defendants from
using discovery regarding an investigation of Detective Dilks, requested by
the defendants as Brady material. The trial court also found that the state
failed to provide any of the 215 million pages of discovery that were part
of the Big Pharma litigation. 	The trial court stated, and based its ruling
on the premise, that “not a single page of the Specific Brady requested by
the Defense [regarding Big Pharma], has been turned over by the State.”
Finally, the trial court found that the state failed to produce the CI’s file
and that it took the state nearly twelve years to produce the patient file for
the alleged manslaughter victim. The trial court evaluated the four factors
set forth in Barker, found that all four factors weighed heavily against the
state, and dismissed the information.
Analysis
The trial court determined that the state’s violation of the defendants’
constitutional speedy trial rights was due to the state’s alleged violation of
the defendants’ right to discovery and Brady. 	The trial court based its
decision mainly on the state’s alleged delay in producing information
relating 	to 	Detective 	Dilks 	as 	well 	as 	the 	state’s 	failure 	to 	produce
information from a civil suit by the state against Big Pharma. We find that
neither of these silos of information, whether related to Dilks or Big
Pharma, constituted violations of Brady and cannot be relied upon when
considering 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	defendants’ 	claim 	of 	a 	violation 	of
constitutional speedy trial.3
3 The issue presented below and now on appeal is the validity of any Brady
violation, which was the basis of the dismissal for constitutional speedy trial
violations. Brady violations are generally raised after a trial has already occurred.
See State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (noting that Brady
was “cast in the post-trial setting”). “Brady is not a discovery rule, but a rule of
fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation.” 	United States v. Beasley, 576
F. 2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing State v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)).
Finally, Brady “is not a pretrial remedy.” 	United States v. Scott, 524 F. 2d 465,
467 (5th Cir. 1975). 	It is important to note that no party on appeal raises the
issue of discovery violations in the context of Richardson. See Richardson v. State,
247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971); Snelgrove v. State, 921 So. 2d 560, 567 (Fla. 2005)
(“Richardson mandates that once a discovery violation is revealed, the trial court
must conduct an inquiry to determine the sanctions that should be imposed on
the violating party.”).

8
We review “whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial
has been violated” as a “mixed question of law and fact.” 	Niles v. State,
120 So. 3d 658, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). 	We defer to “the trial court’s
factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence,
while reviewing the court’s ultimate legal conclusions de novo.” 	Id. 	The
same standard of review applies in reviewing a Brady claim. See Sheppard
v. State, 338 So. 3d 803, 827-28 (Fla. 2022) (stating that a mixed standard
of 	review 	applies 	to 	Brady 	claims; 	factual 	findings 	are 	reviewed 	for
competent substantial evidence, and legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo).
“To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show
‘(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was
willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the
evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.’” Dailey, 283 So. 3d
at 789 (quoting Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011)). 	“To
meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, had the suppressed evidence been disclosed, the jury
would have reached a different verdict.” 	Id.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1,
section 16 of the Florida Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the
right to “a speedy and public trial.” The Sixth Amendment right to speedy
trial applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 	Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). 	Further, section 918.015,
Florida Statutes, also guarantees criminal defendants “the right to a
speedy trial.”4
In the seminal case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court articulated four factors in 	determining
whether 	a 	criminal 	defendant 	has 	been 	deprived 	of 	his 	right 	to
constitutional speedy trial. 	The court is to look at the “[l]ength of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.” 	Id. 	The “balancing test necessarily compels
courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Id. All of these
4 Effective July 1, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court amended the speedy trial
rule. In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Crim. Proc. 3.191, 411 So. 3d 385 (Fla. 2025).
The speedy trial rule now starts from the date formal charges are filed rather than
from the date of arrest. 	Id. at 386. 	Dismissals under this rule will be without
prejudice unless a defendant’s constitutional right to speedy trial has been
violated, which would then require a dismissal with prejudice. Id.

9
factors “are related factors and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant.” 	Id. at 533. 	Barker concluded
that the “only possible remedy” for a constitutional speedy trial violation
is dismissal of all charges with prejudice. Id. at 522.5 Thus, the trial court
in the instant case dismissed all counts in the information.6
I. 	Length of Delay
The length of the delay is the first factor in Barker to consider. 	“[T]he
length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 	Id. at 530-31. 	A longer
delay can be justified for serious, complex charges. 	Id. at 531. 	However,
delays 	approaching 	one 	year 	are 	generally 	deemed 	“presumptively
prejudicial.” 	Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992).
However, “‘[p]resumptively prejudicial’ is not the same as ‘conclusively
prejudicial.’” Szembruch v. State, 910 So. 2d 372, 377 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
(finding no violation of constitutional speedy trial where both parties were
partially responsible for the eleven-year delay in bringing the defendant to
trial). Here, the delay from the filing of the information in June 2012 until
the hearing on the motion to dismiss in January 2024 is a sufficient time
of delay to consider the delay “presumptively prejudicial and require an
inquiry.” 	Id. 	at 	375. 	Once 	the 	delay 	is 	considered 	presumptively
prejudicial, then it becomes necessary to consider the other Barker factors.
II. Reason for Delay
The second factor to consider in Barker is the reason for the delay. 	If
the delay of trial is “deliberate” to “hamper the defense,” then this factor
5 Dismissal as the only possible remedy has drawn criticism from constitutional
scholars. 	“The Framers’ remedial system for constitutional wrongs was based
solidly on punitive damages, not exclusions as the ‘only possible remedy.’ Until
speedy trial discourse takes account of all this, glib judicial pronouncements
about dismissal should not command the respect of thoughtful students of the
Constitution.” 	Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J.
641, 677 (1996).
6 Although dismissal is “the only possible remedy” for violation of constitutional
speedy trial, see Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (quoting Barker,
407 U.S. at 522), even if the trial court had viewed this case through the lens of
discovery violations, dismissal would still be considered “an extreme sanction
and, therefore, should be used with caution, and only when a lesser sanction
would not achieve the desired result.” State v. Lamm, 945 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla.
4th DCA 2007) (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(n)(1).

10
would weigh heavily against the state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Negligence
or overcrowded courts are weighed less heavily as being a more neutral
reason. 	Id. 	Valid reasons such as missing witnesses or a complex case
can justify a delay. 	State v. Bonamy, 409 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 5th DCA
1982). 	Pretrial delay is “both inevitable and wholly justifiable.” 	Doggett,
505 U.S. at 656. 	For example, the prosecution “may need time to . . .
oppose [the accused’s] pretrial motions.” 	Id.
The trial court in its dismissal order found that “[t]he State was the
primary reason for the delay, as they continuously failed to abide by their
discovery obligations.” 	The trial court’s order relied mainly on the delays
related to Dilks and Big Pharma, as well as delays related to a confidential
informant and the alleged manslaughter victim. 	The state responds that
much of the delay was related to the state’s successful interlocutory appeal
of an adverse suppression motion, the period of time that passed when the
trial court was to conduct an in camera review of materials and issue a
ruling, and finally the years that the defense requested Brady materials
related to Dilks and Big Pharma.
We find that the trial court erred in finding that the state failed to
comply with its discovery obligations and specifically its obligations under
Brady. 	The delay was due, in part, to the lengthy discovery in a complex
case which involved 114 counts against fourteen defendants. In response
to numerous discovery requests, the state provided at least forty discovery
responses and a witness list of 535 witnesses. 	A delay can be justified
where 	it 	is 	“principally 	attributable 	to 	a 	lengthy 	discovery 	process
necessitated by the nature of the investigation and the breadth of [the
defendant’s] discovery requests.” United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558,
639 (10th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Johnson, 990 F.3d 661, 670
(8th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he heavy discovery in this case mitigates the delay’s
length.”). 	The record does not contain competent substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that the reason for the delay was primarily
due to the state’s failure to comply with its discovery and Brady obligations
as to Dilks and Big Pharma and, to a lesser extent, the confidential
informant and the alleged manslaughter victim.
A. Detective Dilks
The trial court found that the state’s failure to provide materials relating
to Detective Dilks was one of the primary reasons for the delay and that
the state, through a gag order, effectively prevented the defense from using
any of this information for five years. 	The trial court’s findings are not
supported by competent substantial evidence. 	Dilks signed the affidavit
for the wiretap order in this case. 	At the same time, unrelated to the

11
present case, the FBI investigated Dilks and concluded the case without
any 	charges. 	In 	October 	2014, 	the 	defense 	sought 	Brady 	material
regarding the investigation of Dilks, and the state responded that there
was no Brady material. 	Following an August 2018 order, the state filed
Brady materials regarding Dilks in November 2018. 	Although these
materials were subject to a gag order, the gag order was agreed to by the
defense and the trial court. 	See Pagan v. State, 29 So. 3d 938, 957 (Fla.
2009) (stating that a defendant cannot complain about a decision he
specifically agreed to). 	Additionally, the trial court removed the gag order
following the defense’s request. Although the trial court did not lift the gag
order until September 2023—four-and-a-half years after the defendants’
request—the delay in issuing an order was attributable to the trial court.
In April 2019, the state provided additional documents to the trial court
for an in camera review, as permitted by the August 2018 order. 	In
December 2020, the trial court stated that the in camera materials were
discoverable 	and 	that 	it 	would 	issue 	an 	order 	permitting 	disclosure.
However, the trial court did not issue an order directing the state to provide
the in camera documents to the defense until July 2023, over four years
after the state provided the documents to the trial court for review. Thus,
the delay again was due to the trial court. Indeed, the trial court during a
hearing in October 2023 acknowledged “oversights by the Court causing
delay.” 	Following the July 2023 order, the state produced the documents
in August 2023. 	Because the state was not the primary reason for the
delay, this factor does not weigh against the state.
Additionally, the Dilks investigation was not Brady material because it
was not in the state’s possession until the federal investigation had
concluded, and the federal agency provided the state with access to that
information. 	Under Brady, the state is required “to disclose material
information 	within 	its 	possession 	or 	control 	that 	is 	favorable 	to 	the
defense.” 	Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 789 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
“The State is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of
evidence 	withheld 	by 	other 	state 	agents, 	including 	law 	enforcement
officers.” Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 520 (Fla. 1998) (emphasis added).
The trial court cannot compel the state to produce records from a federal
agency that are not within the state’s custody or control. 	See Barron v.
State, 990 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (finding the trial court properly
denied a motion to compel the state to produce DEA investigative files).
Because the state did not possess the Dilks investigative materials,
initially they would not qualify as Brady material. Thus, there was no legal
basis to require production of those documents. Therefore, the trial court
could not dismiss the case based on any alleged delay by the state in

12
producing the Dilks documents. See State v. McCutcheon, 495 So. 2d 931,
931 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (reversing dismissal of the information based on
an alleged Brady violation where no Brady violation was shown because
the videotape at issue was never in the state’s possession); State v.
Rodriguez, 483 So. 2d 751, 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (reversing dismissal of
the information where the state did not have an obligation to produce
witnesses 	for 	deposition, 	and 	consequently, 	there 	was 	no 	discovery
violation); State v. Carter, 29 So. 3d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
(reversing dismissal of the information based on the state’s failure to
comply with a court order to produce the CI, where there was no legal basis
to require production of the CI). Later, when the federal investigation was
completed, the Dilks documents were initially produced, in part, through
an agreed upon gag order, and then more fully after the trial court’s review
of the documents, and finally after the trial court directed the state to
produce specific additional documents.
B. Big Pharma
In May 2018, six years after the present criminal case commenced, the
state 	filed 	a 	civil 	lawsuit 	against 	Big 	Pharma, 	claiming 	that 	the
pharmaceutical companies engaged in an effort to mislead about the safety
of opioid drugs. That case was eventually settled. None of the defendants
from this criminal case were involved in any way in the civil litigation. The
defendants 	sought 	any 	Brady 	materials 	concerning 	the 	Big 	Pharma
litigation, specifically “copies of the documents in its possession which
support the allegations made in the civil suit.” 	The trial court entered an
order in December 2018, which directed the state to “review the materials
relied upon by the OAG in filing their complaint and provide any Brady
material to the Defendants.” 	In February 2019, the state responded that
it was not in possession of any Brady material, based on its conversation
with an attorney directly involved in the Big Pharma litigation.
Following the state’s response, the defendants continuously requested
Brady material, and the state repeatedly reiterated that it had no Brady
material. 	Only in November 2023 did the trial court now state that it had
ruled in 2018 that all the documents were, in fact, Brady material and
needed to be turned over. In January 2024, the trial court heard testimony
from 	outside 	counsel 	in 	the 	Big 	Pharma 	litigation 	who, 	once 	again,
represented 	that 	there 	were 	no 	Brady 	materials 	in 	the 	Big 	Pharma
litigation. 	The dismissal order found that the December 2018 order
required the state to produce 215 million pages of discovery documents in
the Big Pharma lawsuit and that, despite having over five years, the state
failed to produce a single page.

13
The trial court misconstrued the original order that required the state
to determine if there was Brady material that the state relied upon when
filing the Big Pharma complaint in 2018 and provide any Brady material
to the defendants. The state responded that there was no Brady material.
Thus, the state complied with the trial court’s order of December 2018. It
is important to note that order was not a general discovery order, nor did
it involve a larger span of time. 	It was merely an order to center on the
period of time when the state filed its Big Pharma complaint, and for the
state to provide Brady material as it related to what the state relied on
when filing the original complaint in 2018.
Brady material is not a general discovery order. 	Brady has a specific
meaning. 	Brady material is exculpatory material or material that can be
used for impeachment. 	Brady requires the state to “disclose material
information 	within 	its 	possession 	or 	control 	that 	is 	favorable 	to 	the
defense.” 	Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 789. 	“To establish a Brady violation, the
defendant has the burden to show ‘(1) that favorable evidence, either
exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed
by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was
prejudiced.’” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	Further, “[u]nless defense counsel
becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings
it to the court’s attention, the prosecutor’s decision on disclosure is final.”
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (footnote omitted). 	The
trial court misconstrued the order from 2018, believing that it required the
state to provide all materials from the Big Pharma case. 	The trial court
cannot “authorize a ‘fishing expedition’ . . . on the mere chance that the
prosecution [m]ay be derelict in” its duty to disclose. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d
at 555-56. 	Further, since the trial court did not review the materials, it
could 	not 	have 	determined 	that 	these 	materials 	constituted 	Brady
material. 	The trial court could have ordered an in camera inspection of
Big 	Pharma 	materials 	“if 	it 	is 	demonstrated 	to 	him 	that 	facts 	or
circumstances exist which support the inference that the mandate of
Brady is being violated.” 	Id. at 560.
Additionally, 	the 	defendants 	failed 	to 	show 	how 	the 	Big 	Pharma
documents were “material” under Brady. 	“To meet the materiality prong,
the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had the
suppressed 	evidence 	been 	disclosed, 	the 	jury 	would 	have 	reached 	a
different verdict.” 	Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 789. 	“[A] ‘reasonable probability’
[is] ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” 	Id.
(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)); see also United
States 	v. 	Agurs, 	427 	U.S. 	97, 	112 	(1976) 	(stating 	the 	standard 	of
materiality for undisclosed evidence is “if the omitted evidence creates a

14
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist”).7
Further, the materials being litigated under the designation of Big
Pharma could have been accessible by the defense. 	Although there was a
protective order filed at some time during the pendency of the litigation,
the protective order itself has a provision that states: “Nothing in this
Protective Order shall abridge the right of any person to seek judicial
review or to pursue other appropriate judicial action to seek a modification
or amendment of this Protective Order.” 	Thus, if the defendants could
have attempted to access these materials, then their failure to do so would
not be the fault of the state. 	Further, the defendants would appear to
know the information that the pharmaceutical companies provided to
them directly and what the defendants would have relied on. 	“[T]he
defendant’s ‘personal knowledge’ of the evidence claimed to represent a
Brady violation ‘would in and of itself defeat his Brady claim, since by
definition such evidence would not have been unlawfully ‘suppressed’ by
the State.’” 	Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 479 (Fla. 2018) (quoting
Gorham v. State, 494 So. 2d 211, 212 n.* (Fla. 1986)).
The record does not support the trial court’s finding that the delay was
due primarily to the state. Nothing in the record supports the trial court’s
finding that there were documents in the Big Pharma litigation that
constituted Brady material. 	Thus, the record does not support a finding
that the delay should be weighed against the state.
C. Additional Discovery
The dismissal order found that the state failed to produce the CI’s file.
The record does not contain competent substantial evidence supporting
this finding. 	The defense sought the CI file in February 2019. 	In April
2019, the state reported the CI file from the sheriff’s office was destroyed,
but that the DEA had a file. 	The trial court ordered the state to produce
the DEA file. 	The following month, the state provided the CI’s undercover
file and disclosed additional documents concerning the CI a week-and-a-
half later.
The dismissal order also found that it took the state almost twelve years
to produce the file of a patient whose death formed the basis for the solitary
manslaughter charge out of 114 charges in the information. 	However, at
most, any delay would potentially affect only those defendants charged
with manslaughter and would not affect the other defendants. 	Nor would
the delay affect the multitude of other charges.
7 The defendants also failed to show the Dilks records were material under Brady.

15
III. Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial
The third factor in Barker is whether the defendant asserted his right
to speedy trial. 	“Failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a
defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at
532.
The trial court stated that the defense could not demand a speedy trial
because the defense had not received the Brady material. 	The trial court
erred in finding that the defendants had complied with this Barker factor.
The 	trial 	court 	reasoned 	that 	the 	defendants 	could 	not 	affirmatively
demand a speedy trial because the state was the reason for the delay of
the Brady materials. But the state was not the reason for the delay, since
the state had in fact complied with the Brady request for Dilks materials
and complied by replying that there were no Brady materials in the Big
Pharma case. 	The defendants could have demanded a speedy trial, but
they never did. In fact, the defendants had affirmatively waived their right
to speedy trial.8 Thus, this factor would not weigh against the state.
IV. Prejudice
Finally, the fourth factor in Barker is the prejudice to the defendant. In
assessing prejudice, the court should consider the following interests: “(i)
to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired.” 	Id. 	Of these interests, the last one is the “most serious
. . . because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. “Ordinarily, a defendant must
show actual prejudice under the fourth Barker factor; however, where the
first three factors weigh heavily against the State, prejudice is presumed.”
Niles, 	120 	So. 	3d 	at 	666. 	Significantly, 	a 	“defendant 	who 	cannot
demonstrate how his defense was prejudiced with specificity will not make
out a speedy trial claim no matter how great the ensuing delay.” 	United
States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Doggett, 505
U.S. at 656).
If the first three Barker factors do not weigh heavily against the state,
8 Defendants Kammerman, Trivedi, Thompson, and Gatlin expressly waived their
right to speedy trial under the constitution and rule 3.191. Defendants Gordon,
Karlin, Twyman, and Bengala generally waived their right to speedy trial.
Defendants Buffalino and Turturo waived their right to speedy trial under rule
3.191, and defendant Reiter joined in motions for continuance.

16
then prejudice against the defendant is not presumed. 	See Niles, 120 So.
3d at 666. 	In this case, only the length of delay weighs against the state.
Thus, the defendants must show actual prejudice. See id. The defendants
have not met this burden.
The trial court stated that the defendants were prejudiced by the state’s
“deliberate calculated delays.” The trial court found that the state’s failure
to comply with its discovery obligations impacted the defendants’ ability to
prepare 	their 	defense. 	But 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	in 	making 	these
determinations and placing blame for the delay on the state without
competent substantial evidence. As stated previously, the trial court erred
in finding that the state failed to comply with its Brady obligations. Thus,
since the state complied with its Brady obligations, then the state’s actions
would not have prejudiced the defendants’ ability to prepare for trial.
Additionally, it is undisputed that the investigation against Dilks closed
without him being charged with any crime, and the Dilks records were
eventually provided. 	“[A]s long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence
in time for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant
of due process of law simply because it did not produce the evidence
sooner.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 2001). “There
is no Brady violation unless there is a reasonable probability that earlier
disclosure of the evidence would have produced a different result at trial.”
Id. At this juncture, before the commencement of trial, there is no showing
that any exculpatory or impeachment evidence was not provided to the
defense, or that its earlier disclosure would have produced a different
result. 	The same is true as to Big Pharma because, as previously noted,
the 	defendants 	would 	know 	the 	information 	the 	pharmaceutical
companies provided to them and if the defendants relied on it.
The trial court also found that the delay caused witnesses’ memories to
fade. 	However, “[a] defendant must do more than simply allege that
memories fade or that evidence may be lost. He must come forth and show
that some particular witness that would have been helpful to his case has
actually forgotten the facts or that some particular witness that would
have been helpful to his case has actually been lost.” Bonamy, 409 So. 2d
at 520. 	“[V]ague assertions of faded memory, without connecting it to a
material fact, are insufficient to constitute actual prejudice.” 	State v.
Jenkins, 899 So. 2d 1238, 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “[A]n accused must
offer some explanation of how a missing witness’ testimony would be both
favorable and material.” 	Id. at 1241 (citation omitted). 	Here, the defense
offered no such definitive explanation.
The trial court found that material witnesses had died, including the

17
medical examiner and a CI. 	However, these witnesses were not material.
“A material witness is one who possesses information ‘going to some fact
affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might
testify.’” 	Sardinas v. Lagares, 805 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
(quoting Wingate v. Mach, 157 So. 421, 422 (1934)). The medical examiner
was not a material witness, as another medical examiner could testify in
the original medical examiner’s place.9
The CI was also not a material witness. 	The defendants claim that the
CI’s testimony would have been offered to refute Dilks’s affidavit that the
CI was turned away from the pain clinic because she did not have a
sponsor. 	Rather, according to the defendants, the CI would have testified
that she was turned away because she tested positive for cocaine. Because
this drug test was administered by the clinic, the clinic would have this
information in its own records and would be able to offer this evidence
even without the CI’s testimony. 	Additionally, the trial court simply
accepted, without evidence, the defense counsel’s assertion that the CI was
deceased.
We find that State v. Joyner, 460 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984),
controls. 	In Joyner, the defendant’s constitutional right to speedy trial
was not violated because the defendant “failed to show actual prejudice
resulting from the delay.” 	Id. at 585. 	The defendant’s “assertion that his
defense was impaired by the intervening death of a potential alibi witness
was just that—a mere assertion, lacking in substance or particulars.” 	Id.
Like in Joyner, here the defendants offered nothing more than vague
assertions and speculation, which is insufficient to show actual prejudice.
Conclusion
We conclude that the state was not the primary cause of the delay, the
defendants did not assert their right 	to speedy trial, and finally the
defendants did not meet their burden of showing actual prejudice. 	As
such, the trial court erred in finding that the defendants’ constitutional
right to a speedy trial was violated. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s ruling
and remand to reinstate the charges and for further proceedings.10
9 Additionally, the medical examiner’s testimony would, at most, impact only the
solitary manslaughter charge against two defendants.
10 The state asks that the further proceedings be before a different judge.
However, the state has not pointed to any specific instances of bias or impartiality
that would necessitate remanding to a different judge. 	Thus, we decline the
state’s request. See Baker v. State, 349 So. 3d 443, 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
CIKLIN and S HAW , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.