Sean Webking, Father v. Emily Webking, Mother

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2023-0771
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S EAN W EBKING, Father,
Appellant,
v.
E MILY W EBKING, Mother,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.
J. Scott Duncan, Judge.
December 31, 2025
P ER C URIAM.
Sean Webking (“Father”) challenges the trial court’s Final
Judgment 	on 	Paternity, 	Time-sharing, 	and 	Child 	Support 	on
multiple grounds. 	We reverse the final judgment as to the trial
court’s awards of child support and retroactive child support due
to its failure to make the required finding that the Father has the
ability to pay the ordered support. 	See Edwards v. Sanders, 622
So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (“Because the trial court failed
to find that appellant has a present ability to pay the child support
awarded, the trial court’s order must be reversed.”); Tinoco v.
Lugo, 342 So. 3d 845, 850–51 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“Absent any
findings about the parties’ net incomes or their respective ability
to pay, the order must be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.”).

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Additionally, the Father argues, as he did below, that the trial
court erred in requiring him to pay 60% of the costs of the child’s
extracurricular activities because that provision could subject him
to the expense of any extracurricular activity in which Emily
Webking (“Mother”) may unilaterally involve the child, without
regard to his ability to pay for such activity. 	We agree and
construe the provision as applying only to those extracurricular
activities that the parties agree upon pursuant to shared parental
responsibility. See Gordon v. Gordon, 63 So. 3d 824, 827 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2011) (construing a provision ordering the father to cover
61.47% of the costs of the children’s extracurricular activities as
applying only to those activities that the parties agree upon). 	In
all other respects, we affirm the final judgment.
The Father also seeks review of the trial court’s post-judgment
Order on Motion for Contempt and Income Withholding Order for
Support 	pursuant 	to 	Florida 	Rule 	of 	Appellate 	Procedure
9.600(c)(3). 	We grant the Father’s motion for review and reverse
the order finding him in willful contempt for failing to pay child
support pursuant to the final judgment because the contempt
order fails to recite the facts upon which the court’s finding of the
Father’s present ability to pay child support is based. 	See Fla.
Fam. L. R. P. 12.615(d)(1) (requiring an order finding the alleged
contemnor to be in contempt to contain a finding that he/she had
the present ability to pay support and to contain a recital of the
facts on which the finding is based); Browne v. Blanton-Browne,
199 So. 3d 565, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“If the order grants the
motion, it must contain findings that the contemnor had the
present ability to pay support and willfully failed to do so, and it
must contain a recital of the facts on which the findings are
based.”); Vazquez v. Vazquez, 827 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA
2002) (construing rule 12.615(d)(1) “to require the trial court to
identify the sources from which appellant could have obtained the
funds to comply with a prior order”).
Therefore, we AFFIRM in part, R EVERSE in part, and R EMAND
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
L EWIS, M.K. THOMAS, and LONG, JJ., concur.

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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Sean Webking, pro se, Appellant.
Jerry L. Rumph, Jr., of Brooks Law, Tallahassee, for Appellee.