Touchton-Williams v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-0677
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A LEXIS TOUCHTON -W ILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
James M. Colaw, Judge.
May 13, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
We are constrained to reverse on procedural grounds the trial
court’s 	order 	denying 	Appellant’s 	postconviction 	motion
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In a previous
appeal, Appellant successfully argued that the trial court must
attach to its order record excerpts conclusively refuting Appellant’s
claims and this Court found that there were several claims where
the trial court had not done so. See Touchton-Williams v. State,
402 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) Our opinion issued on February
5, 2025. On February 19, 2025, the trial court sought to comply
with 	our 	decision 	and 	re-entered 	the 	order 	denying
Appellant’s rule 	3.850 motion, 	this 	time 	attaching 	additional
records regarding the previously reversed grounds. However, our

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mandate in the previous postconviction appeal did not issue until
March 5, 2025.
An appellate court’s mandate is the procedural vehicle by
which jurisdiction transfers back to the trial court. Mathis v.
State, 963 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Until issuance of our
mandate, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order
complying with our directions. Accordingly, while we applaud the
trial court’s efficient compliance with our decision, and are loath
to “punish efficiency,” we must reverse the order because the trial
court 	did 	not 	have 	jurisdiction 	to 	enter 	it 	at 	that
time. See Leatherwood v. State, 168 So. 3d 328, 330 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015) (noting the court’s reluctance to punish efficiency); Scott v.
State, 156 So. 3d 9, 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). We are not persuaded
by the State’s argument that the trial court’s order denying the
motion 	to 	strike, 	which 	attempted 	to 	retroactively 	stay 	the
proceedings until this Court’s mandate issued, cured the issue,
because 	the 	lower 	court 	did 	not 	issue 	that 	order 	until 	after
Appellant had filed the appeal on March 21, 2025—thirty days
after the lower court issued the corrective order. “The general rule
is that an appeal of an order divests the trial court of jurisdiction
except to those matters which do not interfere with the power of
the appellate court to determine the issues which are on appeal.”
Kimmel v. State, 629 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The
lower court’s nunc pro tunc order within the order denying the
motion to strike—staying the rule 3.850 denial motion until after
we had issued out mandate to try to retroactively cure the error—
does not fix this issue. “Nunc pro tunc orders are issued to correct
clerical mistakes or refer to judicial acts which memorialize a
previously taken judicial act.” D.M. v. State, 580 So. 2d 634, 635
(Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “A nunc pro tunc entry is an entry made now,
of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as
to the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the
court, but to supply an omission in the record of an action really
had where entry thereof was omitted through inadvertence or
mistake.” Id. (quoting Erlacher v. Erlacher, 289 So. 2d 459, 460
(Fla. 4th DCA 1974)). The error at issue was not an act of omission,
but the creation of a new corrective order that was done when the
lower tribunal did not yet have jurisdiction to create that order.

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Under these circumstances—and without commentary on the
merits of Appellant’s arguments in the motion itself—we reverse
and remand for re-entry of the order with record attachments—
after 	our 	mandate 	has 	issued. See Fla. 	R. 	App. 	P.
9.340(a) (defining “mandate” and setting forth procedures).
R EVERSED and R EMANDED.
LEWIS, W INOKUR , and NEFF , JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized
motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
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Michael 	Ufferman 	of 	Michael 	Ufferman 	Law 	Firm, 	P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Anne 	C. 	Conley,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.