Ivere Lee Hugger, III v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-1756
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I VERE LEE H UGGER , III,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Taylor County.
Gregory Parker, Judge.
January 28, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Ivere Lee Hugger, III, appeals his judgment and sentence for
robbery 	while 	armed 	with 	a 	firearm. 	While 	his 	appeal 	was
pending, Hugger moved to correct a sentencing error under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), claiming that his sentence as
a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) is unconstitutional. Hugger
asserted that the trial court committed an Alleyne* error when it
* 	Alleyne 	v. 	United 	States, 	570 	U.S. 	99, 	114–15 	(2013)
(reaffirming 	that 	“[w]hen 	a 	finding 	of 	fact 	alters 	the 	legally
prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily

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made the factual determination necessary to establish his PRR
status—specifically, that he committed the robbery within three
years of his release from a prior term of imprisonment. The trial
court denied Hugger’s motion. We affirm, concluding that any
error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
“A judgment or sentence may be reversed on appeal only when
an appellate court determines after a review of the complete record
that prejudicial error occurred . . . .” § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. The
error alleged here is harmless if the record establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that “a rational jury,” if properly instructed,
“would have found” the fact necessary to qualify Hugger for the
sentencing enhancement. State v. Manago, 375 So. 3d 190, 199
(Fla. 2023) (quoting Williams v. State, 242 So. 3d 280, 290 (Fla.
2018) (setting forth the harmless error test for Alleyne violations)).
When applying this standard, we consider “the weight of the
evidence in the record, including credibility concerns, and any
conflicting evidence” that bears on the fact in question. Manago,
375 So. 3d at 199.
On this record, there can be no reasonable doubt that Hugger
qualified for sentencing as a PRR. The State introduced a certified
copy of the Department of Corrections Crime and Time Report,
showing that Hugger was released from prison less than twenty-
seven 	months 	before 	he 	committed 	the 	robbery 	in 	this 	case.
Defense counsel also stipulated that Hugger qualified as a PRR.
Based 	on 	the 	uncontroverted 	evidence, 	any 	error 	in 	not
submitting the PRR determination to a jury was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Jett v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D2604 (Fla.
1st DCA Dec. 10, 2025); Hicks v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D2238
(Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 15, 2025); Dowdell v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly
D2236 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 15, 2025); McGlaun v. State, 420 So. 3d
634, 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025); see also Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 19
(1999) (“[W]here a defendant did not, and apparently could not,
forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted
to the jury”).

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bring forth facts contesting the omitted element, answering the
question whether the jury verdict would have been the same
absent the error does not fundamentally undermine the purposes
of the jury trial guarantee.”).
The judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
LEWIS, R OWE , and NORDBY, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Miranda Lee Butson,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.