27 Entrepreneurs Brickell LLC v. Florida Department of Revenue

2024-1717Fladistctapp1

Full text

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-1717
_____________________________
27 E NTREPRENEURS B RICKELL
LLC,
Appellant,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
R EVENUE ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Florida Department of Revenue.
Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel.
January 7, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
27 	Entrepreneurs 	Brickell 	LLC 	(“Brickell”) 	appeals 	final
agency 	action 	by 	the 	Department 	of 	Revenue 	(“Department”)
dismissing, with prejudice, its petitions for an administrative
hearing challenging a tax assessment. Without an evidentiary
hearing, 	the 	Department 	dismissed 	the 	petitions 	as 	untimely
because “[t]he deadline to file a petition for administrative hearing
is jurisdictional and missing the deadline bars the hearing of the
matter.” We reverse.
The 	notice 	of 	proposed 	tax 	assessment 	issued 	by 	the
Department was dated November 26, 2019. It provided a sixty-day
2
window from the date the assessment became final to contest the
assessment. 	See 	§ 	72.011(2)(a), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	(2019). 	But 	in 	its
petitions for administrative hearing, Brickell denied receiving it
until March 2020 when it received only one page of the November
2019 notice from a collector. In April 2022, Brickell received a
complete copy of the notice. As no hearing occurred, there is no
testimony or other evidence in the record to establish the date the
notice was transmitted or mailed. Brickell sought an evidentiary
hearing to establish whether it was afforded a valid point of entry
to the administrative process. Almost two years after Brickell’s
petitions were initially filed, the Department entered separate
final orders dismissing each petition with prejudice.
“An agency must grant affected parties a clear point of entry,
within 	a 	specified 	time 	after 	some 	recognizable 	event 	in
investigatory or other free-form proceedings, to formal or informal
proceedings under Section 120.57.” ADN Global, LLC v. Fla. Dep’t
of Revenue, 418 So. 3d 210, 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (quoting Henry
v. State Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 431 So. 2d 677, 680
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). Additionally, “[w]aiver is not a concept
favored in the law, and must be clearly demonstrated by the
agency claiming the benefit.” Id. (quoting Henry, 431 So. 2d at
680).
Because there was no hearing before the agency action and
because the validity of the agency’s order dismissing the petition
depends 	on 	disputed 	facts 	establishing 	the 	timeliness 	of 	the
petitions, we remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. See
§ 120.68(7)(a), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	(2019). 	“Further 	proceedings 	are
necessary under sections 120.569 and 120.57 to determine the
disputed facts on the timeliness of the petition, the date the notice
of 	proposed 	assessment 	was 	issued, 	and 	whether 	any 	tolling
occurred.” Mr. Comfort Furniture Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 335 So.
3d 193, 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (citing Campbell v. Dep’t of Health,
233 So. 3d 488, 489–90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)).
Accordingly, the action is R EVERSED and REMANDED for an
evidentiary hearing.
W INOKUR , M.K. THOMAS, and TREADWELL , JJ., concur.
3
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Jonathan 	W. 	Taylor, 	Moffa, 	Sutton, 	& 	Donnini 	P.A., 	Fort
Lauderdale, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and William Folsom, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-1717

27 ENTREPRENEURS BRICKELL
LLC,

Appellant,
v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE,

Appellee.

On appeal from the Florida Department of Revenue.
Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel.

January 7, 2026
PER CURIAM.

27 Entrepreneurs Brickell LLC (“Brickell”) appeals final
agency action by the Department of Revenue (“Department”)
dismissing, with prejudice, its petitions for an administrative
hearing challenging a tax assessment. Without an evidentiary
hearing, the Department dismissed the petitions as untimely
because “[t]he deadline to file a petition for administrative hearing
is jurisdictional and missing the deadline bars the hearing of the
matter.” We reverse.

The notice of proposed tax assessment issued by the
Department was dated November 26, 2019. It provided a sixty-day

window from the date the assessment became final to contest the
assessment. See § 72.011(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019). But in its
petitions for administrative hearing, Brickell denied receiving it
until March 2020 when it received only one page of the November
2019 notice from a collector. In April 2022, Brickell received a
complete copy of the notice. As no hearing occurred, there is no
testimony or other evidence in the record to establish the date the
notice was transmitted or mailed. Brickell sought an evidentiary
hearing to establish whether it was afforded a valid point of entry
to the administrative process. Almost two years after Brickell’s
petitions were initially filed, the Department entered separate
final orders dismissing each petition with prejudice.

“An agency must grant affected parties a clear point of entry,
within a_ specified time after some recognizable event in
investigatory or other free-form proceedings, to formal or informal
proceedings under Section 120.57.” ADN Global, LLC v. Fla. Dep’t
of Revenue, 418 So. 3d 210, 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (quoting Henry
v. State Dep't of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 431 So. 2d 677, 680
(Fla. lst DCA 1983)). Additionally, “[wlaiver is not a concept
favored in the law, and must be clearly demonstrated by the
agency claiming the benefit.” Id. (quoting Henry, 431 So. 2d at
680).

Because there was no hearing before the agency action and
because the validity of the agency’s order dismissing the petition
depends on disputed facts establishing the timeliness of the
petitions, we remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. See
§ 120.68(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019). “Further proceedings are
necessary under sections 120.569 and 120.57 to determine the
disputed facts on the timeliness of the petition, the date the notice
of proposed assessment was issued, and whether any tolling
occurred.” Mr. Comfort Furniture Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 335 So.
3d 198, 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Health,
233 So. 3d 488, 489-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)).

Accordingly, the action is REVERSED and REMANDED for an
evidentiary hearing.

WINOKUR, M.K. THOMAS, and TREADWELL, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

Jonathan W. Taylor, Moffa, Sutton, & Donnini P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and William Folsom, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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