Grable v. Grable

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-3224
_____________________________
S TEVEN DOUGLAS GRABLE , II,
Appellant,
v.
M ELISSA GRABLE ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Anthony B. Miller, Judge.
February 11, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Appellant 	Steven 	Grable 	(the 	“Husband”) 	appeals 	the
equitable distribution of marital assets and the award of alimony
to Appellee Melissa Grable (the “Wife”). We affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
In this case, the Husband and Wife were married for 24 years
and have two adult children. Prior to the final hearing, the Wife
filed an updated financial affidavit showing a monthly budget
deficit of $2,714.20, based on an annual salary of $43,103.58 less
various 	expenses. 	Relevant 	to 	this 	appeal 	are 	her 	monthly
expenses 	for 	house 	repairs, 	automobile 	repairs, 	and 	health
insurance for the adult children. The Husband claims that the trial

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court abused its discretion by accepting the full amounts in her
affidavit for these expenses, as well as by adding $285.80 per
month 	for 	further 	“anticipated 	and 	unanticipated” 	expenses
related to the house, thereby awarding her $3,000 total per month
in durational alimony for 18 years (216 months).
The Husband also challenges the trial court’s acceptance of
her annual salary in the affidavit, considering she admitted that
her salary had increased during the course of the final hearing
(which was continued twice over a seven-month span). By the final
day of the hearing, the Wife admitted that her annual salary had
increased to around $46,456—roughly $3,350 more. Nevertheless,
the trial court calculated alimony based on the lower salary in her
affidavit.
Finally, 	the 	Husband 	appeals 	the 	trial 	court’s 	equitable
distribution, which he “receives” by not paying alimony during the
final three years of the alimony award. In short, the trial court,
after accounting for the Wife’s retention of the house and evenly
dividing the retirement accounts, concluded that the Wife owed the
Husband an equalizer payment of $103,157.97. To accomplish this
equalizer payment, the trial court reduced the duration of the
Husband’s alimony obligation by 34 months, from 216 months to
182 	months. 	(At 	$3,000 	each 	month, 	this 	reduction 	totals
$102,000.) The final alimony payment, in the 182nd month, would
also be reduced by $1,157.97, providing a total equalizer “payment”
of $103,157.97. Under this revised alimony schedule, the final
alimony 	payment, 	and 	the 	first 	credit 	or 	offset 	toward 	the
equalizer payment, would occur shortly after 15 years.
The Husband timely filed this appeal.
II.
This 	Court 	reviews 	a 	trial 	court’s 	rulings 	on 	equitable
distribution and alimony for an abuse of discretion. Briggs v.
Briggs, 336 So. 3d 1286, 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022); Abbott v. Abbott,
187 So. 3d 326, 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
A. 	Equitable Distribution

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The Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by delaying the Wife’s equalizer payment to him by more than 15
years as an offset of his final alimony payments. The Wife responds
that the alimony offset was “the most reasonable approach.”
In 1988, the Legislature created the equitable distribution
statute, section 61.075. Ch. 88-98, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at
§ 61.075, Fla. Stat. (1989)); Acker v. Acker, 904 So. 2d 384, 387 (Fla.
2005). It states that a court “may provide for equitable distribution
of the marital assets and liabilities without regard to alimony for
either party,” and further instructs that “a judgment for alimony”
should 	be 	considered 	only 	“[a]fter 	the 	determination 	of 	an
equitable distribution.” § 61.075(9), Fla. Stat. (2023). Accordingly,
“the trial court is first to do the equitable distribution of assets,
and once the assets have been equitably distributed, make a
determination 	whether alimony should be awarded.” 	Acker v.
Acker, 821 So. 2d 1088, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), approved, 904
So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2005). Thus, the equitable distribution statute
gives priority to the equitable distribution over an alimony award.
The statute also allows a trial court to effectuate the equitable
distribution by “order[ing] a monetary payment in a lump sum or
in installments paid over a fixed period of time.” § 61.075(10)(a),
Fla. Stat. (2023). But any such monetary payment “shall vest when
the judgment is awarded.” § 61.075(2), Fla. Stat. (2023). Moreover,
the “award shall not terminate upon remarriage or death of either
party, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, but shall be
treated as a debt owed from the obligor or the obligor’s estate to
the obligee or the obligee’s estate, unless otherwise agreed to by
the parties.” Id.
Here, the trial court’s equitable distribution in the form of an
offset of alimony payments does not comply with these statutory
mandates. First, the $103,157.97 offset is only fully realized by the
Husband if alimony continues, unchanged, for 18 years. Thus, the
distribution is dependent on the continuation of alimony; it does
not take priority over alimony, as required. § 61.075(9), Fla. Stat.
(2023).
Second, by being dependent on alimony, the distribution is at
risk of being reduced or eliminated. For example, the Husband
would not receive his full equitable distribution if alimony is

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terminated by either party’s death or by her remarriage prior to
the completion of the 18-year duration. See § 61.08(8)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2023) (stating that durational alimony terminates upon the death
of either party or upon the remarriage of the obligee). Alimony
could also be reduced based on changed circumstances. Id. This
would then reduce the Husband’s equitable distribution. As a
result of these possibilities, the equitable distribution award of
$103,157.97 as an offset against future alimony payments does not
“vest” immediately upon the judgment, as required. § 61.075(2),
Fla. Stat. (2023). It was therefore an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to fashion the equitable distribution to the Husband as
non-payments of his alimony obligation, which are subject to
modification or termination and therefore might never be realized.
Cf. Gudur v. Gudur, 277 So. 3d 687, 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)
(finding an abuse of discretion where the trial court’s equitable
distribution 	to 	the 	former 	husband 	was 	contingent 	on 	the
liquidation of the former wife’s business interest which might not
happen “during his lifetime”). We hereby reverse and remand this
issue to the trial court to devise a new equitable distribution
consistent with the above statutory provisions.
B. 	Alimony
The party seeking alimony has the burden of proving his or
her 	need 	for 	it, 	and 	the 	trial 	court 	must 	make 	factual
determinations about such need. § 61.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023).
An award of alimony will not be disturbed on appeal if it is
supported by competent, substantial evidence. Pflanz v. Pflanz,
332 So. 3d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).
i. 	Home Repairs and Maintenance
The Wife’s financial affidavit showed an expense of $383.00
per month for household “repairs and maintenance.” The Wife
testified and explained the need for a new roof, new A/C units, and
a 	shower 	repair 	and 	the 	estimated 	costs 	of 	each. 	She 	even
introduced pictures in support of her need for repairs, an insurance
letter requiring the new roof, and a written roof estimate. To reach
her estimate, she took the costs of these expected repairs and
divided the total by 5 years (or 60 months).

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“As a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or
anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support
amounts due to the lack of an evidentiary basis or the uncertainty
surrounding such future events.” Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So. 2d
1252, 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); see also Rhoden v. Rhoden, 295 So.
3d 864, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“Alimony should be based on
‘current existing circumstances, and not on possibilities.’” (quoting
Hedden v. Hedden, 240 So. 3d 148, 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018))). But
future needs and events that are “well-documented in the record”
may be considered. Nelson, 651 So. 2d at 1255.
Here, the Wife did not simply anticipate a need for future
repairs. She substantiated each current need with testimony and
documentation. Because it was reasonable for the trial court to
accept the Wife’s overall estimate of her monthly expenses toward
home repairs based on the above evidence, we conclude that the
trial court’s award of $383.00 per month was not an abuse of
discretion. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.
1980) (an action by the trial court is not an abuse of discretion if
“reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action”). We
therefore affirm this part of the alimony award.
ii. 	Automobile Repairs
Similarly, the Wife’s financial affidavit showed a monthly
expense of $398.78 for automobile “repairs.” She testified to the
recent repairs to the catalytic converters, the starter, and the rear
hatch of her 2012 vehicle. To pay for them, the Wife had withdrawn
$4,521.00 from the parties’ Northwestern Mutual bank account
and accepted money from her parents. She further described other
repairs her car needed with respect to her paint job, passenger side
mirror, and door locks. To calculate her total need of $398.78 per
month in car repairs, the Wife testified that she “took three years’
worth of repairs done to the vehicle” and added the estimated
repair for the passenger side mirror, before dividing it into a
monthly amount.
Once again, the Wife did not simply anticipate a need for
future repairs. She substantiated her monthly budget estimate
with testimony of actual repairs. Because it was reasonable for the
trial court to accept the Wife’s estimate of her monthly expenses
toward automobile repairs based on the above testimony and

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evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s award of $398.78 per
month was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm this part
of the alimony award.
iii. 	Health Insurance for the Adult Children
Next, the Husband challenges the trial court’s acceptance of
the 	Wife’s 	monthly 	expense 	for 	their 	adult 	children’s 	health
insurance premiums.
In general, Chapter 61 concerns itself with the protection of,
and provision for, the former spouses’ minor children. See, e.g.,
§ 61.046(14), Fla. Stat. (2023) (defining “parenting plan” as the
means to govern the parental relationships with the “minor child”);
§ 61.052(2)–(3), Fla. Stat. (2023) (authorizing courts to consider
the support and best interests of the “minor child”); § 61.13, Fla.
Stat. (2023) (generally providing for child support until the age of
18 and requiring a time-sharing schedule for the “minor child”);
§ 61.29(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023) (“Each parent has a fundamental
obligation to support his or her minor or legally dependent child.”).
Even the statutory requirement for health insurance as part of
child support is limited to “health insurance for the minor child.”
§ 61.13(1)(b), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	(2023). 	Only 	when 	an 	adult 	child 	is
“dependent” by being “incapable of self-support as a result of a
physical or mental incapacity that began before the person reached
the age of 18” does Chapter 61 authorize the obligation of support.
§ 61.1255, 	Fla. 	Stat. 	(2023). 	Thus, 	the 	needs 	of 	an 	adult,
independent child are not provided by Chapter 61 obligations.
Florida 	courts—including 	this 	Court—have 	routinely
concluded the same. See, e.g., Dennis v. Dennis, 184 So. 3d 656, 656
n.* (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (concluding that the former wife’s support
of the parties’ adult children is an improper consideration in
determining 	a 	need 	for 	alimony); 	Schwab, 	864 	So. 	2d 	at 	84
(concluding that the expenses of the parties’ adult children, who
did not need support, cannot be included when determining the
former wife’s need); see also Smith v. Smith, 320 So. 3d 971 (Fla.
5th DCA 2021) (concluding that expenses associated with an adult
child 	are 	not 	properly 	included 	or 	considered 	in 	awarding
alimony); Kunsman v. Wall, 125 So. 3d 868, 870 (Fla. 4th DCA
2013) (same); Quinones v. Quinones, 84 So. 3d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2012) (same); Coniglio v. Coniglio, 969 So. 2d 579, 580–81

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(Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (same). After all, “a parent has no legal
obligation to provide post-majority support for a child and cannot
be compelled to support an adult child indirectly through the
payment of alimony.” Dennis, 184 So. 3d at 656 n.1 (quoting Wolfe
v. Wolfe, 953 So. 2d 632, 636–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)); see also Rey
v. Rey, 598 So. 2d 141, 145 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (“There is no legal
obligation to support the non-dependent adult children of the
parties.”).
While the Wife’s intent to cover the adult children’s health
insurance premiums is “honorable,” Rey, 598 So. 2d at 145, the
trial court erred by including such amount in the Wife’s need. After
all, the trial court expressly ruled that the children are “living
independently.” We therefore reverse the trial court’s award of
$130.00 per month based on the erroneous inclusion of the adult
children’s 	health 	insurance 	premiums 	within 	the 	Wife’s 	need
calculation.
iv. 	Additional House Maintenance
Although the trial court accepted the Wife’s entire financial
affidavit showing a monthly need of $2,714.20, it awarded a total
of $3,000.00 per month in alimony. It based the additional $285.80
on 	“anticipated 	and 	unanticipated” 	expenses 	related 	to 	the
house—“property 	taxes, 	homeowner 	dues, 	electricity, 	water,
garbage, sewage, repairs, yard maintenance, pest control, etc.”
The problem with the trial court’s total award is that the
expenses it used to justify the additional $285.80 per month were
already included in the Wife’s financial affidavit. As a result, the
trial court duplicated these expenses for purposes of the Wife’s
need, which is an abuse of discretion. See Lin v. Lin, 37 So. 3d 941,
942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that an award of alimony that
includes amounts for expenses that have already been accounted
for 	constitutes 	an 	impermissible 	double-counting 	of 	those
expenses). In other words, there was no competent, substantial
evidence to support the additional $285.80 the trial court awarded
to the Wife. See Johnson v. Johnson, 297 So. 3d 700, 703 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2020) (reversing a $2,000 per month award of alimony where
the 	record 	showed 	a 	need 	of, 	at 	most, 	$1,171 	per 	month).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award in the monthly

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amount of $285.80 based on its addition of expenses that were
already accounted for in the Wife’s affidavit.
v. 	The Wife’s Income
Finally, 	the 	Husband 	appeals 	the 	trial 	court’s 	failure 	to
account for the Wife’s increased salary. The trial court relied on
the Wife’s financial affidavit showing an annual gross income of
$43,103.58, as well as pay stubs corroborating that amount. Her
testimony even supported that amount at the beginning of the final
hearing, on November 20, 2023. But on the final day of the
hearing—July 8, 2024—she testified that her gross income had
increased to around $46,456.00.
For the trial court to disregard the Wife’s concession during
the final hearing that her income was higher than listed on her
affidavit was an abuse of discretion. See Pflanz, 332 So. 3d at 1049
(the 	trial 	court 	abused 	its 	discretion 	by 	using 	“outdated”
information that conflicted with the former wife’s testimony). No
factfinder could reasonably conclude that the Wife’s gross annual
income 	was 	still 	$43,103.58 	for 	alimony 	purposes, 	when 	she
testified about her recent salary increases that brought her gross
income to around $46,456.00. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court’s 	finding 	of 	the 	Wife’s 	gross 	income 	as 	$43,103.58 	and
remand for a factual determination of her gross and net income at
the conclusion of the final hearing. The Wife retains the burden of
proof. § 61.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023).
III.
In 	sum, 	we 	reverse 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	final 	judgment
regarding the Husband’s equitable distribution, the Wife’s expense
of health insurance for the adult children, the Wife’s duplicated
expenses for house maintenance, and the Wife’s outdated income,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In all other respects, we affirm the final judgment.*
* Judge M.K. Thomas was substituted for an original panel
member after oral argument. She reviewed the parties’ briefs, the
record, and recording of the oral argument.

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A FFIRMED in part, R EVERSED in part, and R EMANDED.
RAY , KELSEY , and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Diane G. DeWolf and Nancy Mason Wallace of Akerman LLP,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Max Galen Factor and Eric D. Schab of Max Factor Attorney At
Law, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.