Bowen, Bowen v. Costello, Waste Pro USA, Inc., et al

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-2983
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B ECKY JEAN BALDWIN B OWEN
and JACK W ENDELL B OWEN ,
Appellants,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JAMES C OSTELLO,
individually; W ASTE PRO USA,
I NC ., a Florida corporation; and
W ASTE PRO OF FLORIDA , I NC ., a
Florida corporation,
Appellees.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Columbia County.
Melissa G. Olin, Judge.
March 11, 2026
PER C URIAM.
A FFIRMED.
LEWIS and RAY , JJ., concur; KELSEY , J., concurs with opinion.

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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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K ELSEY , J., concurring.
I write briefly only as a gentle reminder to trial judges in
general that an order merely granting a motion is not a final,
appealable judgment. See Cardiothoracic & Vascular Surgery, P.A.
v. W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 993 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA
2008) (holding that an order that merely grants a motion for
summary judgment, without also entering judgment, is not final);
Ball v. Genesis Outsourcing Sols., LLC, 174 So. 3d 498, 499 (Fla.
3d DCA 2015) (explaining that an order that merely grants a
motion and does not contain language that enters judgment is not
a final order and that a notice of appeal from such order is
premature).
We generally look at three main parts of an order to determine
if it is appealable: first the heading or caption; then the operative
language, 	usually 	near 	the 	end; 	and 	finally, 	the 	concluding
language. 	Ideally, 	a 	final 	judgment 	will 	bear 	a 	heading 	that
includes the phrase “Final Judgment,” perhaps in the present
context “Order Granting [Party’s] Motion for Summary Judgment
and Entering Final Judgment for [Party].” Alternatively, there
could be one order granting the motion and another entering final
judgment. Here, the heading only states that the order is granting
a motion; and the notice of appeal states the appeal is from an
order granting a motion, so we must look further.
In 	the 	operative/adjudicative 	portion 	of 	a 	judgment, 	the
clearest form of judgment would not merely grant a motion, but
would 	go 	on 	to 	state 	affirmatively 	that 	“Judgment 	(or 	‘Final
Judgment’ 	or 	‘Summary 	Judgment’) 	“is 	hereby 	entered 	for
[Party].” Here, the order states that the motion for summary
judgment 	is 	granted—not 	enough 	to 	create 	an 	appealable
judgment.

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Finally, another excellent indicator of finality is the time-
tested send-off phrase, “[Losing Party] shall go hence without day,”
or words to similar effect. See, e.g., Diaz v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.,
227 So. 3d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (noting that an order stating
that the plaintiff “shall take nothing by this action” and “shall go
hence without delay” signifies that the judgment is final). Here,
the order states “Plaintiff shall take nothing from this Order and
the Defendant’s [sic] shall go hence without day.” This is helpful,
and is the only clear indicator of finality in the order. More clarity
would be better.
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For Appellants: Dale R. Sisco of Sisco Law, Tampa.
For Appellees: Donna M. Krusbe and James M. Kloss of Wilson,
Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, West Palm Beach.