Dune Allen Beach, Inc. v. Breen Realty LTD LP, et al.

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2025-0984
_____________________________
D UNE A LLEN B EACH, I NC .,
Appellant,
v.
B REEN R EALTY LTD LP, E RIC
AND DEBORAH W ILHELM
R EVOCABLE TRUST , BLB B EACH
H UT , LLC, JOHN and M ARY
H OWARD, V ICKI L. I NMAN , JOHN
K. C HANDLER as Trustee of the
John K. Chandler Revocable
Trust, M ARION R UCKEL
SKALICKY , STEPHEN & R HONDA
R UCKEL R EVOCABLE TRUST ,
SHARON JOYCE RUCKEL , and
PHILIP B OND R UCKEL ,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County.
Jeffrey E. Lewis, Judge.
April 15, 2026
R AY , J.
Dune 	Allen 	Beach, 	Inc. 	(“Dune 	Allen”) 	appeals 	a 	final
summary judgment for Appellees in this quiet title and declaratory

2
judgment 	action. 	At 	issue 	is 	whether 	Dune 	Allen’s 	original
conveyances gave Appellees’ beachfront parcels littoral rights.
Dune Allen argues that the trial court improperly resolved, at
summary judgment, a latent ambiguity in the deeds. Because the
record reveals a genuine dispute of material fact on that question,
we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I
The parcels in dispute are part of a 143-acre tract in Walton
County on the Florida Panhandle. E.C. Allen acquired the tract in
1925. After his death, his widow platted part of it in 1949 as the
Dune Allen Subdivision, but the parcels involved here were not
included in that plat. In 1956, Mrs. Allen conveyed the remaining
property, including these parcels, to Dune Allen.
Appellees now own seven parcels that Dune Allen conveyed
between 1964 and 1970. The original deeds described each parcel
by 	metes 	and 	bounds 	and 	fixed 	its 	southern 	boundary 	by 	a
measured call of 315 feet from a point beginning at Highway 30A,
which runs generally parallel to the parcels’ northern boundaries.
None of those deeds referred to the Gulf of Mexico,1 the mean high-
water line, or any other water boundary. Later conveyances in
Appellees’ 	chains 	of 	title 	used 	the 	same 	metes-and-bounds
descriptions.
This dispute arose in 2023, when Appellees filed these actions
to quiet title and obtain declaratory relief. They alleged that Dune
Allen’s original conveyances extended their parcels to the Gulf and
therefore carried littoral rights.2 Dune Allen denied that allegation
1 In January 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued an
executive order renaming the Gulf of Mexico the Gulf of America.
See Exec. Order No. 14172, § 4 (Jan. 20, 2025). Because the
transactions and other events relevant to this appeal predate that
order, we use “Gulf of Mexico” in this opinion.
2 In the proceedings before the trial court, the term “riparian”
was 	sometimes 	used 	broadly 	to 	describe 	waterfront 	owners.
Strictly speaking, however, “riparian” refers to rights incident to
land abutting a river or stream, while “littoral” refers to rights
incident to land abutting an ocean, sea, or lake. See Bd. of Trs. of

3
and 	maintained 	that 	the 	deeds 	conveyed 	only 	the 	property
described by their metes and bounds.
The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment.
After a hearing, the trial court entered final summary judgment
for Appellees. It concluded that the deeds contained a latent
ambiguity, reasoning that whether a conveyance to the 315-foot
mark transferred littoral property depended on where the relevant
shoreline boundary lay at the time of conveyance. The court then
considered 	extrinsic 	evidence 	and 	resolved 	that 	ambiguity 	in
Appellees’ favor. Dune Allen moved for rehearing, which the trial
court denied. This appeal followed.
II
We review the summary judgment de novo. Allstate Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Schroeder, 411 So. 3d 532, 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
Summary judgment is proper only when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). A genuine
factual dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” In re Amends.
to Fla. R. of Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
If the movant carries its initial burden to show the absence of
a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact, 	the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the
nonmovant to show that at least one such issue remains. Casey v.
Mistral Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 380 So. 3d 1278, 1285 (Fla. 1st DCA
2024). And when the nonmovant points to record evidence creating
such a dispute, the court must credit that evidence and draw all
justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255.
These principles underscore the limited function of summary
judgment. “Summary judgment is not designed to resolve disputed
the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512
So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987). Because the parcels at issue abut the
Gulf of Mexico, we use “littoral” in this opinion as the more precise
term.

4
issues of fact. It merely serves to identify whether an issue of fact
exists that must be resolved by trial.” Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
411 So. 3d at 534 (quoting CG Tides LLC v. SHEDDF3 VNB, LLC,
388 So. 3d 1081, 1084–85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)). Thus, summary
judgment 	“should 	not 	be 	granted 	‘unless 	the 	facts 	are 	so
crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law.’” Emerald
Coast Utils. Auth. v. Thomas Home Corp., 359 So. 3d 1239, 1250
(Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (quoting Bowman v. Barker, 172 So. 3d 1013,
1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)). And for that reason, “[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of
a judge.” Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 411 So. 3d at 534 (quoting
CG Tides LLC, 388 So. 3d at 1085).
The same principles apply when the dispute concerns the
meaning of a deed. Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of
law. See Am. Quick Sign, Inc. v. Reinhardt, 899 So. 2d 461, 467
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005). When a written instrument is reasonably
susceptible to more than one construction, and its meaning turns
on disputed extrinsic facts or competing inferences concerning
intent, summary judgment is generally improper. Holmes v. Fla.
A&M Univ. ex rel. Bd. of Trs., 260 So. 3d 400, 404 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018). To be sure, not every issue of intent forecloses summary
judgment. Fleming v. Peoples First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 667
So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). But summary judgment
remains improper when intent must be resolved from genuinely
disputed evidence or from competing reasonable inferences drawn
from the record.
III
Dune Allen does not challenge the trial court’s threshold
conclusion that the deeds contain a latent ambiguity. It argues
instead that, once that ambiguity was identified, the issue could
not 	be 	resolved 	on 	summary 	judgment 	because 	the 	extrinsic
evidence bearing on intent was disputed. We agree.
Appellees offered evidence supporting their view that the
original conveyances were intended to extend their parcels to the
Gulf 	and 	thus 	to 	include 	littoral 	rights. 	Their 	principal
documentary evidence included an unrecorded survey prepared in
1966 for the parcel now owned by the Ruckel Appellees (the

5
“Ruckel survey”) and a 1967 document Appellees describe as a
fractional plat. Those materials, together with other historical
documents, 	supported 	Appellees’ 	claim 	that 	the 	historical
shoreline boundary lay landward of the deeds’ 315-foot southern
calls.
Appellees 	also 	presented 	testimony 	that 	beachfront-lot
ownership was understood to extend to the waterline. Dr. James
Breen 	testified 	that, 	when 	he 	bought 	his 	parcel 	in 	1967, 	he
understood it to extend to the waterline. In his view, a “beach
house included the beach,” and that understanding was commonly
shared in the community. If credited, that testimony supports
Appellees’ interpretation of the original conveyances.
Dune Allen, however, presented contrary record evidence and
offered a competing interpretation. It emphasized that the deeds
themselves used fixed metes-and-bounds descriptions and did not
refer to the Gulf, the mean high-water line, or any other water
boundary. It also maintained that Appellees’ evidence did not
establish, as a matter of law, that the original conveyances were
intended to transfer littoral property. In particular, Dune Allen
contended that the documentary materials on which Appellees
relied were susceptible to a different reading—that they depicted
a gap between the parcels’ southern boundary and the Gulf.
That showing was sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Even on their own terms, the Ruckel survey and related materials
did not conclusively establish where the legally relevant shoreline
boundary lay for all seven parcels across all conveyance dates
between 1964 and 1970. Nor did those materials foreclose the
competing inference that the original deeds conveyed fixed-depth
parcels that did not reach the water.
Dune Allen’s surveying expert, Dave Dagostino, explained
why, in his view, the Ruckel survey and the document Appellees
describe as a fractional plat did not support the conclusion that the
original conveyances were intended to include littoral rights. As he
read those materials, they did not show the parcels extending to
the Gulf. With respect to the Ruckel survey in particular, he noted
a distinct space between the sharply drawn southern edge of the
parcel and the Gulf that could be understood as a beach lying
seaward 	of 	the 	lot 	line. 	The 	survey 	also 	marks 	the 	parcel’s

6
southern corners with physical monuments—an iron pipe at the
southwest corner and a conduit at the southeast corner—from
which he inferred that the Gulf did not occupy the parcel.
Dagostino also opined that the line labeled “high-water line”
on the survey did not represent the boundary between sovereign
and private lands. Because the survey separately depicted the “top
of bluff,” he interpreted that line instead as the toe of the bluff
marking the end of the open beach. The parties sharply disputed
the significance of that line and what shoreline boundary the
historical materials were meant to depict. We need not resolve that
dispute 	here. 	It 	is 	enough 	that 	the 	materials 	required
interpretation and did not settle the issue for summary-judgment
purposes. Whether that interpretation is ultimately correct is not
the question. Because the record supported it, the trial court could
not reject it on summary judgment in favor of Appellees’ competing
interpretation.
John (“Jack”) L. Turner, IV, whose parents purchased the
parcel now owned by Appellee BLB Beach Hut, likewise testified
that during his family’s ownership there was beach area between
the lot and the water, that people used that area and could not be
excluded from it, and that the Gulf’s waterline lay well south of the
parcel’s 	315-foot 	southern 	boundary. 	He 	explained 	that 	the
waterline did not correspond to the “high-water line” depicted on
the 	Ruckel 	survey. 	That 	testimony 	directly 	contradicted 	the
inference the trial court drew from the Ruckel survey about the
historic location of the waterline.
The trial court separately relied on Haynes v. Carbonell, 532
So. 	2d 	746 	(Fla. 	3d 	DCA 	1988), 	to 	resolve 	the 	ambiguity 	in
Appellees’ favor. But Haynes addressed a different kind of deed.
There, the court applied the rule that, when an ambiguity as to a
boundary 	line 	is 	caused 	by 	a 	called 	natural 	boundary 	and
conflicting called distances, the natural boundary prevails as a
matter of law. Id. at 749. Here, by contrast, none of Appellees’
deeds 	call 	for 	the 	Gulf 	or 	any 	other 	natural 	monument 	or
boundary. The deeds instead describe the parcels by fixed metes
and bounds and by distance.
Taken together, the record does not compel a single conclusion
about what Dune Allen intended to convey. A reasonable factfinder

7
could conclude either that the conveyances extended to the Gulf or
that they described fixed-depth parcels ending landward of the
beach. Because the record reasonably supports both inferences, the
issue was for the factfinder and could not be resolved on summary
judgment. See Goswami v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 1221,
1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (reversing summary judgment when
there was a conflict between contractual provisions and inferences
drawn from other facts, holding that “such conflicts cannot be
decided by summary judgment”); Owens v. MacKenzie, 103 So. 2d
677, 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958) (holding that when the essential
inquiry concerns the parties’ intent and the evidence is susceptible
of differing interpretations, it should be resolved at trial and not
by summary judgment); Pitts v. Fox, 591 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla.
1st DCA 1991) (reversing summary judgment when there was a
genuine dispute over the intent of the parties created by language
in the appellees’ chain of title that was not included in their deed);
and see Marlowe v. City of St. Augustine, 369 So. 3d 356, 366–67
(Fla. 	5th 	DCA 	2023) 	(reversing 	summary 	judgment 	when
conflicting historical evidence created genuine factual disputes
over whether the property was originally waterfront and over the
location of the water boundary).
IV
We do not decide whether Appellees ultimately will be able to
prove that their parcels extend to the Gulf or that they possess
littoral rights as a result. We hold only that this record did not
permit that issue to be resolved on summary judgment. The final
summary 	judgment 	is 	therefore 	reversed, 	and 	the 	cause 	is
remanded for further proceedings. In light of that disposition, we
do not reach the remaining issues raised on appeal.
R EVERSED and R EMANDED.
ROWE and LONG, JJ., concur.

8
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Michael J. Henry, Robert L. Kauffman, and Kayla M. Scarpone of
Dunlap & Shipman, P.A., Santa Rosa Beach; Mark A. McCarty of
Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Atlanta, GA, for Appellant.
D. Kent Safriet and Valerie L. Chartier-Hogancamp of Holtzman
Vogel 	Baran 	Torchinsky 	& 	Josefiak 	PLLC, 	Tallahassee, 	for
Appellees 	Breen 	Realty 	LTD 	LP, 	Eric 	and 	Deborah 	Wilhelm
Revocable Trust, John and Mary Howard, Vicki L. Inman, John K.
Chandler as Trustee of the John K. Chandler Revocable Trust,
Marion Ruckel Skalicky, Stephen & Rhonda Ruckel Revocable
Trust, Sharon Joyce Ruckel, and Philip Bond Ruckel.
Peter Ticktin, Ryan Fojo, and Brent Day of The Ticktin Law
Group, Deerfield Beach, for Appellee BLB Beach Hut, LLC.